

(b) *Naishā tarkēṇa mati rāpanīyā*; (c) *Tantvōpanishadam purusham pruchchāmi*; and (d) *Sāstra yōnitvāt*, which declare that Brahman is not possible of understanding through any faulty (or imperfect) sources. He holds that he is understandable only through the aid of the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēda*, which harmonises the meaning of every *Sruti* text relating to *Brahma-Mīmāṃsa* (*Sarva śruti samanvita Brahma-Mīmāṃsa*). It is therefore meet, he says, that a beginning should be made for *Brahma-Jignyāsa*.

Meaning of *Atha*.

Having thus laid the foundation for his doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*, Śrīpati next proceeds to interpret the word *Atha* as meaning *anantara*, i.e., *afterwards* or *then*. He says he does not accept the interpretation that it refers to *adhikāra*, which is the interpretation of Ānandatīrtha. Ānandatīrtha says that *atha* refers to *adhikāra anantaram*, i.e., *after a man is qualified for Jignyāsa*. Though Śrīpati, following Ānandatīrtha, quotes the Mangalaślōka, *Omkārascha atha sabdascha dvāvētau Brahmanō gurōḥ | kanṭham bhitvā vinir-yātau tasmāt māṅgalikāvubhau*, he interprets the word *atha* differently. Ānandatīrtha interprets the word in the sense of *adhikāra anantaram*, i.e., after the student has obtained the necessary qualification of being in a position to assimilate the knowledge relating to Brahman. Śrīpati says that because the word *Jignyāsa* is in the *Sūtra*, the word *atha* need not mean *adhikāra*, because *Jignyāsa* means *Vichāra lakṣaṇatvāt*, that is, *knowing after understanding*. That is, Śrīpati suggests that entering into understanding, for knowing is itself *adhikāra* and so there is no need for further *adhikāra*. From the word *Jignyāsa*, we have to infer that the inquirer has the desire placed in him (*adhikṛita*) to know the Brahman. Therefore *atha* need not necessarily mean *adhikāra*. *Jignyāsa* has included in it *Vichāra adhikāra*. The desire to know the Brahman is sufficient *adhikāra* and that is implied in the word *jignyāsa*. Then to what does *Atha* refer? It refers to the prerequisite in one who wants to know the Brahman. One who has not the determination

(*dīkṣha*) to know Brahman, after freeing himself from the three kinds of worldly sins (*malatraya*) arising from *manas*, *vāk* and *kāya*, cannot know the Brahman. That is, freeing oneself from the sins arising from these three worldly sources is the prerequisite for knowing the Brahman. That is, one should purge himself of these three kinds of sins before he can desire to know the Brahman. “Atha” (“Then”) therefore means “when” one has qualified by purging himself from the three kinds of sins called *malatraya*. Śrīpati’s interpretation is summed up by him in this dictum: *Deva-dhāraṇa*. The term “Athāthah” implies that when the remaining conditions (*sēshalakṣhaṇa*) are fulfilled, “then” *jignyāsa* commences. What are the *sēshalakṣhaṇa*? They are the destruction of the *malatraya*—the sins caused in association with *kāya*, *mānasa* and *vācha* and when one has destroyed these three sins, he reaches the fourth stage—*gnāna*—for *jignyāsa*. *Dharma*, *Brahma* and *Sāstra* in the Vēdic texts imply *karthru*, *karma* and *phala*, i.e., Cause, Action and Effect. Even though he has carried out his various duties in his former birth, yet to attain the Brahman, he ought to carry out the rules set down in the *vidhis* (i.e. *Vēdas*) in connection with *bhōjana* (food) and *gamana* (conduct). He who aspires to *Mōksha* should have carried out the above rules of conduct for *malatraya vidhvamsa*, so that he might be qualified for *Brahma-jignyāsa*. This is what has been fixed in the *vidhis* (*Vēdas*) as the requisite qualification for *Brahma-jignyāsa*. For it is said in the *Taittirīya Upanishad* about the desire of the disciple who wishes to receive wisdom about the Brahman:—*Yadētatch-chandasām rishabhō viśvarūpaḥ | chchandōbhyō’ dhyamrutāt sambabhūva. Samēndrō mēdhayā spruṇōtu. Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam śarīram mē vicharshaṇam, jīhvā mē madhumattamā karṇābhyām bhūri viśruvam. Brahmanah kōśōsi mēdhayāpihitah śrutam mē gōpāya iti.* May the Lord Śiva who is the *Rishabha*, i.e., the greatest of all prosodies, the Lord of all Vēdic lore, who pervades the world in the form of the *vr̥śa* (*viśvarūpa*), grant me that *mōksha* which is obtained by the enlightenment afforded

by Vēdic knowledge, for which (purpose) I wish to undergo this *deva-dhāraṇa* (*Lingarūpa Śivasya dhāraṇa*). May Lord Śiva grant that the *deva-dhāraṇa* will purify my whole body purging it of all sins, purifying my tongue, and making it more sweet, purifying my ears by the sound of the Vēda passing through them and by this means (*i.e.*, purification) grant me the *bhakti* and *gnāna* (faith and wisdom) required and protect me by making me fit to reach the Brahman. By the use of the word *dēva-dhāraṇa*, a doubt may arise as to the meaning intended to be conveyed by it; whether it is the outward (*bāhya*) *linga-dhāraṇa* or the mental (*antar*) *linga-dhāraṇa* or the *praṇavalinga-dhāraṇa*.⁹⁶

In texts like *Tvam dēvānām paramanḥa daivatam*; *Tasmāt dēvāḥ Śiva smrutāḥ*; and *Dēvyāyutam dēvāyutam yuvānam*, etc., the word *dēva* indicates no other than *Paraśiva*, as it generally signifies in the *Vēda*, and is adopted to mean it in *āchāra*, as there are no other evidences in the *Sāstras* to show that any other deity is meant in this connection. According to its root meaning, the word *dhāraṇa* means the agency through which, as an easy means, salvation is reached. Therefore it becomes *dēvadhāraṇo bhūyāsam*, which means that as I wish to attain to Brahman, let me also be joined to those who are fit to understand Brahman by wearing him symbolically. Thus I become the wearer of *linga*—*tasmāt mām mēdhayā samyōjayatu*. Then come the words *Bhūyāsam*, etc. *Bhūyāsam* denotes the necessity for wearing the *linga*. *Linga-dhāraṇa* also implies the wearing of the *Praṇava* symbols, for texts like *yōvēdādaḥ svarāḥ prōktō*, *chchandōvrishabhatvam*, *tatvamasi*, etc., apply only to *Paraśiva* and also the *viśvarūpa* (*i.e.*, form of *Viśvarūpa*) is also applied to *Paraśiva* only, because in the *Ashtāṅga yōgas*, the followers of the *Vēda* (*vaidikas*) meditate only on Him as the chief object of worship.

The *Pūrvapaksha* argument in this connection is thus developed by *Srīpati*: By the use of the word *viśvarūpa* in the *Rik* (quoted above), the *Brahma-linga* referred to therein is none other than *viśvarūpa*, except that both appear

⁹⁶ *Praṇavaḥ* means the sacred syllable *Aum*.

as separate entities and *Dēva-dhāraṇam* (mentioned in the Rik) means that they are both combined in one by the process of wearing (*yōgāt*). If it is not so divided, then the word *Gōpāya* used in the Rik will go without any meaning (*asambhavāt*). And also the word *bhūyāsam*, which is used in a benedictory sense, will also have no meaning. But *Linginam chakriṇam drishtvā* and such other texts like *linga madhyē jagat-sarvam ; tat prāṇēśvantarmanasō lingamāhuḥ ; jyōtirliṅgam bhruvōr madhyē nityam dhyāyēt sadā yatih ; lingam Brahmaiva kēvalam*, occurring in the *Atharvaṇa* (*Vēda*), *Sāma* (*Vēda*), *Rudra* (*Samhitā*), *Hansa* (*Samhitā*), *Katthavalli* (*Samhitā*), etc., which say that *Śiva Parabrahman* is explained (*upadēsāt*) to be *Lingarūpa*, prohibit the outward wearing of the *linga* (*Linga-dhāraṇa*). And also texts in the *Taittirīya*, *Kaivalya*, *Kathavalya* and other *Smrithi* texts lay down that *Daharam vipāpam paravēśma bhūtam hritpundarīkam viruḥ viśuddham*, i.e., internal *linga-dhāraṇa* (*antarlinga-dhāraṇa*) is necessary. Also in other *Sākhya* (i.e., *Samhitas*) *Bāhya linga-dhāraṇa* is not explained, while other texts, such as *Visvādhiko Rudro maharshiḥ tvam dēvēshu Brāhmaṇāt ; tvam dēvānām Brāhmaṇānām adhipatiḥ ; vishnuḥ kshatriyāṇām adhipatiḥ*, etc., state that the unrivalled *Śiva* is greater than the *Viśva* and is the lord of gods and *Brāhmaṇas*, while *Vishnu* is only the lord of *Kshatriyas*. Thus it is said in the *Āgamas* of which *Śiva* is the author, such as *Kāmika* and *Vātula*. There is no support for the views expressed in *Manu* and other *Smrithis* and *Purāṇas* which are opposed to those made in the *Kāmika* and *Vātula āgamas*. Moreover, in the 6th and 8th *adhyāyas* of the *Yajurveda* treating about *Tripura Samhāra*, from the words beginning with *Tēshām asurānām tisraḥ pura āsīt* and ending with the words *So abravīt varam vriṇa ahamēva paśūnām adhipatiḥ asau*, etc., it is suggested that *Brahma*, *Vishnu* and other *Dēvas* are brought under the category of *paśu* and *Śiva* himself is described as *Paśupati* : *Brahma Vishṇvādi dēvānām paśutvau śivasya pāśupatitvam*. This means that the wearing of *Śivalinga*, *Bhasma* and *Rudrāksha*, which are the symbols of *Śiva*

(*Saiva lānchhana*), are necessary. In this world, therefore, the worshipped and the worshipper (*ārādhya* and *ārādhaka*), the lord and the servant (*prabhu* and *bhrutya*) are seen in separate existence (*i.e.*, separately existing). So it follows that *bāhya linga-dhāraṇa* is found to be a necessary procedure. In order to overcome the ties of bondage created by friendship and enmity and the animal nature of the *jīva*, a *mumukshu* (one who desires *mōksha*) and a *bhakta* should wear the symbol of protection of *pati lānchchanātmaka paraśivēśhṭa linga-dhāraṇa* (the symbol of the remover of sins in the form of Paraśivalinga). This goes without saying. In the *Kāmika* and other *āgamas* expounded by Śiva, it is said that *linga-dhāraṇa* should be throughout life (*i.e.*, that the *linga* should be worn throughout one's life) which shows that when one is already invested with one Karma (*i.e.*, *vidhi*), no other Karma binds him.⁹⁷ On the basis of this reasoning, there is no room for one who carries out the *Upāsana Krama* of *Poundarīka* and other *Srauta* and *Smārta* observances, for observing other Karmas. When one is invested with the *dīksha* (*i.e.*, *śivadīksha*), he is absolved from observing the *sūtaka* and other obsequial restrictions (*sūtakādi nishēdha darśanēna*), as also with the performance of the *Sāpinḍa* and other (*i.e.*, subsequent) ceremonies (*Sāpinḍyādi uttara-karmaṇām vaiyarthya prasangāt*). After the *Saiva dīksha* is over, the invested is absolved from *jīvatva* and *prētatva*, for he is, by such investiture, absolved from the Karmas (*āśrama dharma*) to which he was bound from his birth in his caste (*svajātya*); being from the time of such investiture subject to *its* duties and responsibilities, he is freed from the restrictions imposed by being born in his caste. By this investiture there is no fear of his falling again into *Vēda bāhya mata* (*i.e.*, entering into the limits prescribed by the *Vēda*).⁹⁸

⁹⁷ This argument is again and again urged by Śrīpati: while one is subject to one *vidhi*, he cannot be subject to another.

⁹⁸ Śrīpati's argument may be summed up thus: Previous to *dīksha*, one is subject to the restrictions of the caste into which he is born; after the *dīksha*, he becomes a new person and is subject only to the restrictions imposed by the *dīksha* ceremony.

Even such great sages like Vāsishta, and other great Brahmanishṭa Rishis and Muktas are found to have been observers of *jyōtishtōma* and other duties. As stated by Manu and other *Smṛiti* writers, *Yadvaikincha Manuravadat tat bhaishajam*, the medicine prescribed by them for removing the disease of worldly attachment, should be strictly followed. But it may be asked, Brahma and others have not undergone, as required by the *Smṛitis*, *Āgamas* and *Purāṇas*, the *linga-dhāraṇa dīksha* and consequently what use is there in it? The answer is that they have *mōksha* through *Sraddhā*, *Bhakti* and *Dhyāna* in a combined form. And as it is said in texts like *Tamēvam veditvā atimrutyu mēti, nānyaḥ pantaḥ vidyate ayanāya, gnānādevatu kaivalyam, nānyaḥ pantaḥ vimuktayē*, etc., *mōksha* is available by reason of wisdom (*gnāna*). It is said in the text, *Mōksham ichchēt Janārdanāt* (all wealth may be desired through Īśvara and all *mōksha* through Janārdana), which shows that Janārdana only is the giver of *mōksha* and not Śiva. To meet this argument, it is said *Sarvalingam sthāpayati*. Here the *ladanta*⁹⁹ verb (*sthāpayati*) is opposed to the above view. Also, this is against the views of other *Smṛitis*, because the verb *sthāpayati* denotes from its root meaning *sthāvara linga sthāpana*, i.e., the establishing of a *sthāvara linga* on the body. Such a *linga* being held in the hand with the uttering of the prescribed mantra (*linga-pāṇinām abhimantritām pāṇi-mantram*), invests a man with pure thought. Then arises the objection if one is thus invested with pure thought, then there is no need for investing him with *bāhya linga*. The answer is that just as the *lāñchhana*, the insignia of a king, such as *svētachchatra* (white umbrella), etc., are not seen in servants, so certain of the emblems of Śiva, such as *Garalabhakshana* (poison swallowing) and *Bhujaga-bhūshana* (serpent-decoration), on account of their terrifying character, are impossible of being worn by others. Just as there is no authority for adopting the *mangalācharaṇa* (*ōmkāra*) in the

⁹⁹ *Laṭ* is a technical term used by Pāṇini to denote the Present tense or its terminations.

beginning, for there is no Vēdic support for such adoption, just as one who worships Śiva in his *saguṇa* form is unable to worship him in his *nirguṇa* form also, and just as all people who wish to attain their desires worship God only in his temple, similarly the wearing of the *linga* (*linga-dhāraṇa*) seems to be (apparently) against the prevalent (received) procedure of the *Srutis* and *Smritis* as they do not permit any scope for it. If it is said that this principle is also objected to as enumerated in the *Sāṅkhya Smṛiti*, then our reply would be in the words of the text : *Lingadhāraṇa rādhadhāntastu prātyakshika sruti smṛityāgama purāṇētiḥāsa vihitatvēna lingadhāraṇasya agnihōtrādivat vaidikatvam siddham iti*, etc. (It is as decided a fact that *linga-dhāraṇa* is in accordance with the teachings of *Sruti*, *Smṛiti*, *Āgama*, *Purāṇa* and *Itihāsa* as the *agnihōtravidhi* is in accordance with the prescriptions laid down in the *Vēda*.)

Atha means After Diksha.

Therefore it is that only after initiation by means of the (Śiva) *dīksha* (*tat dīkshānantaram*) that one should undertake *Brahmajīgnyāsa* (*Brahmajīgnyāsa vidhīyate*). Śrīpati thus suggests that he has established that *atha* means *dīkshānantaram*, *i.e.*, after the DIKSHA and not AFTER OBTAINING ADHIKARA (as suggested by Ānandatīrtha).

The Vēdic text *Yat chchandāsām rishabhō visvarūpaḥ* denotes that the unlimited Śiva assumes a limited form to enable those who are his Bhaktas to worship him. Upanishadic texts like *Nārāyaṇe nidhanapatayē namaḥ*, etc., denote that the all-pervading *linga* is in everything including Nārāyaṇa, the lord of all people devoid of riches (*i.e.*, people who seek *mōksha* at the hands of Nārāyaṇa). Therefore Śiva is also found pervading Nārāyaṇa. Texts like *Sarvalingam sthāpayati*, etc., therefore, refer only to *linga-dhāraṇa*, the wearing on the body of the all-pervading Śiva. This statement is again supported by the texts of the *Svētāśvatara*, *Atharvaṇa siraḥ* and other *Upanishads* : *Prāṇchōham pratyanchōham* (I existed at first ; I exist ever after). It is also said in the *Kathavalli* and

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Hamsa Upanishads and in the *Linga Purāṇa* and other works: *Tat prāṇēśvantarmanasō linga māhuḥ*; *Lingē sushuptiḥ*; *Lingam Brahma sanātanam*; etc. The light existing in the internal mind (i.e., inner consciousness) is called *linga*; the *sushupti* (i.e., the dreamless sleeping state) is in the *linga*, i.e., the *Jīva* in a dreamless state of sleep is (verily) the *linga*, i.e., they, *Jīva* and *Linga*, are one in that state; the *linga* is *sanātana* (i.e., everlasting), etc. The attributeless form of Brahman (*Nairūpāpada Brahmapada* as opposed to *Sōpāpada Brahmapada*) denoted by the *linga* is just like a form having all the limbs, such as *kara*, *charaṇa*, etc., and is therefore to be understood as synonymous with a Brahman having form. That is to say, the Brahman who has no attributes has to be understood as equivalent to Brahman with attributes and having a body and all limbs. That is, the unlimited Śiva is worn on the body in a limited form; though the unlimited Śiva has no form or attributes, he has to be conceived as possessing both when worn as *Linga* on the body.

If the text *amrutasya dēva-dhāraṇa bhūyāsam* is divided into *dēva* and *dhāraṇa*, then according to the *Aparamitādhikaraṇa Nyāya*, the word *Dēva*, owing to contact with the body on which the *linga* is worn, not only means "to protect" the wearer (*gōpāya*) but also, by being in contact (*samyōgārthakatvēna*), means also the giver of *Mōkshapada* to him (*amrutapada vāchya-mōkshasya*). If this is not understood in this sense, it will not satisfy the importance of the text appearing in the *Śankara Samhitā*: *Lingāṅga sanginō vatsa punarjanma navidyatē, Yugapat gnānasiddhisīyāt tatho mōksham avāpnuyāt iti*, etc., i.e., the wearer of the *linga* will have no more births, but will attain wisdom and final release. The text, *Sarīram mē vicharshanam*, states that the wearing of the *linga* on the body makes the *Jīva* to constantly think and meditate on the *Lingarūpi* Śiva (whom he is wearing) instead of (being distracted by) the many enjoyment-yielding objects of the external world.

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Then the *Smṛiti* texts *Atyāśramastha sakalēndriyāṇi; Atyāśramī sarvadā sakrudvā japēt; Vratamētat pāśupatam paśupāśa vimōkshāya; Vratamētat śāmbhavam; Tat samācharēt mumukshuḥ napunarbhavāya; Tēshām evaitām Brahmanidyām vadeta śirōvratam; Tasyēti kathitā hyarthā prakāśante mahātmanām*, etc., occurring in the *Kaivalya*, *Atharvaṇa siraḥ*, *Kālāgni Rudra*, *Mundaka* and other *Upanishads*, state that only he who adopts the *pāśupata vrata* is eligible for the teaching of *Brahmanidya* (*Brahmanidyādhikāritvōpadēśāt*). Therefore *linga-dhāraṇa dīksha* is decidedly to be imparted to one who is desirous of learning *Brahmanidya* (*Linga-dhāraṇa dīkshitasyaiva Brahmanidyādhikāritvam siddham*). If the objection is urged that in the *Kaivalya* and *Svētāśvatara Upanishads* there are no texts prescribing *linga-dhāraṇa*, and that it is quite enough for one who is initiated in the *Pāśupata vrata* to smear himself with the *Bhasma* only (*Bhasma-dhāraṇa*); then, it may be stated, that is not so. For, one initiated in the *Pāśupata vrata* should also wear the *linga* as part and parcel of his body in the same way as *bhasma-dhāraṇa*. For it is said:—

*Lingāṅga sanginām chaiva punarjanma navidyatē
Yēsha pāśupatō yōgaḥ paśupāśa nivruttayē
Sarva vēdāntasārōyam atyāśrama iti śrutiḥ.*

Whoever wears the *linga* on his body will have no further births; this wearing of the *linga* is the *Pāśupata yōga*, i.e., the joining of the *linga* with the *anga* or body in order to destroy the animal-nature created by bondage (*paśupāśa*) in man. This is the gist of the whole of the *Vēdānta* and this is the *Atyāśrama* which is declared in the *Sṛuti*.

Further it is said: *Parabrahmābhidham lingam paśupāśa vimōchakam; yō dhārayati sadbhaktyā sa pāśupata uchchyatē.*

The *linga* which is named after *Parabrahman*, and which removes the ties of bondage and releases the faithful wearer (from the same) is called *Pāśupata*.

Sarīra tritayā bhaktyā lingam paraśivātmakam, yō dhritvā vicharēt bhūmau sa pāśupata uchchyatē.

Whoever wears the *linga* of the Para Śiva form out of pure mind, physically and mentally, and walks about in the world—he is called a Pāśupata.

Lingam Śivō bhavēt kshētram angam samyōga āśrayaḥ, tasmāt lingānga samyuktō yōpi sō atyāśramī bhavēt.

Linga becomes Śiva ; *kshētra* becomes *anga* (i.e., body); both these being combined become *lingānga*, i.e., *linga* and *anga*; one who becomes *lingānga* becomes *atyāśramī*.

Brahmachāri grihasthōvā vānaprasthō yatistu vā, yastu lingānga samyuktaḥ sa yēva atyāśramī bhavēt.

Be he a *Brahmachāri* or a *grihastha* (householder) or *vānaprastha*, or a *yati* (i.e., *sanyāsi*)—whoever combines in himself the *linga* and the *anga*, he is said to have become *atyāśramī*. (The words *Pāśupata* and *atyāśramī* are synonymous with *lingadhāri*. So these words explain each other.)

Further, in the *Sāmajaṅgishīya śākhā* and in the *Sadānandōpanishad* it is stated: *Antardhāraṇo śaktō vā hyaśaktōvā dvijōttama, samskritya guruṇā dattam Śaiva lingam urasthalē, dhāryam viprēṇa muktyartham yēvam vēdāntinō viduḥ.*

Whether a Brahmin is to wear the *linga* internally or not, he should accept the *linga* given by his *guru* after consecration and wear it on his bosom in order to obtain *mukti*—as declared by the Vēdāntins.

Further, in the *Aiśvarya śākhā* of *Atharvaṇa Vēda*, it is said: *Yō vāmahastārchita lingamēkam parūtparam dhārayatē satatam vipraḥ kshatriyō vā । Tasyaiva labhyaḥ paramēśvarōsau niranjanam paramam sāmyam upaiti divyam.*

One who keeps in his left hand the *linga*, the greatest of the great, be he a Brāhmaṇa or a Kshatriya, him only the all-pervading and great Īśvara will join with all his glory.

From these texts it is seen that *dhyāna* and *dhāraṇa* (contemplation of his glory and wearing his *linga*) of Paramēśvara should always be possessed by a *mumukshu*, i.e., one who wishes to attain *mōksha*.

Again, in the *Rudrādhyāya* it is stated: *Adhyavōchat adhivaktā prathamō daivyō bhishag ityanēna*, etc., which means that Para Śiva only can keep away (*i.e.*, ward off) the flow of birth, death and *samsāra* and can effectually prevent them (from recurring). Therefore it is explained by the Vēda Purusha in the *Rig*, *Yajur* and *Sāma Vēdas* that only one who wears the *linga* will be capable of obtaining release from the bondage of *paśu* and *pāśa* (*paśupāśa vimōchakatvam*, *i.e.*, the release from the subordinate state of animal bondage).¹⁰⁰

Again, in the *Rigveda* occurs the text: *Ayam mē hastō bhagavān, Ayam mē bhagavattarā | Ayam mē viśva bhēshajō, Ayam Śivābhimarshaṇaḥ || Ayam mātā Ayam pitā Ayam jīvātur āgamāt | Idam tava prasarpaṇam subandha rēhi nirīhītyanēna ||*

This text states that the *linga* that is kept in the hand is the *Vēda Purusha* and that *Śivābhimarshaṇa* is the touching of the *Sthāvara-linga*. And therefore the combination of the two (the *Vēda Purusha* as represented by the *linga* and *Śivābhimarshaṇa*) makes Śiva to be in touch with the wearer (of the *linga*).

The same thing is said in the *Vātūla Sruti*:—

Dhārayēt yastu hastena lingākāram Śivam sadā | tasya hasta sthitam viddhi matpadam sapadām padam iti, which may be thus translated: “He who always places in his hand the *linga* form of Śiva, knows that he has in his hand my presence, of great wealth.” “Just as a ball of iron thrown into the fire acquires all the properties of the burning fire, the man who wears in his hand my world-curing *linga* form will be possessed of all my properties.”

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Bhāgavata*, Canto V, where the word *pāsantanyam* occurs. This word describes men as *animals drawn by their nose-strings*. Cf. also the following: *Sarve vahāmo balim Īśvarāyatē prōtā nasīva dvīpadē chatuspādah*, occurring in the *Bhāgavata*, Canto V, Adhyāya 1: We, two-legged animals, carry a bodily sacrifice to that great Lord just as the four-legged *paśu* is dragged along with a string in its nose to the sacrificial fire,

So it is said in the *Kāmika Āgama*: *Ayam mē hastō bhagavān iti*, which means "This Almighty God is in my hand".

From this *mantra*, it follows that the *Vēda Purusha* is firmly held in the hand of one who wears the *linga* (*Lingadhriti*). That is, he who wears the *linga* has the presence in this body of the *Vēda Purusha*.¹⁰¹

In the *Yajur Vēda* (Ashtaka I, Part iv) it is said, *Yāte Rudraśśivātanū aghōrā pāpakāśini | Tayā nastam vāsanta mayā girīśantā abhichākasīḥ iti || Triyambakam yajāmahe sugandhim puṣṭivardhanam | Urvāruka mīva bandhanāt mruthyōr mukshīya māmrutāt iti ||*

Again, it is stated : *Sōmārudrā yuvāmētānyasmai visvā tanūshu bhēshajāni dhattam avasyatām munchatam yanno asti tanūshu baddham kruta mēnō-asmat iti*, etc.

The meaning of these texts is given in the *Linga Purāṇa* as follows:—*Yā tē Śivātanū rudra linga mangaladāyakam | Lingam Śivatanuḥ prōktā mūrtir ghōrā tanuḥ smrutā || Apāpesu cha bhakteshu tayōr madhyē Śivā tanuḥ | Kasatē paramēśasya śishtāstē lingadhāriṇaḥ || Tayāsanta mayā sankhya kārūṇya linga rūpayā | Abhichātasīḥ tanuvā girīśantā abhiraksha mām || Triyambakam virūpāksham lingam brahmasanātanam || Yajāmahē dhārayāma sugandhim puṣṭivardhanam | Urvārukam yathā bandhāt mruthyōr mukshīya māmrutāt | Prathamāstṛē Yajurvēdē prāśnē charama samgnike || Linga dhārāṇa-mākhyātām Vēda punsam mahātmanām | Sōmā Rudrā yuvāmētānyasmai asmabhya mēvahi || Visvāni bhesajānishtha prāṇabhāvātmakāni cha | tanūshu dēhatritaye baddham māyāmayātmakam || Kritam yadēnoduritam manō vākkāya karmajam | tadasmadasmata sthūrnām mukhyatō vāsya*

¹⁰¹ The *mantra* theory is that if the person who wears in symbolic form the deity who is to be worshipped, meditates on that form uttering the *mantra*, and the name of the deity, in the particular form prescribed, he finally attains absorption into that form. This is described in the following text:—*Mananāt trāyatē yastu mantra ityabhidhīyate | tasmāt mantrēṇa tanmūrtim bhaktipurvṛṇa dhīyatām.* (See *Tantrasāra Āgama* on *Dhyāna*.)

*tamyuvām ॥ Munchyantam kripayā samyak pramōchayatam
īśvarau ॥*

In the same work (*Linga Purāṇa*) it is said that Paramēśvara has two forms :

*Rudrō vā ēsha yadagni tasyaitē tanu vau
Ghōrānyu sivānyayiti.*

Rudra has two forms, one a fearful-looking and the other a serene-looking one; therefore the words *Rudra* and *Sōma* imply these two forms of Śiva, *Ghōra* (the fearful) and *Aghōra* (the serene-looking).

In the Vēdic text, *yuvam* means “yaus” (plural) and *asmē asmabhyam* (third person) means belonging to us and *viśva* means the whole universe. All these forms are as medicines (or cures) for the disease of mundane miseries (*bhavarōgaharāṇi*). *Ishṭa*, *prāṇa*, *bhāva*, *bhasma*, *rudrāksha* are the signs which will cure *bhavarōga*. That is, that *Ishṭa linga*, *prāṇa linga*, *bhāva linga*, *bhasma*, *rudrāksha* and other symbols are the cures for mundane ills. That is, the wearing of the *linga* and *rudrāksha*, and the smearing of *bhasma*, etc., on the body will protect a man from *anādyavidyāvāsitam*, that is, the ills of former existence. The wearer will be released from all the ties of this world (*muchyatam*).

In the *Sruti* text, *Umāsaḥāyam Paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakanṭham praśāntam*, etc., the two forms of Īśvara are established. He who is combined with Umā is Sōma (or Īśvara). His body is made of the Five Upanishads and a beautiful form, capable of removing all the ills of family bondage (*samsāra dukkham*). “You two, Umā and Sōma, being on our body in the form of *Ishṭa* and other (*linga*), which being worn (*dhārayitva*) and never leaving our body, will destroy all the ills which have their origin in *malatraya* (*malatrayātmaka*—that is, *manas*, *vāk* and *kāya*).” For it is said in the *Sruti*: *Viśvādēvān vidushā vēditavyam śaivam lingam pradhrutam sarvavēdaiḥ tadātma siddhyai munibhiḥ mukta kāmāiḥ kanṭhē hastē mastakē vā bhavati dhāryam ॥* That *Sivalinga* which, according to all the Vedas,

signifies the Lord of the Universe as is known to the wise, and whose wearing is supported by the *Vēdas* should be worn by those who wish to attain their desires, on their bodies, either in the neck, or on the hand or on the head. As this is so stated in the *Sāma Vēda*, therefore, the wearing of the *Śivalinga*, which is a cure for all worldly miseries, must of necessity be adopted by all who desire salvation (*mumukshubhiḥ*).

In his *Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi*, Rēṇukāchārya interprets the *Rigvēda* mantra *Pavitramte*, etc., in the light of *lingadhāraṇa* (*Lingadhāraṇa paratvēna nirdēśāt*). He thus interprets the *Rigvēda* mantra referred to:—The *linga* is named Brahman. The lord of Brahma is Īśvara. Therefore the *linga* is said to be the purifying agent (*tat-pavitram*). By being in contact with it, the body becomes purified. The Rik, therefore, says *Pavitramtē vitatam Brahmanaspatē*, i.e., the body coming in contact with the *linga*, will purify the wearer. Therefore such a *linga* is necessarily to be worn for obtaining consecration by a Śaiva who would be faultless. A body devoid of such consecration (*dīkshārahita*) will never attain salvation (*uttamapadam*). Just as failing to perform *Sandhyā-vandana* is counted as a religious omission and a sin, so is a person who has not been consecrated in due form accounted a sinner. Again, it is said, “a *bhakta* who does not wear the *linga* on his body until the moment of his death, the food that he takes daily is (no other than) the flesh of his own body.” He who does not keep on his body the *linga*, his body is as useless as that of a corpse. Therefore the wearing of the *linga* is as important as maintaining a sacrificial fire throughout one’s life. Just as a piece of burnt wood found in a cremation ground is prohibited from being used for other purposes, so is one who does not wear the *linga* on his body disallowed from observing every rite prescribed (*sarva karma bahishkritaḥ*). Thus it is stated in the *Vātūla*, *Skānda*, *Laingya* and other texts which treat of the failure to wear the *linga*. Next as to *bhūyāsam iti*, it should be taken to mean *mēdhāvī-bhūyāsam*, i.e.,

Brahma-varchasvī-bhūyāsam, i.e., that which causes one to possess the brilliancy of Brahman. Here, the meaning applicable to *āsam* in the text *Ahamēkaḥ prathamamāsam iti*, "I alone at first existed," should be given to *āsam* in *bhūyāsam* (*bhū + āsam*). If that is done, there is here *vidhyarthōpattēḥ*. That is, by means of the *vidhi* (the prescribed ceremonial), the result follows. Therefore the wearing of the *linga* (after the *dīksha*) is testified to by the *āchāra* that has prevailed from yore (*ahamēkaḥ prathamamāsam iti*). Failure in securing such a consecration will prevent the warding off of the eternal three-fold sins (*malatraya*) of the three-fold physical body (*sarīra-traya*). The function of consecration is also a Vēdic one. In the *Vātūla*, it is stated:—*Vaidikatvam yathāvakshyē sarvavēda pramānataḥ | Vēda vēdānta siddhatvāt vaidikam linga-dhāraṇam || Vēda vēdānta sāstrēshu purāṇēshvāgamēshu cha | Brāhmaṇasya samākhyātam lingadhāraṇam iti ||* I declare that *linga-dhāraṇam* is a consecration (of the body) rendered necessary by the *Vēdas* as the same is affirmed by all the *Vēdas* and *Vēdāntas*. In all the *Vēdas* and *Vēdāntas*, and *Purāṇas* and *Āgamas*, *linga-dhāraṇa* is stated to be necessary for a *Brāhmaṇa*. In the *Yajur-Vēda* generally and *Taittirīya Samhita* in particular, the statement is affirmed:—"To those who aim at *mōksha*, *linga-dhāraṇa* is spoken of as a necessary consecration." The same is understood from *Chchandas* and *Vēda*, where it is said that *linga-dhāraṇa* came to be born from *Amrita* (ambrosia). In the *Linga Purāṇa*, it is said:—

Indrastu Paramaiśvaryaśālī Sāmba strilōchanah, mām mēdhayā pragnyayā cha spruṇōtu prīṇayatvatha, amrutasya mōkshalābhāya sarvadēhēshu sarvadā, dēvasya lingarūpasya śivasya paramātmanah, dhāraṇam tad dhritiriyasya dēvadhāraṇa ishyate, tasmāt sarīrammēlōke vicharshana makilbisham, jihvā mē rasanā bhūyāt madhurālāpabhāshinī, karṇābhyām śrōtrayugmena bhūri vyaśruvamasmyaham || Brahmanah pārvatīśasya kōśōdhishthānamevahi, asēri va yadā lōkē pragnayā mēdhayā vritah, śrutam tatśravaṇādīni mē gōpāya prayatnataḥ, ityādinā ||

In the *Linga Purāṇa*, the *linga* consecration is stated as absolutely necessary to protect the body spiritually. In the *Smritis*, *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*, it is said that to triumph over this world, is this consecration rendered necessary. No Rishi will feel any doubt to this procedure of consecration nor object to it as it is sanctioned by the *Vēda*. Therefore no other procedure is stated to be the right one by the *Vēdas*.

In the *Sāṅkhya Smṛiti*, it is stated that the wearing of the *linga*, *chakra*, etc., should not be allowed as it is objectionable (*nishēdhaḥ*). Such a statement cannot be accepted and followed (*navidhēyam*), because Vēdic support is the one important thing and there is support for *linga-dhāraṇa* in the *Vēda*. In the *Vēda*, it is stated *uditē juhōti* (offer the sacrifice at the appearance of the sun) and *anuditē juhōti* (offer the sacrifice just before the appearance of the sun on the horizon) in expressions which are contradictory to each other. In this instance, the two expressions belong to two different branches (*sākhā*) of philosophy, one to the Māyāvādins (*dhūrta smārta māyāvādins*) and the other to their opponents. These two schools are not in favour of each other. They make use of their own invented groundless arguments (*kalpita nishēdhāḥ*) to support their ideas and discard those of their opponents. Their statements carry as much credibility as the one which says that there is a lotus flower (growing) in the sky. Similarly *taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa* has, it has to be inferred, as much truth in it inasmuch as it is un-Vēdic.

Since the word *Chakri* is put on a par with the word *lingiṇam* and its wearer is put on a level with the wearer of the *linga*, an examination of the relative positions of the *taṭṭa lingi* and the *śrauta lingi*, with the aid of *Srutis*, *Smritis*, *Purāṇas*, *Āgamas*, etc., is rendered necessary. Such an examination proves that the latter is the superior of the two. Therefore *taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa* would be a procedure outside the purview of the *Vēdas*. There are two ways adopted in the wearing of the *linga*: one *śrauta* and the other *aśrauta*. The former is called in

the Śaiva religion *suddha linga-dhāraṇa* (*Shaḍadhva śuddha linga-dhāraṇa*); and the latter is called the *taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa* (*aśrauta taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa*). The Vīra-śaivas being *śrautas* and followers of the Vēdamārga only, are prohibited from having recourse to *taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa*, which is stigmatised as sinful (*pratyavāyaḥ mahānbhavēl*). This is so stated in the *Siddhānta Āgama*. Just as one who maintains a sacrificial fire of one particular kind finds it unnecessary to maintain a sacrificial fire of another kind, though the maintenance of both of them may be in accordance with the *Srutis* (*ubhayōḥ śrautatvāt*), and just as one who has begun the performance of one *karma* finds himself unable (being prohibited) to begin the performance of another *karma*, agreeably to the Vēdic injunction, similarly in adopting *Śaiva dīksha*, two conflicting methods of *linga-dhāraṇa* would be irregular and opposed (to Vēdic procedure). Such a condemned procedure should not be simultaneously adopted in a matter of life-long *dīksha* like *linga-dhāraṇa*, as the procedure presented on the analogy of the Pāncharātrāgama (as to *taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa*) is not Vēdic.

For one who wears the *linga*, there is no kind of pollution caused: pollution arising from birth and death, just as in the same way one who has installed the sacrificial fire need not observe the pollution arising from birth or death. He can continue during that period the worship of the *linga* without any break. And therefore one who wears a *linga* throughout his life will always be a consecrated person and as such will have no need to observe such pollution. As stated in the Vēdic text *Sarvalingam sthāpayati*, that is, the wearer of the *linga* is always under the spell of purity for the very reason he wears it on his body. Because it is said in the *Parāśara Smṛiti*, the *Siddhānta Sikhāmaṇi* and other works that the worshippers of Śiva and the installers of the sacrificial fire—these two classes of people—and a Brahmachāri, that is, one who has been invested with the sacred thread, and a Sanyāsi are not subject to any kind of pollution. Again, it is stated in the same works that a woman who is fond

of always worshipping the *linga*, one who is confined (*sūtaki*) and one who is observing the courses (*rajasvalā*) are a crore of times purer than the sun, fire and the wind (*ravi*, *agni* and *vāyuḥ*). Further, the same works lay down that neither at the time of birth nor at the time of death should Śivapūja be abandoned. These statements prove that the body which bears the *linga* on it is never polluted and is quite free to offer worship to the *linga* at all times without a break.

Next is the fact that customs contrary to these texts exist do not take away from their validity. (The customs lack support and so cannot be held to nullify the texts.) The validity of the *Śrauta* rules is not affected by the existence of customs sanctioning the offer of animal sacrifices at the Jyōtiṣṭōma, Atirātra and Paundarīka rites, the partaking of animal food and the drinking of *Surā* (Sōma juice) at them, and the enjoyment of conjugal felicities by Brahmachārins during day time with *dāsīs*—though these are manifestly against the morals of the world and against *āchāra* as declared in the *Srutis*.

Next, as Śaivas are thus free from pollutions of these five kinds—birth, death, rajasvalā, etc. (*pancha sūtakābhāvē*)—they are superior to the four *Varnas* (*Varnachatusṣṭayātītatva*). It is just that the food touched by them should be partaken of. To say—as some say—that those who follow the Vēdic injunctions should not have intercourse with Lingadhāris who, following the Śaiva Sāstras, do not observe the five kinds of pollution, is not correct. (The suggestion is that such a statement is lacking in support.) For it is said in the (Śaiva) *Siddhāntas*, *Āgamas* and other authorities that just as one during the time the sacrificial fire is being installed need not observe (the pollution resulting from) the courses of his wife, similarly one who wears on his body the *linga*, which he worships of his free will (*i.e.*, with sincere devotion) is unaffected by pollution. Just as the tongue should not be touched by the hand for fear of pollution but still the *mantra* pronounced by the tongue is still very holy and produces holy results, so a Śaiva has no

pollution for the very reason that he wears the *linga* on his body. According to the *Vēda*, he will never become polluted even if he is touched by others. After the Śaiva Dīksha is undergone, there is no such thing for a man as *Prētatva* and *Jīvatva* (i.e., he is absolved from these two kinds of pollutions). Though it is declared that the performance of ceremonies pertaining to birth and death are not necessary any further after Śaiva Dīksha, it is wholly incumbent upon Śaivas to observe the other rites which are prescribed for them in the Śaiva *Āgamas*. For it is said in the *Śankara Samhita*, *Siddhānta Sīkhāmaṇi* and other authorities that those who worship Sūkṛāṇṭha constantly, according to the rules prescribed for each caste (*Svajāti-vihitam dharmam*), are as holy as Mahēśvara himself (*tē vai Māhēśvarāḥ smrutāḥ*), while the worship offered by those who adopt modes of worshipping Him not prescribed for them, is not accepted by Him. Śiva formerly proclaimed that every *varṇa* should practise what was prescribed for it; those who transgress the rules (laid down) would show lack of faith and become sinful. Just as those who transgress the orders of a king become punishable, those who transgress the ordinances of Śiva are liable to the punishment of being thrown into Naraka (*Narakastathā*). Śambhu ordered Sāmba to punish those who transgressed His ordinances; therefore every one should strictly hold fast with wisdom and faith to those ordinances and worship Śankara. With them (those who adhere to His ordinances) He becomes much pleased. Therefore one must become possessed of wisdom and good practice until one's death. Even though he attains wisdom, he should not leave the *karma*, which is the source for yielding good results. Also, good practices enable a man to appear holy and adorable. And one who is destitute of good practices, becomes blameworthy in the eyes of society and the world. Just as eyes and limbs are mutually combined in obtaining wisdom, in view of good results these limbs should be so used as to produce the best fruits desired. Therefore to protect the ordinances of Śiva, one should become a *bhakta Sivavrati*,

i.e., staunch and faithful *Śiva-vrati*, and surrender himself to Śiva (*Śivārpaṇa*) by offering to Him all wise acts done by him, strictly following the path of the *Vēda*. This is what has been stated in detail in the *Śankara Samhita* and the *Siddhānta Sikkhāmaṇi*.

Though nothing immediately useful may result in one's own favour in the case of one who acts in accordance with the ordinances of Śiva, yet he should not travel beyond the right path just as a subject would not break the laws of his king. After obtaining Śiva Dīksha, one should strictly adhere to it and act up to Śiva's ordinances. For it is laid down in the *Sruti* text *Bhūshāsmādvātaḥ pavatē iti*, out of fear, blows the wind. Even the Wind and the Sun Gods blow and shine forth (respectively) in great fear and with due reverence to the ordinances of Śiva, for fear that if they broke even by a little the laws of Paramēśvara, they would be putting themselves in a position in which they would be causing inconvenience to the whole world, and preventing those in it from performing the *karmas* they have respectively to discharge. What need is there to speak of the mere men who are blessed with little wisdom? In the *Linga Purāṇa* it is said :—"We, Brahma and all others, are like quadrupeds (*paśavaḥ*) and you our Lord or *Pati*. Therefore you are called *Paśupati*." So saying all the Gods wore on their bodies the *Śivalinga* and they all became *Pāśupatas*, *i.e.*, they accepted the Lord Śiva as *Paśupati*. And so the Lord Śiva is the chief object of worship for Brahma and other Gods. And they wear on their bodies the *bhūti* (sacred ashes) and *rudrākshaki* (the sacred *rudrākshi* beads) and the *linga*. And Śiva, looking at the faithful Gods, Brahma, Vishnu and others, decorated with *sphatika mālā*, killed Tripurāsura and protected them. This proves that *Śivalinga-dhāraṇa* was accepted by Brahma and the other Gods. It is also stated in the *Śankara Samhita* of the *Skānda Purāṇa* :—Brahma, Vishnu and others among Gods and Gautama and others among Rishis ever wear on the best part of their bodies the *Śivalinga*: Hari suspended the *linga* on his chest; Brahma

pollution for the very reason that he wears the *linga* on his body. According to the *Vēda*, he will never become polluted even if he is touched by others. After the Śaiva Dīksha is undergone, there is no such thing for a man as *Prētatva* and *Jīvatva* (i.e., he is absolved from these two kinds of pollutions). Though it is declared that the performance of ceremonies pertaining to birth and death are not necessary any further after Śaiva Dīksha, it is wholly incumbent upon Śaivas to observe the other rites which are prescribed for them in the Śaiva *Āgamas*. For it is said in the *Śankara Samhita*, *Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi* and other authorities that those who worship Śrīkanṭha constantly, according to the rules prescribed for each caste (*Svajāti-vihitam dharmam*), are as holy as Mahēśvara himself (*tē vai Māhēśvarāḥ smrutāḥ*), while the worship offered by those who adopt modes of worshipping Him not prescribed for them, is not accepted by Him. Śiva formerly proclaimed that every *varṇa* should practise what was prescribed for it; those who transgress the rules (laid down) would show lack of faith and become sinful. Just as those who transgress the orders of a king become punishable, those who transgress the ordinances of Śiva are liable to the punishment of being thrown into Naraka (*Narakastathā*). Śambhu ordered Sāmba to punish those who transgressed His ordinances; therefore every one should strictly hold fast with wisdom and faith to those ordinances and worship Śankara. With them (those who adhere to His ordinances) He becomes much pleased. Therefore one must become possessed of wisdom and good practice until one's death. Even though he attains wisdom, he should not leave the *karma*, which is the source for yielding good results. Also, good practices enable a man to appear holy and adorable. And one who is destitute of good practices, becomes blameworthy in the eyes of society and the world. Just as eyes and limbs are mutually combined in obtaining wisdom, in view of good results these limbs should be so used as to produce the best fruits desired. Therefore to protect the ordinances of Śiva, one should become a *bhakta Sivavratī*,

i.e., staunch and faithful *Siva-vrati*, and surrender himself to Śiva (*Sivārpaṇa*) by offering to Him all wise acts done by him, strictly following the path of the *Vēda*. This is what has been stated in detail in the *Sankara Samhita* and the *Siddhānta Sikhāmaṇi*.

Though nothing immediately useful may result in one's own favour in the case of one who acts in accordance with the ordinances of Śiva, yet he should not travel beyond the right path just as a subject would not break the laws of his king. After obtaining Śiva Dīkṣa, one should strictly adhere to it and act up to Śiva's ordinances. For it is laid down in the *Sruti* text *Bhīṣmādvātaḥ pavatē iti*, out of fear, blows the wind. Even the Wind and the Sun Gods blow and shine forth (respectively) in great fear and with due reverence to the ordinances of Śiva, for fear that if they broke even by a little the laws of Paramēśvara, they would be putting themselves in a position in which they would be causing inconvenience to the whole world, and preventing those in it from performing the *karmas* they have respectively to discharge. What need is there to speak of the mere men who are blessed with little wisdom? In the *Linga Purāṇa* it is said :—"We, Brahma and all others, are like quadrupeds (*paśavaḥ*) and you our Lord or *Pati*. Therefore you are called *Paśupati*." So saying all the Gods wore on their bodies the *Sivalinga* and they all became *Pāśupatas*, *i.e.*, they accepted the Lord Śiva as Paśupati. And so the Lord Śiva is the chief object of worship for Brahma and other Gods. And they wear on their bodies the *bhūti* (sacred ashes) and *rudrākshaki* (the sacred *rudrākshi* beads) and the *linga*. And Śiva, looking at the faithful Gods, Brahma, Vishnu and others, decorated with *sphatika mālā*, killed Tripurāsura and protected them. This proves that *Sivalinga-dhāraṇa* was accepted by Brahma and the other Gods. It is also stated in the *Sankara Samhita* of the *Skānda Purāṇa* :—Brahma, Vishnu and others among Gods and Gautama and others among Rishis ever wear on the best part of their bodies the *Sivalinga* : Hari suspended the *linga* on his chest; Brahma

wore it on his head ; and thus wearing the *linga* they went to their own places. In this world, the *linga* is actually seen worn in the temples of Anantapadmanābha, Viṭṭhalēśvara, and Narāyaṇa—in the hand, on the head and other places respectively. So nobody can have in this world even the suspicion of a doubt about *Linga-dhāraṇa*, i.e., the wearing of the *linga*.

Srutis say that the chief qualification that one should possess for *Mōksha* is the union (*yōga*) of *śraddhā*, *bhakti* and *dhyāna*. But according to some, it is *dhyāna* and *gnāna* that secure salvation. There is therefore no necessity according to them for wearing the *linga* on the body (such wearing after the *Dīksha* ceremony standing, in the opinion of *Srīpati*, for *bhakti*). There is absolutely no use of such a doctrine as this (*na kinchit prayōjanam iti*). In the *Srutis* it is stated that freedom from the bondage of worldly illusions (*Visvanāyā nivrittiḥ*) will be obtained by constantly praying for Śiva (*tasya abhidhyānāt*), by wearing on the body the symbol of Śiva (i.e. *Lingadhāraṇa yōjanāt*) and meditating on the qualities of Śiva (*tatvabhāvāt*). By this, declare the *Srutis*, the sight of God (*Sākshātkāra*) will be finally secured and instantaneously all *māyā* will be removed (*sakala māyā nivrittiḥ*). By lessening the authority of the *Sutis* (*Sruti sankōchē*), we are setting it at naught (*mānābhāvāt*).

Even Bhagavān Vyāsa has explained the three-fold nature of *upāsana* (I. 1. 32) *Jīva mukhya prāṇa lingān-nēticēnnōpāsāt traividhyā śritatvād iha tadyōgāt*, whose meaning is thus explained with the aid of the *Skānda Purāṇa*:—Meditation (*mānasōpāsanam*) should be done in the mind (*hridayē*) or at heart (*dahara*), either by the uttering of the *Panchākshari*, *Gāyatri* or *Rudrasūkta*. This kind of meditation is called *Vāchakōpāsanam*. The next kind of meditation is by holding the *Śivalinga* in the palm of the hand or (kept concealed) in the grain or in the fire. This kind of *upāsana* is called *Kayakōpāsanam*, done out of *śraddhā* and *bhakti*. Thus, in this way, every initiated person (*Dvija*) should worship with three-fold purity

(*trikaraṇaiḥ*). This done, he will attain *mukti*. This is the Vēdic method; and there is no other method (of obtaining *mukti*). For it is said:—A great man (*mahātma*) thinks of the same (thing) in his word, mind and action in the same way.

So, those who offer sacrifice in their minds (*mānasa yagna*) without being duly initiated, and without wearing on their body the *linga* externally, derive no benefit from it, for such *mānasa yagna* (without the contact of the *linga*) will not have freed them from the three-fold sins of the body (*malatraya dhvamsābhāvāchcha*). Just as the previously initiated person only is qualified to chant the *Vēdas* and to perform the *Sandhyāvandana* every morning, so according to the *Sāstras* he who wears the *linga* on his (external) body is alone entitled to *Sivādhyāna* and *Sivagnāna* (i.e., meditating on Śiva and acquiring full knowledge of Him).

Just as fire is necessary to prepare food, so the external wearing of the *linga* (*bāhyāṅgasya linga-dhāraṇa*) is absolutely necessary to enable one to internally meditate on Śiva (*antar dhyāna*). If such a procedure is not adopted, the previously quoted authorities—*Sruti*, *Smṛiti*, *Āgama* and *Purāṇas*—will be of no use and everything will be un-Vēdic (*Vēda bāhyatva prasangāt*). For it is declared by *Manu*, *Gautama* and other *Smṛiti* writers that he is a *dhyāna yōgi*, who during meditation is found to possess on his body the *Śivalinga* (*Sivaliṅgāṅga-samyutaḥ*) and who repeats the *mantra* by his mouth, who meditates in his mind, who wears on his external body—i.e., on his head—the *linga*, who puts on the necklace of Rudrāksha and holy ashes and who keeps his tuft of hair (*śikhā*) on his head—for these are the characteristics of a twice-born person (*ētād Brāhmaṇa lakṣaṇam*). This procedure—of wearing the *linga*—is one in accordance with Vēdic requirements and hence is not opposed to the *Vēda*. It is stated: *Mōksha-michchēt Janārdanāt iti*.¹⁰²

¹⁰² This is from the *Skānda Purāṇa* and the full text is as follows:—*Aham bhōgaṇṇadō vatsa mōkshadastu Janārdanaḥ*, which may be thus translated:—Dear boy, I can give every felicity in life, but as for *mōksha* you should go to Janārdana.

Janārdana (*i.e.*, Nārāyaṇa) alone can give *mōksha* and He alone should be worshipped by those who wish for it. This, however, is not so. For there are *Sruti* texts like the following:—

Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivankaraḥ sarvamanyat parityajya ॥
Īśam gnātvā amrutatvamēti ॥
Gnātvā Śivam śāntimatyantamēti ॥
Īśam gnātvā amrtiā bhavanti ॥
Dhyāna nirmathanābhyāsāt pāśam dahati paṇḍitaḥ ॥
Ksharam pradhānam amrutāksharam haraḥ ॥
Tasyābbhidhyānāt yojanāt tatvabhāvāt bhūyaśchāntē
viśvamāyānivrittiḥ ॥
Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē ॥
Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ ॥
Yō dēvānām prathamam purastāt ॥
Tamakratum paśyati vītaśōkaḥ ॥
Dhātuḥ prasādāt mahimānamāśam ॥ etc.

These and other like *Sruti* texts show that Nārāyaṇa is not a god of the Brahmans (*Brāhmaṇa dēvatā*) and *Smritis* which contradict *Srutis* cannot be accepted as authoritative (declarations). Even such *Smritis* also state that *mōksha* is to be attained by the worship of Śiva through generations. For it is stated in the *Skānda Purāṇa*:—

Sāṅkhyayōgasahasrēṇa janmanā Dvaitagō bhavēt ।
Tanmatasya sahasrēṇa Sauravam matamaśnutē ।
Tatsahasrasamabhyāsāt Gāṇapatyamato bhavēt ।
Tatsahasrēṇa bhūlokē Vaishṇavam matamāryatē ।
Tadvaiṣṇavasahasrēṇa Śākto bhavati sarvadā ।
Tatsahasrvāt mahābhāga Saivasūmānya uchyatē ।
Tatsahasrēṇa viprēndra Vīraśaivismato bhavēt ।
Tēnaiva muktimāpnōti nānyathā bahuyatnataḥ ॥ iti.

If one practises Sāṅkhya-yōga for a thousand generations, he becomes a Dvaita; if he practises a thousand years more, he will then attain to the *Saurava mata*; ¹⁰³ by practising for a thousand generations, one of the *Gāṇapatya*

¹⁰³ *Saurava mata* denotes the worship of the Sun.

mata;¹⁰⁴ after practising a thousand years that *mata*, he becomes a Vaishṇava; if he continues practising a thousand years that *Vaishṇava mata*, he becomes a *Śākta* religionist; after practising for a thousand years that religion, O Mahābhāga, he becomes a Sāmānya Śaiva; and after practising for a thousand years that religion, O Prince of Brahmans, he then becomes a Vīraśaiva. Thereby (*i.e.*, by becoming a Vīraśaiva) he obtains *mukti*; and not by any other means in spite of any number of attempts.

It is heard from the *Kāśīkhaṇḍa* that those who obtain *Vishnusārūpya* (form of Vishnu)—such as Sivaśarma and others who entered the Vishṇu-lōka—have finally to obtain their *mukti* through the worship of Śiva.

It is also stated in the *Mahimnastava*, in the part beginning with “*trayī sāṅkhyam*” and ending with “*tvamasi payasāmarṇava iva*”, etc., that, considering all religions, one’s own as well as others (*svamatānyamatāni nirūpya*), it is proved that Śiva is the final goal for everybody to reach (*Śiva ēva sarvēśhām prāpyasthānam*). It is also heard from the *Kāśīkhaṇḍa* that even Vyāsa, after removing his shoulders and planting the same (in the ground), got himself, with his disciples, initiated in the *Śāmbhava Dīksha* and thus became qualified for obtaining *mōksha*.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ *Gāṇapatyaḥ* is a worshipper of Gaṇeśa. *Gāṇapatyam* is the worship of Gaṇeśa.

¹⁰⁵ There is a reference here to the story of a disputation between Vyāsa and a Vīraśaiva saint, in which the former was defeated by the latter who, in consequence, had to acknowledge the superiority of Śiva over Vishṇu. And, as a mark of such victory, Vyāsa had to sever his right shoulder, the same being planted in the ground. A lithic representation of what is popularly called *Vyāsana tōlu* is to be seen in certain parts of the country—for instance, at the gate of the village of Kunthūr on the banks of the Cauvery, not far away from Kollegal, on the road to Talkad. A banner of the Murugharājendra Mutt has on it a representation of this *Vyāsana tōlu*. There is a Basavēśvara temple at Kunthūr, close to which is a slab on which is an inscription dated in Saka 1467 (=A.D. 1545). This inscription

In the text *Sarvalingam sthāpayati*, the verb *sthāpayati*, though it indicates the meaning in the sense of the present indicative mood, of doing something ordained (*vidhyarthōpapattēḥ*) yet it can be used without any objection (*bhēdadōśhaḥ*) in many different ways. It is stated in the text (of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa*) *Āgnēyō'shṭā kapālo amāvāsyāyām itivat*, on Amāvāsyā day, on the *kapāla*, *Agni* must be worshipped. This injunction that *Agni* must be worshipped on the *kapāla* on the Amāvāsyā day is not observed by all, because such a thing is not easily possible. Yet such a thing is imagined to have been done. In the same manner, though the word *sthāpayati* means "installing in the earth", yet the meaning of the *Sruti* text implies that it might be applied both to installing in the earth and in the hand as evidenced by (*Sruti*) injunction and by practice.

It must not be supposed that *linga-dhāraṇa* becomes effective only by installing the *linga* in the hand, and by meditating (on it) and worshipping (it). It is found that *pūja* is effected by meditation (through the mind) in addition to what is done by the hand, as the word "hand" (*pāṇīśabda*) is not directly connected with *pūja*. The suggestion of some writers that the word *pāṇimantram* is the equivalent of *pāṇinā abhimantritam* is not acceptable to us, for if we take the secondary meaning of the word *mantra* (*mantraśabda*) then it results in the violation of the *Īkshatyadhikaraṇam*. (*Īkshatyadhikaraṇa virōdha prasangaḥ*, that is, *Īkshatyadhikaraṇa* of the *Brahma Sūtras* I. 1.5.) The meaning of this *mantra* is very clearly explained

records a grant to the Mahānandiśvaramaṭha at the place. Another inscription dated in 1512 A.D. records a gift of taxes in the village for providing food and clothing to fifty Wodeyars of the Śivāchāra sect, who were connected with the Sālūra Śāntadēvara-Simhāsana (*M.E.R.*, Inscription Nos. 21 and 23 of 1910). The temple of Mahādēva or Mahalingēśvara at Kundathūru (the ancient name of Kunthūr) goes back to the time of the Western Ganga King Nītimārga, who has been assigned to 850 A.D. (See *M.E.R.*, No. 24 of 1910.)

by Bhagavān Vēdavyāsa in the 21st chapter of the latter part (*Uttarabhāga*) of the *Linga Purāṇa* as follows:—

Yajurapyāha sarvām vai lingam sthāpayatīti cha |
Tasmāt dhāryam mahālingam pāṇimantrvēti mantrataḥ ||
Pāṇau lingam vinikshipya dīkshākālē guruh śivam |
Yēna smarati tanmantram pāṇimantram vadanti hi ||
Pavitratvāt mahēśasya śivasya pratipādanāt |
Pavitrikaraṇāt pumsām pavitramiti kathyatē ||
Ataḥ sarvēshu kālēshu dhārayēt lingamuttamam |
Gachchan tishṭhan upavishan śayānō'pyanyathāpi vā |
Suchirvāpyaśuchir vā'pi lingam sarvatra dhārayēt ||
Lingadhārī sadā śuddhō nijalingam manōharam |
Archayēt gandhapushpādyaīḥ karaṇīthē samāhitāḥ ||
Nityāni karmabrindāni tathā naimittikāni cha |
Sivārpaṇadhiyā kuryāt samyak gnānābhivriddhayē ||

The *Yajurveda* also declares *sarvām vai lingam sthāpayati*, i.e., the *linga* is installed; that is, the *mahālinga* is installed in the palm of the hand by chanting the *pāṇi-mantra*. When one keeps the *linga* in the palm of his hand during the period of the *dīksha* and meditates upon the Holy Guru Śiva by (uttering) the same *mantra* (whereby he is sanctified), he is said to have uttered the *pāṇimantra*. By uttering what *mantra* in the name of Lord Śiva one becomes purified, that *mantra* is called *pavitra* (i.e., the sanctified *mantra*). Therefore at all times such a sacred *linga* should be worn (on the body). Even while going along, standing or sitting in one place, or sleeping or in any other condition (or state), while in a state of purity or impurity, the *linga* should be worn alike at all times. A *lingādhārī* is always pure and he should always worship his loving *linga* by offering sandal, flower and other materials, keeping it in the palm of his hand (*karaṇīthē*). This he should adopt from day to day both in (the performance of) his *nitya* and *naimittika karma* (i.e., *karma* performed daily and on special holy occasions), and he should make over his deeds in the name of (Lord) Śiva in a spirit of self-renunciation (with a view) to improve his wisdom. Can one, who is stung by a mere scorpion or the

like and dies, be expected to possess the power of swallowing the deadly *kālakūṭa* poison (i.e., the poison churned out of the ocean and drunk by Śiva)? Can one, who runs away at the sight of a rope, frightening himself that it is a serpent, be expected to wear (as a necklace) the cobra? If it is said that there is no proof whatever for the wearing of the *linga*, that there is no authority for the wearing of the *Sivalinga*, the smearing of the *bhasma* (sacred ashes) and the putting on of the *rudrāksha* beads by *mumukshus* (those desiring *mōksha*), like the servants of a king wearing his badges, the answer is that the argument underlying these questions is one that cannot be accepted (by us). Devotees (*bhaktas*) for attaining their own *sāyujya* (*Sivatva*) put on (their bodies) the signs *bhasma*, *rudrāksha* and the *Sivalinga*, according to (religious) ordinances (*vidhi*) of Śiva Himself that they should be so worn and that the omission of them would entail sin. As in this world we see that the king's emblems are given to his servants for their wearing them agreeably to his directions, similarly the *Vēdas*, *Sāstras*, *Purāṇas* and *Āgamas* direct the adorning of one's body with the *Sivalinga*, *bhasma* and *rudrāksha* according to the ordinances of Śiva. Agreeably to these directions we see people putting them on, thus making known the facts that they wear the cobra on their body, and swallow the poison (that Śiva wore and Śiva swallowed). Brahma, Viṣṇu and other devotees are proved to have worn the *Sivalinga*. As the *Linga Purāṇa* says:—

Sivāgnāpālanārthāya śivabhaktaśśivavratī ।

Linga rudrāksha bhasmāni śivachinhāni dhārayēt ॥

Rājāgnōllanghanāḷlokē yathā daṇḍō vidhīyatē ।

Sivāgnōllanghanād daṇḍo rauravam narakam tathā ॥ *iti.*

A Śivabhakta in order to carry out the ordinances of Śiva, should wear the *linga*, *rudrāksha* and *bhasma*, the symbols of Śiva; else, just as one who transgresses the orders of a king is punishable by him as may have been ordained, one who disobeys the commands of Śiva is punishable by being consigned to *Naraka*. If it is asked how

the Nīrguṇachaitanya (*Brahman*) could be obtained by the worship of the Saṅgu who is illusionary (*mithyābhūta*), the reply is that it is possible to do so according to what is mentioned in the *Kaivalya*, *Svetāśvatara* and other *Upanishads*, which declare that *Nirguṇa sarva sākshi chaitanya* could be obtained only by means of *Saṅguṇōpāsana*. Thus it is stated:—*Umāsahāyam Paramēśvaram Prabhūm Trilōchanam Nīlakanṭham praśāntam । Dhyātvā munirgachchati bhūtayōnim samastaśākshim tamasaḥ parastāt ॥ iti.*

By meditating on Nīlakanṭha, the supreme three-eyed Lord, helped by Umā, the holy saint will obtain Śiva, the origin of all created beings (*bhūtayōnim*) and the remover of all darkness about Himself (*tamasaḥ parastāt*). There is the further text of the *Rudrasūkta*:—*Sthirēbhirangaiḥ pururūpa ugrāḥ*, etc., which says that the bodily form of Śiva is an eternal one. Not only is such an eternal form of Śiva to be thought of as ordained while installing Lord Śiva in the temples (at consecration time) but also such a form should be thought of as ordained when meditation takes place by the *gāyatri* and *mantrāṅganyāsa* and *karanyāsa* take place and during *dhyāna* and the consecration of wells (*kuṇḍa*) and *manṭapas*. If it is not so accepted—i.e., if Śiva's eternal form is not so accepted—all religious actions, such as the offering of sacrifices and mantras, and the fruits thereof, etc., will prove in vain. Therefore for Brahmadevī, consecration by *Sāmbhava dīkṣa* is the only mode of qualifying.

In the (*Pūrvamīmāṃsā*) text beginning with *Yasyaitē'shtāchatvārimśat samskārah* and ending with *Brahmaṇaḥ sāyujyam salōkatām āpnōti*, all *karmas* including the ceremony of impregnation (*garbhādhāna*) are conveyed (*prāpaka*) to Paramēśvara to remove all sins. (These are *janmasamskāra karmas* and not *Brahmasamskāra karmas*.) Again, according to the texts, *Vidyāṅchāvidyāṅchayastadvēdōbhayam saḥ ॥ Tēnaiti Brahmadevī purṇakṛittaijasascha ॥ Satyēna labhyastapasā hyēsha ātmā samyaggnānēna brahmacharyēṇa nityam ॥* etc., which speak of the collection

of ceremonies required to be carried out for (attaining) *gnāna* (*gnāna karma samuchchaya*), it is meet that these ceremonies should be carried out after *dharma jignāsas* i.e., after *janma karma vidhi*, *gnāna karma vidhi* (should be carried out). Then, as to *janma karma samuchchaya*, another text states: *Tadyathēha karmachitō lokaḥ kshīyatē | Ēvamēva amutra puṇyachitō lokaḥ kshīyatē* etc., which means that the results of *karma* are not everlasting. Therefore, as mentioned in the text, *Parīkshya lōkān karma-chitān Brāhmaṇō nirvēdamāyāt nāstyakritaḥ kritēna* || a Brahman must distinguish between rituals which lead to *nirvēda* (i.e., *vairāgya*) and those which do not and then follow those which lead to it. In the text *Śāntōdānta*,¹⁰⁶ etc., it is declared that he should adopt such rituals whereby he will acquire the quality of becoming *śānta*, *dānta*, *uparata*, *titikshu* and *samāhita* by which he can see himself as well as others around him like himself. Then, as is said in the text *nacha punarāvartatē*, he no more will be born. Thus, he acquires thereby *mōksha* (or eternal bliss) as suggested in the above (quoted) texts.

Is *Brahma jignāsa* to be begun after practising the *sādhana chatuṣṭaya* (i.e., *śāntō dānta*, etc.)? If it is said that *linga-dhāraṇa* is also a *karma* giving no eternal result and is thus of no utility, (our answer is) that (it) is not so. Because in the text *Nāstyakrutaḥ kritēna*, only *prākruta karma* is mentioned to be of no value and as not productive of *mōksha*. But in the texts of the *Taittirīya* and *Svētāśvatara Upanishads*, *Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇōbhūyāsam || Tasyābhidyānāt yōjanāt tatvabhāvāt bhūyaśchānte viśva-māyānivrītiḥ || Vratamētat śāmbhavam tat samācharēt mumukshuḥ na punarbhavāya ||* and *Sarvalingam sthāpayati pāṇimantram pavitram* || etc., the wearing of the *Śivalinga*, meditation, etc., are stated to be *aprākruta karma*, i.e., *karma* fit for only attaining *mōksha*. The *prākruta karmas* such as *garbhādhāna*, etc., included in the twenty-four mentioned, are only preliminary rituals leading to the four

¹⁰⁶ *Śāntō dānta uparata titikshuḥ samāhitō bhūtvā ātmanyēva ātmānam pasyēt*,—*Bṛihad. Upanishad*, VI. 4. 23, (See note on p. 568.)

primary *sādhana*s (*sādhana-chatusṭaya*). Therefore to obtain the qualification necessary for a knowledge of Brahma-vidya (*Brahma-vidyādhikāritva*), the above (mentioned) *prākruta karmas* should be undergone and it is only then that one becomes eligible for a knowledge of Brahma-vidya through this *aprākruta karma* (i.e., *linga-dhāraṇa*). This *aprākruta karma* is the means for obtaining *mōksha* according to the *Sthūlārundhati nyāya* and *Samaksha jala nyāya*, as they (*prākruta* and *aprākruta karmas*) follow one another for their utility (*paramparā sādhanatvam yuktam*).¹⁰⁷

According to the *nyāya sandigdha vākya śēshāt*, in the text *Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam*, the qualification for initiation into *Brahma-vidyā* is unequivocally stated.

¹⁰⁷ *Sthūlārundhati nyāya* and *Samaksha jala nyāya* are two well-known popular maxims. The former is the maxim of the magnified *Arundhati*, the smallest of the seven stars of the constellation, invisible to the naked eye; the latter is the maxim of the water rushing in your presence. The *Sthūlārundhati nyāya* is sometimes called *Arundhatī darśana nyāya*; which Apte explains as the maxim of the view of the star *Arundhati*. Col. G. A. Jacob quotes it in his *Laukikanyāyānjali* (I. 5) as *Arundhatipradarśana nyāyaḥ*—the maxim of the pointing out of the star *Arundhati*. The idea, according to him, in this maxim is that of gradual instruction on the principle of the *Adhyārōpāpavādanyāyāḥ*. The following explanation of Sankarāchārya will make its use clear:—

Arundhatīm didarśayīṣuḥ tatsamīpasthām sthūlām tārām amukhyām prathamam Arundhatīti grāhayitvā tām pratyākhyāya paśchāt Arundhatīmēva grāhayati. I. 1. 8; I. 1. 12.

To know the star *Arundhati*, after discerning the bigger stars which are near to it but are unimportant and understanding them as *prathama* (first) *Arundhati*, you should go to the next (star) which is near to them and understand that that alone is *Arundhati*.

Arundhati is the morning star personified as the virtuous wife of Rishi *Vaśishṭha*, and is one of the *Pleiades*—the cluster of seven stars situated in the neck of the constellation *Taurus*. It is said that this star—*Arundhati*—is not visible to persons whose end has approached.—See *Hitōpadēśa*, I. 76.

The *Samaksha jala nyāya* suggests that one should infer that the water which is flowing before one's eyes in a particular manner has been flowing in that way and will flow through in the same way finding its own limit.

It is, therefore, held that the *sādhana-chatusṭaya* exemplified above, detailing the collection of *karmas* (intended) for obtaining *gnāna* is, according to the *Srutis*, held to be entirely doubtful. For, according to the text in the *Sankara Samhita* beginning from *Nityānitya vichāravān iha paratrāpēkshitārtharatiḥ*, etc., and ending with *Na tyaja prāṇalingam tvam yāvajjīvam pratignayā | Punarbhavō na tē vatsa vidyatē matruyōnishu iti*. (Do not give up the *Prāṇalinga* so long as you are alive; my son, if you keep it on, you will have no more births again out of your mother's womb, etc.) This shows that *linga-dhāraṇa* is held to be a consecration in addition to the *sādhana-chatusṭaya*. After this last (*i.e.*, *linga-dhāraṇa*), *Brahmagnūnōpadēśa* takes place. *Tato Brahmagnūnōpadēśavidhiḥ nirdiṣṭaḥ*. This is so according to the *nyāya Sandigdhe vākya śēṣāt*, *i.e.*, the maxim which allows that where a doubt arises, it should be settled from the sense of the remaining part of the syllogism.¹⁰⁸

The same explanation is given by Rēṇuka Bhagavat-pādāchārya, according to the text beginning from *Pinḍatū pinḍavignānam* ending with *Ētāni śivabhaktasya kartavyāni prayatnataḥ*, etc., appearing in the *Siddhānta Sikhāmaṇi*.

If, then, it is said that as by *linga-dhāraṇa* itself *mukti* can be easily acquired, why trouble oneself with enquiries (*jignāsa*) into the *Upanishad Śāstra*? We answer that it is said in *Sruti* texts like *Ātmā vārē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsitaḥ || Vēdānta śravaṇam kuryāt || Yōgam samārabhēt ||* etc. From these texts it follows that it is incumbent on even those who are free from the ties of the illusionary world (*māyāpūṣa vimuktānāmapī*), until they are quite free from all bondage and until they receive enlightenment to follow the ordinances of God

¹⁰⁸ Variants of this *nyāya* appear in Jnānōttama's comment on *Naishkarmasiddhi*. In IV. 3, the form *sandigdhe nyayaḥ pravartata iti nyayaḥ*, which Col. Jacob translates into *When there is doubt, reason comes into play*. Akin to it is the *nyāya sandigdham saprayōjanam cha vichāra marhatī*, which occurs in Jnānōttama's comment on I. 29. (See Jacob, *Laukikanyāyānjali*, II. 81-82.)

(*Paramēśvarāgnā pālanasya kartavyatva śravaṇāt*). If not (if the divine ordinances are not so observed), there is every cause for *kāma*, *krōdha* and other passions (*arishad varga*) entering the body again and taking away the *lingagnāna*. For it is declared in *Sruti* texts like:—*Āsuptēḥ āmritēḥ kālam nayēt vēdāntachintayā* | *Dadyāt nāvasaram kinchit kāmūdīnām manāgapi* || Utilize all your precious time from your birth until your death and even in your dreams in thinking over what is said in the *Vedānta*. In the meantime do not give heed in the least to other worldly attractions around you even in your thought.

By doing this—*linga-dhāraṇa* in addition to *Brahma-jignāsa*—there will be a death protection (*ubhayavidha balāt*) and a double attainment of the object (*ubhayasiddhi-vat*). *Linga-dhāraṇa* as well as *Brahma-jignāsa* are (therefore) not in opposition with each other (*na virōdhaḥ*) just as the practices (*vidhi*) involved in the sacrifices *Soutrāmaṇi*, *Brihaspati*, *Agnichayana* and *Vājapēya*, are doubly protected by the practices of the one occurring in the practices of the other. Just as in the *Jyōtiṣṭōma* sacrifice, *linga-dhāraṇa* should not, as a *prākruta karma*, be taken to be the cause leading to *mukti* as a matter of course, as it is manifestly contradictory to the *Srutis* above quoted. Also, in all probability the hearing of the *Srutis* will not be a cause to lead the disciple to *mukti*. If double protection is thus obtained—i.e., *linga-dhāraṇa* and *Brahma-jignāsa*—such double protection will prove the chief cause of absolution from the bondage of *māyā* (*māyapāśā nivrittāu mukhya kāraṇatva*). Else *Brahma-jignāsa* as a *Śāstra* will become an inconsistent discussion (*asambhava prasangaḥ*). Then all the trouble taken in using one's proficiency will have been spent on uprooting the very foundation of the subject.

Just as the sacrifices offered on the *darśa* (new moon) and *paurṇamāsa* (full moon) through *vrīhi* (grain) by sprinkling consecrated water on it, are calculated to obtain *svarga*, similarly all the *karma* done previously as *sādhana-chaṭuṣṭaya* is offered as an oblation to *Paramēśvara*

(*Paramēśvarārṇita*). Together with this oblation, the knowledge of Śiva (*Śivagnāna*) and the wearing of *Śivalinga* (*śivalinga-dhāraṇa*) are both calculated to bring about the attainment of *mōksha*. Where is the authority for both *linga-dhāraṇa* and *Brahmavichāra Sāstra* to come in regular succession (*kramaniyama*) for the attainment of *mukti*? In the sacrifices at *darśa* and *paurṇamāsa*, the performer is the same throughout; but in the case of *linga-dhāraṇa* and *Brahmavichāraṇa*, the *kramaniyama* does not apply to a single person or agent. If the doubt is cast that therefore the two cannot be compared with each other, then it is answered that the *Taittirīya*, *Svētāśvatara*, *Kaivalya*, *Jābāli*, *Kāṭhavalī* and other *Srutis* above quoted bear full testimony to the fact that the twice-born who adhere to *Śivōpāsana* are bound to act up to the *kramaniyama* mentioned above. In the *Sruti* text *Yō vai svām dēvatām atiyajatē prasvāyai dēvatāyai chavatē na parām prāpnōti pāpīyān bhavati* || it is laid down that he who disregards his own deity will be considered to have committed a religious sin. As it is stated in *Manu* and *Parāśara* :—

Brāhmaṇānām Śivō dēvaḥ Kshatriyāṇām tu Mādavaḥ |
Vaiśyanām tu tathā Brahmā Sūdrāṇām suranāyakaḥ ||
Brāhmaṇō Bhagavān Rudraḥ Kshatriyaḥ paramō
Hariḥ |

Pitāmahastathā Vaiśyō vṛishalastu Purandaraḥ || etc. Siva is the direct, supreme God of the Brāhmaṇa. In the *Sruti* text *Apāma (sōmam amrutā abhūma) ||* Let us drink *sōma* juice and become immortal, which means, according to the *Smṛiti* text, *Abhūta samplavasthānam amrutatvam hi bhāvyatē ||* that those who do not die in the *Pralaya* are immortal on account of the drinking of the *sōma*. Similarly, *amrutasya dēvadhāraṇam*, i.e., one who wears the *linga* becomes immortal by this *vidhi* (i.e., consecration). The idea sought to be impressed is that those engaged in a sacrifice, become immortal by the drinking of *sōma*; similarly, by the consecration of the *linga*, the person consecrated becomes immortal. Both do not die at the *Pralaya*.

Therefore in order to obtain the *Brahmagnāna* about the true form of Paśupati (Śiva), *Vēdānta vākya vichāra* is necessary. For it is said in *Sruti* and other texts:—*Satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpah sō'nvēshṭavyah sa vijignāsītavyah* That Great Being who is the Lover of truth (*satyakāma*) and who is the Lover of mental resolve (*satyasankalpa*) should, after incessant *jignāsa*, be sought out.

Also in the following text:—*Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyah śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsītavyah* ॥

O, you disciple! you must see that *Ātmā*, you must hear about that *Ātmā*, you must understand it and must meditate on it. Thus is the procedure about the *Brahma-jignāsa* stated in *Sruti* texts. And who is it that is to be sought by *jignāsa*? As to this, it is said in texts like the following:—*Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam Śivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē*¹ *Sa Ātmā sa vighnēyah*, etc., from which it follows that wherever *Ātmā* is referred to, it is only Para Śiva that is to be inferred and not any other.

The compound *Brahma-jignāsa* should be understood as *Brahmanah+jignāsa*, as *karmani shashṭhi* and not as *śēsha shashṭhi*, because *jignāsa* is desired and not anything other than Brahman, for if Brahman is taken along with other things, then the direct desire to know Brahman will be disregarded. In all discussions where firm decisions have to be arrived at, no matters unconnected with the prime object should be discussed. For if other matters of less importance be discussed, then there will be mistakes committed. By inserting the word *kartavya* in the *sūtra* (*Athātō Brahmajignāsa*), how is the mistake in a faulty discussion removed? In the text *Vishnurunupāmsūr yashṭavyō'jām*, etc., the suffix *tavya* denotes that it is necessary that *jignāsa* must be undertaken and not be omitted.

In *mahāvākyas* like *Tattvamasi*, *Ayamātmā Brahma*, etc., though the words are open to free discussion, yet there is nothing omitted, which need be supplied. Nor do they require any discussion to understand their meaning. Therefore, any word that we might supply

should satisfy the full meaning of the *sūtra* combined with the *Sruti* (*Śrutisūtrayōḥ aikyarūpyārtham adhyāhārah*).

The ordinance (*vidhi*) relating to *Śravaṇa* not having been accepted, and the benefit to be derived from it—as the ordained method—not having been obtained, there is no other unusual method possible. In all matters in which final decisions are necessary, the general meaning should enable us to decide them finally. This is in accordance with the universal experience of the world. Nor should we assert that *Brahma-sākshātkāra* could very easily be caused to be attained. What ought to have been obtained by enquiry having been obtained by the act of wearing the *linga*, and thus *Brahmagnāna* having been obtained, where is the necessity for adopting the *Vēdānta-śravaṇa* method for obtaining *Brahmagnāna*? Therefore, it may be asserted that there is no particular method (*niyamavidhi*) to follow for obtaining *Brahmagnāna*. Accordingly, it is not said that *Brahmagnāna* could be obtained without the help of a *guru*, by whom *Brahmagnāna* is to be imparted. For it is said in the *Sruti* text:—

*Parīkshya lōkān karmachitān Brāhmaṇō nirvēdamāyāt
nāstyakrutah krutēna ॥*

*Tadvignānārtham sa gurumēva abhigachchēt samit
pāṇiḥ śrōtriyam Brahmanishṭham ॥* etc.

Having examined the world and having looked at the people doing their *karma* for obtaining the intended fruits thereof, a Brahmin should become free from the bondage of worldly desires. Having determined to seek knowledge he must go (out from his house) to find out the *guru*, keeping in his hand the *kuśa* grass (*samit pāṇiḥ*), ready to hear and understand the sacred *Brahman*. Thus, to understand *Brahman*, the ordained method of going from one's house to the gates of the *guru*'s residence should be adopted, without which *Vēdāntagnāna* cannot be supposed to be acquired. By dispensing with one method for knowing the Brahman, we cannot get by one single process what has been ordained to be acquired from both the methods. The argument is that *linga-dhāraṇa* should be

combined with *śravaṇa* through a *guru* to obtain *Brahma-gnāna*. It ought now to be evident that *linga-dhāraṇa* is a method definitely laid down for knowing the Brahman (*linga-dhāraṇasya nityatvamastu*). The conclusion is that *linga-dhāraṇa* is as much a necessary qualification for knowing the Brahman as seeking a *guru* to know the Brahman through *śravaṇa*.

If it is asked that out of the three rules explained by Jaimini¹⁰⁹ under which rule this—*linga-dhāraṇa*—should be set down, we answer that it comes under all the three rules (*vidhi trayēṇa siddhatvāt*). The necessity for *linga-dhāraṇa* is strongly supported by all three *vidhis* (mentioned). *Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇo bhūyāsam*, etc., comes under *apūrva vidhi*. *Lingadhāraṇasya sarvaliṅgam sthāpayati*, etc., comes under *niyama vidhi*, because *tāntrika taptaliṅga śūla damaruka śankha chakrāṅka nishēdhapūrvaka śrauta bhasma rudrāksha lingadhāraṇa sōṅkārāt* comes under *niyama vidhi*. The text *Yaschchandāsām*, etc., states that all the texts which support *lingadhāraṇa* have been agreed to and adopted by the all-knowing Vyāsa, Durvāsa, Rēṇuka, Śvēta, Upamanyu, Dadhīchi, Kumbhasambhava and other ancient (*pūrva*) Āchāryas who have duly worn the *linga* and obeyed the ordinance and respected it. We always go according to the method supported by *Sruti*, *Yukti* and *Anubhūti* (i. e., Veda, usage and experience).¹¹⁰ Like the Buddhists, we do not deny or disown Brahman though the argument adduced from *yukti* (*yuktimātrūpalāpinaḥ*).

Accordingly in the *Sūtra*, the word *Atha* means:—

*Nigamāgama ubhayavēdānta pratipādita bhakti kriyā gnāna kāṇḍatraya vihita sthūla sūkshma chidachit prapancha prakāśaka śaṭsthala paraśiva sākshātkāra kāraṇa bahu-
janma krita śivārpita yajana yājana tapōdhyānāḍyanēka-
punya pūrva phalaka śarīratraya gata mālatraya*

¹⁰⁹ *Apūrva*, *niyama* and *parisankhyā vidhis* of Jaimini are called the *Jaimini sūtra vihita vidhitraya*.

¹¹⁰ *Anubhūti* in Nyāya philosophy means knowledge derived from four sources: namely, direct perception, inference, comparison and verbal knowledge, see *Bhāṣhā parichchēda*, 51-52.

*dhvamsaka kārūṇya kalyāṇa kaivalya vibhūti traya
pradāyaka aṣṭāvaraṇa panchāchāra sadguru karuṇā
kaṭāksha labdha śakti pātādyavachchinna paraśivēṣṭa
linga-dhāraṇātmake pāśupata dīkshānantaryam iti.*

Here if the word *Atha* gives the meaning of "After"—after the *pāśupata dīksha*—then the idea as to when *jignāsa* is to be undertaken, is conveyed. If that be so, what is the necessity for the use of the word *Atha* in the *Sūtra*? The answer is afforded by the *Sruti* text:—*Apāma sōmamamrutā abhūma*, etc.

Even original (*prākruta*) *karma* is yielding its daily fruits, as indicated in *Sruti* texts like:—*Omityēkāksharam Brahma* || *Asāvādityō Brahma* || *Nārāyaṇaḥ param Brahma* || *Annam Brahma* || etc. From texts like these, it is seen that there are several modes of meditation (*upāsana*). How then is it that the wearing of the *linga* can enable one to attain *mukti* (*paraśivēṣṭa linga-dhāraṇāt muktiḥ sambhavati*)? To remove this doubt and to fully confirm the importance (*driḍhīkaraṇārtham*) of *linga-dhāraṇa*, the word *Atha* is used in the *Sūtra*. Further, the results of *prākruta karma* are *anitya* (not lasting) as determined by several texts, such as:—*Puṇyachitōlōkaḥ kshīyatē*, etc. Several other texts prove that certain *Srutis* which lay down the principles of *vidhi* (*bahu prakaraṇa paṭhitāyāḥ*) are much stronger than the *Srutis* which detail daily *karma*. Therefore the *Sruti* text *Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam* is much stronger in principle than the others. For it is seen from *Sruti* texts like the following:—*Śiva ēkōdhyēyaḥ śivam-karaḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya* || ¹¹¹ *Ēka ēva rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē* || *Asamkhyātāḥ sahasrāṇi smaryatē nacha dṛśyatē* || *Tvam dēvānām Brāhmaṇānām adhipatiḥ Viṣṇuḥ Kṣatriyāṇām adhipatiḥ* || *Brāhmaṇānām Brāhmaṇaiḥ āśrīyatē* || etc., that Śiva is the deity prescribed for worship by the Brahmans. Also, in *Sruti* texts like *Yōvai svām devatām atiyajatē prasvāyai dēvatāyai chyavate naparām prāpnōti pāpiyān bhavati* || etc., which state that he who

¹¹¹ *Śvētāśvatara Upanishad*, IV. 18.

desecrates the worship of his own deity incurs sin, for it is clearly said in *Manu*, *Parāśara* and other *Smritis* :—

Brāhmaṇānām Śivō dēvaḥ Kshatriyāṇāmtu Mādhavaḥ |
Vaiśyānāmtu tathā Brahmā Sūdrāṇām suranāyakaḥ ||
Brāhmaṇō Bhagavān Rudraḥ Kshatriyaḥ paramō Hariḥ |
Pitāmahastathā Vaiśyo vrishalastu Purandaraḥ || etc.

These texts prove that Vēdic Brahmans have for their deity Śiva.

Devadharana Necessary for Jignyasa.

Again, the *Sruti* text *Apāma* (*sōmamamrutā abhūma*) etc., which agrees with what is enunciated in *Smriti* texts like :—*Abhūta samplava sthānam amrutatvam hi bhāvyaṃ*, etc., which state that those who go to *mukti* after the dissolution (*Pralaya*) of the world is complete, must be considered to have entered the Abode of All and become eternal. Accordingly the *vidhi* of *Dēvadhāraṇam*, though fixed by reason of a general requirement (*sādhāraṇakāraṇatvēna*) eventually leads to final bliss (*amrutatva*).

Therefore, in order to definitely know the *Paśupati svarūpa Brahman*, the enquiry into Vēdānta (*Vēdāntavākya vichāra*) must necessarily be undertaken after *dēvadhāraṇa vidhi*. This means that *dēvadhāraṇa vidhi* is necessary for *Brahma-jignāsa* and that both are necessary to attain the knowledge of the Brahman. Accordingly the *Sruti* text thus enunciates the *Brahma-jignāsa vidhi* :—*Satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpah so'nvēśhtavyaḥ sa vijignāsitavyaḥ || Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ ||* Also in the *Sruti* text *Praṇchōpaśamam śāntam śivam advaitam chaturtham manyante sa Ātmā sa vignēyaḥ* etc., the word "Ātman" is definitely intended to have no other meaning than *Paraśiva*.

Here in the *Sūtra*, *Brāhmaṇō-jignāsā* etc. is *karmani shashṭhi* and not *śēsha shashṭhi*, because we must take it to have been used in the genitive case as a prescribed *vidhi* and not as a *jignāsa* that could be treated lightly and as used in the *śēsha shashṭhi* (*jignāsyōpēkshitatvāt śēsha shashṭhī parigrahaṇē*). Therefore *Brāhmaṇō-jignāsa*

should be considered as *sambandha sāmānya nishṭhatva* which method determines the idea of Brahman as an important (*pradhāna*) result. Some say that in this *Sūtra* the word *kartavya* need not be understood (as a necessary addition). If this word is not supplied, then the *Sūtra* which suggests that there is a definite object to be gained (i.e., Brahma knowledge through *jignāsa*), will end in a fruitless discussion (*nishprayōjanānuvādē dōshābhāvāt*). But if one asks how will the mere supplying of the word “*kartavya*” remove all doubt, then we answer that according to the *Sruti* text *Vishṇurūpāmśu yashṭavyō ajāmitvāyē* etc., in which the suffix *tavya* shows that what cannot be attained in any other way can be attained in this particular way. Similarly in the texts *Tattvamasi*,¹¹² *Ayamātmā Brahma*,¹¹³ etc., wherein also the mode of discussion is involved, such a suffix as *tavya* should be understood and supplied. For this *Sūtra* is one which should be discussed and then a decision arrived at according to the *Vidhyapēkshitanyāya* (which lays down that a prescribed rule should be followed before arriving at a conclusion) and therefore a common verb which will satisfy both the *Sruti* and *Sūtra* should be supplied. Therefore the word *jignāsa* should be taken to mean the discussion which is intended to determine the *bhēdābhēda vichāra* denoted in the *mahāvākyas* such as *Tattvamasi*, etc.

To state that *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyaḥ syanda-mānāḥ samudrē* || *Brahma vid Brahmaiva Bhavati* || *Gnātvā Sivam śāntim atyantamēti* || *Nānyaḥ panthā vidyatē ayanāya* || etc., etc., enunciate the unity of the *Brahman* and the *jīva* and make such unity the chief characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of both is un-Vēdic, because by so doing we would be leaving out of consideration their primary meaning. Such an interpretation will end in the contradiction of the *Īkshatyadhikaraṇam*.

¹¹² *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*, VI. 8. 7 and VI. 9. 3.

¹¹³ *Brihad. Upanishad*, IV. 5. 19 ; *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*, I. 2.

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Further *Sruti* texts like *Tamēvam viditvā atimri-tyumēti* || *Nānyaḥ panthā vidyatē ayanāya* || *Dhyātvā munir-gachchati bhūtayōnim samastasākshim tamasaḥ parastāt* || etc., enunciate that only a dual method of worship of God Śiva (*bhinnātmōpāsakasyaiva*) will bring unity with God. *Sruti* texts like *Tarati śōkam Ātmavit* || *Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyaḥ* || etc., assuredly lay down that a dualistic mode of worship only should be adopted.¹¹⁴ And only he who adopts such a dualistic mode of worship as is laid down in the *Sruti* texts referred to, realizes the duality that exists between *Ātma* and *jīva* (*Sruti-vihitātmōpāsanasya bhinnātma vishayatvam siddham*). But the *parisankhyā niyama*¹¹⁵ *vidhi* is not always applicable. Nor does one who adopts a separate form of worship (*sādhana*) obtain unison with God (*samuchchitya prāptyabhāvāt*). To one who follows a different mode of adoration, *Vēdānta vichāra* is impossible throughout his life. It will result in sin (for him to attempt it). Also, is it necessary for one who wants to attain unity with God that he should be a *Sanyāsi* or an *Asanyāsi*; (we answer) he need not be the latter, for it is impossible for him (*aśakyatvāt*); nor need he be the former, for he must be one who rigidly follows all the conditions that bind a *Sanyāsi*. It is said in the *Chchāndōgya* text, *Brahmasamsthaḥ amrutatvamēti*, no one else except he who follows strictly the *mukti sādhana* can attain Brahman (*amrutatva*). For it is said in the *Sruti* texts like:—*Sampūrvatishtatēs samāpti vāchitvasya agnishtōma samsthē* || etc. The phrase *Brahma samsthā* referred to in the *Chchāndōgya* texts means no other form except that of Brahman (*ananya vyāpāravarūpatvāt*), as stated in the

¹¹⁴ The idea is that *aikya* results only when there is the relationship of *pūjya* and *pūjaka*, *upāsya* and *upāsaka*.

¹¹⁵ *Parisankhyā* in the *Mimāṃsā* philosophy means exclusion or limitation to that which is enumerated or expressly mentioned, so that everything else is excluded. *Parisankhyā* is opposed to *vidhi* which lays down a rule for the first time, and to *niyama* which restricts the choice to an alternative which is expressly stated when several such alternatives are possible.

Atharvaṇa text :—*Tamēvaikam jānatha ātmānam anyā-vāchō vimunchatha* ॥ Understand him alone definitely as Ātma and leave away all other words. Texts like *Āsuptēḥ āmrutēḥ kālam nayēt vēdānta chintayā* and others occurring in the *Srutis*, declare that one should never employ any means other than the prescribed *vidhi* which alone will lead to the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, this is the chief *vidhi* prescribed. In the *Kaivalya Chandrōdaya*, in the *Yadvatō Vidyādhivat-adhikaraṇa*, the Paramāradhyas have been stated to have attained the Brahman without any means other than the one above described. From the expression *parisankhyā vā śravaṇādishu sambhavēt*, it would seem that sometimes the *parisankhyā vidhi* may also be employed to attain the knowledge of Brahman. But such a method is not always to be taken as the chief one of the three *vidhis* mentioned.

Object of Jignasa is Brahman.

Therefore in this *Sūtra*, the chief matter for consideration being the knowledge of Brahman as the desired result, the object is, therefore, according to the *Srutis*, Brahman alone. It should not be supposed that this desired knowledge of Brahman may be obtained by any other method as suggested by the word *kartavya*. (It is hinted that the *vidhitraya* should be adopted for the purpose.)

Brahman is not always attributeless (*Sadā Brahmanō na nirviśēshatvam*). If he is ever attributeless, what is left to one to enquire about Brahman? The *Sruti* text goes :—*Parūsyā śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvikē gnāna bala kriyā cha* ॥ The Brahman to be discussed and known has always two forms, corporeal and incorporeal (*mūrtāmūrtatvam*). *Sruti* texts like *Dvēvāva Brahmanōrūpē* ॥ *Tadādi madhyānta vihinamēkam vibhum chidānandamarūpa madbhutam* ॥ *Umāsahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam Nīlakantham praśāntam* ॥ *Dhyātvā munirgachchati bhūta-yōnim samastasākshim tamasaḥ parastāt* ॥ etc., sufficiently well declare that such (both) forms (of Brahman) should be thought of. Else the meaning intended by the *Sruti* texts

would be abridged and thus we will not be respecting the authority of the *Sruti*.

The Theory of Nirvisesha Brahman.

Some (Vēdāntins) say that if the truth about Brahman is to be realized, if one is to obtain freedom from *paśu* and *pāśa* (i.e., worldly ties), he should be understood as *nirviśeṣha Brahman* and not as *saguṇa Brahman*. (In the text *nirviśeṣha Brahmagnāna* is referred to as opposed to *saguṇa gnāna*, i.e., *saguṇa Brahmagnāna*). The qualities of Brahman are always spoken of as of a conflicting kind, as enunciated in texts like *Athāta ālēsō nēti nēti* || But in the text *Ētaḥ vai tadakṣharam gārgyasthūla mananva hrasva* || etc., the Immortal (*Akṣharam*) is stated to be devoid of quality of every kind. In texts like *Ēkamēvādvitīyam Brahma* || *Nēha nānāsti kinchana* || etc., it is said that Brahman has no equal (*advitīyatva*). Similarly in texts like *Sākṣhī chētā kēvalō nirguṇaścha* || etc., it is said that Brahman should be understood as *guṇanishēdha* (i.e., devoid of all *guṇas* or qualities). It should not, however, be so understood. Because all the *Srutis* decidedly taken together declare that Brahman has both the *mūrta* and *amūrta* forms and that he should be understood as such. No qualities of Brahman (*Brahmadharmāṇām*) should be set aside (*anishiddhatvāt*). Likewise is the import of the *Sūtra* (III. 2. 21) *Prakrutaitāvatvam hi pratishēdhati tatōbravīti cha bhūyaḥ* || etc., which declares that Brahman should be considered as having *ānanda* of an exceptional quality (*anyathā ānandādīnām*). Even texts which declare the oneness of Brahman such as, *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt*, etc., state that prior to *srisṭi* (creation), there was this unrivalled One. So the *Sruti* texts that declare Brahman as *nirguṇa* evidently include Brahman possessing all qualities (*sarvagnatādishu*). The word *guṇa* is used (here) in connection with Brahman as meaning "devoid of *satva* and the rest of the three *guṇas*", and so should not be taken as denoting "without attributes" (*guṇa śabda prayōgābhāvēna satvādi guṇatrāyābhāva paratvāt*). Similarly other *Sruti* texts like *Yas sarvagnas sarvavit* || (He

(Brahman) who is all wisdom and all-knowing) etc., also contradict the statement that Brahman is *nirviśēsha*.

The ancient Āchāryas (*Pūrvāchāryas*) possessed of Vēdic knowledge, such as Rēvaṇa Siddha, Marula Siddha and others, affirm that prior to Creation, there was no manifestation of either *Vyakta* or *Avyakta* (the Seen or the Unseen). Therefore it is that we suggest that all the *Srutis* (*Brahma vākyas*) which refer to the Advaita Brahman, simply mean that the all-knowing Brahman, the great unrivalled Being who has no second, alone existed at first and not that the Brahman is attributeless. Thus states the *Svētāśvatara*:—*Yadā tamastan nadvāna rātriḥ na san nachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ* || Similarly the following text from the *Atharva-śiras*:—*Ahamēkaḥ prathamamāsam vartāmicha bhavishyāmicha nānyaḥkaschin mattō vyatiriktaḥ* ||

Then, again, the text goes:—*Nānyat kinchanamishat* || etc. These texts show that running through the whole of the Vēdānta is the idea that, on the analogy of the maxim that all roads lead to a common meeting point, prior to Creation, all was in that One (Brahman) without a second. And that unrivalled Brahman when he was about to bring about Creation, was possessed of several ideas (*bhāva*) about it. Thus declare the *Srutis*:—*Sō 'kāmayata bahusyām prajāyēya* || etc., in an undivided (*abhēda*) sense. That is, before Creation, everything was in Brahman without a division. And it must be understood that all the *Sruti* texts mean that Brahman was in an undivided condition. For it is said in texts like *Aitadāmtyam idam sarvam* || *Sarvō hyēsha Rudraḥ* || *Ātmaivēdam sarvam* || etc. These and other similar texts declare that Brahman, out of his own free will, was in a position to bring about the Creation of *Viśva*, and was both the *kārya* and *kāraṇa* : in an undivided form (*abhēdascha*) just as the earth and the earthen pot.

In the *Atharva-śiras*, we have *Ēka vignānēna sarva-vignāna pratignā cha* || *mām yō vēda sarvān vēda* || etc. "He who knows thoroughly one thing well can claim to

understand about all other things" and that "He who understands Me can understand all the rest." So after knowing the underlying truth of *Śivatatva*, all other truths are thoroughly proved (*siddhamiti siddham*).

Before Creation the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) of *Jagat*, i.e., Prakriti, did exist. If so, how can Brahman be said to be the unrivalled One without a Second? It is explained thus:—Just as the magnet possesses the property of attracting to itself iron and just as fire is never free from its burning property, so *Īśvara* was with this (*Īśvara*) *śakti* and was accordingly the One Unrivalled without a Second. For it is said in *Sruti* texts like *Tād-ātma śaktim svaguṇair nigūḍhām* || *Parāśya śaktiḥ vividh-aiva śrūyatē svābhāvikī gnāna bala kriyā cha* || etc., that the *Paraśakti*¹¹⁶ of *Śiva* is His own and not apart from Him as He is declared by the *Āgamas*, *Srutis* and *Purāṇas* and therefore the *mumukshus* (those who aim at *mōksha*) should not agree to the un-Vēdic statements about the illusion of the world (*Jaganmithyātva*) as propounded by the *Advaitavādins*. And also the text *Nēti nēti* of the *Sruti* should not be understood to mean that Brahman is entirely without a corporeal body (*niravayava*). In the *Sruti* text *Sthirēbhirangaiḥ pururūpa ugra* || etc., it is stated that the worldly sports (*prākṛita paramaśivalīla*) etc., exhibited by the auspicious forms of *Śiva* (*mangala vigraha*) are eternal (*nityatva śravaṇāt*), though this is not to be understood in the same sense as those holding the *Samyuktādvaita* (*Viśiṣṭādvaita*) and *Pāñcharātra* tenets profess it, which explains the rule governing the double nature of Brahman in being both the Remainder and the Whole and his being constant in the different parts of his body (*śēshi śēshatva vyavasthā* of Brahman and his *angāngatvēna sāvayavatva*). If we agree to the latter view, then we have to admit that the *jīva* should enjoy happiness (*sukha*) and misery (*dukkha*).

¹¹⁶ *Paraśakti* : *Para* means pre-eminent, and *śakti* is the active principle of a deity regarded as his wife.

Texts like *Ākāśavat sarvagataścha pūrṇā* ॥ and hundreds of other texts as well, contradict such a view. Nor do we hold the tenets of the *Sadāghaṭapaṭavannātyantabhēda-vādinah* ॥ i.e., those who ever hold that *jīva* and Brahman are constantly as apart as *ghaṭa*—a pot—and *paṭa*—a cloth. Because *Sruti* texts like *Yēnāśrutam śrutam bhavati* etc., solemnly contradict such a declaration. Nor do we discuss according to the opinions of *rajju-sarpa vādins* who hold that everything is one in Brahman and explain that the world is an illusion (*Ēkatara mithyātva vādinah*).

In *Sruti* texts like *Satyakāmas satyasankalpa*, it is declared that Īśvara is naturally possessed of infinite good qualities (*ananta kalyāṇa guṇah*). Also, texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyante* “from whom these creatures came into being”, show that Brahman was the material cause for the creation, etc., of the world.

Again, texts like *Ēka vighnānēna sarvavighnāna pratignā*, declare that the *upāsanā* Brahman is possessed of both *mūrta* and *amūrta* forms. And therefore naturally all the *Sruti* texts go to prove that they should be understood in consonance with the view of *Bhēdābhēda vāda* and all the other views above referred to be held to be contradictory to the import of the *Srutis*. This is the whole established truth (*Bhēdābhēdāvādina iti rāddhāntah*). *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvau ajā vīsānīsau | pradhāna kshētragnapatir-guṇēsah* ॥ explain that the quality of Śiva is unrivalled, having no second and that He is the Para Brahman, the All-knowing and that His qualities are incomparable with those of others as stated in the *Srutis*. This proves that the *jīva* is naturally bound down by the rope of *avidyā* i.e., illusion (*svābhāvikā vidyāpūṣa baddha*) and is possessed of *jaḍa*, *jaḍatva* and *sarvānubhava* (stupefaction, liveliness and all experience).

If it is asked how Paramaśiva, who is in all (*sarvādhish-thānasya*) and who is all-pervading (*sarvavyāpakasya*) can possess the two forms *Mūrtāmūrta*, it is answered that just as *Prakriti* presents herself in the form of sky (*mahat*), in the form of the earth (*jagat*), etc., and is the

cause of all *guṇatraya* and also keeps her *chidrūpa*, so Paramaśiva, on the one hand, exhibits himself in the form of the Wind which can be felt and on the other, without form, by pervading all through the world and without being seen. And He also exists in the *pradhāna*¹¹⁷ form all pervading the sky (*mahat ahankāra kalākāla Vāyurūpēṇa*) while the *chidrūpa*, the *Prakriti*, exhibits herself in such forms as light (*tējas*), water (*salila*) and earth (*prithvī*). What is not possible for Paramaśiva who is possessed of the power to do all things seemingly impossible (*aghaṭanāghaṭana śakti*) and is possessed of infinite powers?

In *Virūpēbhyō viśvarūpēbhyascha vai namōnamah* and numerous other texts of the *Srutis*, it is declared that He is possessed of such powers. Also in the *Saivāgamas* and in certain parts of the *Vēda*, it is said *Śaktēḥ sankōchabhāvēna srishtēḥ pūrvam Mahēśvaraḥ* | *Niramśō nirguṇaschēti vēdāntēshu pragīyatē* || *Śaktēr vikāśabhāvēna hyananta-guṇavān iti* | *Prōchyatē Bhagavān Rudraḥ paśupāśa-pramōchakaḥ* || *Mūrtāmūrtasvarūpēṇa yathā Vāyur virājatē* | *Sadāśivastathā bhāti sarvānugrahakārakaḥ* || *Mūrtāmūrtajagadrūpā yathā māyā tathā Sivāḥ* | *Mūrtāmūrtasvarūpaḥ syādīti vēdāntaḍṇīdimah* || *Ētad vēdāntahridayam agnātvā mōhitāḥ parē* | *Śrutērapārtham kurvanti lōkē paṇḍitamāninaḥ* || But in certain other less prominent texts of the *Vēda*, a view contradictory to the above is suggested, but it is not to be taken seriously by the learned. *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* are not opposed to each other just as light and darkness are (*na tamaḥ prakāśavat bhēdābhēdō viruddhaḥ*). But is it that light and darkness are to be taken as co-existing at the same time or coming (one after another) as day and night by difference of time? The reply is it is not the first (of the two states above mentioned); though they appear to exist simultaneously like *rūpa*, *jāti*, *śabda*, *artha*, *guṇa*, *guṇi*, *maṇi*, *prakāśa*, etc., without opposing each other. In the dualistic world (*dvaita prapancha*), in *ghaṭassanghaṭōbhāti*, etc.,

¹¹⁷ Controlling form of *Prakriti*.

the name and the form (*nāma rūpa*) are seen, and people appreciate it conjointly. The name and the form co-exist and could be seen simultaneously by those who love it (the object). Similarly the existence of *Prakriti*, both in the form of cause and effect (*kārya kāraṇatvēna*), could be seen co-existing simultaneously in the form of *chit* and *ānanda* in an undivided, single (*Advaita*) form. If such a thing is not admitted or agreed to, then, according to the maxim *nahidrishṭēr anupapannam nāma* (i.e., is it likely that that which is seen by the eye is not seen by it?), a contradiction results. And also it will be just as an illusionary mirage (*maru marīchikādivat bhrānti mātram*) and there will be neither fulfilment of the desired object (*artha siddhi*) nor of action (*kriyā siddhi*). Not the second, for in *Dvāsuparṇa* and other *Sruti* texts it is clearly seen that during *samsāra-daśa*, the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are seen to exist separately (*jīva-brahmaṇōr bhēdaḥ*).

Many other *Sruti* texts such as *Tattvamasi*, etc., rightly declare that at the time of release there is unity (*Mōksha-daśāyām abhēdascha yuktamēva*). In *Satya kāma* etc., and other *Sruti* texts, it is declared that the world should not be considered as true temporarily for practical purposes only (i.e., *na vyavahāramātra satyatvam*), just as the magical and illusory appearance of silver in a shell (*aindra-jāla śukti rajatavat*), but that it must be accepted of Parabrahma Śiva that the hidden actions of Creation, Existence and Destruction co-exist in Him as the Reality (*Tirōdhāna kāmasya satyatvam*). There is nothing here that could be falsely attributed; because while the cause is real, the action ought, as a rule, to be real. If it is supposed that it is right to start admitting for purposes of discussion (*jignāsa*) that Brahman is *nirviśēsha* and *nishkriya*, no discussion about such a Brahman can arise. For in such a Brahman, a false attribution of illusory truth is conceived and a false existence of Brahman in whom the chief material cause of the world (*pradhāna satva*) is understood to be existing, is predicated. If such a thing can be accepted as correct, then the text *Yanmanasā namanutē*

yēnāhur manōmatam | *Tadēva Brahmatvam viddhi* | *Nēdam yadidamupāsātē* and other texts which state that attributes, though inconceivable, are admitted by the power of expression, will be contradicted. So it is that Brahman is extolled and worshipped in the *saguna* form (*saguṇōpāsanaśya*) by the use of expression (*vāk*) and by the use of organs of sense (*indriya*)¹¹⁸; if we do not accept this, then we reach the contradictory position (*asambhava*) that for *gārudamantra*, for the use of which (for casting a spell) the magician and the spell are both required, it is enough if we have either of them—either the magician or the spell, which would not help to attain the objective.¹¹⁹ Therefore, throughout the *Vēda*, *Vēdānta*, *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* which deal with *bhakti*, *kriyā* and *gnāna* (faith, action and knowledge), it is declared that Brahman should be understood as *saguna Brahman*. But if it is to be taken as *māyā* (*kalpitam*), then it would be like washing off our hands of the above *i.e.*, *Vēda* etc., (*dattāñjali prasaktiśyāt*).

Further, if *avidyā*, which is not existing (*asati*), is to be assumed as existing, for argument's sake, in Brahman (*Īśvara*), just as an artificial (*kritrima*) *sāligrāma* is assumed to be an object of holy worship,¹²⁰ who could be expected to have

¹¹⁸ Lit. an organ of sense or faculty of sense. In *Vēdānta*, *manah*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *chitta* and *chētana* are said to be the five internal organs. The total number of organs is, therefore, 15, each presided over by its own ruler, or *niyantru* (administrating agent). Advaitins do not admit *chētana* as a different organ, as the identity of *jīva* and *Brahman* is a postulate with them.

¹¹⁹ Here both magician and the spell are of the *saguna* class and the resulting third issuing from their combination is of the *nirguna* class.

Gāruda is a charm against snake poison; see *Kādambari*, 51 (Bombay Edn.).

¹²⁰ The commentator suggests that *Avidyā* is an artificial assumption on the part of Sankara and his followers in regard to Brahman and is no more efficacious than an artificial (*kritrima*) *sāligrāma* can be an object of holy worship on the part of a pious *bhakta*. *Avidyā* is as artificial an assumption in regard to Brahman as an artificial *sāligrāma* can be to a pious worshipper. Śūnya Brahman is as efficacious as a *kalpita sāligrāma* to a *bhakta*.

bhakti, *sraddhā* and *viśvāsa* in such a Brahman or in such a *sāligrāma*? Again, how can that Māyā (*kalpita*) Īśvara be deemed capable of granting all the results that the worshipper wants by his faithful meditation and adoration? If this is not so, the text *Mātrudēvō bhava; Pitrudēvō bhava; Āchāryadēvō bhava* and other *Sruti* texts which prescribe the (prevalent) method of worship will become incomprehensible, meaningless (*i.e.*, *asambhāvyam*). Thus in an Īśvara to whom *chaitanya*¹²¹ is wrongly attributed, Īśvaratva will prove illusory (*viśiṣṭēśvaratvam na syāt*), as in a rope mistaken for a serpent, there is no cause for fear (*bhayamapi na syāt*).

Those who are expert in the knowledge of things invisible (*aparōksha vidyāvatāmapi*) are said to be feared by even the Heavenly planets such as the Sun. In texts like *Bhīṣmāsmāt vātaḥ pavatē (bhīṣhōdēti sūryaḥ)*, *Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśānīśau*, *Ajō hyēkō jushamānō'nuśētē jahātyēnām bhuktabhōgām ajō'nyaḥ*, etc., the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are stated as never having had a birth, which appears to be an invention (*kalpitatvāt*) and hence not Vēdic (*avaidikaḥ*). Moreover, what are the unimpeachable evidences to prove Brahman is attributeless (*nirviśēsha*)? Unless we can clearly understand and prove that *śabda* is not inseparable from Brahman and that Brahman has no separate existence by itself and unless we understand that *śabda* has the power to describe the qualities of Brahman and that *śabda* has the quality of pervasion (*vyāpti*) and that Brahman is completely unassociated with *śabda*, Brahman cannot be (described as) attributeless (*nirviśēsha*), for the knowledge of being attributeless (*nirviśēsha*) cannot remove absolutely the doubts and contradictions regarding the knowledge of Brahman. Unless we make sure that there is a pot (*ghaṭa*) in the house, we cannot definitely state whether there is a pot in the house or not. In the same way, unless we make

¹²¹ In Vēdānta philosophy, *chaitanya* means the supreme spirit considered as the essence of all being and source of all sensation,

sure of the qualities of an object and of its existence or its contrary, we cannot say anything about the object itself. Have we to understand *Īśvara* to depend on his own qualities (*dharma*) or depend on qualities which are beyond himself or on qualities which are contrary to them? Just as a pot (*ghaṭa*) is understood by its qualities, similarly the *Ātma* is understood by the qualities of *Dēvadatta*. A lover of Truth (*satyakāma*) will never fail to realize Brahman (*Brahma sākshātkāra*). The superiority of *Īśvara* cannot be stated to be apart from *Īśvara* Himself. Therefore it may be decidedly declared that it would be as improper to state that a tangible object is possessed of no properties, as to make the statement that "my mother is a barren woman".¹²² Such a statement will destroy all investigation (*vyavahāra*), rendering it nugatory (*ayuktam*).

Sabda and Brahman.

In the *Sruti* text *Ātmā vā'rē drashṭavyah* etc., which states that Parabrahman must be made an object of sight as the result of wisdom, it is declared that Parabrahman should be caused to be viewed by the mental eye through the process of hearing the holy teachings.¹²³ Such a process will go without any meaning if the *pūrvapaksha* argument (*viz.*, that *śabda* is not different from Brahman) is accepted. From the root *śru*, is derived the word *śravaṇa*, to hear; from the process of hearing through the recitation of the *Vēda* and through the teaching of the *guru*, the result (derived) enables the mental capabilities of the disciple to cultivate knowledge (*gnāna*); and this helps to the determining and understanding of Brahman. Texts like *Vēdārtham śruṇōti* etc., should not be construed as "he hears the meaning of the *Vēdas*" (*i.e.*, carelessly, without applying his *gnāna* to it), whereby the actual meaning of the root of the word (*dhatōśśaktiḥ*) has not made any impression

¹²² The declarant being the son of the "mother" referred to.

¹²³ The sound entering into the ears makes the mental eye to open its lids.

on him (*i.e.*, the disciple), *i.e.*, made him enlightened as to the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore this act of hearing has two aspects (*lakṣhaṇa*), *viz.*, the *śakti* of producing a knowledge of Brahman in the disciple and not producing any impression at all on him.

In expressions like *Vīṇānādam śruṇōti*, etc., even though the person who hears shows a great deal of pleasure, he may be utterly ignorant of the nature of the song ; or its innate qualities (*bhāvas*) ; thus though he hears the sound of the *vīṇā*, it gives no opportunities to him to obtain the full benefit of it. Because the sound does not give him the power (*śakti*) for such understanding. Though he can appreciate the sound which he hears, yet he cannot clearly explain the words of the song and their denotation. In texts like *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma*, though the meaning of the words forming the text may be understood, yet their full force may not be grasped by the disciple. Because he may be incapable of right knowledge (*āpāta pratipattiḥ*). Not that such a comprehension of right knowledge is impossible to obtain after learning from a *guru* (*adhyayana gnāna*). Even then just as the *bhramara* and the *kīṭa* who merge into each other by the natural removal of *avidyā*, similarly the good grace of the *guru* is capable of removing all *avidyā* out of the pupil and make him possessed of the supreme knowledge. Therefore sound (*śabda*) has that power (*śakti*) to remove ignorance through the means of the law of hearing (*śravaṇa vidhi*). Thus it is that in the text beginning with *Sahōvācha navā'rē patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyōbhavati* and ending with *ātmanastu kāmāya sarvam priyōbhavati*, we have the truth nunciated for us that we can attain to the highest realization of human effort (*parama purushārtha*)¹²⁴ through the *Ātma* after

¹²⁴ *Parama*+*purusha*+*artha* : in which *purushārtha* means any one of the principal objects of human life,—*Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma* and *Mōksha* ; human effort or exertion. Hence, *Parama-purushārtha* : What might be attained to by the highest human effort—self-realization.

being possessed of that knowledge ; and this is capable of giving us extreme happiness (*niratiśaya sukha*). Similarly texts like *Ātmani vignāta idam sarvam viditam* ¹ *Ētāvāt arē khalu amrutatvam*, etc., declare that the only way (*upāya*) to know Brahman is through *Ātma-gnāna* and that all the means employed are only towards that end. This is the firm declaration of the truth. And therefore such *Ātma-gnāna* ought necessarily to be obtained by those who seek that realization. Towards that end, the only course open is through *śrōtavya* (i.e., through hearing, as a pupil does from his *guru*). This is the firmly established truth. *Sabda-gnāna* creates an extraordinary spirit of inquiry and reasoning in regard to the qualities of the Brahman. As is enunciated in texts like *Tam tvaupanishadam purusham prichchāmi* || *Na veda-vin manutē tam bruhantam* || *Naishā tarkēṇa matir-āpanēya* || etc., Brahman cannot be too clearly brought under understanding for want of sufficient independent evidence (*mānāntarābhāvāt*).

The text *Drashtavya*,¹²⁵ etc., declares that "you must see him". The result of attaining knowledge through the practices of Vēdic adoration (*sādhanas*) is the attainment of Brahman by visually seeing him (*drashtavyam*). That is the purpose of inquiry (*tachchā vichāritam*). The discussion (*jignāsa*) was not meant merely to end in meditation, and making certain the mere existence of Brahman. After knowing the Vēdānta expressions (*vākya*) and being possessed of the knowledge (of Brahman), it must result necessarily in self-realization (*ātma-sākshātkāra*) as a true effect. Else there is no use of simply seeking after an object and not finding it.

No object can be clearly understood without its qualities being clearly described, so that they might be perceptible to the mental eye. In the text *Ardham antarvēdi minōti ardham bahirvēdi ityatra*, etc., the *lakshana* of the words

¹²⁵ *Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsitaivaḥ*. (See *Brihad. Upanishad*, II. 4. 5.)

which describe the qualities, is to be noted. The words *antarvēdi* and *bahirvēdi* describe the *śāla* (i.e., the sacrificial spot). Again, in the texts *Jātaputrā*,¹²⁶ *Krishṇa kēśō agninā adhītē* ||¹²⁷ etc., the first denotes the *vidhis* to be observed at particular ages in the case of a son born to one; and the second, the nature of the fire before which the *adhyayana* is carried out; the words used establish the qualities and through them create the *gnāna* and *karma* (knowledge and acts) relating to them. In the text *Uchchairūruchākriyata*, etc., in which the word *rugādi*¹²⁸ signifies not merely the hymn (which the collection of the words make) but also the action (*kriya*) underlying it.

Again, in the text *Yāvatō'śvān pratighriṇṇyāt*, etc., the words used express the natural qualities (*nijārtha lakṣhaṇa*) of the horses¹²⁹ (which are specially intended for the sacrifice). And in texts like *Nēkshētōdyantamādityam* ||¹³⁰ *Nārshēyam vrinītē* ||¹³¹ etc., the words used indicate the particular qualities of the rising sun and the girl of the Rishi, and convey to the mind the particular idea intended without taking into consideration certain other things. In the text *Na kalanjam bhakshayēt*¹³² which prohibits heavenly bliss (*purushārtha*) to those who partake of tobacco, what is implied is that the man who transgresses the prohibition, though with a good motive, not only by so doing loses the heavenly bliss, but also renders himself utterly sinful. There is decidedly no separation between the body and *ātma* (*na cha vyāvṛttyabhāvaḥ*). Even though the body and

¹²⁶ *Jātaputrā*. *Jātaḥ* denotes a son, male offspring; in dramas, often used as a term of endearment; *Atra jāta kathayitvam kathaya*; *Uttararāma Charita*. "Dear boy", "Oh, my darling", etc.

¹²⁷ Lit.—He is performing the *adhyayana* before the sacrificial fire raised by the *Krishṇa Yajurveda* method.

¹²⁸ Lit.—A hymn of the *Rig. Vēda* as opposed to *Yajus* and *Sāman*. In Pānini, it denotes a collection of words.

¹²⁹ The reference is to a horse sacrifice where the horses, before sacrifice is offered, are tied up.

¹³⁰ That is, "Don't look at the rising sun."

¹³¹ That is, "Don't marry this Rishi's daughter."

¹³² That is, "Don't eat tobacco."

ātma appear to be distinctly separate from each other, yet really they are not so. And it is clearly in the perceiving of the connection between these two that *mōkshasādhana gnāna* (the knowledge which leads to *mōksha*) exists. In regard to the texts *Dvā suparṇau* ||, *Dvē Brahmanī* ||, etc., the underlying truth is different from what it actually appears to be externally. Both being the same, the truth of the two can be rightly understood by trying to understand them by discussion as prescribed by the *vidhi*. In trying to find out the real truth regarding the Paramātma, the knowledge of the *Ātma* is also clearly understood. This follows as if it were a *niyama vidhi*.¹³³ Here the word *ātma* is used in the sense of Paramātma only. Again, texts like *Idam sarvam yadayamātmā* | *Ātmani vignātē idam sarvam vignātam*, etc., declare that if the word *ātma* is thoroughly understood, everything else is clearly understood. The first of the above texts declares: *All consists in Ātma*.

In interpreting the *samanvaya sūtra*,¹³⁴ Ēkōrāma Siddha Bhagavatpādāchārya¹³⁵ states that the word *śrōtavya* should not be understood as merely *ātmagnāna vidhi*, i.e., the method by which the knowledge of *Ātma* is obtained, for it includes the power (*śakti*) to realize Brahman (*Brahma sākshātkāraśakti*). Also, by *śravaṇa* what is intended is that we should seek the knowledge of Brahman for realizing it, not to obtain knowledge which is opposed to it. Therefore, the method of discussion (*vichāra*) should not be one by which a wrong meaning is sought. By *śravaṇa*, it is intended to acquire (*āgamika*) the triple effect of *adhikāra vishaya* and *phala*. This is what this *Sūtra* is intended to affirm (*nirṇaya*).

Therefore, in the *Sūtra Athātō Brahma jignāsa*, in order to satisfy the doubt arising as to the nature of the

¹³³ A rule or precept which lays down or specifies something which in the absence of that rule would be optional.

¹³⁴ That is, *Tattu samanvayāt*, I. 1. 4.

¹³⁵ He was evidently the *guru* of Śrīpati Paṇḍitāchārya. His authority is quoted at the end of I. 1. 4, up to which he is said to have written a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*.

discussion, the word *kartavya* should be understood and supplied. This continued effort at discussion is necessary to attain the intended result (*phala*) by the help of the *sāstras*. By the word *jignāsa*, the nature of discussion (*vichāra*) should be understood.

Prakriti and Pratyaya.

If it is said that the word *jignāsa* does not possess the *śakti* of knowing *Prakriti* and *Pratyaya* (i.e., the material cause of the world and the co-operative cause of the world), then it is replied *jignāsa* gives a collective (*samudāya*) knowledge of both the topics (*lakṣhaṇās*) i.e., *Prakriti* and *Pratyaya*. By the use of the same *pratyaya*¹³⁶, the mode of discussion is understood to be through *Jahallakṣhaṇā*.¹³⁷ By the use of the word *Prakriti*, *Sādhyagnāna*¹³⁸ (knowledge to be proved) is intended to be conveyed through *ajahallakṣhaṇā*.¹³⁹ By some the co-operative causes (*pratyaya lakṣhaṇā*) are understood to be as *siddha-gnāna* (perfect knowledge), though they are yet to be demonstrated (*sādhyā-gnāna*) and they hold that they come under the category of *jahallakṣhaṇā*. It is necessary, in order to obtain a comprehensive knowledge, that the *sādhana-gnāna* should be possessed in a determined manner. *Sāmbhavānanda* and *Śivānanda* very much take the view that both *prakriti* and *pratyaya lakṣhaṇās* must be correctly understood. Here some are of opinion that *prakriti* and *pratyaya* are one and the same (*prakriti pratyaya samudāya ēkaiva lakṣhaṇā*). In expressions (*vākyē*), the *lakṣhaṇā* is not invisible. In the two expressions *Ardham antarvēdi minōti ardham bahirvēdi* etc., and *Visham bhuktē*, the

¹³⁶ In *jignāsa*.

¹³⁷ In this kind of *lakṣhaṇā*, a word loses its primary sense but is used in one which is in some way connected with the primary sense, as in the familiar instance *gangāyām ghōṣaḥ*.

¹³⁸ *Sādhyagnāna* means knowledge of the major term in a syllogism; the predicate of a proposition.

¹³⁹ A kind of *lakṣhaṇā* in which the primary or original sense of a word used elliptically does not disappear as *kuntāha pravāsanti = kuntadhārinah puruṣāḥ*.

actual *lakṣhaṇās* are clearly seen. The expressions clearly convey the meaning. Even though the collective causes (*samudāya śaktyabhāvēpi*) cannot describe the co-operative causes, yet the co-operative causes (*pratyaṃ*) can be rightly comprehended. *Sāchājahati*,—this is called *ajahal-lakṣhaṇā* kind. By looking at one particular form, it should not be said it is devoid of other forms. Because it is not the truth (*tasya aprāmāṇikatvāt*). In the expression *chhatrinōgachchanti*, are included both those who hold the umbrella and those who are without it. It does not merely mean that they are simply going; the words convey the idea that they are going and also holding the umbrella. The speaker wishes to convey in detail the *lakṣhaṇā* of those who are going without omitting the essential objects with which they are connected (*i.e.*, umbrella they are carrying). Instead of omitting the details, the act of going is expressed so as to convey the full form (*rūpēṇa*) in which they are going, *i.e.*, in different ways, some holding the umbrella and others without it. Again, in the expression *Kakēbhyō dadhi rakshyatām* etc. (let the curds be protected from crows), the act of protection and the several crows approaching the curds are referred to. The meaning is not that the curds should be lost (*upaghātakatvāt*). Whenever a course of conduct is enunciated, the mutual ones are also implied. Courses of action which are contrary to each other are not to be understood thereby. Because the course of conduct referred to definitely describes what it is without any misconception (*bhinna vrittīyupasthitatvāt*). When the primary meaning of a word is to be taken into account, its secondary signification ought not to be taken. Where *ajahal-lakṣhaṇā* has to be considered, there both the *lakṣhaṇās* (*i.e.*, *jahallakṣhaṇā* and *ajahallakṣhaṇā*) ought to be accepted. When only the primary meaning is required to be taken into consideration, we have to understand the chief thing, the secondary idea being neglected. In the example *Gangāyām ghōshamatsyau* etc., as the village is seen, it is clearly understood that *ghōsha* cannot be taken to convey the

sound arising from the noise of the river. Because thereby the whole idea will have to be wrongly understood. It is the firm idea that can (enable us) to realize the nature of an object. In fact, the word *jignāsa* is more instrumental (*tantrēṇōpāttam*) in conveying the primary idea to the mind. Whenever such reasoning is employed through *ajahallakṣaṇā*, the word *jignāsa* should be in fact understood in the collective sense. Whenever, in a discussion, we have to arrive at a firm conclusion, both the methods should be employed to know the collective idea. Knowledge is a thing that is to be obtained only after knowing the *pratyaya* and *prakṛiti lakṣaṇās*, in a collective sense. In conclusion, even in places where a long discussion is involved, the primary meaning of each word is largely taken into account. In all *jahallakṣaṇā*, the *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* are both understood in a collective sense to secure the knowledge of Brahman. Since each expression (*śabda*) has a particular power (*śakti*) supporting it, we must understand the meaning of the *śabda* in such a way as to have its primary and not its secondary meaning. How then can Brahman be expected to possess only one form without attribute (*śakti sambandha*) when all the expressions have got two-fold views? On certain occasions, the secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) and its respective attribute ought to be considered, and in such places the primary meaning need not be thought of. In conclusion, when expressions are joined to other words to convey their secondary meaning, in those cases they should be considered as *vākya lakṣaṇā*. Therefore, in *sāstras*, *vyavahāra* is said to be the expression of a meaning of a word other than the primary one attaching to it. While *prakṛiti* is thus understood, the *lakṣaṇā* (or secondary) use should be taken in the collective sense. When the secondary meaning is thus taken, then Brahman can never be understood to be one without attribute. When there is difference in the collective sense, that which is connected with it should also be different. Also, it is not possible to impart

a settled conviction, through the mode of *lakṣhaṇā* discussion.

Then, any attempt to obtain a settled knowledge by both modes of discussion (*jāhallaṣṣhaṇā* and *ajāhallaṣṣhaṇā*) is bound to prove useless (*vyartha*). In the example *Chhatrinō gachchanti*, one is apt to understand that those who possess umbrellas are going even though some may be without theirs. Again, in the example *Gangāyām ghōṣhamatsyau* etc., of the two ways of understanding, only one is right, *viz.*, one indicating the existence of the village on the Ganges. It should not be taken to mean the sound of the flow of the Ganges. Here the collective (*samudāya*) as well as the sense conveyed by each part making the collective sense (*samudāyinaḥ*) ought to be considered as different in sense. Unless we know the properties of all things, it is not possible to have a comprehensive knowledge, which can only be had by the *jahallaṣṣhaṇā* mode of discussion. In reality, the discussion is attended with different kinds of difficulties if we are to obtain a comprehensive view. To obtain the desired comprehensive view, a settled knowledge of each of the component parts should be secured. By the word *jignāsa*, it is to be understood that the *śabda* has got the clearly described power (*śakti*) of the component parts (*prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*) in order to obtain a comprehensive knowledge of Brahman. Though the component parts are different from each other in the properties of the different matters, yet, in the final conclusion, their relationship conveys a comprehensive knowledge of Brahman. When an expression can clearly convey to the mind the properties of matters, such an expression is called *Vākya lakṣhaṇā*, a characteristic expression. So by the *Jahallaṣṣhaṇā* mode of discussion, we should not understand merely difference (*bhēda*) between objects. In the expression *chhatrinō gachchanti*, the actual truth should be considered collectively. Even though among them there are people without umbrellas, in a collective sense the expression is used to denote their going with the addition of the umbrellas. Therefore, while one mode

of discussion by *Jahallakṣhaṇā* is adopted, the *Ajahal-lakṣhaṇā* knowledge also is liable to be impressed on the mind. In the *Guhādhikaraṇa*,¹⁴⁰ Manchana Paṇḍita¹⁴¹ establishes thus the text *Ritam pibamtau*, etc.:—The character of drinking (*pibat*) and not drinking (*apibat*) is expressed by the *Ajahallakṣhaṇā* mode of discussion to convey a collective idea.

At any rate, in the *Lingasamudāyādhikaraṇa* Parama-śivārādhyā Bhattāchārya has commented in his work named *Kaivalya Prakāśa* that whenever several causes and effects are to be discussed in determining all the internally situated attributes of Brahman, the adoption of both *vrittis* (i.e., *Jahat* and *Ajahat lakṣhaṇā vrittis*) is not contradictory. The object in view always possesses the two-fold qualities contained in *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya lakṣhaṇās*. Therefore, the *ajahallakṣhaṇā* mode of discussion should not be disregarded in all discussions where the properties of the component parties are the chief causes to determine the collective knowledge of Brahman. Else a decided knowledge cannot be had and therefore in the expressions *Chhatrinō gachchanti* and *Gangāyām ghōshamatsyau*, to have a collective knowledge we must know the component parts making up the *samudāya*, i.e., those possessing the umbrellas and those not possessing them, and also the sand made by the flow of the Ganges through its banks and also the actual village *Gangāyām ghōsha*. Then only the collective knowledge can be clearly comprehended. Let it be granted. The *śabda* clearly explains the characteristic attributes of a subject and thereby gives a definite knowledge of that object. This is done by the *Jahat* and *Ajahat lakṣhaṇā* modes of discussion, where *Prakṛiti* and *Pratyaya* are generally the subjects of discussion. Having so far admitted that the material cause of an object is to be understood in all its properties, we should also clearly discuss

¹⁴⁰ *Brahma-Sūtras*, I. 2. 11-12.

¹⁴¹ The expression *Manchana Paṇḍitīyē* used in the text indicates probably a commentary by Manchana Paṇḍita on the *sūtras* quoted,

and understand the properties of the co-operative cause of the same object. Paramaśivārādhyā Swāmi, in his work known as *Sivagnāna Chandrōdaya*, clearly describes that only such settled knowledge should be possessed through discussion by the two different modes. It should not be admitted that in having a firm knowledge about *Prakriti* itself is sufficient. Else there will be a contradiction of the knowledge according to the other mode of discussion—*ajahal-lakṣhaṇā*. In the expression *Gangāyām ghōsha matsyan*, if we consider only one method of discussion by *jahal-lakṣhaṇā vritti* instead of both, then, a thorough knowledge cannot be had.

Enough has been said of *Jahat* and *Ajahat lakṣhaṇā* modes of discussion. It is sufficient if it is borne in mind that a firm knowledge should be possessed regarding *prakriti* and *pratyaya*. To possess a firm knowledge, all facts connected with the matter should be proved beyond all doubt. It is not sufficient if only certain facts are clearly understood. It must not be presumed that a firm knowledge has been obtained without fully understanding the properties of the matter. A real desire to know about a matter is not sufficient. Whenever a matter is very difficult to understand, that matter is likely to be treated with reluctance. Sometimes we much desire to understand incomprehensible things just as a bereaved widower (*vidhura*) expresses his love for his lost wife (*i.e.*, yearning for a thing he cannot get). Although much desired, knowledge cannot be had of incomprehensible things. Therefore all attempts ought to be made to clear all the doubts before knowledge could be had of a particular matter. All connected knowledge about the material cause should be acquired. In no other manner can the power of understanding be developed except by discussion about the properties of *śabda* and by pursuing a correct mode of enquiry on the approved lines. A firm knowledge can only be said to have been arrived at when we have determinedly grasped the truths underlying each subject. Unless the

co-operative cause and the connected attributes are fully known, we cannot have an independent knowledge. In the expression *Gaurṇitya* etc., even though a cow is dependent on its protector, yet by various proofs (*lakṣhaṇa*) it can be admitted that it can live independently. Therefore, the material cause can be thoroughly understood only after grasping the truths connected with co-operative causes, which are the result of the two *lakṣhaṇās* (*jahat* and *ajahat lakṣhaṇās*). It is not right to study at first the co-operative cause of matter to know the truth, nor collectively (*samudāyēna*) but the material cause must be studied after discussion and removal of all doubts without presuming at any step a knowledge not acquired. In determining the word of a *Sruti* text, even though it is inferred to be very easily understood, both the methods of argument (*jahat* and *ajahat*) should be used for thoroughly understanding the *lakṣhaṇās* of *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*. It is never right to try to have a collective idea by inferential deductions either of *prakṛiti* or of *pratyaya* or any of the attributes of either as it is likely that it would yield a contradictory meaning.

In the text *Śaktūn juhōti* etc., the accusative case, the object of action (of throwing into the fire)¹⁴² is implied, for obtaining the right result. Also, in the text *Haviṣhyam abhyāhūrayati* etc., for the accusative and the instrumental cases, the objects of action and bearing are implied, which denote both the material and the co-operative causes (*prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*). Also, in the expression *rathō gachchati* etc., where the object of a *vyāpāra* (i.e., motion) is implied, the result of moving is to be understood. In the expressions *jānāti*, *ichchati*, *dvēṣṭi*, *yatatē*, etc., we have to understand each verb according to the root meaning, which is the meaning of the *prakṛiti* as well as the result (or the *phala*) which the words imply. In the expression *naśyati* etc., the agent that is capable of destroying is denoted. Therefore in knowing the meaning of the word, the object which is the agent to produce the result is to

¹⁴² By saying *Svāhā* and throwing the oblation into the fire.

be understood. In the commentary of Dūrvāsa¹⁴³ on *Kāra-
vrittilakṣhaṇa*, *buddhi* and *kṣhētragna* occurring in the text,
Ritam pibantau etc., in the *pūrvapakṣa* part of *Guhādhi-
kāraṇa*, are proved to be agents. In the expressions
*aśmā lutishati*¹⁴⁴ and *kūlam pipatishati*¹⁴⁵ etc., only the
nature of the act that is about to happen is implied and
not any agency that is impelling its happening. Then,
the doubt arising as to whether an inanimate object can
itself accomplish an act is to be determined according
to the (Pāṇini) Sūtra *Dhātōḥ-karmanassamāna kartru-
kādicchāyām vā* etc. By the use of the expression, it
is not intended to show that a lifeless object can desire
or has a discretion. Lifeless objects have not such desire
but are subject only to external forces. It is clearly
proved in Patanjali's *Bhāṣya* that whenever an expression
is used ascribing agency to lifeless objects, then such
expression should be understood as being dependent on
external forces and not possessing by themselves any
desire. According to the maxim, *Gauṇa mukhyayōḥ
mukhyē kāryasampratyayaḥ* etc., in such expressions as
the above, the secondary meaning should always be
understood instead of the primary, because a desire is
naturally attributable to an animate and not to an inanimate
agent. In *Īkṣatyadhikāraṇa*, Dūrvāsa Bhagavadpādā-
chārya also agrees with the above view in regard to (the
interpretation) of *kūlam pipatishati*. Even though the
co-operative causes (*pratyaya*) are to be understood clearly,
yet they are not primarily responsible as *prakṛiti* is
the primary cause. But according to the expression
lakṣaṇayā prakṛityaiva, it is only to understand *prakṛiti*
(the primary cause) that we have to clearly understand
pratyaya (the co-operative causes). If we ignore such
co-operative causes, even though they are negligible, we
cannot arrive at a correct conclusion. Causes which are

¹⁴³ The text has *Dūrvāsīyē*, which denotes a work of which
Dūrvāsa was the author.

¹⁴⁴ A stone is about to fall from the mountain peak.

¹⁴⁵ The river is about to overflow cutting the banks.

contradictory cannot lead to a correct conclusion and should not be enquired into unnecessarily. As correct knowledge (*gnāna*) is the chief thing sought for, all attempts ought to be made in availing (ourselves) of the co-operative causes and the materials pertaining to them. In endeavouring to arrive at a correct knowledge, the desire should be to find out the correct method and the objects which would lead us towards it. Until we are possessed of such a method, every attempt should be made to search it out. We have to aim at its realization by a strenuous search (*anvishan*). Realization is the chief object of correct knowledge, which ends in the attainment of salvation (*mōksha sādhanā*), failing which every endeavour at personal effort (*purusha pravritti*) will be fruitless (*nishphala*). It is to secure correct knowledge that matters are enquired into. The sole subject of such a knowledge is the realization of *mōksha* (*mōksha sādhanā*), of Brahmagnāna and the same is based on the discussion of the *Sruti* texts. The seed of discussion lies in the method of enquiry. When the teacher (*Āchārya*) goes on teaching his disciple through discussion about *mōksha sādhanā*, he must clearly understand from the teacher *Prakritiyartha gnānam* by frequently clearing himself of the doubts arising in regard to the subject-matter under discussion and of the matters which enter into it (*vishaya vishayī bhāvēna*). The nature of the enquiry on the part of the disciple should be such that all the materials should be thoroughly sifted after grasping them and the established truths should be possessed by him. This is the chief object of *jignāsa*. Both *prakriti* and *pratyaya* should be thoroughly understood, not by merely touching their outer fringes but in such a way as to ward off all doubts relating to them. Without such a view in mind, discussion is undesirable. The subject sought for by discussion must be certainly realized. Therefore the view has been propounded by Paramānanda Ārādhyā¹⁴⁶ that both

¹⁴⁶ Evidently a teacher who was considered an authority even greater than Ēkōrāma Siddha Bhagavadpādāchārya, the *guru* of Śrīpati, referred to already and in the next sentence below.

the modes of discussion—*jahat* and *ajahat lakṣhaṇā*—should be employed to understand the nature of *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*. This view is also admitted and agreed to by Ēkōrāma Siddha Bhagavatpādāchārya¹⁴⁷ and hence must be fully adopted.

Brahmatva of Siva.

The mode and object of *jignāsa* apart, how is the Brahmatva of Śiva to be established? How are we to declare Śiva as Parabrahman? *Śivasya Parabrahmatva kathanam*. Here, in the texts,

Asad vā idam agra āsīt | tatō vai sada jāyata ||

Amūlamanādhāram imāḥ prajāḥ prajāyante ||

Na kadāचित् anīdriṣam jagat || etc.

in asserting that the world (*jagat*) was in an unmanifested condition previously (*asadvā idam agra āsīt*), it is suggested that in coming into existence, it (*jagat*) did not require an agent. The text *Jyōtishṭōmēna svargakāmo yajēta*,¹⁴⁸ etc., bears witness to the fact that in regard to sacrifices, etc., there is one who is *kartru* (i.e., sacrificer) and another *Phaladātru* (who is the giver of the fruits thereof). When Īśvara is actually existing (*sadbhāve*), if he is to be treated in the opposite sense (i.e., as non-existing), there results a contradiction and there will be no satisfaction attained. As the existence of Īśvara is not acknowledged, it has to be admitted that the agent himself is his own maker of the result. If in the world it is seen (as we witness) that the enjoyment of happiness and misery is attributed to the sovereignty of Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvara kartrutva*), then inequality and mercilessness will be deemed his offsprings and thus we will have to admit that the sovereignty of Paramēśvara is overthrown with the result that not even the smallest benefit can be gained from Īśvara. Or, if inanimate actions (*jada karmanām*) which are done by *jīvas* are seen yielding fruits, then, even though the All-knowing Īśvara is existing, the doubt arises as to whether

¹⁴⁷ *Guru* of Śrīpati Paṇḍtāchārya.

¹⁴⁸ The desire of attaining *Svarga* is effected by performing the sacrifice of *jyōtishṭōma*.

an inanimate object like a pot can attain the result of securing the fruit or when the existence of *Īśvara* (*Īśvaratva*) is admitted, whether He alone can be described as the giver of the fruit. As between the texts

Ātmā vā idamagra āsīt ॥

Brahma vā idamagra āsīt ॥

*Hiranyagarbhassamavartatāgre bhūtasya jātah
patirēka āsīt ॥*

Om ityēkāksharam Brahma ॥

Asāvādityō Brahma ॥

Namaštē vāyō tvamēva pratyaksham Brahmāsi ॥

Gaṇānām tvā ganapatīm havāmahē ॥

Viśvasmāt Indra uttarah ॥

*Ēkō havai Nārāyaṇa āsīt na Brahmā nēśānō nāgnish-
tōmo nēmē dyāvāprithvī ॥*

Atha purushōhavai Nārāyaṇōkūmayata prajāḥśrujā iti ॥

Nārāyaṇāt Brahmā jāyatē Nārāyaṇāt Rudrō jāyatē ॥

Sadēva sōmya idamagra āsīt ॥

Ēkamēvādvitīyam Brahma ॥

Manōvai Brahmēti ॥

Chakshurvai Brahmēti ॥

Śrōtramvai Brahmēti ॥

Kham Brahma ॥ Kam Brahma ॥ Annam Brahma ॥ etc. considerable mutual discrepancies are observable. While such is the case, the doubt arises as to how Brahmatva can be attributed to Śiva alone.¹⁴⁹

If the attribution of Brahmatva to Śiva is thus rendered doubtful, the answer is that it cannot be so doubted. For in *Sruti* texts like *Agnīshōmīyam paśumālabhēta ॥ Dvipādāschatushpādāscha paśavaḥ ॥* etc., four-legged and the two-legged animals are stated to be *Paśu*, (i.e., animals offerable as sacrifices at rites). Also, in other *Sruti* texts such as *Chchāgasya vapayā mēdaso anubrūhi*, etc., a goat (*chchāgaḥ*) is declared to be a symbol of *Paśu*¹⁵⁰ (an animal

¹⁴⁹ This is the *pūrvapaksha* argument propounded for determination.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *Sarvē vahāmō balim Īśvarāya ōtānasīva dvipādē chatushpādah ॥ Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, V. i.

that could be offered as a sacrifice at rites). In the same way, we have to understand Śiva as Brahman (*Sivasya Brahmatvam grāhyam*).

Therefore in the text *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē* etc., it is said that Paramēśvara is the cause of creation, etc., of the world, which is the primary *lakṣhaṇa* of Brahman. *Īśvaratva* (or supreme overlordship) cannot be claimed by Hiraṇyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa and Kālarudra, who possess but detached portions of *Triguṇātmaka śakti* which is the characteristic of Brahman.¹⁵¹ Therefore the Sūtrakāra has the Sūtra *Janmādyasya yataḥ*, for each of them partakes of one detached part of the *kartrutva* in the creation of the world. Therefore none of them can be deemed to be the chief Creator. In the *Brahmōttarakhaṇḍa*, it is said :—*Yasyāgnyayā jagatsrashtā Virinchiḥ pālako Hariḥ | Samhartā Kālarudrākhyō namastasmai pinākinē || iti*. It thus follows that creation and other powers connected with it and their control is held to be in Śiva only. Moreover, in texts like *Māyāntu prakritim vindyāt māyīnāntu Mahēśvaram | Tasyāvayava bhūtōttam vyāptam sarvamidam jagat ||* etc., it is said that *Māyā* is to be understood as chief *prakriti*, and *Māyīnam* should be understood as *Mahēśvara* and *Māyā* is therefore said to be subject to the control of Paramēśvara. And therefore Paramēśvara is said to be all-independent (*svatantra*) keeping under his control *Māyā*, Brahma, Viṣṇu and Kālarudra, who are but the *aṁśa* (part) of *Śakti* and hence form part of the all-pervading world.

Thus we read in the following texts occurring in the *Atharvaśiras* :—*Dēvāhavai svargam lōkam agaman | Tē dēvā rudram apruchchan kō bhavān iti | Sō'bravīt ahamēkaḥ prathamamāsam vartāmi cha bhaviṣhyāmi cha nānyaḥ kaschana matto vyatiriktah*, etc., which declare that Śiva alone is beyond the changes relating to the *trikālas*—past, present and future ; that he is in the heart of all ; that

¹⁵¹ Brahman possesses in himself the three qualities of *satva*, *rajas*, *taṁas*, while Hiraṇyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa and Kālarudra possess only one of these qualities in the order mentioned.

he is the cause of everything; that he is the chief object of all utterances; that he is supreme over all things; that he dominates all beings and that he is Brahman (himself). In the *Kaṇva śākhā*, in the text *Yaḥprithivyām tiṣṭhan iti*,¹⁵² no one else other than Śiva is declared to be Brahman and possessed of the *Asṭamūrti*¹⁵³ form beginning with *Prithvī*. All other divinities including *sankha* and *chakra*, though they possess the powers of creating the past (*bhūta*) and the future (*bhūtika*) cannot be stated to possess *Īśvaratva*.

It should not be said that *Asṭamūrtatva* beginning from *Prithvī* is also possessed by Viṣṇu in all its forms. It is not so, because Śiva alone stands famous with the title of *Asṭamūrti* and is also reputed to be at the heart of Viṣṇu. It would not therefore be correct to say that both Śiva and Kēśava are at the heart of all beings and pervade them. Both do not possess the same bodily form. Though both are independent in controlling the world's creation, stability and destruction, if both are said to work concurrently (or simultaneously), then the world will be subjected to the danger of dissolution.

Sruti texts like *Sōntarāt antaram prāviṣat; Diśaścha antaram prāviṣat; Yō Rudrō agnau, yō apsu yō ōshadhīshu yō Rudrō visvā bhuvanānyāvivēṣa tasmai Rudrāya namaḥ iti* and hundreds of others bear witness to the fact that Śiva alone is *sarvātmaka* and *sarvāntar-yāmin*. And also in the text beginning with *yō vēdādaḥ svarah prōktaḥ* and ending with *yaḥ paraḥ sa mahēśvaraḥ*, etc., the endings *akāra*, *ukāra* and *makāra* which are the symbols of Brahma, Viṣṇu and Kālarudra, are held to dissolve in Mahēśvara. Therefore *Brahmatva* (state of being Brahman) cannot be claimed by any other (than Śiva). Moreover, the text beginning with *Īśānassarva-vidyānām* and ending with *sadāsivōm* bears testimony to

¹⁵² *Bṛihad. Upanishad*, III. 7. 2.

¹⁵³ The eight-formed, an epithet of Śiva, the eight forms being five elements—earth, water, air, fire and ether—and the Sun, the Moon and the sacrificing Priest. (See *Amarakōṣa*, I. 35.)

the fact that He alone is stated to be the chief object of meditation through *pranava*¹⁵⁴ and hence He alone is Brahman. And also in the *Svētāśvatara* text *Tam Īśvarā-ṇām paramam mahēśvaram tam devatānām paramancha daivatam* | *Patim patīnām prathamam purastāt vidāma dēvam paramēśam īḍyam* || *iti*, it is definitely declared that Īśvara is the sole controller of Brahma, Viṣṇu, (Kāla) Rudra and others and that there is no other Lord known who is above Him. In the *Yajurveda* text *Sōmaḥ pavatē janitā matīnām janitā dēvo janitā prithivyāḥ janitāgnēḥ janitā sūryasya janitēndrasya janitātha Viṣṇōḥ* || the word *Sōma* should not be taken to mean *sōmalata* (the *sōma* plant) but as meaning that He is the sole cause of creation, beginning from Buddhi down to Viṣṇu. The *sōma* plant being an inanimate object, it has no power of causing creation. Texts like the following appearing in the *Atharvaṇa śikhā*, *Dhyayītēśānam pradhyāyitavyam sarvamidam Brahma Viṣṇu Rudrāstē samprasūyantē* || *Sarvāṇi chēndriyāṇi sahabhūtaiḥ nakāraṇam kāraṇānām dhyātā kāraṇamtu dhyēyaḥ* || and the text beginning with *Sarvaiśvarya sampannaḥ sarvēśvaraḥ sambhurākāśamadhyē dhruvam sarvādhikam*, and ending with *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ Śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyat parityajya* || *iti*, enunciate that the seeker of salvation (*mumukshu*) should meditate solely upon Śiva, giving up meditation on other prohibited deities.

Sruti texts like *Utāmrutatvasyēśānaḥ* || *Sarvamidam Śiva ēva vijānīhi* | *Suddhō niranjanō vibhur advayam Sivamekam Sivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē sa ātmā savignēyaḥ Sivō advaitaḥ* || *Ēka ēva Rudrō nadvītīyāya tasthē* | *Nasan nachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ* | *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* || *iti*, and others declare that Śiva alone is without a second and hence He alone is Brahman. Moreover, in the text beginning with *Umā sahāyam* and ending with *Sabrahmā saśivaḥ sahariḥ sēndraḥ sōksharaḥ paramassvarāt*, we are told that Śiva is the agent of all cause (*kāraṇa*) and action (*kārya*) and therefore the

¹⁵⁴ The sacred syllable *Aum*.

attribute of Brahmatva is apposite only in his case. In the text *Annam Brahma*, etc., mere praise is bestowed on Brahman by mentioning his name. Moreover, in the text *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ, sarvam khalvidam Brahma* || and in the texts :—*Trishu dhāmasu yadbhōjyam bhoktā bhogascha yadbhavēt* | *Tēbhyō vilakṣaṇaḥ sākshī chinmātrōham sadāśivaḥ* || *Mayyēva sakalam jātam mayi sarvam pratishṭhitam* | *Mayi sarvam layam yāti* || *tadbrahmā'dvayam asmyaham* || *iti*, and in others of similar import in which the word "Brahma" is used, it has to be taken as only synonymous with the word "Śiva" just as the words "hand", the "arm" and the "palm" which signify the members of the body are synonymous with the body itself. Moreover, in the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, in the text beginning with *Sarvam hyētat Brahmā'yamātmā Brahma sō'yamātmā iti*¹⁵⁵ and in the text *Śivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē sa ātmā savignēyaḥ* || *iti*,¹⁵⁶ it is clearly declared that the whole creation, etc., of the world is due to no other than Śiva (*advaita Śiva*) and from the beginning to the end He alone is held to be the Brahman, the sole cause of all. If Śiva is not held to be the sole cause, as declared by all the *Srutis*, and the Creator of the world and its Destroyer and if it is admitted that there is another Īśvara, then plurality of Īśvaras results and a contradiction of all the *Srutis* will be produced, besides opposition to every known system of belief. Thus Jaiminiāchārya, the most proficient in Vēdāntic knowledge, explains in his treatise called *Vēdapādaṣṭaka*, that every Vēdic text is in a manner applicable to Śiva (*Śivaparatvam*). Similarly, Jyōtirnātha, Ghantānātha, Bhīmanātha, Bhaṭṭa, Bhāskara and others, who have reached the other side of the ocean of knowledge of the four *Vēdas*, who have established their reputation as *Vēdamārgapratishṭhāpanāchāryas* and who have condemned the false systems of thought promulgated by the Pāṣaṇḍas,

¹⁵⁵ *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, 2.

¹⁵⁶ *Atharvaśirasi*.

Pāncharātras, Bauddhas, and Advaitins, declare as follows, establishing the *Parabrahmatva* for Śiva:—*Mahādēvō dēvaḥ sakalā jāgadārādhyā charaṇaḥ trayīmārgō'mārgaḥ kumata-matavruttiḥ pramathanāḥ | Tayōr yōvā brūtē vṛijina manayōr asya nidadhē Sivasyaṅghrim vādipralayadahanōham nripasakhē || iti.* Therefore in the *Sāstras* the word *Brahma-jignāsa* is pointed out to mean the method of enquiring into the *svarūpa* of Śiva. Thus in determining who is the chief cause of creation, etc., the word "Brahma" is, in the *Sāstras*, generally taken to stand, for the sake of *vyavahāra*, for Śiva, as is stated in the *Sūtra* (I. 1. 1.).

In the texts *Brahmavidāpnōti param || Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati || Śiva ēko dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanayat parityajya || iti*, *Śiva* means *śivam karōtīti śivamakaraḥ*.¹⁵⁷ Here the chief object of meditation is pointed out. Therefore, it is meant to establish that salvation (*Śivaprāpti*) is obtained after being freed completely from all ties of bondage. It must not be doubted how salvation (*Śivaprāpti*) could be the final realization without again coming into existence.

According to the *Bhramarakīrtanyāya*, it is clearly seen that the actual *krimi* undergoes a change which turns it into the *Bhramara*. It is also seen that a drop of water naturally undergoes a change and finally turns itself out into a beautiful pearl. What is the good of learned men wrongly interpreting bondage (*bandha*) and falsehood (*mithyātva*) in such changes? Moreover, if it is to be said that illusory belief is removed by actual knowledge, then in accordance with the maxim of the desert and the mirage (*marumarīchikānyāyēna*)¹⁵⁸ we have to answer, it is not so. The traveller through his ignorance and the vast extent of the desert believes in the existence of water and after a time convinces himself of the actual truth that the sight is only an illusory one and that there is actually

¹⁵⁷ He who bestows happiness is Śiva.

¹⁵⁸ *Maru* means desert; *marīchika*, a mirage. Rays of light falling on a sandy wilderness destitute of water bring on an appearance of a mirage.

no water. Because perfection (*samskāra*)¹⁵⁹ is always gained through *Smṛiti*¹⁶⁰ and sin is removed by meditation on Śiva, just as sorrow is banished by being consoled by the beloved, doubts are cleared by proofs and the *pūrvapakṣa*¹⁶¹ is displaced by the *siddhānta*¹⁶².

Again, in texts like *Ajāmēkām lōhitām śukla krishnām iti*, etc., where *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛiti*) is represented to be the chief cause of the world (*Jagat*), Brahman is represented as being subject to several changes¹⁶³ in the cause of the world (*Jagat*). If it is said that *atha atah abrahma jignāsa iti*, we have to say, it is not so ; because such a statement will contradict the *Sruti* and the correct meaning of the term *jignāsa*, interpreted in accordance with *Sruti*, will be lost. Also, in the *Sruti* text *Nōpāsyau prakṛiti jīvanu iti*, the meditation of both *prakṛiti* and *jīva* as different entities is denounced. As *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛiti*) is naturally devoid of independent powers, the *Sruti* texts which attribute the cause of the world to *Pradhāna* should be understood as making *Pradhāna* subordinate to Śiva and not independent of him, just as the expressions of the *Sruti*, *Saṣṭram chchinatti*¹⁶⁴ and *Śrōtram śhrūṇōti*¹⁶⁵ denote that they (the instrument sword as well as the organ ear) are subjected to the agents possessing them, inasmuch as they themselves are inanimate. Therefore *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛiti*) is incapable of being the cause of the world, but subordinate to the *kartrtva* of Śiva. As the *Sruti*

¹⁵⁹ Here this word would seem to indicate grace or perfection rather than purification.

¹⁶⁰ That is, well-directed action according to the *Smṛiti* (traditional Law).

¹⁶¹ The starting point of a debate ; the first statement.

¹⁶² Final decision.

¹⁶³ The text has *Vikāritva prasangāccha*. According to Pāṇini, the term *mayat pratyaya* is used to denote three kinds of existence : (1) *tādātmyārthē*, (2) *vikārārthē* and (3) *prāchuryārthē mayat tridhā*, i.e., affirmation, change and pervasion.

¹⁶⁴ *Lit.*—The instrument (sword) hits

¹⁶⁵ *Lit.*—The ear hears.

text lays it down, *Māyāmtu prakritim vindyāt māyīnamtu mahēśvaram*¹⁶⁶ *iti*, Māyā is always subordinate to Śiva.

The Attributes of Brahman.

Srīpati next passes on to set down the attributes of Brahman. Before beginning to comment on I. 1. 2 *Janmādyasya yataḥ* (*From whom the origin and so on of this universe proceed*), he remarks that agreeably to the maxim that the realization of the object (*vastu*) is dependent on accurate description (*lakshana*), which is subject to correct proof (*pramāṇa*),¹⁶⁷ this *Sūtra* is intended first to describe the characteristic attributes of Brahman and then to repudiate *nirviśēshatva* and *saviśēshatva* and finally to expel doubts and contrarities. The accurate character of Brahman that we are to discuss is accordingly described (in this *Sūtra*).

In the *Taittirīya* text *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē, yēna jātāni jīvanti yatprayantya abhisamviśanti tadviṣṇāsasva tadbrahmēti*, the subject-matter of this *Sūtra* is dealt with. The purport of this *Sūtra* may be summed up as follows: *Prayanti mriyamāṇāni santi*, ultimately to undergo destruction; *abhisamviśanti*, back into that complete whole.

While, in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, Brahman was understood in an uncertain (*sandigdhe*) manner through assumptions, now, in this *Adhikaraṇa*, Brahman is discussed at length by means of illustrations and examples. When by assuming doubtful cases, Brahman is discussed, then creation and so on cannot be taken to exemplify the chief characteristic marks of Brahman. Here, in this *Adhikaraṇa*, such causes as have not been discussed previously,

¹⁶⁶ *Lit.*—Understand that Prakriti is Māyā and Mahēśvara to be *māyīnam*, i.e., the controller of Māyā. Māyā is also designated as Mahāmāyā, Avidyā, Niyati, Mōhinī, Prakriti, Vāsana and Tavēchcha. (*Yajurveda*).

¹⁶⁷ *Lit.*—Mode of proof, a means of arriving at correct knowledge. The Naiyāyikas recognize only four kinds of *pramāṇa*: *pratyaksha*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. The Vēdāntins and Mīmāṃsakas add two more, *anupalabdhi* and *arthāpatti*, while the Sāmkhyas admit *pratyaksha*, *anumāna* and *śabda*.

are clearly explained by means of illustrations. *Janma ādih yasya iti tadguṇasamvignānē bahuvrīhiḥ*. Here, the word (*Janmādyasya*) should be construed as a *bahuvrīhi* compound by which the characteristics (of Brahman) are explained. Also, while trying to understand these characteristic marks (of Brahman), we see arising from them their different parts in a collected form and these present to us the thought of another object suggesting a different meaning. To prevent this suggestion, the Sūtrakāra has particularly used the words *janma ādi asya iti*. The intended thought not having been conveyed by the characteristics of the different component parts, the Sūtrakāra in order to convey the exact idea of the object has used both the masculine and the feminine genders of the words *janma ādi asya iti*. Throughout, for fear of heaviness being caused by the increase of letters, the Sūtrakāra has used a neutral form of expression. Even here, the term *Brahman* is understood. The word *tat* should also be understood and supplied. Then the Sūtra would be thus divided *Janmādi asya yataḥ iti*.

The word *Janmādi* embodies the five-fold creative acts of *śrishti*, *sthiti*, *laya*, *tirōdhāna* and *anugraha* (*i.e.*, creation, protection, destruction, disappearance and rewarding); *asya* indicates Him who sports in bringing into play the *chit*¹⁶⁸ and *achit*¹⁶⁹ worlds (*prapancha*); *yataḥ* implies Brahman, from whom arises out of his infinite powers, never-ending manifestations in a natural way. *That is the Brahman* (as described above) that is envisaged by the Sūtra. By the word *Asya* is meant that part of the *chētanāchētanā*¹⁷⁰ world which is made manifest to the physical vision. Therefore, the word *yataḥ* denotes Brahman as the chief cause of the five-fold acts of *janma*, etc. (*i.e.*, creation, protection, destruction, disappearance and rewarding). And therefore as the creation and so on consisting of these five-fold acts is

¹⁶⁸ *Chit* means understanding, thought or perception, *i.e.*, the world of perceptions.

¹⁶⁹ *Achit* means material *i.e.*, the material world.

¹⁷⁰ *I.e.*, the material world and the world of perception.

ascribed to Paraśiva Brahman by the *Srutis*, all beings (*jīvas*) are enjoined to meditate on that Brahman. To Brahman who is the chief cause of everything, the doing, undoing and doing otherwise,¹⁷¹ are all within his powers. In the *Sruti* text *Yatōvā*, etc., the expression *abhisamviśanti* denotes *āvirbhāva* and *tirōdhana*, i.e., manifestation and disappearance. When Brahman is understood, all inconclusive reasoning will be at an end. When Brahman is not understood, there will be no attempt (made) to enter into (discussion). Therefore, in such circumstances, how are the objects as well as their characteristics to be sought for and understood? The answer is that all kinds of inconclusive reasoning will no more exist when, after being duly initiated by *Sāmbhava dīkshā* and duly taught by a *Guru*, the superficial knowledge regarding *Lakshya* (Brahman) and *Lakshana* (his characteristics) are thoroughly established after discussion. The first topic (*vishaya*)¹⁷² of this *Adhikaraṇa* is : If Brahman is stated to be possessed of no characteristic marks that could be described within this manifested world, then, how could his overlordship and agency be understood? Is it by his nature, which is all-pervading throughout the world, by his having any particular form, by his possessing no form, by his *śakti* exhibited through *Prakṛiti* as his reflected agent (*pratibimba*) or by the pretended (*kalpita*) overlordship ascribed to him? The answer is that in the case of Brahman in whom all powers are invested and who is attributeless (*nirguṇa*), who is inseparable (*niravayava*) and eternal (*nityatvāt*), such a thing (as *kalpita īśvaratva*) never occurs. Much less does such a Brahman, with separated members and possessed of a pretended overlordship, which is false, at all occur. In the texts *gnā gnau dvau ajau-īśānīsau* and *na kadāchit anīdriṣam jagat iti*, etc., both

¹⁷¹ *Karthum akarthum anyathākarthum samartha* *Īśvaraḥ* is a common phrase indicative of the vast and unlimited powers possessed by Brahman of doing, undoing and doing otherwise—in a manner other than we expect. See *Kathāsaritsāgara*, XXII. 51.

¹⁷² *Vishaya* means the first of the five members of an *Adhikaraṇa* ; the topic or subject to be explained.

the world and living beings are stated to be existing for ever. If so, how can Paramēśvara be described as their chief cause? If he is the cause, then their prior creation is improbable. Therefore the revered Sūtrakāra denounces the *Pradhāna Vaishṇava mata* as being contradictory to the *Srutis* and *Smritis* which hold the doctrine of *jīvōtpatti* as the chief thing in the manifestation of *Prakṛiti*.¹⁷³ But if it is accepted that it (the *jīva*) was not created, there arises a contradiction to what is declared in the *Sṛuti* texts *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē iti*, etc., and also to what is stated in the texts from *Asadvā idamagra āsīt, Tatō vai sadajāyata*, etc., to *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt, Nasannachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ, iti*, etc., which declare *asat-kāraṇa*, *satkāraṇa*, and the contradictory *sadasatkāraṇatva* and *paraśiva-kāraṇatva* and many (other) mutual discrepancies. The *Pūrvapaksha* or the *prima facie* view is thus stated:—The cause of the *jagat* cannot be (attributed to) Paramēśvara, for he is *nirguṇa*. If it is thus to be taken, then how should he be understood to be as he is indescribable in relation to the world (*jagadvilakṣaṇatvēna*)? Or, again,

¹⁷³ Śrīpati in quoting the text *Na kādāchit anīdriṣam jagat* (lit. there was never a world which was different from this—the present one) stresses the Bhēda viewpoint, which is essentially based on the Sāṅkhya system of the eternity of this world. The double negative in the text is to be noted as affirming its truth in a striking manner.

The *Pradhāna Vaishṇava mata* referred to by Śrīpati is the pre-eminent Vaishṇava School, i.e., *Viśiṣṭādvaita Viśṇupradhāna mata* as opposed to *Śivapradhāna mata*, the school that makes Viṣṇu the predominating deity as opposed to the school which makes Śiva the predominant deity. In commenting on I. 2. 32. *Āmananti chainamasmin*, Rāmānuja states, "*Paramātmā Puruṣhōttama ēva*", i.e., Paramātmā is Puruṣhōttama. Paramātmā occupies the centre of the *Sarīra*, which is of the form of the three worlds, and obtaining *upāsana* from the *jīva* and satisfied with his offerings, grants him his own *svarūpa*. Ānandatīrtha's conception of Viṣṇu differs somewhat from that of Rāmānuja. The greatness of Viṣṇu, according to Ānandatīrtha, is based on a footing of *tāratamya* (i.e., gradation) as between Viṣṇu and the other deities, a point not recognized by Rāmānuja. The latter holds *Sarvam Viśṇumayam jagat* as opposed to *Sarvam Śivamayam jagat*.

should he be understood as pervading all over or as having a form or having no form whatever? It cannot be the first, because it contradicts his all-pervading power; and also being faultless and unsupported by anything, he cannot be called to be the Creator any more than the wheel of a potter (*kulāla*) and the loom of a weaver (*kuvinda*) can be said to create the pot (*ghaṭa*) and the cloth (*paṭa*). It cannot be the second, because it will have to be considered that the pot is different from the potter's wheel, which opens the subjects of *ādhāra* and *ādhēya* (the supporter and the supported). It cannot be the third, as it is not possible to create (*kalpana*) formless space (*niravayava ākāśa*), for Brahman, who has a body (*sāvayava*) which, as before, also leads to the discussion of a contradictory subject. Not the fourth, as a formless (Brahman), it is not possible to create a world of *sāvayava*, i.e., one conjoined to form. For it contradicts the *Sruti* text *Nishkriyam nishkalam śāntam niravadyam niranjanam*, etc. Or if we acknowledge a new birth for *satyagnānānandātmaka Paraśiva*, then even *jagat* becomes *satchidānandātmaka*. If we do not accept that, then the birth, etc., for the world become false (*anruta*) and the world which is bound with paralysing sorrow will cease to exist. Moreover, it will be just as clay undergoing several changes. If Brahman is the chief cause, can he be said to be either the efficient (*nimitta*) or assumed (*upādāna*) cause or can he be described as both included? Further, whether Brahman could be stated to possess the three-fold creative powers (of creation, preservation and destruction) or Prakriti? Not the first; as regards his being the efficient cause, the *Sruti* texts proclaim *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma; Sarvō vai Rudraḥ*, etc., which contradict the Advaita texts. Not the second; because according to the *Sruti* texts *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē* ¹ *Ēkamēva advitīyam Brahma* declare that there can be no other than what is declared as being the chief cause. Not the third; because both are as opposed to each other in nature as light and darkness. If we accept the chief cause as being due to Prakriti, then, being *achētana* and *asatva*,

it would be attributing that cause to an inanimate object just as the potter's wheel. Thus, therefore, the cause (suggested) is improbable. There will be contradiction between the two. Moreover, if the *Sruti* texts *Ānandō Brahmēti vyajānāt* | *Ānandāddhyēva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyantē* | *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt* | *Nasan nachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ* || etc., which proclaim that Brahman is Ānanda (or bliss), are interpreted otherwise, then the whole discussion of Āgama will end in mutilation and unsettlement. When such a thing happens, there will result a discussion about many Brahman. Then even the cause of creation cannot be definitely ascribed to such a Brahman, who is the form of virtue. If we should admit that Brahman is the cause of creation, etc., just as milk is the cause of butter and curd, then a contradiction arises regarding Ānanda in Brahman. If it is admitted that Brahman is subject to changes (*vikāritva*) just as gold undergoes changes in turning it into ear-rings, etc., then it should be admitted that Brahman is also subject to changes. For the world which was stated to be in the form of *asat* originally, if we should admit that it is just as illusory as a rope mistaken for a serpent, then why should we not admit rabbits as possessing horns¹⁷⁴ (i.e., an impossibility)? Therefore, it cannot be asserted that *prapancha* was originated. But yet in consonance with the ancient maxim *Adhyārōpāpavādābhyām nishprapancham prapanchata iti*¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ *Śaśaśringa* or hare's horn is a phrase used for denoting anything impossible ; an utter impossibility. (See *Bhartrihari*, II. 5.)

¹⁷⁵ This maxim is briefly described as *Adhyārōpāpavāda*, the method of the illusory attribution followed by its withdrawal. This is a *nyāya* peculiar to *Vēdānta*. The two terms *Adhyārōpa* and *apavāda* are thus explained in the *Vēdāntasāra*.—"Illusory attribution is the attributing to the real of that which is unreal ; as a snake is imagined in a rope which is not a snake." "The withdrawal is the assertion that the whole of the unreal, beginning with Ignorance, which is an illusory effect of the Real ; just as a snake, which is the illusory effect of a rope is nothing whatsoever but the rope." In what follows, *Srīpati* explains the object of this *nyāya* "in order that their disciples might understand and fulfil

it has to be accepted as held by the previous Āchāryas (*Pūrvāchāryas*) in order that their disciples might understand and fulfil the fundamental truth of the *Vēdas*. Yet it is possible to state agreeably to *Sruti* texts like *Ajāmēkām lōhita śukla krishṇām iti*, etc., that the *achētana māyā*¹⁷⁶ is the cause of the world's creation as it is the material out of which creation is evolved.¹⁷⁷ But if it is asked why not it be due to *Māyā* which is wrongly ascribed to Brahman or its reflection of the *satva guṇa* of Brahman, then, we declare (as our doctrine) that the cause of the world's creation is only Shatsthala Śiva Parabrahman, who is Sachchidānanda (all-glorious) and Sarvādhishṭha (all-pervading) and to him only is Creation rightly attributable.

the fundamental truth of the *Vēdas*." In order to describe the Brahman, the *guru* attributes to him or superimposes on him, certain qualities which in reality do not belong to him, and then afterwards withdrawing them, teaches that what is left is the Brahman. When the Advaita Vēdāntin speaks of the origin of the world, he does not believe its origin to be true. This mode of expression is called false imputation (*adhyārōpa*). It consists in holding for true that which is false, in accommodation to the intelligence of the uninitiated. At a further stage of instruction, when the time has arrived for propounding the true view, the false imputation is withdrawn, and this withdrawing is called rescission (*apavāda*) (See Sadānanda's *Vēdāntasāra*, Poona Edition (1929), p. 2 ; Col. Jacob's *Laukikanyāyāñjali*, II. 2-3). *Adhyārōpa* is thus the act of attributing falsely, or through mistake, the properties of one thing for another ; considering through a mistake, a rope which is not really a serpent, to be a serpent, or considering Brahman which is not the real material world, to be the material world.

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According to texts like *Apāṇi pādōham achintya-śaktiḥ pasyāmyachakshuḥ saśruṇōmyakarnaḥ* । *Aham vijānāmi viviktarūpō nachāsti vēttā mama chitsadāham* ॥ *Ākāśa śarīram Brahma* । *Satyātmaprāṇārāmanam mana ānandam* । *Sarvāṇi havā imāni bhūtāni ākāśādēva samutpadyantē* । *Ākāśam pratyastam yanti* । *Ākāśō ha vai nāmarūpayōr nirvahitā tē yadantarā sa ātmā* ॥ Brahman, though devoid of bodily form and all desires, yet is regarded to be the chief agent for all phenomenal changes. In the *Sruti* text, *Ākāśa śarīram Brahma*, etc., the word *Ākāśa* denotes the pervasive power of the *Chitsakti*, not the worldly sky, because the worldly sky which is lifeless (*jada*) has no such power for acting. Brahman is *satya* personified. In the text *Ritam satyam (param Brahma purusham krishṇa pīngalam* । *Ūrdhvarētam virūpāksham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ* ॥)¹⁷⁸ the supreme spirit, Brahman, is described as the Divine Law, the Truth, the Supreme Being who is Soul of the Universe; in colour, admixture of red and black; of superior virility; possessing an innumerable number of eyes; and omnipresent. By the word *prāṇa* is meant the power of bearing all the worlds of the *Chitsakti* in which Parabrahman delightfully sports. By the word *manaḥ* is meant the incalculable power of *Parāśakti* in which Brahman feels his joy without the assistance of any external causes. Also the Wind who has no bodily form yet exhibits his power in shaking the big trees as though possessing a body. Also the soul (*jīva*) who has no bodily form, yet, during dreams, experiences the world in its creation and sees it. While such agencies are empowered with such vast powers, what can be stated of him (Parabrahman) who is of *aghaṭita ghaṭanā sāmartyaḥ*, i.e., possessed of the capacity of bringing together things that cannot easily be expected to be brought together? For it is impossible to imagine an all-glowing form (*prabhākarasya*), even though it be for a moment, as

¹⁷⁸ *Mahānārāyaṇōpanishad*, XII, 23.

a bodiless form. Such being the case, there can be no mistake in imagining both a bodily form and a spiritual form (*mūrtāmūrta*) for Mahēśvara who is (represented) in the all-auspicious form of an image, in order that he might bestow his bountiful powers on his *bhaktas*, just as the hardened ghee melts by the (application of) warmth to it. The *Sruti* text, *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma tajjalānīti śānta upāsīta iti*,¹⁷⁰ states that this world is just like the froth collected on the top of the waters of the sea at the time of its (the world's) creation, existence and destruction, though it consists of a modified form of the sea-water; similarly the inconceivable power of Paramēśvara in finding materials for the creation of the world is only a part of his power, as enunciated by the *Sruti* in the text *Pādō'sya viśvābhūtāni tripādasyamritamdivi iti*.¹⁸⁰ Therefore, just as the vast Space (*mahadākāśa*) is, as the holder of the Wind and the other elements,¹⁸¹ for that very reason the cause of their creation, Paramēśvara possessing inside himself the several worlds, is the cause of their creation. *Sruti* texts such as *Lingamadhyē jagat sarvam lingabāhyāt param nahi iti*, suggest the same conclusion. Also texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē iti* state that Parabrahma Śiva is only the instrumental or efficient cause of the world (*nimitta kāraṇa*).¹⁸² The expression *yatprayanti* (occurring in the same text) also denotes that Parabrahma Śiva is also the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*). Therefore he is said to be possessed of the indivisible character of efficient and material causes (*nimitta* and *upādāna kāraṇas*); not merely one of these two causes. Nor can it (the Cause) be said to be either false attribution (*Adhyārōpatvam*) or unreality (*Mithyātvam*). In the texts *Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśānīsau iti* etc.,

¹⁷⁰ *Chchānd. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

¹⁸⁰ *Rig-veda*, Purushasūkta.

¹⁸¹ *Prithvī*, *Ap*, *Tējas*, *Vāyu* and *Akāśa* are the five elements referred to.

¹⁸² *Nimitta kāraṇa* as opposed to *Upādāna kāraṇa*. The text quoted is *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

the *jīva*, like *Paramēśvara*, is spoken of as having been never born. If it is said that, according to the *Sruti* text *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante iti*,¹⁸³ *Paramēśvara* is the generative cause of the *Panchamahābhūta* also,¹⁸⁴ it is not so; because long before Creation, *Paramēśvara* had contained in him all the *jīvas* and He only as Cause brought them out—just as a granary in which all the grain is stored (*kusūla dhānyavat*), is capable of being emptied out (from time to time). Even though the *Srutis* mention creation and non-creation, they do not state anything contrary (to this). In the texts of the *Sruti* and the *Smṛiti* : *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyīnantu mahēśvaram* | *Tasyāvayava bhūtōttham vyāptam sarvamidam jagat* ||¹⁸⁵ *Mamaivāmsō jīvalōkō jīvabhūtas sanātanaḥ* etc.,¹⁸⁶ *Paramēśvara* is said to be *nirguṇa* only when he, prior to Creation, contracts all his powers (and draws them within himself). Thus *Nirguṇa Sruti* texts like *Nishkalam nishkriyam śāntam iti*¹⁸⁷ declare restricting *Paramēśvara*'s *nirguṇatva* to that period (that is, before Creation). *Sagūṇa Sruti* texts like *Īkshyām chakrē* etc., however, declare the expansion of his powers at the time he is about to Create the world. But if it is said that *Paraśiva* Brahman, who is of the form of *Satyagnānānanda* and, is subject to change (*vikāra*) just like the potter's earth in regard to the Creation of the world, then, according to the *Sruti* text *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt*, *māyā* will become the material (*upādāna*) cause of the world and *Paramēśvara* the efficient (*nimitta*) cause of the world. Then if it should be doubted how *chidātmaka* *Paraśiva* could be credited with the fabrication of an irrational world (*jaḍa-prapanchakalpanam*), the answer is in the words of the *Sruti* text *Yathōrṇanābhiḥ srujatē gruhṇatē cha iti*,¹⁸⁸

¹⁸³ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

¹⁸⁴ *Panchamahābhūta* : *Prithvī, Ap, Tējas, Vāyu* and *Ākāśa*.

¹⁸⁵ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

¹⁸⁶ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XV. 7.

¹⁸⁷ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 19.

¹⁸⁸ *Mundakōpa.*, I. 1. 7.

which declares that as a living spider lets out of its womb a lifeless thread and constructs therefrom its (web), there exists in Paramēśvara a power for accomplishing that which is unaccomplishable. There is no wonder in this. Therefore, it is that it has been already exemplified that there is identity in the cause of the rational and the irrational and Paramaśiva and the material world. That this is the Vēdic doctrine is demonstrated in the clearest manner (as clearly as the ringing sound of a bell) by the *Sruti* text *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma* । *Tajjalānīti śānta upāsīta iti* । etc. If we accept the theory of false attribution (*adhyārōpāpavāda*), then, we will be contradicting many *Sruti* texts like *Sadēva saumyēdam agra āsīt* । *Ēka-mēvādvitīyam Brahma* । *Sa īkshata bahu syām prajāyēyēti* । *Ēkōham bahusyām prajāyēya* । *Dyāvāprithivī janayan dēva ēkaḥ* । *Dvāsuparṇā sayujau sakhāyau* । *Prādhāna kshē-tragnapatir guṇēśaḥ samsārabandhasthiti mōkshahētuh* । *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parātparam purusha-mupaiti divyam* । *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ* etc., and finally enter into the precincts of the Bauddha religion¹⁸⁰ and thus get outside the pale of Vēdic religion.

To say that the rational and irrational (*jaḍa* and *ajāḍa*) are identical and that the world is illusory and false (*ādhyāsikatvēna mithyātvaṁ*) is vain (*tuchcham*). If this be so, does this same principle hold good in any other place? In that case, is the world to be taken as *ātmā* in *anātma* form or *anātma* in *ātmā* form? It is not the first; because the existence of the serpent seen previously being true, the deception (*bhrānti*) comes into being whether it is a serpent or a mere rope. In the same way, the world being true, without admitting its existence, a separate view of *ātmā* will have to be held, which is not acceptable to us. Such a contradiction nowhere exists. Nor is it the second.

¹⁸⁰ Because the Bauddha religion rejects all *Sruti* texts. Bauddhas and Jainas are not infrequently termed *Vēdanīndakāḥ*, i.e., those who reject the divine character of the *Vēdas*.

By attributing in *anātma* the existence of *ātmā*, we would be attributing falsity to Brahman. Thereby many errors will result. If we do not admit what was actually seen previously and go on arguing, then, on the basis of the *bījāṅkura nyāya*,¹⁹⁰ as the doubts arise, the conclusions will also prove doubtful, thus stranding us in confusion. Or, according to the doctrine that whatever is perceived is not real, in the world which is seen by the eye, how can any attribute be applied to it (*i.e.*, what is seen by the eye)? In the case of the serpent, the false attribute of the serpent in such a thing (as the rope) is irresistible. Moreover, Brahman and the world being without a beginning or an end, if we were to adopt the doctrine that the world is unreal, *Sruti* texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyante* etc., will be contradicted. Such a view would also result, it would seem, in contradictory conclusions in regard to purposes and reasons and the discussion would be frustrated by incongruity between the first and the last (*i.e.*, between the proof and the thing to be proved). Then there will be the undesirable conclusion of Brahman being unreal (*mithyā*). This is also because of illusory sight. If we do not say that what we see is false, Brahman cannot, in this world, be experienced by perception. Moreover, it will be contradictory to the declared meaning of the *Sruti* text that the *ātmā* could be perceived materially as an image visibly (*aparōksha*) thrown backwards (*pratyagātma*). If the Self is not to be taken as a material image thrown backwards, as Brahman, then the difference between the *jīva* and Brahman cannot be accepted. *Smṛiti*, *Sruti* and *Purāṇic* texts like *Kaschit dhīraḥ pratyagātmānam aikshat || Tarati śōkam ātmavit ||*¹⁹¹ *Ātmā-*

¹⁹⁰ The maxim of an eternal series of seed and shoot. It takes its origin from the relation of mutual causation which subsists between seed and sprout—seed being the cause of the sprout, which in its turn is the cause of the seed. This maxim is used in those cases where two things stand to each other in the relation of both cause and effect. See Sankarāchārya's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, II. 1. 36 ; III. 2. 9.

¹⁹¹ *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 1. 3.

vā'rē drashtavyaḥ ||¹⁹² *Driśyatē tvagriyā buddhyā* ||
Paśya mē yōgamaīśvaram ||¹⁹³ *Sivātmakam idam sarvam* ||
Sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ ||¹⁹⁴ etc., declare that Brahman can be clearly perceived. If we do not admit that Brahman is capable of being seen, in conformity with usage (*vyāvahārika*), we will have lost our stand in the argument (*niradhishtāna bhanga prasangaḥ*) and this will result in a delusion (on our part). Therefore we should not admit the existence of false attribution (*i.e.*, illusion).¹⁹⁵ If it should be admitted on the basis of an invented *Sruti* text that the untrue appearance of *Māyā* (*māyābhāsēna*) leads to the existence of *jīva* and *Īśa* and if we also accept the falsity of the world, then in view of the existence of *Sruti* and *Smriti* texts *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau* ||¹⁹⁶ *Mamai-vāmsō jīvalōkō jīvabhūtas sanātanaḥ* etc., a great contradiction results.

Because it is inconsistent to predicate of *pradhāna* (*Māyā*)¹⁹⁷ which is irrational (*achētana*) that it can possess the power of creating *jīva* and *Īśvara*, which are rational (*chētana*). Also such a view is contradictory to the *Sūtra Antavatvam asarvagnatā vā*, II. 2. 41. And such a view will lead to the destruction of the traditional doctrine (*kritanāśa*) and result in the fabrication of a new doctrine (*akritābhyāgama prasangaścha*). If it is to be admitted that the power of *Paramēśvara* has been vested in *Pradhāna* to create the world, then it results in the admission that *Pradhāna* is the chief cause of the world's creation, which is against the Vēdic and other *Sruti* evidences, such as *Sa īkshata* and other texts enunciated in the *Īkshatyadhikarāṇa* (see I. 1. 5).¹⁹⁸

¹⁹² *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 4.

¹⁹³ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XI. 8.

¹⁹⁴ *Taitt. Upa.*, IV. 2. 9.

¹⁹⁵ The text has *adhyāsa*, which literally means *false attribution*.

¹⁹⁶ *Śveta. Upa.*, I. 9.

¹⁹⁷ *Prakṛiti*.

¹⁹⁸ For the text *Sa īkshatēmē nu lōkā* etc., see *Aitarēyōpanishad*, III. 1.

Consequently the doctrine of *pradhāna jagatkāraṇa* stands repudiated. Alternatively what is *mithyā*? Is it *asatva* (unreal) or *anirvachanīya* (indescribable) or *bādhyatva* (objectionable). It is not the first, because then the *Vēda* will become unauthoritative (*aprāmāṇya*); nor is it the second, for fear of the argument becoming dumb (*i.e.*, reaching a stage when argument becomes unavailing); nor is it again the third, because how could it be objectionable? Does the objection apply to the counterpart (*pratiyōgitva*)¹⁹⁹ of prohibition, past, present and the future (*traikālika nishedha pratiyōgitvam*)? Or is it the impossibility of comprehending by knowledge? It is not the first, for the world is actually true (*i.e.*, real) by its existence, proving fulfilment of a desired object (*arthasiddhi*) and fulfilment of a desired action (*kriyāsiddhi*) and without having a beginning or an end, it cannot be said that it was not existing in the past. As it can be experienced by direct perception, it cannot be said that it is not being directly perceived to-day. As it existed in its rudimentary condition even at *Pralaya* (deluge) in the form of *vēdarāśi* (collection of sounds),²⁰⁰ it cannot be ruled out as being non-existent in the future. Nor is it the second, because the sages were capable of irradiating their minds with the world even at *Pralaya*, as it existed formerly.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ *Pratiyōgin*: This term means opposing, counteracting, impeding, etc., or related or corresponding to, being or forming a counterpart of anything. It is often used in works on Nyāya; a *ghaṭa* is the *pratiyōgi* of *ghaṭābhāva* (*Yasyābhāvō vivakshyatē sa pratiyogī*).

²⁰⁰ *Vēda* signifies not only spiritual knowledge but also sound. Cf. *Śabda-Brahman*, which means the *Vēdas*; spiritual knowledge consists in words, knowledge of the Supreme Spirit, or the Spirit itself. The *Vēdas* are said to be *apaurushēya*, "not human compositions", being supposed to have been directly revealed by the Supreme Being Brahman and are called *Sruti*, *i.e.*, what is heard.

²⁰¹ That is, sages could by their meditation make the world as it existed before *Pralaya*, when there is no material world in existence, to manifest itself before their minds.

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It should not be said on the basis of the *dagdhapaṭanyāya*²⁰² that they who are liberated while living (*jīvanmuktas*) are yet subject to the pleasures of the body and the sensory organs,²⁰³ and are led by such (bodily) influences, for it is possible to say that even though one is devoid of illusion (*bhrānti*), yet in a big sandy desert, the sight of a mirage induces him to think of the actual existence of water. Similarly, the burnt cloth (*dagdhapata*) appears like cloth itself, for there is not in it the quality of preventing (or warding off) moisture. In the world, even though there is no actual water to quench one's thirst, the illusory sight of mirage exhibits such a property (*dharma*) in contradiction to the actual fact (*ayōgyatvāt*). Therefore for those who are liberated from the world—*jīvanmuktas*—even though they possess the knowledge of differentiation (of sensory organs and the pleasures created by them) (*bhēdagnāna*), yet they are absolutely free from the thrills of the body (*i.e.*, thrills to which the body is subject as the result of imagining bodily pleasures) hunger, thirst, etc. If it be said that as in this world the destruction of a protecting stick (*daṇḍanāśēpi*) destroys the power for movement possessed by a person using it, so the destruction of *avidyā* will remove the effects of the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, *avidyā*

²⁰² *Dagdhapaṭanyāyaḥ* :—The maxim of the burnt cloth. When a piece of cloth, or a leaf is thrown into the fire and consumed, its outline is still visible in the charred remains; and this the Advaita Vēdāntins use to illustrate the unreality and unsubstantiality of all phenomena. See Nrisimha Sarasvati's commentary on the *Vēdāntasāra*, pages 55 and 56. The burnt covering looks like the actual covering. The maxim suggests that when the soul is liberated by the burning away (*i.e.*, destruction) of the body covering it, it joins Brahman and is absorbed into it. See also Col. Jacob's *Laukikanyāyanjali*, I. p. 29.

²⁰³ The words are *Dēhēndriyādi*, which signifies the body and the organs of sense or the faculty of sense. In the Vēdānta, there are four *indriyas* recognized: *manah*, *buddhi*, *ahankāra* and *chitta*. They are spoken of as the four distinct organs, the total number being 14, each presided over by its ruler, *niyantru*.

being like a screenlike obstruction—the material cause of the illusion—it (has to be remarked that it) is not right to say so. Verily it has been said in the work of Dūrvāsa (*Dūrvāsīya*):—

*Ānādyavidyayā baddham Brahma tat kālakāraṇam ।
Svāvidyayā samsarati muktiḥ kalpitavākyataḥ ॥
Ēvam pratāraṇam sāstram sarvamāhātmyanāśakam ।
Upēkshyam śivabhaktaistu śrutiśmritivirōdhataḥ ॥
Kālāpagūdayam mukhyaḥ phalam vai mukhyatastamaḥ ।
Gnānanāśatvasiddhyartham tadeva hi nirūpitam ॥
Tadanyadaiva samsiddham vidyāvidyānirūpaṇaiḥ ।
Tanmāyikatvakathanam purāṇeṣhu pradarśyatē ॥
Tathaindrajālapakṣhēpi matāntaramidam dhruvam ।
Nāsti śrutishu tadvārta dṛśyamānāsu kutrachit ॥
Vāchārambhanavākyānām tadananyatvabōdhanāt ।
Na mithyātvāya kalpyantē śivōpādānakāraṇāt ॥
Gnānārtham arthavūdaśchēt jagat-srishtyādikāriṇi ।
Śaktēranangīkaraṇāt vidhimāhātmyayōr na tat ॥
Apavādārīhamēvaitadārōpō vastutō na hi ।
Dṛḍhapratītisiddhyartham iti chēt tanna yujyatē ॥
Mukhyārthabādhakam nāsti kāryadarśanataḥ śrutēḥ ।
Aindrajālikapakṣhēpi tatkartrutvam tadīritam ।
Māyādīnām cha kartrutvam śruti sūtrair na bōdhyatē ।
Akartrutvam cha yat tasya mūhātmyagnāpanāya vai ॥
Viruddhamadhyārōpāya na yuktēḥ kasya kāraṇam ।
Māyikatvam purāṇeṣhu vākyārtham upapadyatē ॥
Tasmād avidyāmāyātvakathanam mōhanāya vai ॥²⁰⁴*

Then it is said (in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*):—

*Asatyamapratishṭham tē jagadāhur anīśvaram ।
Aparasparasambhūtam kimanyat kāmahaitukam ॥²⁰⁵*

Then, again, the *Linga-Purāṇa* says:—

*Sēśvarādvaitabhāvē tu sarvam Śivamayam jagat ।
Gnānāt vikalpabuddhistu līyatē na svarūpataḥ ॥
Bhinnatvam naiva yunjīta Śivōpādānataḥ kvachit ।
Ēvam vaidikasiddhāntam sēvyam nānyaditi śrutiḥ ॥ iti.*

²⁰⁴ From the *Dūrvāsīya*.

²⁰⁵ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XVI. 8.

The *Dūrvāsīya*, above referred to, says that the statements that *Avidyā* which has been endlessly tied to Brahman, is the cause of Time, and that *Mukti* naturally evolves round one's own *Avidyā* are invented statements. A *Śāstra* that proposes in this manner absolutely to deliver one out of *Avidyā* is only destroying all its sacredness. Such a *Śāstra* should be discarded by all *Śivabhaktas* as contradicting all *Srutis* and *Smritis*. Perdition is the chief result for those who think that Time is a mere passing away (*i.e.*, that perdition awaits those who discard the evolution of Time).²⁰⁶ It is thus ascertained that such a thing²⁰⁷ will result in the destruction of *Gnāna* (knowledge).

Therefore, the other view is completely attained by those who are experts in the science of *Vidyā* and *Avidyā*. That it (Time) is *Māyā* is proved from the *Purāṇas*. Those who hold other tenets call it as *Aindrajāla* (illusion) for nowhere in the *Srutis* has it been seen so said. The text of the *Srutis* explaining the sentences *vāchārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadhēyam*, etc. (in the *Bṛihadāranya-kōpanishad*)²⁰⁸ does not mean anything that would make one understand that there is any agency beyond Śiva, so as to enable them (those who hold other views) to invent *Mithyātva* (*i.e.*, *Avidyā*). If *Arthavāda* (explanation of the *Srutis*) is meant for obtaining *gnāna*, then

²⁰⁶ There seems to be a reference to the adherents of the Advaita doctrine here. Sankara does not accept Time; it is, according to him, an illusion, *Nityatvam* being included in *Satyatvam*. Commenting on *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. 1. 1, Sankara observes:—*Ihatubhūtam Brahma-jignāsyam nityāvruṭtatvā na puruṣa vyāpāra tantram | chōdanā pravruṭtibhēdāt....Nityāntya vastu vivēkaḥ ihāmutrārtha bhōga nirāgaḥ* || *Kāla* is not, according to Sankara, the Supreme Spirit regarded as the destroyer of the universe, a personification of the destructive principle. See Chap. X of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, where Sri Krishṇa says that he is himself *Kālaḥ kalayātāmaham; ahamēvā-kshayaḥ kālō*, etc., (Of calculators of Time am I; I am also everlasting Time) *Bhagavad-Gītā*, X. 30; 33.

²⁰⁷ That is, such denial of Time.

²⁰⁸ *Bṛihad. Uṇ.*, VI. 1. 4.

the *Śakti* of Śiva should be set down as the chief cause for the creation, etc., of the world. If such a view is not agreed to, then there is neither any binding character nor sanctity attaching to the *Srutis*. No refutation (of this view) can be established as in fact such a refutation cannot be made. If it is sought to establish a firm conviction that there can be no refutation of this view, then it should be understood that such a refutation does not exist.

Throughout the *Srutis* there is no other contradictory view to the chief one which shows that all results proceed from Śiva (*kārya darśanataḥ*). Even if it is said that it is due to *Aindrajaḷa* (illusion), then also it (the result) is established as being due to the *Śakti* of Śiva (*taṅkartrutvam*). The direct agency of *Māyā* is nowhere mentioned in the *Srutis* and *Sāstrās*. The non-agency (*akartrutva*) of *Māyā* is stated to describe its exact virtues. To say anything contradictory should not be the skill of knowledge (*i.e.*, the aim of knowledge should not be to propound contradictory views). Under whose direction *Māyā* acts is well established in the expositions of the (texts of the) *Purāṇas*. Therefore to speak of *Avidyā-Māyā* is simply (to create) perplexity (or mere folly).²⁰⁹ It is said (in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*)²¹⁰ that "the universe is without truth, without a basis, they say, without God; brought about by mutual union and caused by lust and nothing else." The *Linga-Purāṇa* states:—In the event of correct knowledge developing on the lines of *Sēśvarādvaita*, *i.e.*, oneness of *Īśvara* with the world (*i.e.*, identity of *Īśvara* with the world), then the whole world will be perceived to be made of Śiva (or full of Śiva, *i.e.*, consisting of Śiva). Any

²⁰⁹ To create a delusion of mind which prevents one from discerning the truth.

²¹⁰ Chap. XVI. 8. This verse is, it will be seen, quoted by *Śrīpati* in support of his view, without comment. This is so, because it is in itself a denunciation of the view that this universe has come about haphazardly.

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knowledge formed which cripples the main thought leads not to the (realization of the) true form (or its natural state).

Nowhere in the *Sāstras* should you form a dualistic view beyond Śiva as the Supreme Cause. The *Sruti* says that no other view should be established in Vēdic *siddhānta*. Thus it is not meet to conclude the discussion on the basis of the Avidyā-Māyā (theory) of which (the theory of) Jīva-Īśvara is a reflection (*Avidyā-Māyāpratibimbīta jīvēśvaravādō na yuktaḥ*).²¹¹

The body which is perceptible through the knowledge that it is "I", could it be a reflection of *avidyā* (illusion)? Could it be a reflection of *antaḥkaraṇa* (mind)? Or could it be *chaitanya* (consciousness) which is inseparable from *antaḥkaraṇa*, which (again) is inseparable from *avidyā*? Or could it be that Īśvara, a reflection of Māyā, which is inseparable from him? Or could it be that both of them (*Īśvara* and *Māyā*) are naturally subject to *upādhi* (a virtuous reflection)? Or could such an *upādhi* be *māyā*, *avidyā*, or *antaḥkaraṇa*? At any rate it is not gross *upādhi* (*sthūlōpādhi*), for it is unable to travel into the higher regions, because it is said *Kāryōpādhirayam jīvaḥ kāraṇōpādhir īśvaraḥ iti*—this jīva is the effect and Īśvara is the cause. It does not hold good in the case of *pratibimba* (reflection). Because, it is said that Brahman is formless (*nīrūpatvēna*) and Māyā is *asat* (unreal). Therefore there can be no *pratibimba* (reflection) of such a thing (*i.e.*, a formless or an unreal thing). It must not be said that it is the *pratibimba* of water in the sky (*jalākāśa pratibimbavat*). Things are invented as we fancy them; there can be no reflection for a formless sky (*nīrūpasya ākāśasya pratibimbāsambhavāt*).

Even if such a falsified reflection is assumed, then, it would be only *bhrānti* (delusion). It cannot be said

²¹¹ Śrīpati's position is that the theory of Avidyā - Māyā is unnecessary to postulate the position that *jīva* and *Īśvara* is one, for, according to him, *jīva* and *Īśvara* are already one in Śiva. Avidyā has to be postulated if Māyā is to be assumed.

that as the image of the sun is seen reflected in water, likewise the reflection of the air is also seen in it. An image that is seen in a mirror through reflection cannot be actually seen (when it is removed); likewise it would not be meet to postulate that we could see a reflection of Brahman who is all-pervading. In which (the latter) case it could not be said that the all-pervading nature connected with Brahman can be possibly reflected. Even if it were possible, the sun's disc (*prabhāmaṇḍala*) is incapable of exhibiting such a reflection.

Moreover, both in the *Sruti* text *Guhām pravishṭau paramē parārdhē*²¹² and in the *Sūtra Guhām pravishṭāvāthmānau hi taddarśanāt*,²¹³ it is laid down that *jīva* and *Īśvara* live together in the same place (*ēkatra*). But such a thing cannot be accepted as right, because *bimba* and *pratibimba* could not be lodged in the same place. Further, if *māyā* and *avidyā* are assumed to be *bimba* and *pratibimba* and *jīva* and *Īśvara*, in the event of the destruction of *māyā* and *avidyā*, can it be they (*jīva* and *Īśvara*) have attained *mōksha*? If that view is accepted, then *mōksha* is the destruction of *jīva* and *Īśvara*. Then we will be entering into the precincts of the religion of Pāshanda Bauddha, (*i.e.*, heretical Buddhistic faith). Then, according to the saying *Ātmahananam apurushārtha iti*,²¹⁴ *mōksha* will have to be understood as being self-destruction (*apurushārthatva*) which is absurd, when *jīva* and *Īśa* come into destruction, then no one will seek the benefits of *Paralōka* (*i.e.*, the next or future world). Then, one who is desirous of *mōksha* will no longer attempt for it.

²¹² *Kaṭhavalli (Kaṭhōpa.)*, III. 1. The full text is *Ritam pibantau sukrutasya lōkē guhām pravishṭau paramē parārdhē* *iti*. Sankara begins his comment on *Brahma-Sutra* I. 2. 11 with this quotation from the *Kaṭhavalli*, remarking "Thus the *Kaṭhavalli* reads," etc.

²¹³ *Brahma-Sutras*, I. 2. 11.

²¹⁴ It is a common saying suggesting that self-destruction results in the non-realization of any one of the four principal objects of human life, *i.e.*, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mōksha*.

Both existences being false, every one will have to be contented with the present world. Then, when nobody attempts (*mōksha*), emancipation (*nivritti*) will be removed. Every one will think that there is no binding for the virtuous and the wicked. Both being false and without any difference, nobody will enter into it (*mōksha*), while this view prevails, the right path will not exist. The *jīva* will have no more to be considered as *pratibimba*. Then the *Sruti* text which begins with *Sa ātmā iti* will have to end by saying *Na tattvamasi*. The objects that are reflected in a mirror, such as fire, etc., shall have, as cause and effect, no effect whatever. Then great contradiction will arise from the *Sruti* text of *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa* regarding the text *Yō vighnānē tishṭhan iti*.²¹⁵ When the *pratibimba* (reflected image) is affected by *Māyā*, there will be no unity of *jīva* (and *Īśvara*) and there will be no more *bandha*, *mōksha*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, etc. Thus, therefore, the argument on the side of *pratibimba* cannot be availed of with advantage.

If we accept the argument that neutral objects (*jaḍa*) are also capable of possessing *chaitanya* (life), then even *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* (pot and cloth) will have to be considered to be possessed of *jīvatva*. Therefore even though undivided, the same objection holds good and therefore it is not meet (to accept it).²¹⁶ The *Sruti* text goes : *Ēkadhā bahudhā chaiva dṛśyatē jalachandravat iti*. It appears in one way and in several other ways just as the moon is reflected in water. This text strengthens the evidence in support of the view put forth. According to the maxim that an object that is compared to anything cannot possibly bring out all the points in the object with which it is compared to, Brahman is, by his universal existence, perceived to be generally so

²¹⁵ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, III. 7. 22.

²¹⁶ That is, even if *jaḍa* and *chaitanya* are taken as inseparable from one another, then too the same objection that neutral objects like *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* cannot be possessed of *jīvatva* holds good.

existent. According to the *Smṛiti* text *Māyābhāsēna jīvēśau karōti iti*, the reflection of *Māyā* makes and unmakes both the *jīva* and *Īśa*. We cannot postulate any invented opinion. The text *Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśā-nīśau iti*²¹⁷ is greatly contradicted if the above view (that *jaḍa* is possessed of *chaitanya*) is held. The compound *Māyā* is made up of *mam śivam ayaṭīti māyā*, i.e., all that which proceeds towards Śiva to join Him is *māyā* [*Maḥ* (मः) signifies *Śiva*; and *Yah* (यः) signifies one who goes or moves]. From the root *Aya Paya* which means *to go*, comes the word *Māyā*. The *Pranavārthavivarāṇa* quotes in the *Nighaṇṭu* from which we learn that *makāra* (the letter *ma*) includes “Śambhu, Brahma and Chandra”. In the *Sruti* text *Akārō Brahmā Ukārō Viṣṇuḥ Makārō Rudraḥ*, the word *Māyā* means the *Śakti* of *Paraśiva* (*Paraśiva Śaktiḥ*). And this *Māyā* flashes from the light proceeding from *Paramēśvara* and exhibits itself in the form of *jīva* and *Īśa*. Thus it is established in two different forms. If this is not so, all the *Sruti*s are contradicted. As stated before, there is no misconception in understanding that *Satya* and *Ananda* (on the part of *Paramēśvara*) are the causes of the creation of the world. For they are the prime virtues of *Paramēśvara*, just as the red hot iron keeps both its heat and light (i.e., they two being its properties). Therefore it is possible to say that the world is capable of being the agent for creation just as a pot, etc. (*ghaṭādivat*) are, i.e., just as the pot or other like thing is the outcome of the earth of which it is made and is capable of being made into a pot. Anyhow creation of the world, etc., are entrusted to *Prakṛiti*. But subsisting in different receptacles cannot be said to be equal to the *svarūpalakṣhaṇa* of *Brahman*; yet under the will of *Paramēśvara*, it is the cause of creation. While it is understood as different from the properties of

²¹⁷ *Gna* is the wise and *Agna* the ignorant. The wise and the ignorant are proved to be both lord and the servant—*ajāviva* represents the *Brahman*, the happy one and *anīśa*, the unhappy one, *Anīśatvamcha Duḥkhitvam*.

Īśvara, the quality of being different (*bhinnatva*) is only an incidental quality (*atastha lakṣaṇam*).²¹⁸ Without transgressing (or violating) the original idea, it comes to mean separate property (*pratyēka lakṣaṇam*), generally known as *jagat janmādikatvam*, i.e., the property of creating the world. It has only a property for creating; it has not got the property of destruction and should not be so understood. An agent which is a cause for creation has, at no time, the power of destruction. Till then (upto the time of destruction) the cause for which it is the agent, creation and existence (*utpatti sthiti*), should be agreed to as being its natural properties. The material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) alone is not the entire property (of Śiva).²¹⁹ Yet according to the maxim that Prakriti is always subject to changes (*vikāra*), it does in no case come in the way of the conception of establishing unity (i.e., it does not contradict the conception of unity). Brahman, though different from Prakriti and its quality of being the material cause, yet sustains both. Just as the potter in producing a pot and a king in his royal position, so in the same way we have to understand the power of creation and existence as material cause in Prakriti. As regards *svarūpa lakṣaṇa*, the natural characteristics (of Brahman) as enunciated in the *Sruti* text *Satyam gnānamanantam Brahma iti*,²²⁰ Brahman is in *Satya*, *Gnāna* and *Ananta*, i.e. Truth, Wisdom and Eternity. *Satya* etc., are his *svarūpa* (natural characteristics). This is a mere truism (*satyavādē*). Though the world appears not to be from its character a separate thing proceeding from Paramaśiva, yet its realization consists in knowing that it is one with Paramaśiva, in his natural and inseparable characteristics (*Śivasvarūpam abhēdē*). In other words, it is the chief characteristic (*guṇa*) and form (*bhāva*) which should be

²¹⁸ That property or *lakṣaṇa* which is distinct from its nature, and yet is the property by which it is known, e.g., *gandhavatvam* in the case of *Prithvī*.

²¹⁹ Śiva has other properties also; of his properties he has endowed Prakriti with the quality of being *upādāna kāraṇa*.

²²⁰ *Taittī. Upa., Brahmāṇḍavallī*, II. 1.

understood as existing in association with Śiva at all times. But if it is said that it can also exist independently of Śiva, it is not so. For, wherever a material is demonstrated, there its property also is seen combined with it. Whenever an object is to be explained by an exhibition of it, then its property should also be understood as co-existing along with it. For example, if one asks, "In this stellar sphere, who is the Moon?" the answer is "That body which exhibits light over a large tract of space, that is the Moon." Else, it cannot be proved in any other way by evidence except by its power of luminosity. Nor can any other body be made to assume the characteristics of the Moon, possessing its luminosity. Nor can it by any other way be explained to one who had never seen it, to bring to his knowledge the form of the Moon, in reply to his question. In reality, all controversies end in establishing the chief properties contained in the objects exactly in the same proportion as they are seen existing everywhere. That object is realized by enumerating its characteristics. In this world all objects possess their properties in their entirety and not in their divided parts. And nobody has had experience of their existence in the latter condition. Therefore the mere existence of (certain) properties in an object enables one to explain it through examples. The words *Satya*, etc., primarily denote the thing (or object) Brahman (*Brahmapadārtha*). The thing Brahman, therefore, does not include all the thousands of things related in the *Srutis*.²²¹ Though there are actually existing several of them, if it is asked how these several of them could be understood to be as one undivided whole (*Akhaṇḍa bōdha*), the answer is we have to understand it from its characteristics. For it is said in the *Śivādvaita Prakāśika*:—*Hyupāyastu vaiśiṣṭyamakhaṇḍa chandra-pratipattau tachcha virōdhāt chandrē na jāyatē. Sattvādi-vākyē tvanantādi padair vaiśiṣṭyam bādhyata iti ētēna sēva-nādi lakṣaṇasya nākhaṇḍārthakatvam | sēvanāvanādīnām*

²²¹ That is, we should understand that Brahman is one though it comprehends many. This leads the commentator to *Akhaṇḍa*, etc.

samudāya rūpatvēna akhaṇḍārthatvābhāvāditi ॥ While everything is seen under the influence of the luminosity of the Moon, it cannot be said that that luminosity is not proceeding directly from the Moon itself. While Truth and other expressions are endless in number, including the descriptions of such things as are of a contradictory nature, yet it should not be held that different characteristics show different objects other than Brahman. A close examination of the nature of such different characteristics on the whole proves that there is no other one undivided thing (*akhaṇḍārthatvābhāvāt*).

Therefore, it is held as disproved that by the mere enumeration of the characteristics of an object, it cannot be admitted that what we mean by the entire object (*Akhaṇḍārtha*) is expressed. However, that single characteristic denotes a particular object in a particular disputation; the characteristic was never intended to convey the meaning in only one sense. The expressions *Satya*, etc., used in a particular sense for conveying a particular meaning cannot be held to convey different meanings. While a word is capable of conveying several shades of meanings according to its characteristics (*lakṣhaṇa*), we cannot hold without contradiction that what has already been expressed is the only way in which it could be interpreted. It does not thereby contradict its original characteristic (*na cha vaiyarthyam*). By the word *Satya* is denoted that it does not include *Asatya*. By the word *Gnāna*, all lifeless things are excluded,²²² and the word *Ananta* (endless, eternal) includes all things limited in time. These words always avoid contradiction, difference in interpretation and redundancy. By the word exclusion (*vyāvṛttiḥ*), what is to be inferred? Is it exclusion from Brahman or not? If it is the first (*i.e.*, Brahman), all the *Srutis* that declare unity (*aikya*) are contradicted; if it is the second, then the same appearing as a different one, shows uselessness (or unproductiveness) (*vaiyarthyam*). If it is said that in the same there should be

²²² *Gnāna* is restricted to the *Chaitanya* world and does not extend to *Jaḍa*.

both *pratiyōgi* and *anuyōgi* (being counterpart of a thing and being united with it), and the power of pervading all over (*pratiyōgyanuyōgi karaṇa vyāpakādi*) then such a word is of no use. Nor can cause be then said to be a separate *Dharma* (characteristic). In this way, if while contradictions point to difference in Brahman, the same expressions denote the contradictory sense which is of no use. With this very idea, it is said in the *Sivādvaita Prakāśikē*:—*Sangrahaḥ aviśiṣṭam aparyāyānēkaśabda-prakāśitam ēkam | vēdāntanīṣṭhitam akhaṇḍam pratipēdirē iti* || In short, that is the only one which is *aviśiṣṭam* (not capable of being distinguished), *aparyāyam* (not capable of being otherwise interpreted) and *anēkaśabdaprakāśitam* (which many words display as the only one); which the Vēdanta particularly reveres and salutes, that undivided One, forms its sole fixed subject. Therefore it is declared that *Satya*, etc., form the chief characteristics of Brahman.

If it is said that according to the text *Yatō janma tat Brahmēti*, etc., that it is to the original (*Ādyasya Brahmanah*) four-faced Brahma, that these characteristics apply, then it is replied that it is not so. For it is contradictory to the *Srutis*, *yukti* (reason), and *anubhava* (experience). Then, what is meant by the *Ādyatvam* (beginning) as applied to *Chaturmukha* (the four-faced Brahma)? Is it in reference to *sarvakāryāpēkshayā* or *chētanāpēkshayā*? Not the first; for the text *Ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ iti*²²³ refers to *Bhūtasrisṭi* (the whole class of *bhūtas* taken collectively) which is stated to be the first among the created. It must not be said that *Bhūta srisṭi* is after *Hiranyagarbha srisṭi*,²²⁴ for *Hiranyagarbha* who embodies the spiritual character of *srisṭi* in its entirety cannot be supposed to have been subsequent to *Bhūta srisṭi*. Therefore *Bhūta srisṭi* cannot be earlier than *Hiranyagarbha srisṭi*, as there is nothing to prove such a thing. If *Bhūta srisṭi* is, notwithstanding, taken to be earlier in

²²³ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

²²⁴ *Hiranyagarbha*: Name of Brahman as born from a golden egg.

order to have a knowledge of the characteristics of Brahman, then, it results in no consequence. Daśaratha and Vasudēva are considered to be the parents of Rāma and Krishṇa for certain purposes; and if this is acknowledged to be so, then *Sarvagnatva*²²⁵ cannot be established in Rāma and Krishṇa. As in the case of Rāma and Krishṇa, Chaturmukha is much higher than the one represented as his originator. The *Sruti* text goes:—*Vishṇōrēva hiraṇyagarbhōtpattiḥ iti*. From Vishṇu only is *Hiraṇyagarbha srisṭi*. This is also to be similarly understood. Other *Sruti* texts declare:—*Yō dēvānām prathamam puraścāt | Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ | Hiraṇyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam* ||²²⁶ *Sa nō dēvaḥ śubhayā smṛityā samyunaktu* || The meaning of the first of these texts is as follows:—The Maharshi Rudra is greater than the *chidachit prapancha* and far beyond the universe (*Viśvasmāt*) and also the All-knowing author of the *Vēda* (*Sarvagnatvādinā*). Then as to the second text, Paramaśiva is the first of all Dēvas, Indra, etc. Śiva produced out of his will *Hiraṇyagarbha* and the four-faced Chaturmukha in the form of Prakriti and taught him all the spiritual knowledge, *Vēda*, etc., out of his favour. Let that Śiva protect us, out of His unlimited grace, by disentangling us from the entire bondage of *samsāra* and granting us that *paramānanda svarūpa* as the result of the spiritual knowledge derived from the *Vēdānta* and the *Āgama*, and bring us into unity with Him. Accordingly texts like *Yō dēvānām prathamāschōdbhavaścha | Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* and *Hiraṇyagarbham janayāmāsa pūrvam* || should be held to denote that *Hiraṇyagarbha* came into *srisṭi* as the result of creation by Mahēśvara. Such a meaning cannot be held to be unreasonable.

However, there is the text of the *Mahōpanishad*:—*Ēkō ha vai Nārāyaṇa āsīt | Na Brahmā nēśānō nāgnīśhōmau nēmēdyāvā prithivī iti* || *Nārāyaṇa* was the only one who

²²⁵ Omniscience.

²²⁶ *Mahōpa.*, I. 12.

existed (before the creation). Neither Brahma nor Īśvara nor Agni nor these others (pointing to them) nor the sky nor the earth existed (before the creation). It is here shown that Nārāyaṇa alone was above all existent as the Supreme Spirit, the greatest, before the creation. And then there is the text *Nārāyaṇāt Brahmā jāyatē | Nārāyaṇāt Rudrō jāyatē iti* || From Nārāyaṇa was born Brahma and from Nārāyaṇa was born Rudra, which proves that Nārāyaṇa is the All-Cause of everything. And then it is also stated, in the text of the Upanishad, *Atha kasmāduchchyatē Brahma brihantōhyasmin guṇāḥ* ²²⁷ *iti*, from whom else could Brahma in whom are so many of the greatest good qualities (*brihantō guṇāḥ*) have been born; whereby for Him (Nārāyaṇa) alone is ascribed the fullest good qualities. Again, according to the text *Tadēva Brahma paramam kavīnām* ²²⁸ || to the all-knowing Brahma and others, *He* (Nārāyaṇa) alone is Para Brahman. Further in the text, *Ajasya nābhāvadhyēkam arpitam (yasmin viśvāni bhuvanāni tasthuḥ)*.²²⁹ In the navel of the Unborn, one chief stock took its origin and in it the whole universe and the worlds existed. Again, in the text *Antas-samudrē manasā charantam Brahmānvavinda daśa hōtāram-arnē iti*²³⁰ || While under the ocean, He (Nārāyaṇa) was going about thinking, Brahma and the ten sacrificial agents were born. It is said that the quality of lying in state in the ocean has been ascribed to Him (Nārāyaṇa) by the learned through usage, and it applies to Him only in particular.

In texts like *Na sannachāśaschchiva ēva kēvalaḥ* ²³¹ | *Brahma Viṣṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyante* ²³² | *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt iti*,²³³ the reference rightly is to the same

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In texts like *Namō Viṣṇavē brihatē karōmi* | *Brihattē Viṣṇō Sumatim bhajāmahē iti* || ²³⁶ there is no ground for leaving out of account the existing evidences in support of the statement that the Eternal Paramēśvara is the sole author of the creation and ascribing invented proofs for the position that Viṣṇu is the author of the creation. But some timid people may question, with doubt, how could one who has no birth at all, have been born? In the text of the *Śvētāśvatara Upanishad* we read, *Rudra yattē Dakṣiṇam mukham tēna mām pāhi nityam iti* || It is here said that Mahēśvara alone is termed as *Ajāta*. And therefore the statement that Śambhu is the creator of Ādi-Viṣṇu is right. It is also seen in the following text of the *Yajur-Vēda*:—*Sōmah pavatē janitā matīnām janitā divō janitāgnēḥ janitā sūryasya janitēndrasya janitōtha Viṣṇō iti* || As also in the text of the *Atharvāna Vēda*:—*Dhyāyītēśānam pradhyaṇitavyam sarvamidam Brahma-Viṣṇu-Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē iti* || Śiva alone is the sole cause of creation. Further the text *Śiva ēva kevalaḥ* implies that Śiva alone is the author of *Sanātana srishti* ²³⁷ (i.e., *Eternal Creation*). Also, in the text *Nārāyaṇāt Brahmā*, ²³⁸ where Brahma is described as derived from Nārāyaṇa (creator), it must be understood as referring only to subsidiary creations (i.e., after the original). For, it is thus supported in the *Vāyavīya Samhitā* of the *Saiva Purāṇa*:—*Trayastē kāraṇātmānō jātāḥ sākshān mahēśvarāt* | *Charācharasya viśvasya sargasthi-tyantahētavaḥ* | *Pitrā niyamitāḥ pūrvam trayōpi trishu karmasu* | *Brahmā sargē Haristrānē Rudraḥ samharaṇē punaḥ* | *Tadāpyanyōnyamātsaryāt anyōnyātiśayārthinaḥ* | *Tapasā toshayitvā tam pitaram Chandraśēkharam* | *Brahmā Nārāyaṇāt pūrvam Rudraḥ kalpāntarē 'srijat* | *Kalpāntarē punar Brahmā Rudra Viṣṇu*

²³⁶ *Rig-Vēda.*

²³⁷ As opposed to *Sūkshma srishti* above spoken of.

²³⁸ Add here *jāyatē* which is omitted. A quotation from the *Mahōpanishad* (*Mahānārāyaṇōpanishad*). The name *Nārāyaṇa* is not ordinarily mentioned as too holy for mention.

jaganmayah † *Vishṇuścha bhagavān tadvat Brahmāṇam asrujat punaḥ* † *Nārāyaṇam punar Brahmā Brahmāṇam cha punar Bhavaḥ iti* † Moreover, texts like *Sa Brahmā sa Śivaḥ sēndraḥ sōksharaḥ Paramassvarāt iti*, etc., and hundreds of other *Sruti* texts declare that Brahman is beyond the Trinity (*Mūrtitraya*). Likewise, in the *Nārāyaṇa* and other *Upanishads*, *Nārāyaṇa* is not so stated, *i.e.*, as being beyond the Trinity. The *Māndūkya* (*Upanishad*) text :—*Prapanchō-paśamam śāntam Śivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē sa Ātmā sa vighnēyaḥ* ²³⁹ † *Śivō dvaitaḥ iti* † and the text *Dhyāyītēśānam pradhyaḥyitavyam* † *Sarvamidam Brahma Vishṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē iti* ²⁴⁰ † and other texts fully prove Śiva to be beyond the Trinity and therefore for Him alone does Parabrahmatva hold good. Likewise, it is said in the *Anuśāsanika* (*parva* of the *Mahābhārata*):—*Sō'srijat dakṣiṇāt angāt Brahmāṇam lōkasambhavam* † *Vāma pārśvāt tathā Vishṇum lōkarakshārtham Īśvaraḥ* † *Hridayāt kālarudrākhyam iti* † Here the creation of Rudra is referred to as being Kālarudra and not Śiva. Else, a timid (*bhīru*) man may doubt as to how an unborn one (Śiva) could have been born, being contrary to the *Srutis*. Nor can the birth of Vishṇu be taken to be an *avatar*. For it is against the *Sruti* texts above quoted (*Sruti* texts such as *Vishṇuritthā*, etc.).

Moreover, in the *Atharvaśiras* (*Upanishad*) there is the text :—*Akāraṇam kāraṇānām dhyātū kāraṇam tu dhyēya iti*, where the termination *tu* signifies the peculiar *lakshana* referring to Śambhu, which is beyond the reach of all others. But in the *Sruti* text (*Ēkō*) *Nārāyaṇa āsīt iti*, whereby *Nārāyaṇa* is to be taken not as always existing but born as only the first incarnation after the *Sūkshma srisṭi*. (Vishṇu belongs to the future and not to the present or the past.) In texts like *Saktēr āsīt Parāśaraḥ iti*, etc., on the basis of the *Chhāgapaśu nyāya*, the words *Sadātmā*, *Nārāyaṇa*, etc., only signify Śiva, and none others, for it is supported by the texts occurring in the *Kaivalya*—*Sarvō vai Rudraḥ*, and *Sa ēva Vishṇuḥ*

²³⁹ *Mānd. Upa.*, I. 6. 7.

²⁴⁰ *Atharvaśiras*.

sa prāṇaḥ sa kālō'gniḥ sa chandramāḥ iti. Also, in the *Atharvaṇaśikhā*, we have the words of Śiva Himself:—*Ahamēkaḥ prathamam āsam vārtāmi cha bhaviṣhyāmi cha nānyaḥ kaśchin mattō vyatiriktaḥ iti* ²⁴¹ In the *Harivamśa*, it is said:—*Yāni nāmāni Gōvinda tava lōkē mahīyatē tānyēva mama nāmāni nātra kāryā vichāraṇā iti* ! Here Śiva says to Kriṣṇa that whatever the names by which Gōvinda is distinguished, those are the very names of Śiva also. Jaimini, Bhaṭṭa, Bhāskarāchārya and others who were well versed in the *Vēdas* and also in the full and established meaning of the four *Vēdas* have laid down that Parabrahman is none other than Śiva alone. Also, in the *Sūta Samhitā* it has been stated by Vyāsa that Śiva only is Parabrahman, in whom complete *Brahma-lakṣhaṇa*, such as creation, protection and destruction are combined and that this is indisputable. Further, the following *Sruti* texts:—*Dhyāyītēśānam pradhīyāyitavyam sarvamidaṁ Brahmā Viṣṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē* । *Sōmaḥ pavatē janitūmatīnām* । *Kṣharam pradhānam amrutākṣharam haraḥ kṣharātmanā-vīśatē dēva ēkaḥ* । *Īśānaḥ sarvavidyānām Īśvaraḥ sarva-bhūtānām Brahmādhipatir Brahmaṇōdhipatir Brahmā Sivō mē astu Sadāśivōm* ॥ *Ēkō hi Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthuḥ* । *Ya imān lōkān īśata īśānīyuh janānīyuh* *yassarvān lōkānīśata īśānībhiḥ paramaśaktibhiḥ* । *Yēshāmīśē paśupatīḥ paśūnām chatuṣpadāmuta cha dvīpadām* । *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam Sivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē* । *Nidhanapatayēnamaḥ* । *Nidhanapatāntikāya namaḥ* । *Sarva-bhūtadamanāya namō manōnmanāya namaḥ iti* ॥ and many like collections of other *Sruti* texts establish that Śiva alone is the chief cause for the creation of *jagat*, etc. (*Jagadjanmādihētutva vyapadēśāt*). One alone shines in his all-effulgent nature without lessening any part of his character, creating the world under the name of *Bhava* by his *Rājasa* quality; protecting the world under the name of *Mruḍa* by all his *Sāttvika* qualities;

²⁴¹ I was the only one who was at first; who prevails now; who is going to exist in future and there is none other beyond me.

and destroying all the creation under the name of *Hara* by all his *Tāmasa* qualities and being overlord in all his three-fold qualities, keeping in himself his own *Śakti* intact. Verily it has been said in the *Mahimna-stava* :—*Viśvōtpattau Bhavāya namōnamah* । And therefore also in the *Saivāgama* it is said :—*Sarvagnatā triptir anādibōdhaḥ svatantratā nityam alupta śaktiḥ । Anantaśaktischa vibhōr vidhignāḥ shadāhur angāni mahēśvarasya । Yadbhaktasthalam ityāhuḥ tat sarvagnatvam* *chyatē । Yanmāhēśvarakam nāma sā triptir mama śāṅkarī । Yat prasādābhidham sthānam tadbōdhō mē nirankuśaḥ । Yat prāṇalingakam nāma tat svātantryam udāhritam । Yad asti śaraṇam nāma hyaluptā śaktiruchyātē । Yadaikyasthānamūrdhasthā hyanantā śaktiruchyātē । Ētadangasthalam dēvī guhyāt guhyatamam param iti ॥*

Thus are established all the characteristics, such as *Sarvagnatva*, etc., and *jagadjanmādi kāraṇatvam* (creation, etc., of the world) in Śiva alone and in none else.

Siva as Para Brahman.

Having thus discussed the attributes of Brahman and establishing them, Śrīpati proceeds to deal with the source of all knowledge relating to him. Commenting on 1. 1. 3, *Śāstra yōnitvāt* (*Because the Śāstra forms the source—of the knowledge relating to Him*), he initially remarks that texts like *Asya mahatō bhūtasya niśvasitam ētadrigvēdō yajurvēdassāma vēdaḥ iti*—These Rig, Yajur and Sāma Vēdas which are the result of the inhaling breath of that Great Being, form the subject-matter of this Sūtra. In other words, Śāstra is the source of all authority. For Śāstras, such as the Rig Vēda, etc., the source and cause is Śiva. The *Sruti* text goes *Śivō māmēva pitarah iti*,²⁴² I am the Father (cause) to whom Śiva is referred. Therefore Nigama and Āgama are paramount authorities, Śiva being the chief cause of creation, etc. Here the *Srutis* determine the applicability. Texts like the one quoted above prove Paramēśvara to be the chief source (cause) for the

²⁴² *Rudrachamaka*.

Vēdas. Texts like *Vāchā virūpa nityayā iti* prove the eternity of the *Vēdas*. The question whether we could appropriately say that Paraśiva Brahman is the chief cause for Nigama and Āgama is one open to discussion. In the *Smritis* it is said *Anādinidhinā nityā vāgutsrishiṭā svayambhuvā* । *Ādau vēdamayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravrittayaḥ iti* । From that *Svayambhū*, came out that ever-existing and eternal speech, which was in the beginning the effulgent *Vēdas*, wherefrom all took their origin. Here the *Vēda* is stated to be eternal. This shows that the birth of Paramēśvara is not true (*apramāṇya*). He had no birth of a Paurushēya character (*i.e.*, He had no human origin). And, therefore, if it is said that the *Vēdas* also are equally as eternal and unaffected by the three kinds of time (*traikālikābādhyatvam*), then we propound the following *Siddhānta*:—If it is said that the *Vēdas* exist by themselves, it would be against the *Sruti* text *Śivō māmēva pitarāḥ*. And also in the fourth part of the *Sāma śākhā*, it is mentioned that they (the *Vēdas*) are stated to have been possessed of *angas*, *śarīra*, *gōtra*, *varṇa*, etc. These denote that the former (portion) treats of the first creation and the latter generally treats of the (subsequent or succeeding) creations. Those (the former) form their characteristics denoting a cause showing a sign (of *srishti*). Texts like *Ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ iti*²⁴³ state that the sky and the other elements were created by the order of Paramēśvara as the sole cause. If so, how can the *Vēdas* be called *Svayambhūtam*, *i.e.*, without origin (*apaurushēya*)? The *Smritis* enunciate a similar position in the text.

Ashtādaśānām ētāsām vidyānām Brahmavartmanām ।
Ādikartā Śivassākshāt śūlapāniriti śrutiḥ ॥
Sādyōjātēna Rigvēdam Vāmadēvēna Yājusham ।
Aghōrēṇa tathā Sāma Purushēṇātvatharvaṇam ॥
Īśānēna mukhēṇaiva kāmikadyāgamām tathā ।
Janayāmāsa viśvēśaḥ sarvasiddhipradāyakaḥ ॥
Vimarśarūpiṇī śaktiḥ Śivasya paramātmānaḥ ।
Nigamāgamarūpā syāt sarvatattvaaprakāśinī ॥

²⁴³ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

*Tasmāt vēdāgamārthēshu yaḥ kuryāt bhēdabhāvanām ।
Sa sahasrakulam ghōrē narakē patati dhruvam ॥ iti.*

Therefore Paramēśvara is the sole cause for bringing to light, in continuation, the former and latter parts of Nigama and Āgama, by means of that *Śakti* that is inherent in him. And in him lies all the power of bringing to light every kind of knowledge. Therefore there is no contradiction between *Sruti* and *Āgamas* with regard to whether Paramēśvara is born or not born (*janyatva* and *ajanyatva*).²⁴⁴ Further, *Sruti* texts like *Nasannachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ । Nānyat kinchanamishat । Nēha nānāsti kinchana । Natutāt dvitīyamasti ॥ iti* enunciate clearly that none other created the Vēda and that it is eternal. If it is then asked how such statements ought to be reconciled, then we say that *Sruti* texts like *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma । Sarvō vai Rudraḥ ॥ iti*, etc., distinctly hold out that Brahman is the sole Creator of *charāchara prapancha* (the living and the lifeless world). If so, these contradict the other set of *Sruti* texts, according to which the world is stated to be unreal (*mithyāparatvam*). As to this, we say that that is wrong; because even prior to the time that creation became manifest, the world was existing in a very shortened (*samkuchita*) form (*rūpa*) in the *śakti* of Mahēśvara himself, therein containing all the elements of Nigama and Āgama and others as if in the form of a seed ready to sprout up. *Śakti* and Paramēśvara are never different, for it is said in the *Sruti* text:—*Parāsyā saktir vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvikī gnānabalakriyā cha ॥*²⁴⁵

Moreover, if it is doubted, as to how Vēda could be called Eternal, when it is simply a resonant sound implying *śabda*, *buddhi* and *karma* (words, knowledge and actions) and only lasting for a limited time in its three forms of

²⁴⁴ Some *Srutis* hold He was and some others that He was not born. Sripati's view is that He was not born. If that is so, there is really no contradiction in the *Srutis* on this point.

²⁴⁵ This is the last line in the *Chchāndogya* text beginning with *Apāni pādō javanō grihitā* and ending with *svābhāvikī gnānabalakriyā cha* which is all that is quoted by Sripati above.

existence, then we say there is no reason for any such doubt. We say this, on the basis of the maxim *Kāraṇa-satyatvē kāryasya satyatvam*, the cause being true, the effect also should be quite true. It is indisputable that *Śakti* in *Paramēśvara*, which is the cause for all the *Vēdas*, is Eternal, from which it follows that the effect (of that *Śakti*) also should likewise be Eternal. Lord *Mahēśvara*'s statement that Brahman is *nitya-mukta buddha* and *śuddha* by *svabhāva* and is manifest at any moment and intimate with all is verily true. But that statement which people put forth attributing *rāga*, *dvēsha* and *pāśabaddha*, qualities which are exhibited by *Pauruṣhēya*, is untrue, because it is only a statement of the ignorant with evil thoughts. Therefore the *Vēdas* are decidedly eternal. Moreover, the *Vēdas* having determined to extol *Paramēśvara* and none else, they keep constantly praising *Paramēśvara* regarding his unending eternal propitious qualities and like so many poets continuously extol him without a break.

Further, the smearing of the *Bhasma* (sacred ashes) is heard of in the *Vēdas*. In the text of the *Śvētāśvatarōpanishad*, *Triyāyusham Jamadagnēḥ Kaśyapasya triyāyusham* । *Yaddēvānām triyāyusham* । *tanmē astu triyāyusham iti* ॥²⁴⁶ the word *triyāyusha* is interpreted to be *tiryakpuṇḍra*, a triple cross-wise or horizontal mark. In the *Yajurveda*, we read :—*Mānastōkēti mantrēṇa mantritam Bhasma dhārayēt* । *Urdhvaṇḍram bhavēt sāma madhya puṇḍram yajūmshi cha* । *Adhaḥ puṇḍram Richas sākshāt tasmāt puṇḍram triyāyusham* ॥ *iti*. Further, in the *Bōdhāyana śākhā* the following occurs :—

Tāni vā ētāni rudrākshāṇi yat trayō vēdā dhārayanti tasmāt dēvā dhārayanti । *tasmāt tāni dhārayan gachchan tishṭhan khādan svapan unmishan nimishan hasan sarvāṇyē-nāmsi tarati Rudrōbhūtvā Rudrō bhavati iti*. For what causes the *Vēdas* put on like Rudra and become Rudra Himself, the *Bhasma* and *Rudrāksha*, for the same reasons

²⁴⁶ *Śvēta. Upa.*

the Devatas also wear them and so they are wearing them while going, while standing, while eating, while sleeping, while sitting, while meditating, while laughing—in all conditions. From this we see that *Rudrāksha dhāraṇam* is also prescribed (in the *Smritis*).

Also, in the *Rigvēda* text *Ayam mē hastō Bhagavān* || *iti*,²⁴⁷ what I have in my hand is Thyself, O Lord, *Yā tē Rudraśśivā tanūḥ aghōrā pāpakāśini*²⁴⁸ || *iti*, etc. which state that the Vēdapurusha wears the Śivalinga according to the *Vēdas*. Further in various hymns of praise is seen the text *Jagatām patayē namaḥ*²⁴⁹ | *Namō hiraṇya-bāhavē namaḥ iti*²⁵⁰ and others.

Therefore in weighing all the *Śrutis* and *Smritis*, it is seen that in the *ātma Śakti* of Paramēśvara which is the embodiment of Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvara ātmaḥ śakti*), is observed to be the principal figure referred to in all the *Vēdas* and the *Āgamas*.

Again, if the doubt is expressed how Mahēśvara could be said to be the author of the *Vēdas*, when Chaturmukha (the four-faced Brahma) is plainly said to be the sole author of the *Rik*, *Yajus* and *Sāma Vēdas* according to texts like *Shadḍōlā vai bhūtvā prajāpatir idam sarvam asrijata* | *Ruchē yajūmshī sāmāni* | *iti*, etc., then we contradict such a doubt and state that it is not so. For it is said in the *Śrutis* that long prior to the creation of Hiraṇyagarbha, that Vēda had its origin, according to the texts *Yō brahmāṇam vidadhāti pūrvam yō vai vēdāmscha praṇiṇōti tasmai*²⁵¹ | *iti*, etc., which state that long before Brahma was created, the creation of the Vēda took place and then those *Vēdas* were taught to Brahma after he came into existence. This decidedly proves that Hiraṇyagarbha got all the Vēda tutored by Paramēśvara and therefore Paramēśvara is alone stated to be greater than all others.

²⁴⁷ *Rigvēda*.

²⁴⁸ *Rudrachamaka*.

²⁴⁹ *Mahōpa.*, XVIII. 13.

²⁵⁰ *Rudrachamaka*.

²⁵¹ *Śvēta Upa.*, VI. 18.

Accordingly, *Śruti* texts like *Yō dēvānām prathamam purastāt* | *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* | *Hiraṇyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam* | *Sa nō dēvaḥ śubhayā smṛityā samyunaktu*²⁵² | *iti*, state that the supremacy of Paramēśvara extends absolutely over the creation of Hiraṇyagarbha and *chidachit prapancha*. Moreover, the sages Upamanyu, Dadhīchi, Gautama, Dūrvāsa, Reṇuka, Dārūka, Sankharsṇa, Gōkarṇa and others also observe that the all-knowing power (*sarvagnatva*) consists in knowing decisively what all is contained in the Vēda and the Vēdānta. If it is questioned how such *Sarvagnatva* could be found only in Paramēśvara and not with others, the reply is that we should not doubt it (*i.e.*, such *sarvagnatva* in Him alone). Because such a power can also be obtained to a small extent (*kinchit*) by the good grace of Paramēśvara through meditating on and worshipping Him. And therefore there is no contradiction (here). Comparing the brightness of the Sun with skylight, the light being the same, the intensity of it is seen to a large extent in the case of the Sun. In the same way, though every *Śruti* describes Paramēśvara as the sole *Kartru* (Lord), he is also the Sole Being of supreme knowledge (*Sarvādhika gnāna upapadyate*). Because one who knows everything in the *Śāstra* is by far superior to the one who has merely just entered (on its study). Therefore, no one can be said to be *Sarvagna* or *Sarvāntaryāmi* or *Sakalajagadvyāpaka* other than Paramēśvara Himself, for these six qualities, such as *Sarvagnatva*²⁵³ and others, cannot be a property owned by Him (Paramēśvara) in common with others (*i.e.*, nobody can show these qualities with Him).

Further, if it may be asked, "Where is the need for this *Sūtra* in application as the previous *Sūtra* alone establishes for Paramēśvara *Jagadjanmādikāraṇātva*, *Śāstrakāraṇātva*, *Sarvagnatva*, etc.?" The answer to this

²⁵² *Mahōpanishad*, X. 19. 1.

²⁵³ These six qualities are:—*Sarvagnatva*, *Sarvāntaryāmitva*, *Sakalajagadvyāpakatva*, *Sarvādhikagnānatva*, *Sarvasāstrapraṇētrītvā* and *Sarvavastvabhāsatva*,

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question is "It is not so." For in the previous *Sūtra*, the subject relating to Paramaśiva possessing the above powers was mentioned only by way of introduction subject to the proviso that it might later be discussed at length with a view to establishing the Brahmatva of Paramaśiva. To remove the doubt (that pertaining to the Brahmatva of Paramaśiva), this *Sūtra* has been set down by Bhagavān Vyāsa under the heading *Sāstrayōnitvāt*. This means *Sāstram nigamāgamātmakam yōniḥ pramāṇam yasya tathātvāt*. He that is proved by the *Sāstras* through the testimony of Nigama and Āgama as entitled to Brahmatva, He is called *Sāstrayōniḥ*. Therefore, nothing can be said in the following *Adhikaraṇas* contradicting this *Adhikaraṇa* regarding the Brahmatva of Paramaśiva. That no other alternative meaning could be attached to this *Sūtra* (*Sāstrayōnitvāt*) is plain from what is suggested in this *Sūtra* itself. No further *Adhikaraṇa* is, therefore, necessary to explain this (point). (There is nothing further to be said on the topic discussed in this *Adhikaraṇa*.)²⁵⁴ If anybody raises the objection that it is not possible to know the All-powerful Brahman as being Paramaśiva alone through the *Vēda* and *Vēdānta Sāstras*, without other proofs, then, we say, that texts like *Tam tvaupanishadam puruṣam pruchchāmi* | *Nāvēdavinmanutē tam brihantam*²⁵⁵ | *Naishā tarkēṇa matirāpanēyā*²⁵⁶ | *Ritam satyam param Brahma puruṣam kṛishṇa-pīngalam* | *Ūrdhvarētam Virūpākṣham Visvarūpāya vai namaḥ*²⁵⁷ | *Pradhānakṣhētragnapatir guṇēśaḥ samsāra mōksha sthitibandhahētuh*²⁵⁸ || *Satyam gnānam anantum Brahma*²⁵⁹ *iti*, etc., state that Para Brahman is the sole subject treated of in these *Sūtras*. And again a number of *Sruti* texts like *Na chakshushā grihyatē nāpi vāchā* | *Tam tvaupanishadam*

²⁵⁴ Sṛipati suggests that this *Sūtra* is self-contained and exhaustive to a degree.

²⁵⁵ *Taitt. Brā.*, III. 12. 9.

²⁵⁶ *Katha Upa.*, II. 9.

²⁵⁷ *Mahōpa.*, X. 11.

²⁵⁸ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 16.

²⁵⁹ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

purusham pruchchhāmi || etc., postulate without a shadow of doubt as to who Para Brahman is and how he is to be understood. The former goes to prove that Brahman cannot be understood through the *Vēdas*, nor can he be realized by the sight nor through expression. But texts like *Yan manasā na manutē yēnāhur manōmatam*²⁶⁰ | *Yatō vāchō nivartantē aprāpya manasā saha* | *Ānandam Brahmanō vidvān na bibhēti kutaschanēti*²⁶¹ and others prove again that the power of creation and the All-knowing Power is confined only to Him who can be understood by discussion of the *Śāstras*. The *Siddhānta* is that none other than Brahman is the sole cause of the creation and He is established through the *Upanishads* and other *Śāstras* and no others are so described. He who is so described is alone Para Brahman.

Texts like *Nāvēdavinmanutē tam brihantam*²⁶² | *Naishā tarkēṇa matirāpanēyā* | *iti*,²⁶³ etc., state that there are no other sources from which Brahman can be determined or understood which are not contradictory.

In the text *Tam tvaupanishadam purusham pruchchhāmi* | *iti*, it is laid down clearly that the *Upanishads* alone describe Brahman in a manner which harmonizes with the *Vēdānta Śāstra* through *Tarka* and *Vēdānta*, which are the sole materials for its proof. If it is postulated that Para Brahman can be known from other sources besides the *Vēdānta Śāstra*, then we say that it is not so. The *Siddhānta* then is that Brahman is only proved by the *Upanishad Śāstra* as being (*Jagajjanmādikāraṇa*) the Creator and chief cause of the Universe and He alone is the subject-matter of all the *Vēdas*. Texts like *Nāvēdavinmanutē tam brihantam* |²⁶⁴ *Naishā tarkēṇa matirāpanēyā*²⁶⁵ | *iti*, etc., state that

²⁶⁰ *Kena Upa.*, I. 6.

²⁶¹ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 4.

²⁶² *Taitt. Brā.*, III. 12. 9.

²⁶³ *Katha Upa.*, II. 9.

²⁶⁴ *Taitt. Brā.*, III. 12. 9.

²⁶⁵ *Katha Upa.*, II. 9.

Brahman cannot be understood by any other means. Also from the Upanishadic text *Tam tvaupanishadam purusham pruchchhāmi | iti*, it is to be understood that Para Brahman is understood by the knowledge obtained from the *Upanishads* alone by the help of the *Vēdānta Sāstra* and *Tarka* (Logic). But nothing other than the *Upanishads* can lead one to know Brahman. Just as in bringing into existence a chariot, a pandal, a turret, a storeyed structure, the skill of different persons and agencies employed on them is shown, it cannot therefore be said that only one person was the author in producing so many different kinds of work.

In the case of Brahman who is *satyasankalpa* and *satyagnāna*, *anantādisvarūpa* and *dharmagnāna*, He can be said to be the sole creator of the two worlds (*Jagadubhaya*). And therefore the *Vēdas* correctly hold without any doubt that he can be fully understood only by that source (*Vēdānta*). The text *Yatō vāchō nivartantē | iti*,²⁶⁶ and other like passages, which are observable in the *Upanishads*, describe all the more His infinite qualities in manifestation. Else, the text *Brahmavidāpnōti param | iti*²⁶⁷ and the like which enunciate the view that He who knows well Brahman can realize Brahman, will be contradicted.

In the *Smritis* and in the *Matsya* and the *Śiva Purāṇas*, it is stated that Śiva is of a *tāmasa* nature:—

Agnēḥ śivasya mātmyam tāmasēshu prakalpyatē |
Rājasēshu cha mātmyam adhikam Brahmānō viduḥ ||
Sāttvikēshu cha kalpēshu mātmyam adhikam Harēḥ |
Tēshvēva yōgasamsiddhāḥ gamishyanti parām gatim || iti.

And therefore in the *Matsya Purāṇa*, *tāmasatva* is attributed to *Śiva Purāṇas*. Similarly, in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* in the verse beginning with *Sattvāt sanjāyatē gnānam* and the one ending with *Bandham mōksham cha yā vētti buddhiḥ sā Pārtha sāttvikī || iti*.²⁶⁸ It is made clear that only those possessed of *sāttvika buddhi* are eligible for *mukti*. Also in the

²⁶⁶ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 4.

²⁶⁷ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

²⁶⁸ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XIV. 17 ; XVIII. 30.

Pāncharātra Āgama the statement is found :—*Agnēḥ Śivasya mākātmyam tāmasam mōhakāarakam । Tayōrupāsanādēva pratyavāyō bhavēt dhruvam ॥ iti*. It is established from this that *Śiva Purāṇas* wherein Śiva is chiefly described are *tāmasa* (in character).²⁶⁹ If it is asked how passages like these could be reconciled with the above proofs, wherein Śiva is extolled, and how He can be called Para Brahman, agreeably to the teaching of the *Vēdānta*, then the answer is, that there is no ground for any doubt of this nature. For there is no clear proof anywhere in the *Sruti* to the effect that *Śiva Purāṇas* are of a *tāmasa* character. And the invented (*kalpita*) statement of the Prachchanna Bauddhas cannot be admitted as a proof (of the alleged *tāmasa* character of the *Śiva Purāṇas*). Moreover, Vyāsa being the author of the *Purāṇas*, is it the subject-matter treated therein (in the *Purāṇas*) of a *tāmasa* nature or is it Vyāsa, the author himself, being of a *tāmasa* nature, found opportunity to impart a *tāmasa* character to the *Śiva Purāṇas*? It cannot be the first, because the *Rig Vēda* and all other *Vēdāntas* declare Rudra as the chief subject and even if they are considered as of a *tāmasa* nature, then the whole *Vēdānta* becomes spurious (*apramāṇya*) and enters into the limits of the Bauddha *āgama*.²⁷⁰ Nor can it be the second, in which case, even the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, of which the author is Vyāsa, is liable to be called one of a *tāmasa* character. Nor can it be the third, for Vyāsa could not have been the author of the same *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, which is said to be of a *sāttvika* nature and also of *Śiva Purāṇas* which are said to be of a *tāmasa* nature, for which there is no sufficient evidence. Vyāsa is stated to be the author of all the *Purāṇas* which are stated to be the essence of all the *Vēdas* and *Vēdānta*. Then in the *Matsya Purāṇa* it is seen that *Mātsyam kūrman tathā laingyam śaivam*

²⁶⁹ This is the Pūrvapaksha argument.

²⁷⁰ That is, it will deny Brahman altogether, denying as it does wholly the authenticity of the *Srutis*.

skāndam tathaiva cha ! *Āgnēyam cha shaḍḍētāni tāmāsāni nibōdha mē*. Then, again, we have texts like, *Agnēḥ śivasya mahātmyam tāmāsam mōhakāvakam* ! *iti* ; *Yatra yatra Jagannātham Mukundam Viṣṇum avyayam* ! *Vadanti tāni śāstrāṇi sāttvikāni matāni vai* ! *Yatra yatra hyumānātham Sankaram Bhairavam Yamam* ! *Durgām Gaṇapatim kalam yāni tāni vadanti cha* ! *Tāmāsāni muniśrēṣṭha phalāni vividhāni vai* ! *Pancha pūjāścha dēvāmścha tathā dēvīm Sarasvatīm* ! *Vadanti yāni śāstrāṇi rājasāni matāni vai* || *iti*.

There are other texts as well of a similar kind in the *Matsya Purāṇa*, the *Harita Smṛiti*, the *Pāncharātra* and other *Āgamas*. All these declare that *Śiva Purāṇas* are of a *tāmāsa* nature. If so, then the doubt arises, how could Śiva be entitled to Para Brahmatva, beyond being only one of the Trinity and entitled to the Rudra Dharma (of destruction) which is of a *tāmāsa* nature? Such a statement should not be taken as evidence of *tāmāsatva*, because the *Matsya Purāṇa* itself having already been stated to be of a *tāmāsa* character, the statements appearing in such a *Purāṇa* cannot be admitted as proof (for the *tāmāsa* nature of *Śiva Purāṇas*). Again, in the *Pāncharātra* and other *Āgamas*, a contradictory statement is seen stating that Agni is of a *rājasā* character, as in texts like *Brahmendra Sūrya Chandrāgni parā rājasā sambhavāḥ* ! ²⁷¹ *iti*, etc. There is, therefore, a contradiction between the statements made in the *Matsya Purāṇa* and the *Pāncharātra Āgama*. They both, therefore, become necessarily *apramāṇya* and cannot be held to be proofs (of the *tāmāsa* character of the *Śiva Purāṇas*).

Further, texts such as, *Brāhmaṇānām Agnir agrē prathamō dēvatānām* ! *Yāvajjīvam agnihōtram juhuyāt* ! *Archata prārchata* ! *Triyambakam yajāmahē* ! *Antar ichchhanti tam janē* ! *Rudram parō manīshayā gridhnanti jihvayāsasam* ! *Yō vai svām dēvatām atiyajatē* ! *iti*, etc.,

²⁷¹ This contradicts the statement of the *Matsya Purāṇa* that the *Āgnēya Purāṇa* is of a *tāmāsa* character.

clearly state that Rudra and Agni should be chiefly worshipped, else one is to be considered sinful. Also the statements in *Sruti* text like *Tvam dēvānām Brāhmaṇānām adhipatiḥ*; *Vishṇuḥ kshatriyānām adhipatiḥ* | *iti*, etc., clearly explain that if one does not duly worship his own deity, then he will have to undergo *naraka*, for failing to do as prescribed. This proves that if the worship of Rudra and Agni is not carried out, it will end in the casting of oneself out of the four castes (*varṇa chatushtaya*). Therefore such invented statements, which contradict the Vēdic principles, should not be agreed to by those who dispute with the aid of the *Vēdas*.

The *Sūtra* text, *Attā charāchāra grahaṇāt*²⁷² and *Sruti* texts like *Yasya Brahma cha kshatram cha ubhē bhavata ṍdanah* | *iti*, etc., clearly show that *samhāra* (or destruction) is held to be the characteristic of Para Brahman. If that view is not accepted, then it will end in *abrahmatva* for Vishṇu.

Texts²⁷³ like *Rudrō vā ēsha yadagni stasyaitē tanuvau ghōrānyāśivānyēti* | *Aghōrēbhyō' tha ghōrēbhyō* | *iti*, etc., declare that Īśvara by His Aghōra face creates and protects, being the chief agent and by that fearful form of his face, he destroys the creation, which proves that He alone is the chief cause of the three functions of Creation, Protection and Destruction and hence Para Brahmatva is His.

Moreover texts²⁷⁴ such as *Yā tē Rudra śivā tanūr aghōrā pāpakāśinī* | *iti* and others declare that Paramēśvara showed his beautiful form comprising of *śuddha sāttvika* character under the Śiva Śarīra form, through prayers (offered by his devotees).

Further, texts like *Prapanchōpaśamam*,²⁷⁵ *śāntam Sivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē* |²⁷⁵ *Umāsaḥāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakaṇṭham praśāntam* | *iti*

²⁷² *Brahma-Sūtras*, I. 2. 9.

²⁷³ *Rudrachamaka* of the *Yajurveda*.

²⁷⁴ *Rudrachamaka* of the *Yajurveda*.

²⁷⁵ *Kaivalya Upa.*

and others state that Śiva alone keeps his mildest form of *sāttvika*, while the most cruel form of the *tāmasa* character applies only to Kāla Rudra. It is well known from the *Vēda Śāstra* that even Kāla Rudra is of a higher order than Viṣṇu, because Kāla Rudra belongs to Śivāmśa. The *Srutis* also support the same view.

In texts like *Parāt parataram Brahma tatparāt paratō Hariḥ* | *Yatparāt paratō Īśaḥ tanmē manah śivasan-kalpamastu* ²⁷⁶ *Ajāmēkām lōhitaśuklakrishṇām* | *iti*, etc., Paramēśvara is described as having the triple qualities of the *prākṛita śakti*.²⁷⁷ And therefore if Nārāyaṇa is held to possess the *sattvaguṇa* character of Brahman, the argument becomes fallacious, and *aprākṛita Para-Brahmatva*²⁷⁸ as described in all *Vēda Śāstras* will become disproved.

According to the *Jābālōpanishad*, the text *Sukla-dhyānaparāyaṇa* | *iti*, lays down that one who is desirous of *mōksha* (*mumukshu*) should meditate only upon the bright and pure Rudra (*i.e.*, possessing the *sukla* form, *i.e.*, white complexion). Again, in the *Sūta Samhitā* and the *Sūta Gītā*, the following text is found:—

Asti Rudrasya viprēndrā antaḥ sattvam bahistamaḥ |
Viṣṇōrantas tamaḥ sattvam bahirasti rajōguṇaḥ ||
Antarbahiścha viprēndrā asti tasya Prajāpatēḥ |
Rajasā tamasā krāntau Brahma-Nārāyaṇau khalu ||

Also in the *Śiva Dharma Śāstra*, it is observed:—

Antaḥ sattvaguṇōpētō bahistāmasasamyutaḥ |
Suddha sāttvika ityuktaḥ Śankarō lōkaśankaraḥ ||
Antastāmasasamyuktō bahiḥ sattvaguṇānviताḥ |
Suddha tāmasa ityuktō Viṣṇussākshāt Sriyaḥpatiḥ | *iti*.

These texts prove that Īśvara belongs to a higher order than Brahma and Viṣṇu. Further, from the following passage occurring in the *Sūta Samhitā*, *Śivarahasya khaṇḍa* :—

²⁷⁶ *Mahōpa.*, XII. 2.

²⁷⁷ Brahmatva fully supported by the *Vēdas*.

²⁷⁸ Brahmatva not supported by the *Vēdas*.

Daśa Saiva purāṇāni sātत्वikāni vidur budhāḥ ।
Sraddhēyāni dvijavaraiḥ tēshām dharmāstu tatra yat ॥
Sattvam śuddham samādishtam sukha gnānāspadam
tu yat ।
Vidyōpadēshṭā yōgibhyaḥ śuddhasphaṭikasannibhaḥ ॥
Na nidrāti Sivaḥ kvāpi Brāhmaṇādhipatiḥ Sivaḥ ।
Bruvantyēvam purāṇāni Brāhmaṇānām kathāḥ śubhāḥ ॥
Daśa Saiva purāṇāni himsā dōshaparāṇi cha ।
Vaishṇavāni cha chatvāri tāmasāni munīśvarāḥ ॥
Kshatriyaṇām śrutā dharmāḥ tēshu taddēvatā Hariḥ ।
Tamaḥ krishṇam udāsīnam kūtakrityaviśāradaḥ ॥
Nidrālasya pramādūdi panchadhā syāttu tāmasāḥ ।
Nidrālasya pramādādīdyāḥ tadgunāḥ parikīrtitāḥ ॥
Krishṇō Viṣṇuḥ smṛitaḥ śēshaśūyī bhakti vimōhakaḥ ।
Ētēshu kshatriyaṇām cha dharmā viprā udāhritāḥ ॥
Brāhmē tu rājasē vaiśyadharmaiḥ sarvatra sammatē ।
Duḥkhāspadam raktavarṇam chanchalam cha rajōmatam ॥
Gunatrayasamāyuktam āgnēyam sauram ēva cha ।
Tasmāt Saivāni viprāṇām purāṇāni hitāni vai ॥ iti,

it is seen that only *Śiva Purāṇas* are of an absolute *sāttvika* character. Moreover, if it is argued that *Śiva Purāṇas* are of ancient origin treating of matters going back to previous *kalpas*,²⁷⁹ then, it should be held as being inconsistent. For it is said in the *Matsya* and other *Purāṇas* :—

Purāṇam sarva sāstrāṇām prathamam Brahmaṇā
krītam ।
Anantaram tu vaktrēbhyō Vēdāstasya vinirgatāḥ ॥
Purāṇam ēkamēvāsīt śatakōṭipravistaram ॥ iti.

²⁷⁹ The argument may be thus amplified :—If *Śiva Purāṇas* are of ancient origin and can be held to treat of matters going back even to previous *kalpas* and be held at the same time as not treating matter of the present *kalpa* and thus become inapplicable to the latter, then such an argument becomes inconsistent. The *Śiva Purāṇas* cannot be both ancient and unauthoritative.

The *Purāṇas*, whose first author was Brahma, were latterly, about the end of the *Dvāpara Yuga*, abridged by *Vēdavyāsa* into 4 lakhs of verses (from *Satakōṭi* verses). Similarly it is said in the *Dharma Samhitā* :—

*Brāhmanam ēva kritē chādyē purāṇam śruti sammatam ।
Āshṭādaśavidham tasya kritam kōṭi prabhēdataḥ ॥ iti.*

And therefore the *Śiva Purāṇas* cannot be held to be old or as belonging to *kalpāntara*. Moreover, if it is held that according to the *Mātsya*, *Kūrma*, *Varāha*, etc., *Purāṇas* that *Nārāyaṇa*, because by his *avataras* of *Matsya*, *Kūrma* and *Varāha*, removed all the evil opponents on the face of the world and established righteousness and therefore that He alone should be reckoned as bearing a *śāttvika* character and that He alone is entitled to that character, then we say that it is not so. Because in the *Kūrma Purāṇa*, in the chapter treating of *Ēkādaśi*, it is said :—

*Ēkādaśyām tu madhyānhē māghamāsē Mahānataḥ ।
Sarvalōkahitārthāya visham bhunktvā tataḥ Śivaḥ ॥
Śivayōgēna tadrātrau sthitvā chandrakalādharaḥ ।
Parivēshṭita Vishṇvādīn drishṭvā tatpādasēvakān ॥
Upōshita mahābhaktān dvādaśyām Nīlālōhitaḥ ।
Samudramathanōdbhūta sudhāpānārthamādarāt ।
Āgnām chakrē Mahādēvaḥ sarvalōka bhayāpahaḥ ॥ iti.*

From which it is learnt that *Paramēśvara*, with his unrivalled prowess did perform the *kālakūṭa bhakshana* and bring about the destruction of *Andhakāsura*, *Jalandharāsura*, *Tripurāsura*, *Vyāghrāsura*, *Gajāsura*, *Sūrapadmāsura*, and others and thereby relieved the whole world of evil perpetrators. Accordingly, it is said in the *Purāṇas* and *Āgamas* that the *Ēkādaśi Vrata* should be strictly observed both by the *Śaivas* and the *Vaishṇavas*. It is also said in the *Śiva Dharma Sāstra* :—

*Śaiva Vaishnavayōrgrāhyam ēkādaśyām upōshanaṁ ।
Nandīśa Vishṇupramukhā yatō vratamathācharan ॥
Sēsham pradhānam Smārtānām ēkādaśyām upōshanaṁ ।
Sāyam pradhānam Śaivānām Vēdamargaikavartinām ॥ iti.*
And further in the *Siddhāntāgama*, it is said :—

Pradōsha vyāpinī Śaivī samyak ēkādaśī smritā ।

Nānyā śaivaiḥ parigrāhyā śaiva śāstraika śāsanāt ॥ iti.

Also it is said in the *Vīrāgama* :—

Sarvēśhām Vīraśaivānām śrauta smārtānuvartinām ।

Pradōsha vyāpinī grāhyā sāmyagēkādaśī Śivē ॥

Śaivavratānām śarvēśhām sāyamprādhānyamēva hi ।

Anyathācharaṇē dēvi pratyavāyō mahān bhavēt ॥ iti.

Moreover, even though the *Padma* and other *Purāṇas* proclaim the greatness of Viṣṇu, even in them the qualities of Śiva are greatly extolled. Then why not those *Purāṇas* also be said to be possessed of *tāmasa* character.

In the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, it is said²⁸⁰:—*Traiguṇyā-kātmakā Vēdā nistraiguṇyō bhavārjuna । iti.* Even the *Vēdas* are of a triple character (i.e., *Sattva*, *Rājasa* and *Tāmasa*). Therefore the *Srutis* constantly describe the trinitarian character of God (*mūrti-traya*). And if it is said that therefore the triple character is what is to be understood from the *Vēda*, then, we say it is not so. For it is said in the *Srutis*, *Vāchā virūpa nityayā । iti*, from which it follows that though the *Sruti* is immortal, the character of the *Vēdas* is likewise trinitarian. Moreover, *Sruti* texts like *Śivam praśāntam amṛitam Brahma-yōnim । iti* declare Śiva as the most *sāttvika* (*parama sāttvika*) of the triple character described in the *Vēdas*. And the other qualities apply to the different classes of duties of the *sthūla* and *sūkshma* characters confined in the trinity, as explained in the *Sāṅkhya* and *Yōga Śāstras* and by which *Paramēśvara* should be meditated upon and worshipped. No other meaning should be attached. Further what is the meaning to be attached to *tāmasatva*? Should we understand that it (*tāmasatva*) indicates the origin of *tamōguṇa* (i.e., ignorance) or does it mean that it is co-related with the other two (*sattva* and *rajas*) *guṇas*? Or does it mean that it is independent of the other two *guṇas*? Or is it completely devoid of the other two *guṇas*

²⁸⁰ In the current version of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the verse runs “*Traiguṇya vishayā vēda*” etc., see *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 45. Elsewhere, Śrīpati adopts the latter reading; see text, p. 42. For the reading *Traiguṇyakātmaka*, see text, p. 41.

or trying to change the character of the other two *guṇas*? Or does it really describe *tāmasa* only as being the chief character, and as being above the other two? It cannot be the first; because Paramēśvara, who is himself above all the triple qualities and from whom the *Vēdas* exuded, would assume a transcendent character (*anityatva*) and become subject to delusion and human weaknesses. And *Vishṇu* and other *Purāṇas* which treat about *chit* and *achit prapanchas* and the triple qualities of *Vishṇu* would also have to be treated as of a *tāmasa* character. *Tāmasa* cannot be attributed to one only among many of the same nature. Nor can it be the second, because all the qualities of God are of such a nature that *Tamōguṇa* cannot be seen prevailing as a prominent character. Nor can it be said that it is the third. In the *Sruti* text *Yadā tamastanna divā na rātrir nasan nachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ* | *iti*, Śiva is proclaimed to be ever pure without even a speck of *tāmasa* character about him. Nor can it be the fourth, because it is said in the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*: *Asṭadaśa-purāṇānām kartā Satyavatīsutaḥ* | *Ākhyānaischāpyupākhyānaiḥ gāthābhiḥ kalpaśuddhibhiḥ* || *Purāṇasamhitām chakrē purāṇārthaviśāradaḥ* | *iti*. Out of the 18 *Purāṇas* composed by Vyāsa not one of them can be classed as belonging to *tāmasa* character. Else if one is of a *tāmasa* character, all must be of the same (*tāmasa*) class, according to the maxim of equal justice (*tulya nyāya-tvāt*). Nor can it be the fifth. If Rudra is by reason of his function of destruction, for which he is responsible, to be described as possessing a *tāmasa* character, as declared in all the *Śāstras*, then it is urged that it is not so. Because *Vishṇu* will then be rendered devoid of the function of destruction which he is said to possess by reason of *Īśvaratva*.²⁸¹ By the very act of destruction, Rudra cannot

²⁸¹ *Īśvaratva* denotes the three-fold function of creation, preservation and destruction (*sṛiṣṭi*, *sthiti* and *laya*). If the argument is that Śiva is to be given the whole power of destruction, *Vishṇu* would lose it and his *Īśvaratva* would be gone and he would be reduced to *anīśvaratva*.

be called to possess a *tāmasa* character. If it so happens, then there will be a gradation of character for which there is no proof. Even such proofs would be involved in *tāmasa* character. The Vēdic text *Yā tē Rudra śivā tanūḥ*²⁸² prohibits the body of Śiva from containing even a particle of *tāmasa* character. Again, according to the text, *Traiguṇyavishayā vēdāḥ*, Śiva cannot be held to perpetrate any action purely of a *tāmasa* character against his *sāttvika dharma*. Moreover, if *tāmasa* character largely predominates in a particular *kalpa*, then, all works done in that *kalpa*, such as *Brahma Purāṇas*, etc., would have also to be invested with *tāmasa* character, because in those *Purāṇas* also Śiva and his character are greatly extolled. Such a suggestion is not seen throughout the *Śāstras*, according to which even the present Kalpa of Brahma which is called *Śvēta Varāha Kalpa*, should have been characterized as invested with *tāmasa* character, for which no proof is forthcoming. This Kalpa which is called the 28th one, is the one in which Vyāsa as the author of all the *Purāṇas*, is to preside. It is said thus in the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*:—*Vaivasvatāntarē tasmin dvāparēshu punaḥ punaḥ | Vēdavyāsavyatītāyām ashtāvimsati sattama || iti*. From this it follows that all the current *Purāṇas* were dedicated to Vyāsa as their promulgator. It is further said therein *Purāṇasamhitām chakrē Purāṇārthaviśāradaḥ || iti*. It follows that all the 18 *Purāṇas* have been in the order of their birth (*utpattikrama*) dedicated. And it is further said:—*Ētad vaishṇava-saṁgnām vai Padmasya samanantaram || iti*. Such are the works that were then existing. The Rāma, Krishṇa and other *Avatāras* have had their origin in the family of Raghu. The sacrifice offered by Daksha and its destruction (by Śiva) is far remote from the present Kalpa. As regards the present Kalpa and the *Purāṇas* composed during its currency—i.e., the 18 *Purāṇas* done by Vēdavyāsa—these treat of both Śaiva and Vaishṇava *Purāṇas*. And

²⁸² The text of the *Rudrachamaka* (Namaka Chamaka) continues thus:—*Yā tē Rudra Śivā tanūḥ aghōrā pāpakāśinī | tayā nasthanvā vāsantā mayāgiriśantā ivākasīḥ*.

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therefore it is of no consequence to argue about the *tāmasa* character or otherwise of the respective *Purāṇas* in comparison with the ancient and antiquated ones of the previous Brahma Kalpa. Moreover, the act of making *Purāṇas* was ordained by Brahma in each Kalpa, denoting therein the respective events that took place in it. For example, in the Padma Kalpa, the story of Mārkaṇḍēya and Paramēśvara has been narrated, showing how Paramēśvara was graciously pleased with Mārkaṇḍēya and blessed him. Similarly, in the present Kalpa, the events regarding the *avatāras* of Rāma, Krishṇa, Varāha, etc., have been fully narrated, while those of Kālakūṭa Bhakṣhaṇa and Dakṣādhvara Dhvamsa and others have been merely referred to for the sake of comparison. All the Paurāṇikas agree in that statement and opine that it is of no consequence whatever to dwell upon the contradictory character of the events (of the different Kalpas) appearing in the *Purāṇas*. As each Kalpa is completed, a great distance of time intervenes between it and the preceding one. Then the question of determining how far the events are of a *sāttvika* or *tāmasa* character is not possible of solution after such a distance of time.

Nor can it be the sixth. Rudra, though connected with the ghastly form of destruction, yet has a form which is capable of being reduced to a most attractive form by the meditator. Therefore *tāmasa* character cannot be attributed to Paramēśvara. So it is said in the *Kaivalya Sruti* text:—*Umāsaḥāyam Paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakanṭham praśāntam । Dhyātvā munirgachchhati Bhūta-yōnim samasta sākshim tamasaḥ parastāt ॥ iti.* From which it may be deduced that a certain person, Dēvadatta by name, though he may be tainted by *tamōguṇa*, is seen in public by his *tāmasa* behaviour. That very person, meditating upon Paramēśvara, will ultimately become quite free from his *tāmasa* nature and become quite bright, by his wisdom, through the blessing of Paramēśvara. Further in the text:—*Sthirēbbhir angaiḥ pururūpa ugrō babhruḥ śuklēbbhiḥ pipiṣē hiraṇyē ॥ iti,* the word *śukla* denotes that Śiva is completely made of *sattva* character.

Again, in the text *Lōhita śukla krishṇām* ॥ *iti*, Īśvara is said to be made up of *śukla* or *sattva* character. Therefore in all these *Purāṇas* wherever Viṣṇu is extolled to be the greatest, there also Viṣṇu is represented as being of a *tāmasa* character. Then how can Viṣṇu by his incarnations have destroyed the whole Yādava family, if he had not that *tāmasa* character in him? And how can he have exhibited himself so as to cast delusion on the Daityas when he assumed the highly deceptive forms (*mahāmōhākhyā Puruṣharūpa*) of Buddha and Jina as narrated in the *Purāṇas*? It is said in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* :—

Ityuktvā Bhagavānstēbhyō mahāmōha śarīrataḥ ।

Samutpādyā dadau Viṣṇuḥ prāha chēdam surōttamāḥ ॥

Māyāmōhēyam akhilān daityāmstān mōhayishyati ।

Tatō vadhyā bhavishyanti vēdamārga bahishkrutāḥ ॥ iti.

From which it follows that if Viṣṇu had not the *tāmasa* character in him he could not have put on that *mahāmōhākhyā* form which is that *Mōhinī* form of female beauty.²⁸³

Moreover, Viṣṇu in order to finish that important task, exhibited all the *tāmasa* nature in him and brought it about. Hence he too is possessed of *tāmasa* character to a great extent, though he is not chiefly made up of it. In the same way Rudra, who has a large share of destruction to carry out, has a larger extent of *tāmasa* character in him. But if it is asked "Can it not be said that he is possessed of *tāmasa* character because of the work he does?", then the answer is, "It is not so". Just as Viṣṇu assumed the form of man-lion in order to destroy the enemy, so, in the same manner he (Viṣṇu) also should be said to have consisted of *tāmasa* character. As to Śiva, he cannot become subordinated to that predominating *tāmasa* character like all the incarnations of Viṣṇu. If it were otherwise, the evidence afforded by the Vēdic texts would become contradictory. Nor could it be the last. It assumes that whoever

²⁸³ This refers to the incident in the churning of the ocean, when Viṣṇu assumes the form of *Mōhinī*, the goddess of beauty, in order to distract the demons from the nectar which was being distributed. See *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*.

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destroys, he possesses a *tāmasa* character. But then, should it not be said that he also has one to destroy him? If the answer is in the affirmative, then that agent should be greater than all else. Because he will be the one who destroys all—and independent (*svatantra*)—and one who has no second. And Rudra is possessed of such a nature and is therefore greater than all others, being destroyer of all others. No proof which contradicts this can be accepted. In determining points of this nature that which carries greater harmony and induces less contradiction should be accepted as *sāttvika* proof. As the maxim *Mruduh sarvatra bādhyatē* | *iti* (softness is always troublesome) says, nothing can be successfully overcome without *tāmasatva*. In the text *Visvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* | *iti*, this above maxim is amply proved, and Īśvara is shown to overcome everything by the grace of his *tāmasatva*. Therefore *sāttvika* (character) has ended in one form of *vikalpā*, contrariety. Moreover, if in any of the *Śāstras*, wherever Viṣṇu is stated to be the greater, as in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, and therein Īśvara's *sāttvika* character is also extolled to the same degree, then such *Purāṇas* will have to be characterized as tainted by *tāmasatva*. For example, in the *Padma Purāṇa*, both in the former and latter parts (*Pūrva* and *Uttara Khaṇḍas*), *tāmasatva* is more extolled in the cases of Hari and Hara. Hari is stated to be characterized by more of the *sāttvika* spirit than Śiva by his *tāmasa* spirit. Even the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavata* have to be placed in the category of *tāmasa Purāṇas*, for it is said in the *Bāla Kāṇḍa* of the *Rāmāyaṇa*:—*Tvām vai dhārayitum vīra nānyam paśyāmi sūlināḥ* | *iti*. In the *Yuddha Kāṇḍa* it is said:—*Umāpatiḥ paśupatiḥ sarvalōka namaskrutāḥ* | *iti*. And in the *Uttara Khaṇḍa*, we read:—*Ētadastram balam ghōram mama vā tryambakasya vā*.

The travel to Kailāsa and the destruction of Rāvaṇa and Indrajit was mostly due to the grace of Rudra in causing his power of destruction to be given to Rāma for bringing about the end of Rāvaṇa. Even the description of this event should be said to obtain the character of

tāmasa. Thus the *tāmasa* character is to be found in Rāma as well. And therefore if *Śiva Purāṇas* are to be dubbed as of a *tāmasa* character, then we enter into the precincts of the Bauddha religion which is beyond the pale of the *Vēdas*. Therefore it is not useful to prolong this discussion.

In the first *Adhikaraṇa* of this work, it has been said, in respect of those who are deeply devoted to Śiva and who are secret devotees, that the word *jignāsa* covers both the phases of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* in respect of *jīva* and *Brahman*.²⁸⁴

For the texts *Brahmavit Brahmaiva bhavati* | *Īśam gnātvā tatra ēkībhavanti* || (By knowing Brahman thoroughly becomes himself Brahman. By realizing Īśa, becomes one with him) state that the worshipper and the worshipped are not different from each other and they become one.

In the second *Adhikaraṇa*, Brahman is described to be possessed of qualities by which the creation, preservation and destruction have been brought about so as to convey a difference between *jīva* and *Īśa*. But while in the act of destruction, it is described to be just as the river joining the sea and becoming one with the ocean without any difference. In the third *Adhikaraṇa*, Paramēśvara, though he exhibits himself both in different and single forms, yet is known throughout the *Vedānta Āgamas* as one single whole, without any division and that Brahman only is real as a proof thereof.

Shatsthala Paraśiva Brahman and Other Deities.

This fourth *Adhikaraṇa*, *Samanvayādhikaraṇam*, is begun in order to clear the clouds of doubt and confusion that arise from the study of the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta*, viz., that while Shatsthala Paraśiva Brahman is being declared throughout (as the Supreme Lord) whether Indra, Upēndra,

²⁸⁴ That is, they realize *Paraśiva Brahman* while in the form of *jīva* (i.e., human form) ; *jignāsa* means the attainment of Śivahood while still in *jīva* form.

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Dinēdra or Chandra, or any of the several other deities should be considered as one with Paraśiva or as different from Him. In order to clearly establish this point this fourth *Sūtra* (I. 1. 4.) *Tat tu samanvayāt* (*That but by reconciliation*) is laid down. The word *tat* should be understood to establish that *Shaṭsthala Paraśiva Brahman*, who is touched upon throughout the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta* as the primæval cause of everything (*Sarva kāraṇa vēdānta vēdya pūrvā parāmrishṭa shaṭsthala Paraśiva Brahmaiva*).

The word *tu* destroys all evidence that is visible to the eye. By the word *samanvaya*, it is clearly taught on the principle of the *Sthūlārundhatīnyāya* that Śiva, who is of the *Amśa* of Indra, Chandra, Upēdra, Dinēdra, etc., is throughout the *Sāstras* Supreme Lord.²⁸⁵

And therefore the meaning of the *Sūtra* is that on the whole, disallowing all the ocular proofs and taking all the *Vēda-Vēdānta* proofs according to the *Shaḍvidhalinga-tātparya*, Śiva is *that* (i.e., the chief) *Brahman* (*tat Brahma*). Here the matter for proof is whether the *Sūtra* points out that *Sarva Vēda-Vēdānta* should be depended upon.

Sruti texts like *Sadēva saumyēdam agra āsīt* ²⁸⁶ | *Ēkam ēva advitīyam Brahma*,²⁸⁷ *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē* | *Asankhyātāḥ sahasrāṇi smaryatē na cha dṛiṣyatē* ²⁸⁸ | *Dēvā ha vai svargam lōkam agaman* | *Tē dēvā rudram apruchchhan* | *Kō bhavān iti* | *So'bravīt* | *Aham ēkaḥ prathamam āsam* | *Vartāmi cha bhaviṣyāmi cha* | *Nānyaḥ kaśchin mattō vyatiriktaḥ* | *Sō'ntarādantaram prāviṣat* | ²⁸⁹ *Ritam satyam param brahma purusham kṛishṇaṇḍālam* | *Ūrdhva-rētam virūpākṣham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ* | *Sarvē vēdā yat padam āmananti* | *iti*, which are of a *bhēdābhēda*

²⁸⁵ The six ways of proof for fixing an argument are:—*Upakrama* with *Upasamhāra*, *Abhyāsa*, *Apūrvatā*, *Phalam*, *Arthavāda*, and *Upapatti*. These are, in logic, collectively known as *Shaḍvidhalinga-tātparya*. For the *Sthūlārundhatī nyāya*, see ante, page 273, footnote No. 107.

²⁸⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

²⁸⁸ *Atharva Upa.*

²⁸⁷ *Atharva Upa.*

²⁸⁹ *Mahōpanishad*, X. II.

character, denote the purport of *sarva vēda-vēdānta* expressions which speak in favour of Śiva being the Paraśiva Brahman for creation, etc., and for *śaṭsthala*. The great argumentative doubt is whether the word *Samanvaya* includes in its purview deities (like) Indra, Upēndra, etc., and the different forms of God worshipped or whether *Prakṛiti* is meant, of which Śiva is the Overlord.

Perhaps we may argue that Paraśiva is not meant to be the chief Brahman. The *Pūrvapakṣa* argument is: Never at any time can Paraśiva be considered to be Parabrahman; nor do the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta* anywhere declare Him to be so. Because the *Vēdas* are entirely devoted to the practice of attaining Brahman, the doubt arises on both sides (regarding Paraśiva being Brahman).²⁹⁰ Further, the Brahman that could be attained through practice (*Jagad Brahmanoh*) is generally sought by realization through objects and motives (*kārya kāranaṭva*) by several ways and means until *Brahma Siddhi* is attained. Therefore it is not purely on *Vēdānta* alone that one can depend upon for realizing the Brahman.²⁹¹ Furthermore, it is also right that the *Vēda* should describe the several kinds of worship and the several deities to be worshipped according to it. For example, in the Vēdic texts :—

Agniragrē prathamō dēvatānām |
Asāvādityō Brahma |

²⁹⁰ Śrīpati says that two Brahmas should be considered in two ways *Pratipādita Brahma* and *Vidhipūrvaka Brahma*. That *Para Brahma* should be proved in two ways: (1) through *Śāstra Samanvaya*, and (2) from *Vidhi* or *Āchāra Samanvaya*. Both must coincide.

²⁹¹ Cf. Ānandatīrtha's commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, Chapter II, where the nature of the *Vēda* and the *Vēdānta* are described with reference to the ways and means of attaining the Brahman. Ānandatīrtha distinguishes between the *Vēda*, which, he says, lay down the practice (*Dharma*) to be followed to realize (Para Brahman) and the *Vēdānta*, which, he says, shows the reason why the practice (*Dharma*) should be adopted in order to realize Para Brahman. In other words, the *Vēda* prescribes the course of conduct, while the *Vēdānta* assigns the reason for the same.

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Tadvishnor ēkam uttamam ।

Nārāyaṇaḥ Param Brahma । iti ॥

And in similar other texts such as :—

*Saishā vichitrā sudriḍhā bahvamkurū svayam guṇa-
bhinnā ankurēshvapi guṇabhinnā । Sarvatra Brahma
Vishṇu Sivarūpiṇī ।*

*Ajāmēkām lōhita śukla krishṇām bahvīm prajāṃ jana-
yantīm sarūpām ॥ iti ॥* etc.

Brahman is denoted to be the Supreme Being, declared in all *Vēdānta* as the prime cause and as *Pradhāna-Prakriti*. These therefore are the different forms of Brahman as declared throughout the *Vēdānta* and adopted in practice (for realization). Moreover, if the realization of Brahman which is the highest of all attainments, is reduced to mere dependence upon useless things and to what is seen in the everyday world—such as *ayam ghaṭaḥ*, *ayam paṭaḥ* (this pot, this cloth) etc., which are of a transitory (or destructive) nature, then Brahman becomes a matter of uselessness and one never deserving to be aspired for with so much effort and religious meditation. In order to obviate these two great defects, the *Vēda* prescribes the *vidhi* for working out the realization (of Brahman) as stated in the *Vēdānta*. Or, if it reduces itself to this, *viz.*, that by working through certain prescribed methods, one could realize the Brahman, then, we lay down the following as the *Siddhānta*:—The *Vēdānta* generally treats of Brahman; it also shows how to realize Brahman; and it further lays down the rules of action (required for it). Thus, there is no fault regarding the statements made in the *Vēdānta* because both these ²⁹² are brought about by the actual *vidhi* prescribed by the *Vēdas*. We have to understand the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta* in the following manner. The *Vēdas* prescribe the method of action to realize Brahman under six heads, *viz.*, *Upakrama*, etc. ²⁹³ For example, *Sruti* texts like *Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyaḥ*

²⁹² That is *Brahman* and how to realize *Brahman*,

²⁹³ See note 285 on p. 369,

śrōtavyō mantavyo nididhyāsitaṃ | ²⁹⁴ *iti* || show the particular way that should be adopted to realize Brahman. In the *Smṛiti* text *Upakramōpasamhārau abhyāsō'pūrvatā-phalam* | *Ārthavādōpapattī cha lingam tātparyanirṇayē* | *iti*, || ²⁹⁵ the several methods which are the ways and means by which Brahman might be realized from the start to the finish are laid down in detail as declared in the *Vēdānta*. And therefore one should start from enquiring and hearing about the method, as laid down in the text: *Agnānāt prabhavam duḥkham gnānam tasya nivartakam* | *Sarvavēdāntavākyaṇām śravaṇam tatpravar-takam* | *Śravaṇam nāma vākyaṇām vaidikāṇām parātparē* | *Upakramādibhir lingaiḥ kṛita tātparya niśchayam* || *iti*.

Thus *Agnāna* is the cause of all misery and *Gnāna* is the way to get out of it. And this is realized first by initiating an inquiry into and hearing about Brahman. Those statements which bind one to hear and understand that great Brahman described in the *Vēdas* clearly state that one should start by knowing the cause and the effect by inferences. And therefore discussion is the first step to gain knowledge of the chief cause and the final effect. The text *Sadēva saumyēdam agra āsīt* | *iti*, ²⁹⁶ indicates the first starting point. Then the text *Sa ya ēśhō'nimaitadā-tmyamidam sarvam sa ātmā tat tvam asi* (*Śvētakēto*) | *iti*, ²⁹⁷ denotes the final effect. Again, the text *Tattvamasi* is also a subject for discussion and study. Further, the text *Tam tvaupanishadam purusham pruchchhāmi* | *iti*, provides the several proofs in the *Upanishad* and the *Vēdānta* to know the Purusha (i.e., Para Brahman). Finally, texts like *Yēnāśrutam śrutam bhavati* | *iti*, and *Ēka vignānēna sarva vignānam phalam* | ²⁹⁸ *Sēyam dēvataikshata* | *Hantāham*

²⁹⁴ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 5.

²⁹⁵ This follows the usual reading. For a different one, where the words *Ādimadhyānta sangānām* takes the place of *Upakramōpasamhāra*, see Śri Kumāra's commentary on Bhōjadēva's *Tattvaṇṇakāśa* (Tri. Skt. Series, 68).

²⁹⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, VI. 14. 3.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, VI. 3. 2.

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imāḥ tisrō dēvatāḥ anēna jīvēna ātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpē vyākaravaṇi | *iti*, and others provide for the understanding of *Srisṭi*, *sthiti* and *samhāra*, and other kinds of manifestations and disappearances.

For example, the text ²⁹⁹ *Yathā saumyaikēna mritpiṇḍēna sarvām mṛiṇmayam vignātām syāt* | *iti*, provides an instance by way of illustration. Similarly, we have to understand in other places. In the case of Nārāyaṇa, the text *Aṇōraṇyān mahatō mahīyān* | ³⁰⁰ *iti*, is the beginning. The text *Sarvō hyēsha Rudraḥ* provides for the final conclusion. Also, texts like *Yaḥ paraḥ sa Mahēśvaraḥ* | *Ambikāpatayē Umāpatayē Paśupatayē namō namaḥ* | *iti*, etc., ³⁰¹ provide for the study (of the whole meaning of the *Vēdānta*).

Texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* | *iti*, declare that Rudra is the greatest of all and above the whole universe.

Texts like *Parāmritāt parimuchyanti sarvē* | *iti*, etc., provide for the grasping of the *phalam*, i.e., final realization (result) of the *Vēdāntic* study.

Texts like *Sahasraśīrsham* | ³⁰² *iti*, and others provide for *arthavāda* (discussion of the *Upanishads*).

Texts like *Yasmātparam nāparamasti kinchit* | *iti*, prove for *Upapatti* (argument). Agreeably to this, throughout the *Vēdānta*, the hidden characteristic of Brahman is indicated by the neutral (passive) qualities (*taṭastha lakṣhaṇa*) of things. Just as an object is clearly realized by viewing it directly with one's own eyes, similarly the *Vēdānta* as a whole gives for realization the characteristic of Paraśiva Brahman. Therefore there is no contradiction either way. The *Sruti* text *Naishā tarkēṇa matirāpanēyā* | *iti*, ³⁰³ declares that Brahman cannot be

²⁹⁹ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

³⁰⁰ *Katha. Upa.*, II. 20.

³⁰¹ *Mahōpanishad*, XIII. 18.

³⁰² The full text is :—*Sahasraśīrsham dēvam viśvāksham viśva-sambhavam* | *Viśvam Nārāyaṇam dēvam aksharam paramam padam* ||

³⁰³ *Katha. Upa.*, II. 9.

realized by the knowledge obtained through discussion and therefore the three forms of discussion fall to the ground. As through inference it is not possible to realize Brahman or the truth about him, inference ought not to be relied upon. Again, texts like *Viśvam bhūtam bhuvanam chitram bahudhā jātam jāyamānam cha yat | Sarvō hyēsha Rudraḥ tasmai Rudrāya namō astu | iti*, etc., clearly point to the material cause of the world. Also, the text beginning with *Umāśahāyam Paramēśvaram prabhum | iti*, and ending with *Sa ēva Viṣṇuḥ sa prāṇaḥ sa Kālōgniḥ | sa Chandramāḥ | Sa ēva sarvam yadbhūtam yachcha bhavyam sanātanam | Dhyātvā tanmṛityum atyēti nānyaḥ panthā vimuktayē | iti*, sufficiently proves that throughout the *Vēdānta* Paraśiva alone is Brahman and that He alone should be meditated upon in order to realize *mōksha*. Texts like *Yō Rudrō'gnāu | iti*, etc., also declare as the purport of all the *Vēdas* that Śiva is enshrined in all (mundane) things. And therefore He is the subject treated of as the Chief Brahman and declared to be such throughout the *Vēdānta*. This does not conflict with the worshipping of different kinds of deities, high, middle or low (or good, indifferent or bad).

The *Smṛiti* text *Bhēdābhēdātmikā śaktiḥ Brahma-niṣṭhā sanātānī | iti*, states that the chief characteristic inherent in *vahni* (giving light and heat) is that of Brahman. These agencies (such as fire, etc.) are powerless without their respective *śaktis* invested in them by Brahman (as his chief agents). Therefore Brahman possesses power above all these agencies. Just as the father gladdens his heart by the joyous words he speaks to his child and obtains replies from it and feels happy over them ³⁰⁴—which we generally see and experience in the world—so Brahman imparts his own power among his respective agents—

³⁰⁴ This idea is found worked up in the *Harikathāmṛitasāra*, 3rd *Sandhi*, in this manner: when a father dresses up his child in a becoming way and feels glad at the sight presented by it, though the child has no idea of it, so Brahman gives his blessings to those who are dependent on Him.

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Fire, Sun, Moon, etc.—and points them to the world as his chief agents, who primarily would have been nothing of consequence without his special power (invested in them). This is not merely an antiquated practice but also is current (to-day) among parents who we find saying (to their children) “This is a pot,” “This is a piece of cloth,” in order to give them a clear knowledge of the several objects we perceive around us. Further, just as those who are learned in the *Kāvya*s and *Alamkāras* teach their disciples their views in order that they might grasp the whole meaning by illustrations, all statements made in the *Vēdānta* prove nothing but the existence of Brahman.

Moreover, the realization of Brahman being inevitable anyhow, a knowledge of the *Śāstras* is shown to be of little use, and renders action the only desideratum. Nor does it give the fruit of freeing oneself from bondage. Then, whether bondage is separate from Brahman or one with Brahman will have to be understood. Then, whether it is eternal or illusory (has also to be understood). (It is) not the first, because in that case, *Śakti* will have to be separated from Paraśiva which results in the abandonment of *Advaita*. Nor can it be the second, because human beings, who in fact are subject to the bondage of illusion (*Māyāpāśa*), will not have any chance for absolution (*mōksha*) left for them. For *Māyā* being removed, no attempt is necessary for any one to attain Brahman. Nor even the last one. For Paramēśvara being available at all times, one who wishes *mōksha* will never put forth any attempt by his exertions towards attaining it. Then there will be no difference made between *bandha* (bondage) and *mōksha* (absolution). Then if one asserts that there is no necessity whatever in trying to discuss and understand the *Vēdānta* to know Brahman, then we say, it is not so. Paramēśvara who is ever composed of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) is different from the three *guṇas* themselves. And therefore no sooner the *jīva* is freed from the fetters of the said three *guṇas*, he will be no more separate from Śiva but naturally get embodied with Śiva and become one with him, who is never apart from

chitsakti.³⁰⁵ Even though *Māyāpāśa* (the bondage of illusion) is true, yet *mōksha* need not be despaired of, as it is inevitable. Therefore the *dvaitādvaita* doctrine should be accepted. There is no contradiction in accepting this doctrine. The text *Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati* | *iti*, One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman, and the text *Brahmabhāvanakāmō Brahmavēdanam kuryāt* | *iti*, He who desires to become Brahman should know Brahman well³⁰⁶ and others like it sufficiently prove the above view.

As *Avidyā* produces *mōha* (delusion) and is absolutely different from *chitsakti* (mental power or intellectual capacity) until the *jīva* is free from *Avidyā*, the practice of religious meditation (*upāsana*) must continue in order that the fetters of *Avidyā* may be broken and Śiva reached.³⁰⁷ Then what is meant by *release* (*nivrittir nāma*) from *Māyā* is to *end oneself by ceasing to be the cause of Māyā* (*Chit śaktau tatkāriṇībhūta layaḥ*) and becoming one in the domain of knowledge. According to the maxim *Nāśaḥ kāraṇalayaḥ* (destruction is only the cause for displacement from one place to another), it may be argued that the material and the non-material world (*charāchara prapancha*) being constantly the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*), release from *Avidyā* (illusion) cannot possibly be had at all and therefore even for those who know Brahman, it would not be possible to get themselves freed from the shackles of the bondage of *Samsāra* (*Samsāra pravrittīḥ sambhavati*). It, however, cannot be argued so. Because the *Sruti*

³⁰⁵ The *jīva* while not free from the three *guṇas* is separate from Brahman (*i.e.*, in a dual state). There is, therefore, *Advaitahāni*, *i.e.*, abandonment of *Advaita* in that state. When the *jīva* frees himself from the three *guṇas*, he is no longer separate from Brahman, *i.e.*, he loses his duality. The duality goes and he becomes one with Śiva, who is ever with *chitsakti* (*i.e.*, mental power). That is, *Advaita* state is reached when the *jīva* is freed from the three *guṇas*.

³⁰⁶ In order to become Brahman, know (or understand) Brahman well. When Brahman is well known, you will become Brahman.

³⁰⁷ Until he breaks the fetters and joins Śiva, he is separate from Śiva. The *Dvaita* doctrine prevails till then. And the way to reach *Advaita* is through *upāsana* or religious meditation.

text *Anīśayā śōchati muhyamānaḥ* | *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati* | ³⁰⁸ *Nacha punarāvartatē nacha punarāvartatē* | *iti* and hundreds of other *Sruti* texts like it teach that he who fully recognizes Brahman by his knowledge will become Brahman Himself, being freed from bondage for ever. It must not be said that by the mere use of the word Brahman it simply means mere understanding of Brahman and not becoming one with him, as it is not expressly said so. Just as by the mere chanting of a *mantra* one readily becomes cognizant of the deity to whom his offering is directly due, similarly at the very time of the offering of the sacrificial object, which is to be offered simultaneously with the chanting of the *mantra*, in order to secure the complete realization of the fruit of the sacrifice, in the *Vēdānta*, the *prayōga vidhi* ³⁰⁹ thus binds one's action in realizing Brahman. In this instance, the principle denoted in the declaration of the *Vēdānta* is not in contradiction with actual practice. If the doubt is raised as to how the declarations in the *Vēdānta*, which while they do not point to the various stages of development in *karma* which help to attain wisdom, could be held to render the realization of Brahman by merely applying the principles of practice, we reply, it is not so. *Sruti* texts like *Amritasya dēva dhāraṇō bhūyāsam* | *iti* declare decisively and without doubt that by the mere application of the principles of *karma*, such as the wearing of the *Śivalinga* on the body and the holding fast to one's dedication vow (*dīkshā*) will enable one to immediately perceive Brahman and realize him.

Also, texts like *Tasyābhidyānāt yōjanāt tattvabhāvāt bhūyaschāntē viśvamāyānivrittiḥ* | *Gnātvā dēvam muchyatē*

³⁰⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

³⁰⁹ Literally, the principle or method of application. The meaning is that when an oblation is offered in the fire, the deity to whom it is offered is thought of simultaneously. Similarly in the *Vēdānta*, through a particular *karma* (method of action), a particular aspect of Brahman is known and according to the text *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati*, Brahman is attained simultaneously. There is no interval of time between the "knowing" of Brahman and the "attaining" of Brahman.

sarva pāśaiḥ | *iti* ³¹⁰ lay down that one becomes eligible for *mōksha* by closely meditating upon Paraśiva and investing oneself with the *Śivalinga*. According to the *Rātrisattva nyāya* (*offering of sacrifices in the night*), ³¹¹ one who is desirous of *mōksha* should at once adorn himself with the *Rudrāksha* (beads) and invest himself with the *Śivalinga* and dedicate himself with the *Śāmbhava dīkshā* and then get at the *Shatsthala Paraśiva Brahmagnāna* in order to realize Brahman. As *Sruti* texts like *Ātmā vā'rē drashtavya* | *iti*, ³¹² do not clearly prescribe any particular principle for attaining *Brahmagnāna*, therefore it may be said that the principles laid down in the *Vēdānta* may lead one to blind action without actually helping to the realization of Brahman, who is *nirvikāra* (unchangeable). Or even it may be said that because the laws of procedure (*vidhi*) being declared, action is inevitable and therefore one is obliged to act up according to the principles laid down, in order to realize Brahman as a compulsory measure, though Brahman is not changeable. Moreover, in order to attain Brahman, it is not right to see a substitute for meditation acting on the basis of the *Saktu nyāya* ³¹³ as illustrated in the expression *Saktunā juhōti* | *iti* and other texts. In trying to realize Brahman, the never-changeable, it is not right to adopt a different method of application in meditation out of mere jealousy. Whatever be the nature of the principles adopted for attaining Brahman in the different methods according to the *Vidhi*, one who is earnest about realizing *mōksha* should adopt an indisputable method free from contradiction. If it is asked then which is that particular way which is not beset with

³¹⁰ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 8.

³¹¹ According to this maxim all the sacrifices that should have been performed during the day might be performed during the night, if one has been rendered unable to perform them during the day. Otherwise he becomes a *Karmabhrashta*.

³¹² *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 5.

³¹³ *Saktu* is the flour of barley first fried and then ground and offered in sacrifice.

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contradiction, we would answer that the following three methods deserve contradiction. According to the *Vēdānta*, Brahman cannot be realized just as we realize a pot placed in the presence of our eyes. Generally speaking, even though one dislikes (to see it), yet he does see a pot as soon as his eyes catch hold of it and thereby he realizes the object. But in *Vēdānta*, the realization of Brahman must be obtained through the various proofs and inferences drawn by the expressions therein in order to get at a firm knowledge regarding Brahman before actually realizing him. Brahman cannot be realized in any other way. Of course, we find in various sacrificial *Vidhis*, as in the text *Samidhō yajati | iti*, that by way of offering sacrifice Brahman can be realized. Even in such instances, one must have a firm knowledge both in *Vēdānta* and in sacrificial functions in order to realize Brahman as the result of sacrifice. But one should not say that while *Vēdānta* offers *Brahmagnāna* through correct knowledge, that there is not the slightest use of following the *Vidhis* (relating to the offering of sacrifices) on the pretext that knowledge of *Vēdānta* alone is sufficient. While *Vēdānta* provides for a firm knowledge in order to realize Brahman out of sight (*parōksha*), in order to realize visibly (*aparōksha*) one has to apply oneself to the ritual functions (*vidhēḥ upa-pattiḥ*), which alone will enable him all the more easily to realize (Brahman). It is never possible to attain Brahman by mere knowledge derived from learning the *Vēdānta*. But the *Srauta mārḡa* (the way pointed out by the *Srutis* or *Vēdas*) is only to get at the grace of *Sadguru*, which can only be attained through *upāsana* (meditation) and penance and thereby through the help of the knowledge imparted to him by the *Sadguru*, the attainment of Brahman can at once be had. And this is the only way.

The *Sruti* texts —

*Dhyātvā munir gachchati bhūtayōnim samastasākshim
tamasah parastāt |*

*Tasyābhidhyānāt yōjanāt tattvabhāvāt bhūyaśchāntē
viśvamāyā nivrittiḥ |*

Sraddhā bhakti dhyāna yōgāt avēhi ।
*Brahma vēda Brahmaiva bhavati ।*³¹⁴
Dhyāna nirmathanābhyāsāt pāśam dahati paṇḍitaḥ ।
*Gnātvā dēvam muchyatē sarva pāśaiḥ ।*³¹⁵
*Īsam gnātvā amrutā bhavanti ।*³¹⁶
*Ātmanyēva ātmānam paśyēt ।*³¹⁷
*Sambhurākāśa madhyē dhyēyaḥ ।*³¹⁸

*Tajjalāniti śānta upāsīta । Iti prāchīna yōgyōpāsava ।*³¹⁹
iti, declare that in order to readily obtain *mōksha* as the result of meditation, the knowledge obtained by the worship of Paramēśvara is the chief means. So say the *Smritis* also :—

Śrōtavyaḥ śrutivākyēbhyō mantavyaśchōpapattibhiḥ ।
Dhyātvā cha satatam dhyēyam ētat darśana hētavaḥ ॥
Gnānam vastuparichchhetti dhyānam tat bhāvakāraṇam ।
Tasmāt jīvō bhavēt Sambhuḥ krimivat kṛtāchintanāt । iti.

The above texts show clearly that it is by the method of constant *śravaṇa* and *manana* and the knowledge derived therefrom applied to *nididhyāsana* (the process of meditation and penance) that Paraśiva, who is the Lord of *śaṭsthala*, can be realized by the *jīva* and become one with him. This is the chief means by which *Shatsthala Paraśiva sākshātkāra* can be obtained. And those who desire the attainment of *mōksha* through Paraśiva should abstain from all pleasures of life, steadily and faithfully act according to the strict ordinances laid down by the *Nigamas* and *Āgamas*, which derive their authority directly from Śiva, and faithfully follow the *karma* in applying them and thus clearing their minds free of all wrong thoughts and dedicate themselves by vow for obtaining Paraśiva.

Such persons only can be in a position to gain the knowledge required for knowing *Shatsthala Paraśiva* and to meditate upon Him to become one with Him. The

³¹⁴ III. 2. 9.

³¹⁵ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 8.

³¹⁶ *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 7.

³¹⁷ IV. 4. 23.

³¹⁸ *Ātharvaśiras.*

³¹⁹ *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

Atharvaṇa Śikhā texts *Tad upāsva* (Meditate only on Him) and *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya* *iti* ³²⁰ (Śiva alone should be meditated upon; Śiva alone is capable of giving *mōksha*; and therefore all others must be renounced), prohibit the meditation upon any deity other than Śiva. And by no other means can he be freed from the bondage of the illusory *Samsāra* (*samsāra māyāpāśa nivrittiḥ*).

Again, texts like *Ksharam pradhānam amrutā-ksharam Haraḥ ksharātmanā viśatē dēva ēkaḥ* ³²¹ *Tāsyā-bhidhyānāt yōjanāt tattvabhāvāt bhūyaśchāntē viśvamāyā nivrittiḥ* *Yadā charmavadākāśam vēśṭayishyanti mānavaḥ* *Tadā Śivam avignāya duḥkhasyāntō bhaviṣyati* *iti* declare that meditation on Śiva, adorning of the body with Śiva's symbol, and knowledge of Śiva result in the fruit of *mōksha*. ³²² And therefore Śiva alone is Parabrahman. Accordingly those who desire *mōksha* must therefore adopt the following six paths as of knowledge epitomised in *śaḍvidha lingātātparyā* ³²³ :—*dhāraṇa*, *gnāna*, *dhyāna*, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *archana*, ³²⁴ according to the *Vēdānta* in order to realize Brahman.

If, in following the maxim *Brahma satyam jagan mithyā* *iti*, the doubt is raised that realization cannot mean anything different from the knowledge derived from

³²⁰ *Atharva Upa.*

³²¹ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 10.

³²² Śrīpati says *Śivādhyāna*, *Śivadhāraṇa* and *Śivāgnāna* will end in *Śivarūpa* (*lit.*—will lead to the *mōksha* called *Śivarūpa*). The *kīṭa* becomes *bhramara*, i.e., the *jīva* assumes the *rūpa* of Brahman.

³²³ *Śaḍvidha lingātātparyā* means of the six means of knowledge. (Here *linga* denotes *hētu* or *kāraṇa*.)

³²⁴ Cf. with the following taken from the *Nārādīya*, wherein it is stated :—*Śravaṇam mananam chaiva dhyānam bhaktistathaiva cha* *|| Sādhanaṁ gnānasampattau pradhānam nānyadishyātē || Na chaitāni vinā kaśchit gnānamāpa kutaśchana*. The following are the six ways of attaining absolute knowledge about Brahman :—*Śravaṇa* (hearing through teaching); *Manana* (repeating); *Dhyāna* (meditation); *Bhakti* (devotion—*Sudrīḍhasnēhasamyukta yathārthagnānatō bhavēt* *|| sā bhaktirīti vīgnāya*, says the *Āgama*); *Sādhana* (accomplishment); and *Gnāna* (firm knowledge). Śrīpati replaces *Bhakti* and *Sādhana* by *Dhāraṇa* and *Archana*.

realizing thoroughly one's own form (*svasvarūpa*), all the world being nothing but false, and if this is to be the result of discussion of the whole of the *Vēdānta*, then the reply is that it is not so. Because it will lead to contradiction of the *Vēdānta*. If it is asked whether by the term "*Jagan mithyā*" (*The world is false*), it is meant that it is ignorance (*Brahmagnānabādhyatvam*) that prevents the knowing of Brahman; or whether it is *traikālika nishēdha*, i.e., prohibition relating to the three times—past, present and the future—the reply is that it is not the first. For there is no means of prohibition attaching to it as it is impossible. The knowledge of Brahman enables one to free himself from the five elements making the world. For *Sruti* texts such as *Sarvō vai Rudrah* 1 ³²⁵ *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma* 1 *iti*, ³²⁶ declare firmly that the whole world consists of the body of Śiva. Or is, alternatively, agreeable to *Sruti* texts such as *Nānyat paśyati nānyat śruṇōti* 1 *iti* ³²⁷ (*He can see nothing else; he can hear nothing else—but Brahman*). He may be interrupted from becoming one with Śiva through knowledge by the bondage of worldly ties, which he feels and hears. Texts such as *Śivō dātā Śivō bhōktā Śivah sarvam idam jagat* 1 *iti*, insist on one being absolutely free from worldly ties like *ghaṭa* (pot) and *paṭa* (cloth) and until he is released from that bondage, he cannot have the knowledge of becoming one with Brahman or be released from the bondage of worldly ties. Therefore the doctrine of *mithyātva* (the falsity of the world) is not suitable (*ayuktam*). So long as this doctrine is entertained, the vow embodied in the *Sruti* text *Ēka vīgnanēna sarva vīgnāna pratignā śrutēh* 1 ³²⁸ (*If you know one thing*

³²⁵ *Mahōpa.*, 22-24.

³²⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

³²⁷ *Samādhi* is of two kinds:—(1) *Asampragnā Samādhi* and (2) *Sampragnā Samādhi*. In the former, one loses even the senses of hearing, seeing, touch, etc., but in the latter, he will be feeling the external things—seeing, hearing, etc.

³²⁸ *Chchāndōgya* text (VI. 1. 4):—*Yathā saumyaikēna mr̥tipindēna sarvam mr̥ṇmayam vīgnātam syāt* ॥ (Oh, my dear boy, if you know

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thoroughly well, you will be able to know all other things), will have been washed off one's hands (*dattāñjali prasangaḥ*).³²⁹ It is stated in the *Srutis* in the form of a vow *Ēka vighnānena sarva vighnānam | iti*, in order to illustrate the world as the chief material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) for Brahman in regard to *srisṭi* (creation), etc. Therefore *Sruti* texts like *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma | Aitadātmīyamidaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ sa Ātmā tattvaṁ asi Śvētakēto* |³³⁰ *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ* |^{330a} *iti* declare that the world is composed of Śiva. Therefore the knowledge of Brahman with (belief) in the existence of the world is no contradiction.³³¹ Even King Janaka and other great men, who knew and realized Brahman, seem to have acknowledged the above truth. Even they thought that realization of Brahman was compatible with belief in the existence of the world. The existence of *Jīvanmuktas*³³² in their carnal bodies, etc., also renders impracticable (the theory of) *Jagad vyavahārānupapattiḥ* (when considered) with the exposition (contained) in the *Srutis*.³³³ Further it is stated in the *Smritis* generally as a great objection

*Akhaṇḍādvaita bhānē tu sarvaṁ Brahmaiva nānyathā |
Gnānād vikalpabuddhistu līyatē na svarūpataḥ ||*

what one ball of earth is constituted of, then you can understand the whole world.)

³²⁹ Literally, giving away with a handful of water, as when making a gift—as prescribed in the Hindu Law relating to gifts.

³³⁰ *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1 ; VI. 15. 3.

^{330a} *Mahōpa.*, 22-24.

³³¹ Śrīpati's opinion is that the doctrine of *jaganmīthyātva* is false. In his view, the belief in the existence of the world is compatible with the realization of Brahman.

³³² Those who have realized Brahman but still live in this world to lead people (the followers) to *Brahmagnāna*.

³³³ Here Śrīpati combats the theory of Sankara that the world is real only for the purpose of *Vyavahāra*. Śrīpati suggests that this view is impracticable for two reasons:—(1) that the *Srutis* declare against it; and (2) that the existence of *Jīvanmuktas* makes the theory impossible of belief. The connecting link between the *Jagat* and Brahman is the carnal body. I am Brahman and the carnal body disappears when meditation makes me realize Brahman.

Bhinnatvam naiva yunjīta Brahmōpādānataḥ kvachit ।

Vāchārambhaṇamātratrivāt bhēdaḥ kēnōpajāyatē ।

Tasmāt Avidyāmātratra kathanam mōhanāya hi ॥ iti ॥

In *Sruti* texts generally, only censure is heard in regard to the doctrine of *jaganmithyātva*.³³⁴ When knowledge develops to a stage capable of realizing everything as an indivisible Whole, everything is Brahman and nothing else. When comprehension departs from true knowledge, he cannot find absorption in *Brahmasvarūpa*. Never at all entertain division from Brahman. Though the *Sruti* text *Vāchārambhaṇa*³³⁵ speaks of division, it is to be understood as not real, because *Avidyā* is treated in the *Smritis* evidently to delude the minds of those who have a firm knowledge of Brahman. In the *Gītā* it is said: *Asatyam apratisṭham tē jagadūhuḥ anīśvaram । iti*,³³⁶ the world is not real, nor an established one; nor has it a Lord to rule over it.

Nor can it be the second, for the text *Amūlam anūdhāram imāḥ prajāḥ prajāyantē । Na kadāचित् anūdriṣam jagat । iti*, affirms that the world is eternal. Moreover, *Sruti* texts like *Asad vā idam agra āsīt । tatō vai sadajāyata । sadēva saumyēdam agra āsīt*,³³⁷ *Ēkamēva advitīyam Brahma । iti*, and hundreds of others similar to them declare that the world did not exist long before it was created (*sriṣṭēḥ pūrvam prapanchasya sattvāt*). Then, if it is asked, "How can it be affected by the three kinds of time, present, past and future (*traikālika*)," the answer is "It is not so (affected)". Because the *Sruti* text *Asad vā idam agra āsīt* clearly states that the world did

³³⁴ Śrīpati protests that if the *Jagat* is real only for *vyavahāra*, then how can the carnal body be real and help through *karma*, the realization of Brahman? So, he drives home the point, "You have to grant that the carnal body is real" and if that be so, then the *Jagat* is also real. Compare the *Chchāndōgya* text *Vāchārambhaṇam vikārō nāmadhēyam mrīṭṭikētyēva satyam ॥* What is uttered undergoes *vikāra* (change), which is the result of the final change of *mrīṭṭikā*, the earth.

³³⁵ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

³³⁶ *Bhag.-Gītā*, XVI. 8.

³³⁷ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

exist before it became manifest in Brahman in the form of an indivisible small particle (*sūkshma rūpa*) with the same name and form and therefore it is termed *asatvam* in the *Smṛiti*. Then the *Sṛuti* says *Tatō vai sadajāyata*,³³⁸ which means that after creation, it (the world) developed (from its small condition) to such an extent as to appear to be a world different from Brahman, in a divided (*i.e.*, separate) form, assuming a big shape. Furthermore, by the use of the word “*Asat*”, the *Sṛuti* text grants and pre-assumes the existence of the forms of *ākāśa* (space), *gagana* (sky) and *aravinda* (the earth).³³⁹ It would, therefore, be as correct to ask “Why not a barren woman be possessed of a son” as to suggest that the world never existed but still gave an idea of its existence (*gaganāravindavadabhāva-tvāṅgīkarē vandhyāputrādīnāmapi jagatkāraṇatvam kim na syāt*) by accepting *bhāvatva* (*i.e.*, the state of being in existence through *gagana* and *aravinda*).³⁴⁰ Moreover, the word *Sadēva* in the *Sṛuti* text, directs attention (*avadhāraṇa*) to the characteristic idea of the world’s existence in Brahman in an attributive manner (*na saviśeṣatva nishēdhaḥ*).³⁴¹ And the word *asataḥ* removes the contradiction of the idea which throws delusion (*bhrānti*) on the mind.³⁴² Then how can the expression *Sadēva saumya* | *iti*, in the *Sṛuti* text, be taken to mean what is contradictory to actual existence?³⁴³

³³⁸ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

³³⁹ That is, Sṛipati suggests that the word *Asat* presupposes the existence of space, sky and the lotus (the lotus representing the earth—as a product of earth).

³⁴⁰ A barren woman cannot possess a child. To think of her possessing a child is inconsistent. So if the world never at all existed, the *bhāvagnāna* pointed out in the *Sṛuti* is incorrect and hence the *Jagat* did originally exist in an infinitesimal form (*sūkshma rūpa*).

³⁴¹ This is opposed to Sankara’s description of Brahman as *nirviśeṣa*, without any characteristic attributes. Sṛipati’s view is that Brahman is *saviśeṣa*, *i.e.*, has attributive characteristics.

³⁴² It removes the delusive feeling whether the world actually existed or not.

³⁴³ This is another aspect of the criticism directed against Sankara’s view.

The word *agrē* used in the text—*agrē-iti*—denotes the characteristic (*kālavīśēśah*) of time. The word *āsīt* in the text is the verb which seems to declare clearly the world's existence. The word *āsīt* means existed.³⁴⁴ The word *Ēkamēva* (in the text) directs attention to the idea (*avadhāraṇa*) of the actual existence (of the world) without leaving anything to doubt. And the word *advitīya* (in the *Sruti* text) clearly shows the double characteristic of Brahman in being the two-fold cause. *Sruti* texts like *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē ṁ iti*,³⁴⁵ must be understood in the same manner. Then, the *Sruti* text *Viśvādhikō Rudrō mahārshiḥ ṁ iti*, also firmly declares that there is no contradiction whatever in the three periods of time—past present and future—regarding the world's existence. This is all the secret about it (*Iti rahasyam*).

Jagad Vyavaharika Khandanam.

Indeed, it is said that the world is true only for purposes of transaction (*Vyāvahārika*).³⁴⁶ If it is asked, "Is it not the highest truth of spiritual knowledge?" the reply is "It is not so". Then, "What is meant by *Vyāvahāra-satyatva*, Truth only for purposes of transaction? Can it be said that it is assumed as existing only for purposes of discussion (*vyavahāra*, i.e., *vyavahāramātra gamyatvam*) or can it be called *Bādhita vyavahāra gamyatvam*, i.e., not true beyond the purpose of *vyavahāra*?³⁴⁷ Or is it possessed of any secret contradiction within its three or four folds which is inexplicable (*trichatura kakshyābādhyatvam*) or is it possessed of statements contradictory to those made in the *Vēdas* (*tattvāvēdaka pramāṇa viruddhattvam*) or is it incapable of giving any result, if understood as truth (*arthakriyā śūnya pratīti gōcharatvam*)? Or is it knowledge useless for obtaining any good result (*kāraṇa*

³⁴⁴ *Āsīt* when coupled to *agrē*, suggests "existed at first".

³⁴⁵ *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 2.

³⁴⁶ Worldly transaction, usage, practical conduct.

³⁴⁷ *Bādhita vyavahāra gamyatvam*—literally, opposed to what *vyavahāra* makes suitable.

dōsha rahita gnāna vishayatvam)?" The reply is "It is not the first"; because if Brahman is also assumed as existing for purposes of *vyavahāra* (transaction) only, then it involves an unwarranted stretch beyond the Vēdic truth, (it results in *ativyāptiḥ*); and this results as between *guru* and *śishya* to silence and ignorance.³⁴⁸ The very starting point of the *Sūtra*, *Athātō Brahmajignāsā* and the underlying truth of *Sruti* texts like *Sadēva saumya idam agra āsīt* and *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma | iti* are crippled (*i.e.*, prejudiced); like decorating a wall which never existed with pictorial likenesses, everything is reduced to a sophistical argument ending in mere attributive expressions (*Pravrit-tāyāḥ śruti sūtra phakkikāyā abhitti chitrakarmatāpātāchcha sarvāpīyam phakkikā saviśēshavishayā*). *Nirviśēsha* (attributelessness), however, can never be thought of by anyone in *vyavahāra*, even for argument's sake. It is incomprehensible to any one even as a matter of *vyavahāra*. Hence the whole argument is impeded. When nothing can be seen or understood, such a *vyavahāra* deserves no commendation. Throughout *Vēdānta*, nowhere is *Nirviśēsha* mentioned and such a thing cannot be assumed. And this helps us conveniently. Even such ³⁴⁹ things will have to be understood as merely argumentative.

Then it cannot be the second, *viz.*, *Bādhita vyavahāra gamyatvam*, *i.e.*, not true beyond the purpose of *vyavahāra*. Because the *ativyāpti* of Brahman cannot be prevented (*i.e.*, the unwarrantable stretch of Brahman cannot be prevented).³⁵⁰ All this taken together leads to contradiction (and not to the Truth). Moreover,

³⁴⁸ That is, it ends in the cutting short of discussion (*jignāsa*).

³⁴⁹ Such things as *Nirviśēsha*, which is not mentioned in the *Vēdānta*—*i.e.*, *Vēdas* and *Āgamas* (*i.e.*, *Upanishads*). *Āgama* means only that which is handed down; that which has come down from time immemorial; traditional doctrine or precept; a sacred writing or scripture; the *Vēdas*.

³⁵⁰ That is, the proposition goes beyond the granted limit of actual truth. The idea is that the argument would lead to something beyond *Brahman*,

all arguments are limited to mundane existence³⁵¹ (and to nothing beyond it). Mere arguments with contradictions (such as these) will not avail to prove whether Brahman is *saviśēsha* or otherwise. If so, the characteristics of these contradictory arguments will lead to uselessness (*vaiyarthya*)³⁵² and what is aimed at is not gained. Everything thought of in argument leads to unreality (*prātibhāsika*) or to an unwarrantable stretch beyond Brahman (*ativyāpti*). At any rate, any knowledge which extends beyond Brahman is unreal and contradictory and is a perfect embellishment of mere argument (*parishkāraḥ sādhuḥ*). What finally results therefrom is a perfect destruction of any kind of knowledge to be derived therefrom about Brahman; the antithetical method of argument leads further to incapability of producing better knowledge afterwards, and also makes one lose whatever true knowledge he previously possessed. And such a knowledge finally leads him to be impressed with the conclusion that there is neither a *ghaṭa* nor a *paṭa* (neither a jug nor a cloth). And finally everything ends in stretching to something beyond Brahman. Such a knowledge we discard (*nirākarishyāmaḥ*).

Moreover, granting the truth of the existence of the blueness of the sky, which is the starting point³⁵³ (*i.e.*, foundation) for the argument and holding that Brahman alone is likewise true and nothing else, the means adopted to obtain a knowledge of Brahman in a contradictory manner is just like one mistaking the whiteness in a conch-shell for silver, which leads by an unwarranted stretch to a something beyond Brahman, which is unpreventable.³⁵⁴

³⁵¹ Cf. *Vāchā pravṛitti* and *vāchā nivṛitti*, granted as desired and cancelled as desired.

³⁵² Literally, unproductiveness.

³⁵³ *Prishṭha*, the word used by Śrīpati, means *back*.

³⁵⁴ The argument may be thus set down:—The blueness of the sky is perceived and accepted to be true—in this world of *vyavahāra*. This blueness of the sky is all-pervading. Similarly, the existence of Brahman, who is all-pervading, is accepted as true. This, however, is true only in a limited sense; as much as there

Even for those who possess such knowledge, the realization of Brahman is not only impossible but also their trials for the same will have to stretch beyond Brahman. Inasmuch as the blueness of the sky is not altogether real, it should not be said that a knowledge about such a thing is an unwarranted stretch of the principle (*atiprasaṅgaḥ*). But the *nirviśeṣatva* (attributelessness) and the *mithyātvā* (falsity of the existence of the world) both lead to a knowledge which ends in an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman.³⁵⁵ Being rid of the world for mere *vyavahāra* purposes, no *lakṣhaṇa* (characteristic) of Brahman remains for argument. To one who wishes to establish *nirviśeṣatva* (a Brahman without attributes) in an opposing manner (*sapratiyōgikānām*), we say it is impossible to realize such a Brahman in whom many characteristics are to be found. It would be really impossible to realize the true Brahman if the mere existence of Brahman is granted, holding all that is about him is the result of *Adhyāsa* co-existing with him. The possessing of such a knowledge cannot lead to the realization of Brahman. Such realization

is real silver in a conch-shell, the mere whiteness makes us believe that silver is there, is taking us beyond the actual fact, *i.e.*, *ativyāpti*. Such a result is unpreventable. In order to attain a firm knowledge of Brahman, it is to be understood that the world is real only for the sake of argument and its existence is not real. The character of knowledge relating to Brahman consists in attaining to a condition which is all light and free from darkness. This Light alone is Brahman. There can be nothing found which is attributeless (*nirviśeṣa*) in this world. Hence the existence of attributeless things is not true. If attributeless things are to be grasped, one has to go by an unwarranted stretch (*ativyāpti*) beyond Brahman—which results in contradiction.

³⁵⁵ That is, Śrīpati's argument is that we may grant the blueness of the sky for the sake of illustration and argument and also the existence of silver in the whiteness of the conch-shell for purposes of argument but not the *nirviśeṣatva* of Brahman nor the *mithyātvā* of the world—for if these two are granted, then the existence of Brahman will be jeopardised or it will take us to something else beyond and other than Brahman.

accordingly is impracticable. If we accept Brahman by his mere *Svarūpa* as co-existing along with *Adhyāsa*, which cannot completely remove the illusion so as to enable us to realize the true Brahman, it will be impossible to realize such a Brahman. But if *Adhyāsa*, which is the infirmity in the whole theory, is removed so as to keep Brahman without *Adhyāsa*,³⁵⁶ then the *Siddhānta* (theory) becomes confused and ends in contradiction. (That is, the realization of such a Brahman—Brahman separate from *Adhyāsa*—is impossible.) Anyhow, accepting that true knowledge leads to the realization of Brahman, throughout the *Siddhānta*, a Brahman free from *Adhyāsa* is never seen to exist at any time. Therefore such a *Siddhānta* is impracticable and therefore let us not discuss it any more.

Nor can it be the third. For in that case, the realization goes unwarrantedly beyond Brahman. A true knowledge of Brahman cannot be displaced by any doubt or opposition. But a Brahman who is co-existing with *Adhyāsa* is really one who cannot actually be realized and is opposed to true knowledge. In that case, according to the *Siddhānta*, Brahman becomes not real (*prātibhāsika*) but existing only for appearance. This results in *Ativyāpti*, an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman.³⁵⁷ It is within our experience that illusory thoughts run into our minds which are unrealizable and not true—just as the existence of *Gandharvanagara* (or *Gandharvapūram*), the city of the Gandharvas, an imaginary city in the sky, probably the result of some natural phenomena, such as mirage), the

³⁵⁶ In Philosophy, *Adhyāsa* is to attribute or ascribe (falsely) the nature of one thing to another.

³⁵⁷ According to the theory criticized, Brahman cannot exist without *Adhyāsa*. If Brahman cannot exist without *Adhyāsa*, then such a theory cannot help to realize the true Brahman, because the theory goes beyond Brahman. And a knowledge of such a Brahman—unconnected with *Adhyāsa*—cannot be had according to the theory. Accordingly, Brahman exists only in appearance and is not real.

imaginary circle created by a fire-brand (*Alāta-chakra*), and the like, which are actually not in existence. Further, the word *kakshā*³⁵⁸ employed in the argument is *yukti-parah*, i.e., a mere intellectual trick (or expedient), *kāla-parah*, i.e., a mere time-serving one; or *Viparīta-pramā-parah*, i.e., a mere perverse proof. It cannot, however, be the first; (*yukti-parah*) in which case the *prapañcha* (world) would appear to be false, which alone would be enough to make the whole argument unreal. That would also become contradictory to the Vēdic view that Brahman is *nirdōsha*, i.e., without fault (or defect). Thus the previous intellectual argument is contradicted by the subsequent one. Nor is it the second (i.e., *kāla-parah*); for the long interval of time intervening between the illusory thoughts (*Bhramā-vishaya*) ends in unreality (*prātibhāsikē*) of the object and in an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (*ativyāptih*). Nor is it the third (*viparīta-pramā-parah*); for the contradictory thoughts overlapping the proofs make the realization of Brahman impossible, and thus the whole becomes a contradiction (*vyāghātāt*). The realization of such an object terminates in not attaining it, i.e., proves infructuous. When the hammer is removed from work, there is no *ghaṭa*; and the intellectual skill employed in the evolution of the three or four folds of intellectual argument (*tri-chatura viparītaghnāna*) naturally ends in *ativyāptih*, i.e., in an unwarranted reach beyond Brahman. The hammer instead of bringing the *ghaṭa* into existence has helped to make it disappear on account of the employment of contradictory skill and perverted thought.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁸ *Kakshā* in Logic means *objection or reply in argument*. Literally, it means a lurking or hiding place. An argument which does not make things plain. The argument of Sankara is described by Śrīpati as using *tri-chatura-kakshayābādhyatvam*, i.e., three or four folds of objection (or contradiction).

³⁵⁹ The saying is that a hundred strokes by the hammer produces a *ghaṭa* (a pot) out of earth as a hundred strokes of the chisel make an article of the shapeless wood. Śrīpati remarks that Sankara has by the use of his intellectual skill and perverse argument made the hammer not produce the pot, but made it disappear.

Furthermore, in the first instance, the intellectual skill used in the three- or four-folded argument (*tri-chatura-bādhyatvē*) has brought in a contradiction which establishes *avyāpti*, i.e., inadequate pervasion of the proposition formulated.³⁶⁰ (Brahman is full of *gnāna* and of *jyōtisvarūpa*; but when he is to be considered along with *Adhyāsa*, these qualities—*gnāna* and *jyōtisvarūpa*—become contradicted, because *Adhyāsa* is *agnāna* or illusion. Hence *avyāpti* results.) The skill employed in argument, instead of removing *agnāna*, and establishing *gnāna* and developing it, so as to help in the realization of Brahman, has increased *agnāna* and thus made it impossible to know the characteristics of Brahman. It is thus: Is Brahman visible or invisible? If it were visible, there is no more falsity about its reality in existence. But if it be invisible, even a thought of accepting it as granted for the sake of *vyavahāra* becomes incomprehensible (that is to say, that even for the sake of *vyavahāra*, the existence of Brahman cannot be granted). For it is impossible to realize (Brahman), because if it is *seen*, there is no more *mithyātva*; if it is *not seen*, Brahman cannot be existing even for the sake of *vyavahāra*.³⁶¹ The mere assuming the existence of a thing which is not seen is impossible (*dussādhyatva*). Nor can *avidyā* be removed, having no opportunity for realizing the object by seeing. The mere idea of existence (*vriddhi*) for the sake of *vyavahāra* leads finally to the failure of the attempt to establish the existence of Brahman and ends in ignorance (*agnānatvāt*) and futility. The employment of Brahma knowledge cannot bring (one)

³⁶⁰ *Avyāpti* means the non-inclusion or exclusion of a part of the thing defined; one of the three faults of a definition. When a *lakṣaṇa* is predicated of a thing and that *lakṣaṇa*, though it is true, is not actually found on examination in it, there is *avyāpti*. Thus, a Brāhmaṇa is possessed of *sikhā* (hair on the head) and *sūtra* (the sacred-thread on his body). When, however, this *lakṣaṇa* is applied to a *Sanyāsin*, it is found to be otherwise, he being devoid of both, though he is yet a Brāhmaṇa. There is *avyāpti* here.

³⁶¹ Literally, the need for a Brahman even for the sake of *vyavahāra* is removed. Śrīpati puts Sankara's argument on the horns of a dilemma.

to that condition (*Brahmatva*). If we accept that a *gunja*—a red berry with a black dot at its top—appears like fire, the burning property of fire cannot be accepted in it. In order to obtain *gnāna* without any doubt, it is not primarily possible to use *agnāna* as the instrument for the purpose. Such *gnāna* which is unable to discriminate between what is the means and what is the thing for which such means should be used proves infructuous (*vyāghātāt*). It is not even capable of recognizing *ghaṭa* from the knowledge regarding *ghaṭa*. *Ghaṭa* and the knowledge relating to *ghaṭa* are one. Moreover, while correct knowledge is the chief means of realizing Brahman, a mistaken idea of division between Brahman and Brahman-knowledge (*gnāna*) is postulated. There is absolutely no need for the employment of such an argument. Where both (*gnāna* and *agnāna*) become important, *gnāna* cannot claim superiority over *agnāna*. Nor can, between *gnāna* and *agnāna*, *gnāna* stand out as proof (*prāmāṇikam*). On the whole, in the loss of one's pervasive nature (*svavyāpakatva*) and one's brilliant nature (*svaprakāśatva*), the way of correct knowledge being lost, *gnāna* finally enters *nirviśēshatva* of Brahman, which is not true. There is no *Chinmātra Brahman*,³⁶² because, he is really non-existent. Everything thus becomes an illusory argument (*agnānatva prasangāchcha*). Even though *gnāna* is capable of being obtained so as to realize Brahman, *Avidyā* could not be shaken off in order to know oneself in Brahman; because *Adhyāsa* always being in contact with *Chit Brahman* (intelligence), its non-existence could not be proved, without which Brahman cannot be all-pervasive or realizable. Moreover, the double causes of *pravṛtti* (manifestation) and *nimitta* (instrumental or efficient cause as opposed to *upādāna kāraṇa*), exhibited in Brahman as his two important characteristics (both of them co-existing without separation), lead to the creation of many

³⁶² Of the *Sat*, *Chit* and *Ānanda* folds in Brahman, *Chit* is referred to here.

different meanings (significances).³⁶³ And such meanings when applied to *chaitanya* in Brahman make the idea of *prapancha* contradictory to the starting point, *i.e.*, *vyavahāra satyatva* Brahman and end in non-existence (*vaiyarthya*). Such a non-existent Brahman, who can be seen, is not only a calculated (*i.e.*, deliberate) but also an ineffaceable falsehood—so hard a falsehood³⁶⁴ that it could not be believed under any circumstances. In trying to establish true knowledge out of *gnāna* and *agnāna* and in trying to prove that true knowledge will lead to the realization of Brahman, the double method of argument, *viz.*, *pravritti* (manifestation) and *nimitta* (efficient cause), was adopted but in the attempt thus made, the chief object (*i.e.*, the realization of Brahman) has been left unrealized, just as between the two objects *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, the importance of *ghaṭa* had been lost. However, without having a firm, true knowledge regarding Brahman, the *nirviśēsha* mode of argument regarding *Nirviśēsha* (attributeless) Brahman has helped to reduce Brahman to void (or emptiness). And all consciousness being different from Brahman, no *vyavahāra* can result. Hence, it (*vyavahāra*) becomes *mithyā* (false). In order to establish true knowledge regarding Brahman and to realize the self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) character of Brahman, the *mithyātva* of Brahman must be given up (*Brahmaṇaḥ mithyātvam varjanīyam*). To create a *bhēda* which is not in existence (*kalpita bhēdamādāya*) and to argue that the world is only existent for purposes of *vyavahāra*—just as one Dēva-datta who never existed—and then to finally arrive at a *Nirviśēsha* Brahman, which can never be realized,—such a method (of argument) should be given up (*varjanīyam*). Just as difference between Brahman and *chaitanya* is untrue, similarly Brahman without attribute is also untrue, for realization of such a Brahman is of no use (*aprayōjakam*) and

³⁶³ The word *artha* used in the text means *object* or *significance*.

³⁶⁴ The words used are *mithyātvāpādunasya vajralēpatvāpātāchcha*, where *vajralēpa* means a kind of very hard cement. Cf. *Vajralēpa ghaṭitēva*, see *Māl.*, V. 10. For its preparation, see Varāhamihira's *Brihat Samhitā*, Chap. 57.

in this world it is unattainable (*tadasiddhēḥ*).³⁶⁵ *Jīva* being an indivisible whole, with Brahman, such a start by postulating *vyavahāra* becomes untrue. The annihilated form of *mithyātva* cannot be stated as belonging to *chid-vishaya* (worldly matter, *i.e.*, matter only for *vyavahāra*). Thus, we have come to the conclusion that a mode of argument which comprises such a knowledge does not help us towards true realization; nor does it help us towards the reality of the world for the sake of *vyavahāra*. As the argument leads us to conclude that all the component parts being different from each other, on account of their differences in characteristics,³⁶⁶ there is really no *mithyātva* (of the *prapancha*). This leads to the conclusion that the complete divided nature of the three parts (*prapancha*, *jīva* and *Brahman*) proves the *satyatva* of the *prapancha* *i.e.*, the reality of the world (*prapanchasya satyatvam*).

This ends in the inverted position that Brahman is false (*Brahmanō mithyātvam iti viparīta vrittih*).³⁶⁷ Therefore, this mode of argument has brought us finally to the unpreventable conclusion that the world is real and Brahman is false (*prapancha satyatva* and *Brahma mithyātva*).

Moreover, does *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman really exist or not? In the second case (*i.e.*, if you say that it does not), the *Mādhyamika* (Bauddha) *mata* is entered on. In the first case (*i.e.*, if you say that *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman

³⁶⁵ Śrīpati here criticises both the *Advaita* and *Dvaita* view-points combined. If *Advaita* with its *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman is untrue, so is *Dvaita* in its position that Brahman and *chaitanya* (*Jīva*) are different. Śrīpati's argument seems to be that the Advaitin having postulated *prapancha* for purposes of *vyavahāra*, has had to end in Nescience. He suggests that while the Advaitin has, for *vyavahāra*, to grant the *Dvaita* position of *prapancha* being different from Brahman, he has been unable to prove the proposition he started with, *viz.*, a *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman, as he has ended in Nescience.

³⁶⁶ That is, *prapancha*, *chaitanya* (*jīva*) and *Brahman* being different from each other.

³⁶⁷ That is, Brahman is proved to be false and *prapancha* real.

exists), the way in which the argument by means of *pravritti* and *nimitta*, which are different from each other, is put forward, leads to the utter futility and contradiction of *nirviśeṣatva*. By the mode of argument employed, *i.e.*, by means of *pravritti* and *nimitta*, the postulated *vyavahāra* (*satyatva*) proves certain attributes in Brahman which cannot be avoided. Starting with the assumption that *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman exists, the proof brings out a result which is contradictory to that assumption inasmuch as it points out a *Saviśeṣa* Brahman, and reduces finally the argument to the prattle (or raving) of a mad man (*unmatta pralāpavat*). The word *asti* (exist) used in the *bhēda* creating argument of *pravritti* and *nimitta*, regarding *chaitanya* (*sattāyāḥ*), in your philosophy (*tvanmatē*)³⁶⁸ has ended in the conclusion of *mithyātva* (Nescience).

The assumption of the existence of Brahman ends in the *nirviśeṣatva* of Brahman and thus makes Brahman non-existent. The skill employed in the argument becomes only useful to prove that the very assumption of Brahman at the starting ends in a contradiction and proves that nothing is existent, because *nirviśeṣa* cannot be correlated with the assumption that Brahman exists. If it is said that *pravritti* and *nimitta* are not different from each other, then *samānādhikaraṇa* follows: *Nirviśeṣa* and *saviśeṣa* should then be treated as possessing a common substratum—or as being in the same category. Formerly some ancients³⁶⁹ treated *pravritti* and *nimitta* which indicate *bhinna* (that is, difference), sometimes as *samānādhikaraṇa*. Even they arrived at the same conclusion, committing the same fault.

In assigning a non-existent *dharma* to *pravritti* and *nimitta* and discussing a *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman, the identical absurdity (*ayamēva dōṣaḥ*) is arrived at. If Brahman does not exist beyond the assumption (*anatirēkē*), then *samānādhi-*

³⁶⁸ Here, at this final point, Śrīpati addresses the *Advaita* expounder directly by using the word *tvanmatē*.

³⁶⁹ There is no clue as to who these ancients were.

karana is destroyed (*samānādhikarana hāneḥ*). If Brahman exists beyond the assumption (*atirēkē*), the *siddhānta* (conclusion) itself is destroyed.³⁷⁰

From this, the hypothesis of a *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman goes without proof; and by its very nature results in contradiction. When the things we ardently seek for are by their very nature impossible of attainment, we should not lay on them an unbearable blame (blemish) and renounce them. By this, according to the *Srutis*, *nirviśeṣatva* is disproved and rendered futile. In such a case, the *Srutis* which are separated from the differences created by *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* (radical form and prefixes and suffixes) would result in want of authority. Indeed, does *mithyā* mean being different from Brahman as *paramārtha* or *aparamārtha* (as the highest or the most sublime truth regarding Brahman or the reverse of it)? In the first case, as *bhēdatva* is accepted as true, the opposite cannot be true, because the destruction (nullification) of the *siddhānta* results therefrom. Nor is it the second; for both the *satya* (truth) and *mithyā* (untruth) even as to the existence of Brahman will be unpreventable. The causes that go to prove the differences in Brahman will be the causes which go to prove his non-existence. The *ghaṭa* cannot in its real state claim to be different from Brahman and in its *mithyā* (non-existent) state claim to be one with Brahman. This *bhēdābhēda* state itself being *mithyā* (non-existent), it cannot go without being called faulty (*i.e.*, it would be faulty to postulate that in its real state the *ghaṭa* is different from Brahman and that in its *mithyā* state it is one with Brahman). The truth of the whole matter is that mutual contradiction and unrectifiable confusion cannot be removed while you only profess to be impartial between *bhēda* and *abhēda* and between *jīva* and *Brahman*. Why don't you accept the *mithyātva* of both of them, *jīva* and *Brahman*?

³⁷⁰ Cf. Ānandatīrtha's *Māyāvāda Khaṇḍana*, Section relating to *atirēka* and *anātirēka* (Kumbakonam Edn., p. 2).

Not that it is impossible to arrive at such a conclusion on the basis of the *abhēda śrutis*. By the text *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*, *Brahman* as well as the *jīva* are ever proved. And therefore the existence of *prapancha* as well as *Brahman* is true. Is *nirviśēsha* an aid or a hindrance to *Brahma* knowledge? If it is the second, the *Siddhānta* falls to the ground. Is *Nirviśēsha* *Brahman* to be understood as *gnāna* or *agnāna*? If it is the second, the *Siddhānta* falls to the ground. If it is the first, then, is *Brahman* *saviśēsha* or *nirviśēsha*? If it is said that *Brahman* is *nirviśēsha*, then it contradicts (*vyāghāta*) your cherished objective. If it is said that *Brahman* is *saviśēsha*, the *Brahman* becomes eternal (*nityatva*). If *gnāna* becomes *nitya*, the argument also becomes *nitya* (eternal), *i.e.*, endless. Similarly even *Muktas* understand that *prapancha* is eternal.³⁷¹ Then, in the *Mukti* state, when full satisfaction has been attained in *vishaya* (*i.e.*, worldly affairs), it cannot be said that the *prapancha* is *nirvishaya* (*i.e.*, does not pertain to worldly affairs). Then, there will be no state of correct knowledge (*gnāna*). A knowledge (*gnāna*) which describes no object (*i.e.*, nothing), has nothing to support (*i.e.*, no prop or support) and is a contradiction (in terms). A *gnāna*³⁷² which relates to a past enjoyment (*atīta gnāna*) can no more be desired to be had. In the same way, if out of past enjoyment there is some small particle still left out, we cannot without contradiction call such a small particle left over as *nirviśēsha*. Because such a declaration would end in a faulty observation. Therefore to describe things which are within our experience as *nirvishaya*³⁷³ and *nirāśraya*³⁷⁴ is vain, for, in the example "I know this is a *ghaṭa*", which can be stated with firmness, without any doubt by

³⁷¹ So real is *prapancha*.

³⁷² *Gnāna* is obtained for realizing *Brahman*; it is the highest object that can be aimed at; but if that is not to be aimed at, what is the use of that *gnāna*?

³⁷³ *Nirvishaya*: Having no scope or sphere of action; not attached to sensual objects.

³⁷⁴ *Nirāśraya*: Without a prop or support,

seeing and handling, it cannot be stated that it (the *ghaṭa*) is not true and that it (the *ghaṭa*) does not exist. It is the height of contemptuous folly (*dhik*) to state that the *ghaṭa* is just like a flower existing in the sky (*gagana kusumavat*) which can neither be handled nor obtained and which has merely to be imagined, having no real existence.

Further, is Brahman matter (*dravya*)³⁷⁵ or otherwise (*adravya*)? If he is *dravya*, then he should possess its properties or qualities also. Also he will have to be considered along with time, just as the existence of a pot (*ghaṭa*), as to when it came to exist, etc., which becomes meaningless.

Having an idea involving Time, it may be granted as being *Sat*. Even though at certain times certain properties (*guṇa*) are exhibited yet, he (Brahman) possesses no properties (*agūṇa*), which shows an inconsistency. If the existence of *guṇa* is permanently granted, then, *nirviśēshatva* becomes foiled. If *avidyā* (illusion) is granted, it is not possible to establish true knowledge. If Brahman is to be considered as *adravya* (non-matter), Brahman is always co-existent only with *dravya*. For example, *Sruti* texts like *Svē mahimni* | *iti*, contradict the argument. Therefore, as Brahman is always co-existing with *dravya*, the *nirviśēshatva* becomes broken down (*bhaṅgāchcha*). Therefore, with the argument, conducted at length, in these ways, with all reasons and proofs adduced for contradicting the first and the second *kakshas*,³⁷⁶ Brahman, who has no contradiction whatever, becomes contradicted by the remaining two *kakshas*, i.e., the third and the fourth, and the confusion becomes unpreventable. Hence the argument is one to be discarded (as a remote one).

It is not the fourth, because there is no contradiction in the *Vēdas* themselves about the truth and principles

³⁷⁵ *Dravya* means a thing, substance, object or matter. An elementary substance; the substratum of properties; one of the seven categories of the Vaiśēshikas. The *dravyas* are nine:—*prithvī*, *aṇu*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa*, *kāla*, *dik*, *ātman* and *manas*.

³⁷⁶ Cf. *Tri-chatura kakshā bādhyatva* referred to above in detailing the basis of the *Advaita* argument,

relating to Brahman. As to the real nature of Brahman (*tatvādishu*) as revealed in the *Vēdas* and as stated in the *Srutis*, there is no contradiction. The *nirviśēsha* doctrine exhibits the qualities relating to Brahman in a manner contradictory to them (*i.e.*, *Vēdas* and *Srutis*). Such contradictions not only contradict the Vēdic truth, but are also evidently against *Sruti* texts such as :—*Nēha nānāsti* ³⁷⁷ and *Yasmindyauḥ | iti*, ³⁷⁸ etc. These are gravely contradicted and the argument becomes inconclusive thus, *viz.*, that though there is no *prapañcha* actually, it is only assumed for *vyavahāra*.

The thing assumed is an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (*atirikta*) and it leads into the region of *dvaita* (*dvaitaprasaṅgāt*), though professing that *dvaita* is false (*mithyātva*). And those proofs that maintain the dualistic doctrine contradict his (*advaitic*) own doctrine and establish finally the truth of the dualistic (*bhēda*) doctrine as one to be accepted (*angīkāryatayā*) and thus results an unwarranted stretch (*ativyāptēyascha*) beyond Brahman. Further, if it is asked, whether the characteristics of Brahman are in accordance with the principles of the *Vēda*, or different from them, whether the complete attainment of Brahman could be fulfilled or not, the reply is that if it is not fulfilled, it is contradicting the starting point, according to his (adversary's) argument. If it is realized that the starting point of *prāpañchaka vyavahāra* breaks down under weight of many Vēdic proofs adduced against it, the argument ends in open contradiction. If the world becomes illusory (*asatvi*), the proofs adduced in support of it (by himself) become contradicted. What was stated at first, *viz.*, that *bhēda* (*jīva* being different from Brahman) is *mithyā* (false), is itself established as being consonant with truth, contrary to one's own argument.

Nor the fifth. While such is the case, your attempt at starting with an argument, professing it to be a Vēdic one, to establish to the world *Brahmasatyatva*, has finally ended

³⁷⁷ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

³⁷⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, II. 2. 5.

in the destruction of your argument and in contradiction, and (your) whole labour has been lost—much like the labour that is lost in trying to establish the beauty of a flower hanging in mid-heaven or in representing a pole as a malicious serpent. So you have to retire from gesticulating in the (dialectic) arena. Now, this is the final verdict (*abhiprāya*). Throughout the argument relating to *nirviśēsha Brahman*, the negative prefix *ni* (in the word *nirviśēsha*) denotes and establishes *artha kriyā śūnyatvam* (i.e., void of all realization of object) and *artha kriyā śūnyatva bhāva* (incapability of expecting any realization of the object). While so, Brahman is proved to be, by an unwarranted stretch, one beyond himself (*ativyāptih*). *Avidyā* being one never separable from Him (Brahman), the impossibility of realizing Brahman, the yearned object, is proved.

And being Himself inseparable from impurity (*aśuddha*), *vyavahāritva* is not established. When all true knowledge is separated, then, all attributes are gone and there results finally *śūnyavāda sāmvrājya* (i.e., the ascendancy of the kingdom of *Śūnyavāda*³⁷⁹ or Nescience). The differentiation (*viśēshitam*) can never exceed the attributes (*viśēshana*) of an object (*viśēshya*). In order to exterminate *avidyā*, the argument employed denotes that it reaches beyond (*atirichyatē*) the characteristics of Brahman, so that it finally goes to an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (*ativyāptih*). Even if the light of knowledge is obtained, yet the non-destruction of *avidyā* renders the result nugatory—the cause not leading to the desired result.

Though the corporeal object is brought to light, the illusion (*avidyā*) regarding the corporeal objects is not removed. Similarly the Self (*svatvam*), even though without selfishness (*svavishayatām vināpi*), brings into the light the *svarūpa* of Brahman and removes *avidyā*. This is the declaration of the *tattva* (truth) (i.e., *siddhānta*).

Moreover, the mere imagining of the existence of the serpent in the rope, which is unreal (*prātibhāsika*), and

³⁷⁹ The doctrine of the non-existence of anything; the doctrine of a Buddhist sect.

which makes one to fear and tremble, is a result which can only be described as an unwarranted stretch beyond the truth of the actual existing object, causes and effects. When the existing facts are ignored, as for example, in a *ghaṭa* mere thoughts about it are unwarranted stretches beyond it (*ativyāptih*). A multitude of unsettled thoughts (*prachayā vyavahita*) which arise (*utpannēshu*) about a thing cannot give a settled idea regarding it. Such unsettled thoughts for that moment mean evidently an unwarranted stretch beyond that object (*ativyāptih*). No correct result can be realized by such (unsettled) thoughts and action (*kriyā*) taken on such (unsettled) thoughts. Similarly, in *svapna* (dreams), both good and bad sights are seen with indications for the time being of several actions and results, which finally (in the wakeful state) prove as unwarranted stretches beyond actual reality. As regards the *vyāvahārika* objects, of which knowledge ought to be gained by endeavours and by trying to realize them, the fault is of one's own mind (*ātmāśraya dōsha ēva*). For an untoward result that eventuates by the wearing of a *kaṭaka* (gold bangle) or a *makuta* (a crown) or some such thing, cannot be warded off by blaming merely the *kaṭaka* or the *makuta* (when actually the result has already been experienced). In the same way what is seen occurs and is experienced in *svapna* (dreams). Even though they are unwarranted and beyond the stretch of actual facts, yet nothing can be prevented by applying any kind of interruption. While such is the case, in all such cases of illusory knowledge (*prātibhāsika*), where an unwarranted stretch beyond the actual facts is reached, there can be no interruption. Such things cannot fail to occur under such circumstances. While such is the case, in the present instance, your starting at first with the calculated mistake—of imagining for the purpose of *vyāvahāra* a serpent in a rope—is but accidental and results in unforeseen consequences (*ākasmika prasangāt*). Such a view is again confirmed by the detailed description of the result of actions seen and experienced in *svapna* (dreams).

Nor can it be the sixth; that is, Brahman cannot be mere light of knowledge free from any cause or fault. Because in examples derived from the conch-shell (*śukti*) throwing the light of silver, in which it is mere illusion, Brahman becomes *ativyāptih* (an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman). In regard to objects about which almost all people have an ascertained knowledge, even though such things are away from their senses of sight, yet it cannot be said that the characteristics of such things are in any way contradictory to those actually pertaining to them.

In texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*³⁸⁰ *Ātmana ākāśassambhūtaḥ*³⁸¹ | *Yasmin dyauḥ prithivī*³⁸² | *iti*, which refer to the creation of the creatures of the world and the birth of *ākāśa* by *Ātman*, etc., which objects are perceivable only by mental wisdom, it is not possible exactly to say what their characteristics are. Then, the *Srutis*, which are responsible for mentioning *avidyā* as being the root of all ignorance, state that *avidyā* cannot bring into existence the actual knowledge of Truth for realizing Brahman. Therefore Brahman becomes *ativyāptih* (*Brahmaṇi ativyāptēḥ*). That is, *avidyā* is something beyond Brahman. (That is, you are going beyond the *Srutis* in attributing a power to *avidyā* which the *Srutis* do not predicate for it though you are bringing in the *Srutis* to support it. There is *ativyāpti* here.) Therefore it cannot be said that by such proofs Brahman can be realized after being freed from the illusory knowledge of *Māyā* co-existing with him. It cannot be said of the *Upanishads* that the root of ignorance (*avidyā*) has taken its origin in them or that *avidyā* is in Brahman. Those proofs cannot be expected to support such a view. The *Sruti* text *Athāta ādēśō nēti nēti* | *Nāsadāsīn nōsadāsīt tadānīm*³⁸³ *Purupurastān-*

³⁸⁰ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.³⁸¹ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.³⁸² *Mund. Upa.*, II. 2. 5.³⁸³ *Rig-Veda*, X. 129. 1. This text is quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his comment on II. 1. 18, *Asadvyapadēśāt nēti chēnna dharmāntarēṇa vākyasēshāt*,

nasannāsannasadasat ³⁸⁴ *iti*, contradicts even whatever was assumed to be as true of Brahman. By describing Brahman in the terms used in the *Sruti* (texts) and interpreting them in a different manner, and describing the world (*prapancha*) in contradiction to them (*Sruti* texts), you are belittling them (*kinchitkaram*). While Brahman possesses all the characteristics mentioned in the *Sruti* (texts) in a real form, you have interpreted them to show an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (*ativyāptēh*). It is not possible to say that the arguments used are in one continued form along the path of right knowledge (*gnāna prakāratva*). Even the knowledge about a pot (*ghaṭa*) according to your argument, goes beyond the attributes of correct knowledge (*avyāptiḥ*) about it, and the attributes are not rightly applicable.

Even though Brahman is possessed of *sadrūpa* (good characteristics), you have in some manner (*prakāratvāt*) interpreted a world consisting in Brahman (*Brahmaṇi prapanchaḥ*) in the form of an illusion (*gnāna prakāratvāchcha*) thereby concluding that Brahman only is true and that the world is a mere illusory (*adhyastatvam*) appearance in Brahman just as *ghaṭa* is seen by the eye and taken to be true by its fashioned appearance and that Brahman is really attributeless (*viśayā viśeṣaṇam iti*), which is neither right nor true (*na yuktam*). For this very reason, all the attributes mentioned (in the *Upanishads*) become useless (*vaiyarthyaṭ*). The statement that it (*prapancha*) exists only in appearance and not real (*prātibhāsike*) is only intended by you to make the all-pervading character of Brahman void of truth (*vyāpti vāraṇāchcha*). Therefore, the statement that the *viśva* (world) is true only for the purposes of *vyavahāra* is in clear contradiction to *Sruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava* ³⁸⁵ and hence is called an

³⁸⁴ Ānandatīrtha, in his *Māyāvādakhaṇḍana*, quotes this text to prove that the *Advaita* conclusion regarding Brahman being neither *sat* nor *asat* nor *sadasat* and being one inexpressible or having no characteristics—is nothing but *sūnya*.

³⁸⁵ Literally means *Vēda*, reasoning and experience.

argument of concealed Buddhism and *Māyavāda* (*Prachchanna Bauddha Māyavāda*). And this is the conclusion of *Srauta Śaiva Siddhānta* (publicly) declared to the sound of a bell-metal bell (*ghaṇṭā-ghōṣaḥ*).

Moreover, in the grand texts (*mahāvākyēṣhu*) of *Tattvamasi*, etc., no *aikya* with *nirviśeṣa Brahman* is taught (*upadiśyatē*). The words *tat* and *tvam*³⁸⁶ in the *mahāvākya* teach in the sense of (*paratvāt*) *saviśeṣa jīva-Brahma* (i.e., *jīva* and Brahman possessing qualities).

In texts like *Tad aikshata bahusyām*³⁸⁷ *iti*, the words *tat*, etc., denote clearly Paramēśvara Brahman with attributes (*saviśeṣa*) by whom the creation of the world was effected. If you say that everything is covered in knowledge inseparable from *Māyā* (*Māyāvidyāvachchinna*) and that no *aikyatva* can be brought about between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, who are respectively of little-knowing and all-knowing nature, being far wide from each other as a cow and a dog; and pursue the doctrine further by employing the *jahal* and *ajahal lakṣaṇā* modes of argument, sometimes vetoing and sometimes agreeing with the texts of the *Sruti* and finally saying that "He is Devadatta" who appears as the result of the *upādhi* of *Māyā* (*Māyāvidyōpādhiḥ*), the destruction of which *upādhi* created by *Māyāvidyā* will result in the realization of Brahman, who should be understood to be free from all attributes (*Nirviśeṣaḥ*)—if you ask us to admit the existence of such a Brahman, then, we say, we do not accept such a doctrine; because by your own argument you have arrived at a conclusion that is either an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman or which ends in anything but Brahman (i.e., in Nescience). For texts like *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati*³⁸⁸ *Brahmakāmō*

³⁸⁶ Cf. *Aitadātmya midam sarvam tat satyam sa ātmā tattvamasi Svētakēṭō*, where the words *tat* and *tvam* are used in terms of *jīva* and Brahman, with their respective attributes. The text is from the *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*, VI. 1. 8.

³⁸⁷ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 3.

³⁸⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

Brahmavēdanam kuryāt | *Divyam paramjyōtirūpam sampadya svēna rupēna abhinishpadyatē* ¹³⁸⁹ *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvam anyat parityajya* ¹³⁹⁰ *Dhyātvā munir-gachchati bhūtayōnim samastasākshim tamasaḥ parastāt* ¹³⁹¹ *Śraddhā bhakti dhyāna yōgādavēhi* ¹³⁹² *iti*, teach clearly that Śivatva could be obtained by the *jīva* by duly meditating upon Paramēśvara and praying to Him agreeably to the *Bhramara-kīta nyāya*, the *kīta* being transformed into the *bhramara* through constant meditation of him.

Texts like *Ēsha hi ēva sādhu karma kārāyati* | *iti*, ³⁹³ proclaim that Paramēśvara is capable of getting done all good deeds and conferring all the four states of *mukti* in addition to granting the privilege of residence in the same heaven with himself (*i.e.*, *Kailāsa*). Moreover, *Sruti* texts like those beginning with (the words) *Tadaikshata bahusyām* ¹³⁹⁴ *iti*, are contradicted by your mode of argument and the meaning of the *Sruti* text *Ēkavignānēna sarva-vignānam*, etc., ³⁹⁵ is totally shattered to pieces by you. Besides, according to your doctrine, meditation on Paramēśvara will not end in the realization of *sākshātkāra* ³⁹⁶ of Paramēśvara, because your maxim *yad driśyam tan naśyam* (whatever you see by the eye that is destroyable—and not real) leads to *nishprayōjana*—utter futility of all objects, and attaining nothing as the result of *dhyāna* (meditation) and renders it useless; and exhibits Paraśiva Brahman who shines resplendently in his all-knowing and other qualities (*sarvagnatvādi*) and his six kinds of characteristics, exhibited in expressions such as Śiva, Sarva, Sankara, Ānandagnāna, Ananta, etc., powerless, and makes his name a term convertible into *hasta*, *kara*, *pāṇi* and other

³⁸⁹ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 3. 4.

³⁹⁰ *Atharvaśiras*.

³⁹¹ *Kaivalya Upa.*

³⁹² *Kaivalya Upa.*

³⁹³ *Chch. Upa.*

³⁹⁴ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

³⁹⁵ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

³⁹⁶ Literally, direct perception, apprehension or knowledge.

terms and makes him inexplicable and also exhibits *jīva*, who is entitled to be considered as the indivisible part of that *all-knowing svarūpa of Paramaśiva* (*akhaṇḍagnāna svarūpa Paramaśiva*) as being both separate and one with him. But if one asks whether *jīva* is different from the *akhaṇḍagnāna svarūpa Paraśiva Brahma* or one with him, it is not the first. For a world composed of (material objects such as) *ghaṭa* (pot), *paṭa* (cloth) and the like which shine as clear objects by the (aid of the) rays of the Sun, cannot be said to be shining by the internal light of the *jīva* (*sva*³⁹⁷ *svabhāsa* *prabhākara*) that perceives it. For it is the urge caused by *Paramaśiva* which brought to him the knowledge of the object so perceived. Nor can it be the second. It cannot be said that the mere eyes as the organ of sight have realized the sight of it. Or, if it be said that *jīva* being separated from real knowledge, could acquire the knowledge of the object by experience of sight, we say it is not so. How can it be possible for it to get at a knowledge by its own exertions? Then could it have the power in itself both to lower itself and raise itself (*utkrishṭa* and *apakrishṭa*)? Not the first; for it is against *Sruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava*. Nor could it be the second; for meditation as aforesaid is incapable of giving realization on account of its own fault. Nor is it the third, for, according to *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśānīśau* ³⁹⁸ *Pradhāna kshētrapatir guṇēśah* ³⁹⁹ *Īśānasarva vidyānām Īśvarassarva bhūtānām* ⁴⁰⁰ *iti*, etc., a great contradiction will ensue as it is opposed to the *Sruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava*. The actual realization (*sākshātkāra*) will become impossible, even though the light of knowledge is as clear and effulgent as the light of the Sun (*Prabhākara*) shining in the middle of the sky. And, therefore, if you say that by the knowledge derived from meditation and worship and prayers that

³⁹⁷ *Sva* here means *jīva*.

³⁹⁸ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

³⁹⁹ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 16.

⁴⁰⁰ *Mahōpa.*, 29.

Brahman could be realized, according to your own argument, it is not possible. But just as the Sun is to the sky, the eyes are to the body for the purpose of realizing Brahman. And there can be no contradiction if the soul of the *jīva*, which has attained purification by the *dīkshā* (initiation) administered by the *guru* (*guru dīkshā śuddha jīvasya*), obtains *sākshātkāra* (i.e., direct realization) of Paramēśvara through his direct grace (*anugraha*). If not, *Sruti* texts like *Gnātvā Śivam śāntim atyantamēti* ⁴⁰¹ *Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati* ⁴⁰² *Ēshōṇurātmā chētasā vēditavyaḥ* ⁴⁰³ *iti* and hundreds of other similar texts will be rendered useless. Otherwise, in this world, there would be no more such a thing as the imparting of instruction by a *guru* to a *śishya*. Therefore, what has been formerly said, is the declared meaning of all the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta*. This is our conclusion (*siddhānta*).

Now, it should not be said—says *Srīpati*—that the first four *Sūtras* have given the full purport of the whole work entitled the *Brahma-Sūtra* consisting of four chapters and that it is unnecessary to consider the remaining *Sūtras* of the work. If it is suggested that a consideration of the remaining *Sūtras* is not necessary, then, the reply is that it is not so. The first four *Sūtras*, in *Srīpati*'s opinion, define in the main *Brahma lakshana*. In order to bring home clearly and at length the *lakshana* of Brahman, *Bhagavān* *Bādarāyaṇa* primarily explains in the *Sūtras* that follow that the *śankā* (doubt) of *ativyāpti* cannot, under any circumstances, exist in regard to Brahman. In commenting on the *Sūtras* immediately following, *Srīpati* not only seeks to reaffirm the proposition that the Brahman under discussion is *Mahēśvara* himself but also refutes the *Dvaita* and the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* standpoints and *Sankara*'s doctrine of *Jagannithyātva*. A very brief reference to these points ought to suffice, in view of the consideration already given to the last of these topics.

⁴⁰¹ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

⁴⁰² *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

⁴⁰³ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 9.

The Repudiation of Sankhya-Dvaita.

In the next *adhikaraṇa*—*Īkshatyadhikaraṇam*—Śrīpati suggests that Bādarāyaṇa refutes (*nirākarāṇa*) the *Sāṅkhya-dvaita-mata* (i.e., the Sāṅkhya-dvaita doctrine). Just as a magnet draws to itself the needle by its power of attraction, so Brahman draws to himself the *pradhāna* (i.e., world) as he himself is the sole author of creation, etc. Agreeably to this maxim, Bādarāyaṇa repudiates in this *Adhikaraṇa* the doctrine of *Sāṅkhya-dvaita* and establishes that the Brahman under discussion is no other than Mahēśvara, who is both the cause and the effect of the creation of the universe. This *Adhikaraṇa* consists of eight *Sūtras* from the 5th to the 12th. In *Īkshatērnāśabdām*, 1. 1. 5, it is enunciated that Brahman undergoes no change; *Prakṛiti* only undergoes change, just as earth does in the hands of a potter.

So Brahman controls *Pradhāna* by his power. The chief cause for the creation of the universe is (Para) Brahman. *Pradhāna*, *Prakṛiti*, etc., are only materials for him in connection with creation, protection and destruction. Brahma, Viṣṇu and others are ever ready to work according to the will of Paraśiva (Brahman). In the next *Sūtra* (1. 1. 6) *Gauṇaschēnnātmaśabdāt*, the word *ātma*, says Śrīpati, denotes that *Pradhāna* must be looked upon as subordinate (to Brahman) and neither as independent nor as capable of acting of its own freewill just as a servant is never independent of his master, even though he is granted any amount of power and influence. So *Pradhāna*, even though it is described in terms of *ātma*, cannot be independent of Paramēśvara. In 1. 1. 7, *Tan nishtasya mōkshōpa-dēśāt*, Śrīpati refutes both the Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrines. Śrīpati calls Dvaita as *ghaṭapaṭavat asamspruṣṭa bhēdavāda matam*.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰⁴ In the *Tatvasankhyāna* of Ānandatīrtha, the following occurs :—*Duḥkha spruṣṭam tadasspruṣṭam iti dvaidhēva chētanam | Nityāduḥkhā Ramānyētū spruṣṭa duḥkhāsamstasah | Spruṣṭa duḥkhā samastāscha asamspruṣṭa iti dvaidhā | Dēva rishi pitru pā nara iti muktāstu panchadhā* ॥ Śrīpati's description is a short one based

Srīpati describes Viśiṣṭādvaita as *daṇḍā daṇḍivat angāṅgivat samsrusṭa bhēda vāda matam*. The doctrine holds *daṇḍā* and *daṇḍi* and *anga* and *angi* (body and its members) as a composite whole though they are seen separate by the eye. Srīpati after refuting these two doctrines establishes that there is no difference between the *jīva* and (Para) Brahman. In 1. 1. 8, *Hēyatvā vachanāchcha*, Srīpati tries to establish that none other than Paraśiva Brahman could claim to be the cause of creation. The *Pradhāna* (i.e., *Prakṛiti*) cannot claim to be its cause as it is lifeless (*jaḍa*) and can only be a material for Brahman. Here he uses two *nyāyas*:—(1) *Sthūlārundhatī nyāya* and (2) *Sākhā chandra nyāya*. *Pradhāna* is only a material to locate the action of Brahman as being the cause in creation. In 1. 1. 9, *Prati-gñā virōdhāt*, it is suggested that *Pradhāna* cannot be made a cause because it is only *jaḍa*, i.e., a lifeless thing in which no life (*chētana*) can be imagined. Hence it cannot claim the description of *sat*. In 1. 1. 10, *Svāpyayāt*, Srīpati endeavours to show that *Pradhāna* cannot claim to be the cause of destruction. Paraśiva Brahman only is the chief cause of *laya* (or destruction) in the same way as he is the Creator. Paraśiva Brahman is always in the heart of the *jīva* in *sūkṣma* form and causes sleep of a very profound kind (*sushupti*). The *jīva* finds its temporary station in Para-Brahman during profound sleep (*sushuptau Sankarē laya iti*) and returns to the world after it awakes. In 1. 1. 11, *Gati sāmānyāt*, Srīpati points out that Paraśiva Brahman is

evidently on this text of Ānandatīrtha. Srīpati's description may be thus translated:—Those disputants who hold that *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* (i.e., *jug* and *cloth*) are quite different from each other, so different that they do not touch each other at any point. Ānandatīrtha's text says:—“The unaffected and the afflicted are the two eternal kinds among the *chētanās* (souls). *Ramā* (i.e., Lakshmi) is never afflicted even in the least; as regards others they are all afflicted, more or less to a degree. Among the afflicted, they are divided into the least touched and the most touched. The least touched are five in number: the gods, sages, ancestors, kings and good men who are eternal *muktas* (i.e., the eternally blessed).” [These are least afflicted by reason of their very subordination to (Para) Brahman.]

above three deities Brahma, Indra and Upēndra and also Chandra, Dinēndra and others and that he is the Chief and Supreme Lord over all and the author of *Srishi*, *Sthiti* and *Laya* as well as the creator of the deities. He quotes the *Mahānārāyaṇōpanishad* and states that though Nārāyaṇa is said to have been the only one above all—that there was neither Brahma, Īśa nor Agni nor the Sky nor the Moon nor this world at first, yet, according to the *Kaivalya*, *Kāthavalli* and *Sivādvaita Prakāśika* and the *Atharva Upanishad*, Paraśiva Brahman alone is the Lord above all, the others being his mere subordinates, tied up with the bondage of *Māyā*. Srīpati quotes in this connection the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and the *Atharvōpanishad*. In 1. 1. 12, *Srutatvāchcha*, Srīpati suggests that all the *Upanishads* and *Vēdas* prove that Paraśiva Brahman alone is discussed in the *Sūtras* and that as he is the One above all, should be understood and realized as the great cause of *Srishi*, *Sthiti* and *Laya*. And this realization is the result of meditation. He quotes the *Svētāśvatara*, the *Mahimna*, the *Saiva Purāṇa*, the *Śkānda* and the *Siva-Gītā* for establishing this position and impresses it by referring to the *Sthūlārundhatī nyāya* and the *Pravāha samudra nyāya*. According to the *Mahimna*, there are three kinds of *yōga*, viz., Sāṅkhya, Pāsupata and Vaishṇava. Each of these three, though they denote different ways of meditation, through different principles, in their final stages, where these three methods meet in regard to the realization of Brahman, they are one and the same just as all rivers finally find their way to the sea. Srīpati once again dissents from the view that Brahman is attributeless (*nirviśēsha*) and refutes that doctrine and warns *mumukshus* against it (*Sruti sūtra viruddhatvāt na mumukshu grāhyam*). As it is opposed to *Sruti* and *Sūtra*, he says such a view must not be accepted by those who are desirous of realizing the Brahman. Here, in this *Sūtra*, he once again controverts the Advaita view that Brahman is *nirviśēsha*. Srīpati says that the statement that *prapancha* is false, goes without proof; when the cause is to establish an effect, the world being an effect, it goes without

In that state (*sushupti*), Paramēśvara is the cause for all the *ānanda* and he is the agent (*kartā*). Therefore it follows that *Ānandamaya*, who gave the *jīva* all the *ānanda*, is no other than Paraśiva, who is the chief cause (*hētu*). If indeed, Brahman is *nirviśeṣa* (attributeless), then, the granting or securing of *ānanda*, transforming one into *Ānandamayatva* is not possible. If it is said, adopting the reasoning of the Pūrvāchārya (Sankara) that the mere allegation (*adhyārōpa*, attributing wrongly what is not existent) that the world was created without its being truly existent (*nishprapancham prapanchitam*) only for the purpose of *vyavahāra* (for argument's sake), and that Brahman cannot be held responsible for transforming the *jīva* into the state of *Ānandamaya*, then, we say that it is not so. In that case, we will have to understand *vyavahāra* as meaning truly existing and capable of development into a transformed condition after the lapse of time (*kālāntara*). Then the doubt arises whether *prapancha* is of the character of *sat* or of *asat* or incapable of interpretation being a combination of *sat* and *asat*. It is not the first; because at what distance of time, however short, two irreconcilable things like *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* can reconcile themselves into one cannot be conceived of by us with any degree of certainty. If we go on trying to establish that there is a common relation between two irreconcilable things, to bring about a reconciliation between them within a particular limit of time, then it is to be understood that such an argument is employed for the time being in terms so as to satisfy only the purpose of the argument (*vaibhāshika*) and not as a matter of truth. Being incapable of establishing the absolute non-existence of *mithyātva* (*vyavahāra* being used), it (the argument) ends in contradicting its own *siddhānta* (*svasiddhānta virōdhak*). *Mithyātva* is a thing which is said to exist in that space and time and counteracting all existence. This finally opposes his own argument and the doctrine held by him (*i.e.*, Pūrvāchārya) ends in *ativyāpti*—an unwarranted

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stretch beyond the starting point (of the argument). Nor can it be the second. Being himself the well-known and the indescribable and consisting of *sat* and *asat* (*sada-sadātmaka*) and containing the qualities of both *sadasad*, such a curious thing is unknown (*aprasiddhēh*).

Nor can it be said of Brahman, that he is different from *sat* or *asat* and comprising of the characteristics of *sat* and *asat*. If Brahman is said to consist of *sat* and *asat* combined, then also *ativyāpti* occurs. If it is said that Brahman is absolutely one, consisting of *sat*, then it follows that he is different from the combined characteristics of *sat* and *asat*. Then he can only be said to consist of purely *sat*. If Brahman is said to consist only of *sat*, without any admixture of *asat*, then there can be no kind of *asat* of even the smallest quantity in him. If he should consist of *asat* in him, then *ativyāpti* follows. Therefore, correct knowledge of Brahman is realized when he is understood to be free from *asat* and only as consisting of *sat* in him. Even then if Brahman is understood to be devoid of *Dharma*, then again *ativyāpti* follows in Brahman. But it is said that for the very reason that Brahman is devoid of *Dharma*, it should not be said that results in *ativyāpti*, i.e., is an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman. Because the argument becomes unreasonable and ends in unjust conclusion. No conclusion, unless free from faulty inferences, can be considered as final and one capable of realizing *Brahmatva*. So far as there is a decided and correct knowledge regarding the characteristics of Brahman, so far only is Brahman readily realized. The knowledge of Brahman and the realization (of Brahman) are never separated from each other. This is our belief (*matam*). There is no *ativyāpti* in such a realization of Brahman. So long as Brahman is seen in so many different forms of existence, it is not possible to describe Brahman in all the characteristics of the several forms in which he is seen. For example, in texts like *Tattvamasi* etc., hundreds of patently

contradictory expressions are to be found not easily reconcilable. And therefore if Brahman is to be considered as *abhēda* and absolutely one, then it is not possible to easily reconcile all such contradictory expressions found in the *Srutis*; for, even if the expressions are intended to convey the idea of *bhēda*, just as between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, then also it is not possible to avoid *ativyāpti*. While things are patently different, to say that they are one and undivided is to land the argument in *ativyāpti*. Even though silver is seen in the conch-shell, to say that it is not silver but a mere illusory thing that appears like silver is to say that there is no definite description of what is seen. Even though the eye sees objects with several characteristics, to deny that it has no characteristics, is to harm the *siddhānta* sought to be established. Indeed, when we see an article made of silver, we call it "This is made of silver"; thereby we mean that it could not be a thing made of anything else but silver. There is no reason why we should doubt it to be any other thing. Again, when we see another article of a different form and made of silver, we call it "This article is made of silver". Though the two articles are different in form, they are made of the same metal silver, and there can be no *bhrānti* (mistake) in regard about it. We cannot say that for the mere reason of change of form the substance also is different. Similarly, Brahman who exhibits himself in several forms is the same in substance. Thereby the argument that Brahman is devoid of attributes ends in defeat, according to the *Sruti* text *Nēha nānāsti kinchana* ⁴⁰⁷ which means that Brahman is never void of attributes. If so, by a contradictory argument (*vyāghātancha*) Brahman ends in *apasiddhānta* (in an erroneous conclusion). A Brahman devoid of attributes (*nīrvīṣēsha Brahman*) is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, an object which is without any attribute cannot be exactly expressed

⁴⁰⁷ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

in any form of its existence. In such a state, Brahman goes without any description, just as a *ghata*, which has not been formed into any shape by which it could be described. Then, it is to be said that the *ghata* appears to be of a black colour (*nīlō ghataḥ*), whereby no comprehension of the object is realized. Now, *bhrānti* is never preventable. An object which appears to the sight cannot be wrongly mistaken to be any other than what it is actually seen to be and consist of those attributes. We cannot describe a thing that has not been actually seen. A matter which is possessed of a particular characteristic cannot be stated to be no matter at all; for it is capable of undergoing changes from one form into another. Similarly Brahman who is the *Ātman* and who takes on several forms to the sight, cannot be said to be devoid of such characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*). If we do not admit the existing characteristics as we see in them, such as the *ghata* in our sight, reading its colour, etc., then we will be forming a wrong conclusion by a wrong mode of argument. We cannot disprove our sight when we clearly come into contact with a particular object; nor can we think of any other object when we have a particular one before us. There can never be any difference between the observations that we make in an object and the actual characteristics that they display. If we did so, we would be making wrong conclusions just as assuming *danda* and *puruṣa* wrongly as (indicating) one (object) only—(i.e., without distinguishing between the two).

Then such a contradictory argument is to be understood as indicating the non-existence of either. But such a thing in Brahman is damaging (*dusṭam*). If Brahman is to be conceived of in the form of an inexpressible one and as possessing characteristics which are contradictory to each other, unless such contradictions exist in him, such a Brahman possessed of *Sadasadvilakṣaṇa* cannot be actually realized or supposed to exist. In your (Pūrvāchārya's) opinion if such a contradiction cannot be removed or reconciled, Brahman

is not clearly established and Brahman, therefore, becomes something else and ends in *ativyāpti*. Accordingly we cannot be prevented from deciding that Brahman can be anything but what you decide him to be—*i.e.*, one possessing a character indescribable and composed of both *sat* and *asat*. The characteristics of *sat* and *asat* which, by your argument, you attribute to Brahman, can never be spoken of as *nirviśēsha* characteristics. Taking *sat* and *asat* on the whole, it is easily arrived at that Brahman is full of attributes, such as a *ghaṭakalaśa* which consists of a combination of *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, etc. It follows, therefore, that what you said to be *abhinna* and *adhyāsa* and just as the appearance of silver in the conch-shell is all untrue and proves only the Brahman with attributes. The belief that Brahman is distinguished by *viśēshaṇa* or attributive characteristics cannot be said to limit his unlimited (*viśiṣṭa*) qualities; even if you say so, he is not affected by your so limiting his characteristics.

The Bhedabheda Theory.

At this point, it might prove useful to obtain a comprehensive view of the *Bhēdābhēda* view propounded by Śrīpati. Śrīpati's *Bhāṣya* is to the Vīraśaivas what Rāmānuja's is to the Śrī-Vaishṇavas, Ānandatīrtha's to Sad-Vaishṇavas (or Mādhva-Vaishṇavas) and Sankara's to Smārtas. It came to be written at a time when the Vīraśaivas occupied the foremost position in the religious counsels of the first Vijayanagar Empire. If Vīraśaivism may justly claim to be a revival of the ancient Śaiva faith which became popular amongst the generality of the Western and South Indian people, long anterior to and more prominently since the days of Basava, the reformer, who largely democratised it about the middle of the 12th century A.D., Śrīpati's *Bhāṣya* may be taken to represent its higher philosophical aspects. Its chief merit—as any one who reads through it will readily acknowledge—is that it seeks to put Vīraśaivism on a philosophical footing. What Śrīkantha did for Suddhaśaivism, Śrīpati did for Vīraśaivism.

While Śrīkantha's system has been sometimes interpreted, notably by Appaya Dīkshita, in terms of Sankara's *Advaita*, though he himself styles it *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, it is impossible to so interpret Śrīpati's. It is *Vīraśaiva* in letter and spirit where Śrīkantha's is *Śaivite*. It touches on every important article of faith of *Vīraśaivism* and brings it within the philosophic sweep of Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras*. Coming as it did after the efforts of Sankara, Rāmānuja, Ānandatīrtha and Śrīkantha, it passes in review the first three of these and rejects their standpoints as also of Śrīkantha, though not in the same open manner as it does the first three, and this for the obvious reason that Śrīkantha and Śrīpati were both *Śaivas*, though differing from each other in certain respects. Śrīpati does not accept the *Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaitism* of Śrīkantha any more than he accepts the *Advaita* of Sankara. Even the casual reader will be struck with the deep learning, the extensive range of knowledge, the high dialectic skill and the intimate acquaintance Śrīpati shows of the systems he criticizes at such great length and with such effect. In places, his argumentation is searching and his criticism piercing to a degree. As a philosophical polemic, it is not a mere destructive treatise; it is something more than that. It builds up a system, which seeks to give a broader base to the transcendental aspect of *Vīraśaivism*. What is particularly noteworthy is that he does not put it forth as a mere statement of his own individual views but as one founded on an old and well-established tradition going back to the hoary days of Agastya, the sage to whom all South Indian culture is attributed. This suggestion is of considerable importance, because it enables us not only to determine what authority should attach to the commentary of Śrīpati but also helps us to fix, within certain tolerable limits, the comparative age of the view-points taken by him and his predecessors in interpreting the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. The *Sūtras* themselves bear eloquent testimony to the fact that there were, at or about the time they came to be composed, different schools of *Vēdāntic* thought, led by well-known teachers, to whom specific references

are made by Bādarāyaṇa. Among these are Āśmarathya (I. 2. 29 and I. 4. 20); Ātrēya (III. 4. 44); Audulōmi (I. 4. 21; III. 4. 45 and IV. 4. 6); Bādari (I. 2. 31; III. 1. 11; IV. 3. 7 and IV. 4. 10); Jaimini (I. 2. 28; I. 2. 31; I. 3. 31; I. 4. 18; III. 2. 40; III. 4. 2; III. 4. 18; III. 4. 40; IV. 1. 17; IV. 3. 12; IV. 4. 5 and IV. 4. 11); Kārshṇājini (III. 1. 9) and Kāśakritsna (I. 4. 22). If the interpretation of Sankara and Rāmānuja of II. 1. 1 and II. 1. 2 and II. 1. 4 are to be accepted—Ānandatīrtha differs from them in his interpretation of these *Sūtras* as in many others—then, we have to concede that Bādarāyaṇa refers, though without mentioning his name, to Kapila also. Of these teachers, the view of Āśmarathya is, if the interpretation of Sankara of I. 4. 20 is adopted, that the soul stands to the Brahman in the *bhēdābhēda* relation, *i.e.*, it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. This, in other words, means that individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different. This is the *bhēdābhēdāvāda* associated with the name of Āśmarathya. Audulōmi, however, takes a different view. He teaches (I. 4. 21) that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time when, obtaining final release, it is merged in it. Sankara commenting on this *Sūtra*, which is devoted to Audulōmi's opinion, says that the individual soul which is rendered restless by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts, *viz.*, body, senses and mind, attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on, a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at some future time out of the body, to become one with the higher self; hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different from the highest Self. This opinion of Audulōmi is supported by him by two texts from the *Upanishads*. The first of these is: *Ēvamē vaishā samprasādō*, etc., that serene being arising from this body appears in its form as soon as it has approached the highest high.⁴⁰⁸ The second intimates, by means

⁴⁰⁸ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12, 3.

of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, *Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ*, etc., as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and their form thus, a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great.⁴⁰⁹ That is, as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the highest Person. That the latter half of the passage has the meaning assigned to it, follows—adds Sankara—from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two members of the comparison. Vāchaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmati*, a commentary on Sankara's *Bhāṣya*, remarks, when writing in this connection that the Upanishadic texts quoted transfer a future state of non-difference to that time when the difference exists. He quotes the following saying of the *Pāñcharātrikas*:—"Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference." Audulōmi's doctrine is known as *Satyabhēdavāda*. Finally, we have the view of Kāśakritsna, who holds that the individual soul is absolutely non-different from the Brahman (I. 4. 22). Sankara in commenting on this *Sūtra* makes it read "the highest Self exists in the condition of the individual soul". That the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual, is, he says, evident from the *Brāhmaṇa* passage, "Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms" and similar texts. He also cites *mantras* to the same effect, for instance, "The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names."⁴¹⁰ Where the *Srutis* relate the creation of fire and other elements, they do not—he says—at the same time relate a separate creation of the individual soul; we have, therefore,

⁴⁰⁹ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 8.

⁴¹⁰ *Taitt. Ār.*, III. 12. 7.

he argues, no right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, different from the latter. In the opinion of Kāśakritsna, the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. Āśmarathya, although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest self, yet intimates by the expression "On account of the fulfilment of the promise which declares a certain mutual dependence—that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul—and not the relation of absolute identity." The opinion of Audulōmi, again, clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition, *i.e.*, upon the state of emancipation and its absence. Of these three opinions, Sankara holds that of Kāśakritsna accords with the *Srutis*, because it agrees with what all the *Vēdānta* texts, for example, *Tattvamasi*, etc., aim at inculcating. Only on the basis of his opinion, says Sankara, immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul—as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers—but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason, the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which the *Srutis* speak in some places as analogous to the issuing of the sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.

Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two—propounded by Kāśakritsna—is well founded. Having said that, Sankara considers a possible objection to that view. After quoting the passage, 'Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge,' he states that this might be taken to intimate the final destruction of the soul,

not its identity with the highest Self! "By no means," he replies. The passage means to say only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. The eternally unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the *mātras*, i.e., the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the connection has been solved, specific cognition which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, 'When he has departed there is no more knowledge'.

Then, Sankara says, if Kāśakritsna's view is, as shown above, in keeping with the *Srutis*, all the adherents of *Vēdānta* must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz., the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. After quoting numerous texts, the *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* in support of this view, he states that if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge and there would be no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire. The *Srutis*, he says, speak of those "who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the *Vēdānta*."⁴¹¹ He compares the passage, 'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that unity?'⁴¹² He further notes that the *Smṛiti* also represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady.⁴¹³

Finally Sankara winds up the argument by observing that as the individual and the highest Soul differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for

⁴¹¹ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 6. (*Vēdāntavignāna*, etc.)

⁴¹² *Is. Upa.*, 7. (*Yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmaivābhūdviṣṇataḥ । tatra kō mōhaḥ kaḥ śōkaḥ yēkatva manupaśyataḥ ॥*)

⁴¹³ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 54-58.

its object the absolute oneness of the two, it is senseless to insist as some do,—Sankara says—on a plurality of Selves, and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave'⁴¹⁴ refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul). And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, *viz.*, *Tat srishṭvā tadēvānuprāviśat*, 'Having sent forth he entered into it',⁴¹⁵ according to which the Creator only entered into the created beings. He then adds that those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the *Vēdānta* texts stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge which is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal (while it is really eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman). And, he adds, if they attempt to show that *mōksha*, although effected, is eternal, they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic.

We thus see Sankara rejecting Āśmarathya's *bhēdā-bhēda* and Audulōmi's *satyabhēdavāda* and accepting the doctrine of Kāśakritsna, as interpreted by himself, that the highest Soul exists in the condition of the individual Soul and deducing from it the theory of the identity of the *Jīva* and the *Brahman*. Turning to Sripati, we find him interpreting these three *Sūtras* (I. 4. 20, I. 4. 21 and I. 4. 22) in a somewhat different manner. In connection with the first of these, he quotes the *Sruti* texts: *Ātmani vighnātē sarvamidam vighnātam bhavati* (When the Self is known, all this is known); *Idam sarvam yadayamātmā iti cha*⁴¹⁶ (All

⁴¹⁴ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1. (*Brahmavidūpnōti sarvam*, etc.)

⁴¹⁵ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6. (*Asannēva sa bhavati*, etc.)

⁴¹⁶ *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 6.

these, wherever they may be that appear to us, are nothing but *Ātmā*); and *Ēka vignānēna sarva vignāna pratignā-siddhēḥ lingam sūchitain bhavati*⁴¹⁷ ('If one is known, all is known' indicates the fulfilment of the promissory statement). The statement that "if one is known, all is known" leads to no contradiction, because *Sruti* texts, such as *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*⁴¹⁸ *iti*, etc., explain clearly that all those things, whatever that appear to us, are *jīvas* consisting of the five elements (*bhūta panchaka*) and they came to existence from Brahman. As they are connected mutually as cause and effect, there can be no separation between the two and hence they are relatively connected with each other, and therefore, according to the maxim *dadhi kshīravat* (curds resulting from milk),⁴¹⁹ a thorough knowledge of the cause of transformation from one state to another will lead to the realization of the whole truth laid down in the text *Ēka vignānēna sarva vignānam*. And therefore Āśmarathya considers that in order to gain a knowledge of the principles of difference underlying the text *Ēka vignānēna sarva vignānam*, a close study of what is enunciated in the texts *Yasya ātmā śarīram*⁴²⁰ *iti*, etc., is necessary. Such a study would show the transformation of the *śarīra* into the *Ātmā* (i.e., Brahman), and fulfil the texts *Sarva vignāna pratignā*, etc. In order to clearly point out the close connection that exists between *śarīra* and *ātmā*—which is as close as between the body and its

⁴¹⁷ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

⁴¹⁸ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Ānandatīrtha's *Anuvyākhyāna* on the *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, I. 4. 6, where the phrase *Kshīravat vikāraḥ syāt naiva sa syāddharēḥ kvachit* occurs. Also see Jayatīrtha's *Nyāyasudhā*, I. 4. 6, where the same phrase is commented upon. For Sankara's view see *Bhāṣya on the Vēdānta Sūtras*, II. 1. 18, where he maintains as his final conclusion that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible even within hundreds of years ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. See also Sankara's *Bhāṣya*, II. 1. 24.

⁴²⁰ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

members (*angāṅgi*)—Āśmarathya, who upholds the *bhēda-vāda* doctrine, considers that a close study into the nature of the difference between *ātmā* and *śarīra* is necessary. In this manner, having considered both the doctrine of *Asamyukta bhēdavāda*, which differentiates between *jīva* and *Brahman* as between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, and the doctrine of *angāṅgivat samyukta bhēda*, which connects the *jīva* with the *Brahman* as closely as the body is related to its members, Āśmarathya demonstrates (thereby) the doctrine of *Suddhādvaita*. Śrīpati next passes on to I. 4. 21, which propounds Audulōmi's view. He interprets the *Sūtra* thus, *utkramishyataḥ, svām vidyōpādhiṁ tyajataḥ, jīvasya ghaṭākāśa, mahākāśavat Brahmabhinnatvāt sarvadā Brahmabhinnatayā jīvōpakramaṇam*. Here the expression *utkramishyataḥ* means *svām vidyōpādhiṁ tyajataḥ*, i.e., abandon the deceptive knowledge inherent in the Self—by which the *jīva* realizes that the Brahman is absolutely identical with the Self, just as *ghaṭākāśa* is quite the same as *mahākāśa*. Therefore by knowing correctly Brahman, all is known and a thorough knowledge of all is possessed by the Self. Thus considers Audulōmāchārya. In other words, as soon as the *Sarpabhrānti* is removed in the rope, the rope appears quite plain—i.e., simply as a rope; similarly when the deceptive knowledge inherent in the Self is removed, *Brahmatva* is realized. So thinks Audulōmi. In all the *Sruti* texts, such as *Tattvamasī*, etc., the prime object of the teaching is to inculcate the truth of the doctrine that the *jīva* and the Brahman are absolutely one, behaving in the manner of *bimba* and *pratibimba* just as *ghaṭākāśa* and *mahākāśa*. (Just as the space in the pot is the same as the unlimited space outside of it, so the *jīva*, as soon as he is relieved of the ignorance that veils him from the knowledge of Brahman, will realize that he is Brahman. That is, knowledge will make the *jīva* aware of his identity with the Brahman.) Some believe that they—*jīva* and *Brahman*—always exist in this manner. The fact is that in Brahman *jīvatva* is falsely postulated to exist as the *rajju* (rope) is falsely understood to be *sarpa* (serpent). According to the

Advaita doctrine, it is pointed out that *adhyāsa* is the chief cause for *bhrānti*, which when removed, Brahman is realized as being identical with the *jīva*. Some conceive the truth in this fashion. Having thus proved the one-sided views of the different argumentators holding different doctrines, the chief *Vēdānta* doctrine is thus set down (in the next *Sūtra*) by the *Sūtrakāra* in a manner which harmonizes every *Sruti* text.

In keeping with this suggestion is *Srīpati*'s interpretation of I. 4. 22. This *Sūtra*, he says, sets down the *siddhānta* of the *Sūtrakāra*. *Kāśakritsna* abides by the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* which is declared by the *Sruti* texts which, without contradicting each other, enunciate in *Dvā suparṇā*, ⁴²¹ etc., and other texts the *bhēda* doctrine and the *abhēda* doctrine in *Tattvamasi*, etc., and other texts. In order to point out clearly the existence of *bhēda* and *abhēda* between the *jīva* and the *Brahman*, *Kāśakritsna* here declares that all *Sruti* texts purport to propound the underlying doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*. Therefore the third (variety of) doctrine—of *bhēdābhēda*—is the highest essential truth (*pāramārthika*) declared by all the *Sruti* texts; and so it must be understood. Hundreds of *Sruti* texts declare that during the *Samsāradaśa* (i.e., one's lifetime) *jīva* and Brahman are quite distinct from each other and separate; and that during the *Mōkshadaśa*, *abhēda* is declared to be the established truth. *Sruti* texts like the following :

Ḙsha samprasādōrtha ātmā śarīrāt samutthāya Paranjōti rūpam sampadya svēna rūpēnābhinishpadyatē || ⁴²²

Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya | Tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣham upaiti divyam || ⁴²³

Dhyātvā munir gachhati bhūtayōnim samastasākshim tamasaḥ parastāt ||

Sraddhā bhakti dhyānayōgādavēhi || ⁴²⁴

⁴²¹ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

⁴²² *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 14.

⁴²³ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 8.

⁴²⁴ *Kaivalya Upa.*

Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati || ⁴²⁵

Brahmavidāpnōti param || ⁴²⁶

Gnātvā śivam śāntam atyantamēti || ⁴²⁷

Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanayat parityajya || ⁴²⁸ *iti*, and hundreds of other *Sruti* texts declare to the same effect.

Then, if it is doubted how at all two sets of *Sruti* texts which hold to two such clearly contradictory views as *bhēda* and *abhēda*, which are as opposed to each other as darkness and light (are to each other), could be summed up in the single word *bhēdābhēda* and that doctrine declared as enunciating the highest essential truth and as containing the *siddhānta* view, we answer (says *Srīpati*) it should not be so doubted. Because there is no proof that the *Srutis* should be taken only to declare an one-sided view (*Ēkadēśaprāmāṇya*). If such an one-sided view is accepted as the truth, the *Srutis* as a whole would become unauthoritative. We must never think that the *Sruti* texts (relating to *bhēda* and *abhēda*) are as opposed to each other as sleep and wakefulness, as darkness and light, as fire and water and as ignorance and wisdom. Then, if we are to accept the mutually contradictory doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*, is it on account of the contradictory nature of things; the absence of contradictory causes; the wrong (committed) by adopting only one of these—*bhēda* or *abhēda*; the non-existence of either (*bhēda* or *abhēda*); of either being proved (*bhēda* and *abhēda*); of inconsistency in either of them; of the fruitlessness of either of them; ⁴²⁹ of either of them being not perceptible to the mind; of the absence of difference between them; or on account of the absence of the unity in the *Srutis* referring to them? It is not the first, because *Yat param Brahma sarvātmā viśvasyāyatanam mahat* ⁴³⁰ *iti*, and other

⁴²⁵ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

⁴²⁶ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

⁴²⁷ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

⁴²⁸ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

⁴²⁹ That is, the unrealizable character of either of them.

⁴³⁰ *Mahōpa.*, XI. 2. 5.

Sruti texts show that *prapancha* and Brahman are composed of *dvaitādvaita* in the form of *rādhārādhētvam* (effect and cause). Then *Tamēvabhāntamanubhāti sarvam*⁴³¹ | *iti*, and other texts declare the nature of the illuminator and the illumination (*Bhāsyā* and *bhāsakatvam*). Next *Samasta sākshyam tamasaḥ parastāt*⁴³² | *iti*, and other texts declare the *sākshya* and *sākshitvam*—the evidence and the matter that is evidenced. Finally *Tat srishtvā tadēvānuprāviṣat*⁴³³ | *iti*, and other texts show clearly the cause of the world's creation and the form by which Brahman is evidenced in the world by his entering into it. While living in the world, as *jīva*, experience of *gnāna* and *agnāna* is seen. In *prakṛiti* (in the original state) the three forms of *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*) are also seen; in *vikṛiti* (in transformed state), *jīva* is seen possessed of a bodily existence, subject to the three states, and of a body formed from the elementary condition of matter (*kāṇādēḥ*) composed of *pāñchabhautika* (the five elementals), of the nature of *nitya* and *anitya*. It is also seen that coldness and warmth attaching to earth and air are experienced. The dual characteristic of *jahada jahallakṣhaṇa* is exhibited in conformity with the Sāṅkhyādvaita doctrine as exemplified in Mahēśvara in his *ardhanārī* form consisting of *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* qualities. With human beings, the existence of fear in respect of *punya* and *pāpa* is seen. With the Sun, the state of brilliancy and dimness is seen.

Nor is it the second. The *Sruti* text *Yadā tamastan-nadivā narātriḥ nasannachāsachchiva ēva kēvalaḥ*⁴³⁴ | *iti* and hundreds of other texts show that even before the creation of the world the self-illuminating Paramēśvara existed in combination with *prakṛiti* in the form of darkness (*tamaḥ*). In *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*⁴³⁵ | *iti* and other *Sruti* texts Śiva, who is Parabrahman and who

⁴³¹ *Kath. Upa.*, V. 15.

⁴³² *Atharvasiras*.

⁴³³ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6.

⁴³⁴ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

⁴³⁵ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

has no second, is represented as the cause for the creation of the world, etc., which is evidence of his *dvaita* character. *Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāvikī gnāna bala kriyācha*⁴³⁶ | *iti* and other texts point out clearly that as all matter is associated with its qualities,⁴³⁷ Brahman is naturally possessed of all connected qualities without which creation is impossible just as a gem (*maṇi*) is possessed of its natural lustrous qualities without which it cannot be called by that name.

If we should admit that the *prapancha* is composed of *māyā* and therefore illusory just as a lotus in the sky or horns in a rabbit, then we cannot be prevented from arriving at the manifestly wrong conclusion which is witnessed to by the maxim "my mother is barren". Moreover, *Dvā suparṇā*⁴³⁸ etc., and other *Sruti* texts distinctly teach that the *jīva* and Brahman are different (*bhēda*), while *Tattvamasi* and hundreds of other texts point to *abhēda*. Therefore, it is right that we should adopt both combined as *bhēdābhēda*. If we only accept one side (of this truth), then we will be shrinking the import of the *Sruti* texts.

Nor is it the third. For *Ēshō anu jīvō hridayē sannivishṭaḥ* | *Ēshō anurātmā chētasā vēditavyaḥ* |⁴³⁹ *Vālāgra śata bhāgasya śatadhā kalpitasyacha* | *Jīvō bhāgaḥ savignēyō hridayē sarvajantushu* || *Ākāśavat sarvagatō nīramśaḥ* | *Mahāntam vibhurātmānam matvā dhūrō na śōchati* |⁴⁴⁰ *Antaḥpūrṇō bahiḥpūrṇaḥ pūrṇakumbha ivāmbhasi* | *Antaḥ śūnyō bahiḥśūnyaḥ śūnyakumbha ivāmbharē* || *Tadādi madhyānta viḥnamēkam vibhum chidānandam arūpam adbhutam* || *iti* and other texts explain that *jīva* and Brahman possess mental unity (*chittaikatva*). While in their dimensions of *anulva* and *vibhutva*⁴⁴¹ they are distinctly contradictory to each other. Therefore it is but right

⁴³⁶ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

⁴³⁷ *Dharmādharmānōriva*.

⁴³⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

⁴³⁹ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 9.

⁴⁴⁰ *Kath. Upa.*, II. 22.

⁴⁴¹ *Anulva* is atomic state and *vibhutva* is the supreme state.

that we should agree to *bhēdābhēda*. Just as a coiled serpent is seen in a contracted form in its quiescent condition, while in motion it is seen in an elongated form, so the mutual contradiction is clear in their dimensions (*parimāna*), the object being the same. Also, just as the rays of the Sun proceeding from his disc show a larger area than the disc itself, even though the disc is small, the area covered up by the light appears contradictory in its dimensions on account of the areas respectively covered by them—the rays and the disc from which the rays proceed. And lastly just as a sheet of cloth coiled up appears much shorter in length than it is seen when it is expanded out, the cloth being the same, similarly in conclusion *bhēdābhēda* has to be accepted.

Nor is it the fourth. *Vāchārambhaṇam vikārō nāmadhēyam mrīttikētyēva satyam* ⁴⁴² | *Sarvam khalvidam Brahmā Tajjalānīti śānta upāsīta* ⁴⁴³ | *Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa śabdādibhyaḥ* ⁴⁴⁴ | *iti* and other *Sruti* and *Sūtra* texts together denote the characteristic contrasts between Brahman and *prapancha* and cause and effect (*kārya* and *kāraṇa*); by introducing the example of *mrīttikā*, etc., *bhēdābhēda* is clearly pointed out. Similarly in the first *khaṇḍa* of the *Atharvaśiras* text beginning with *Dēvāḥ vai svarga magaman* | *Tam dēvā rudramapruchchan* | *Kōbhavānīti* | *Sō'bra-vīt ahamēkaḥ prathama māsam vartāmicha bhavishyāmicha* | *Nānyaḥ kaschin mattō vyatiriktaḥ* | and ending with *Jyōtirityahamēka sarvēcha māmēva mām yō vēda sa sarvam vēdā* | *Sivābhinnatvam* is pointed out. Also, in the second *khaṇḍa* (of the same work), it is stated clearly in the text *Yō vai rudra sa bhagavānyascha Brahmā tasmai vai namō namaḥ* | *Yō vai rudra sa bhagavānyascha Vishṇuḥ tasmai vai namō namaḥ* ⁴⁴⁵ by which Brahma, Vishṇu, Mahēśvara, etc., are conclusively declared to be the chief cause for *prapancha*, which is the effect. Also,

⁴⁴² *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

⁴⁴³ *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14.

⁴⁴⁴ *Brahma-Sūtra*, II. 1. 14.

⁴⁴⁵ *Atharvaśiras*.

the *Kaivalya* and *Taittirīya* texts *Sa Brahmā sa Śivaḥ sa Hariḥ sēndra śōkshara paramasvarāt* ⁴⁴⁶ | *Sa ēva Vishṇuḥ sa prāṇaḥ sa kālōgniḥ sa chandramāḥ* | *Sa ēva sarvām yadbhūtam yachchabhavyam sanātanam* | *Ritam satyam Param Brahma purusham krishṇa pingalam* ⁴⁴⁷ | *Ūrdhvaṇ-rētam Virūpāksham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ* | *iti* state that the work which is the form of effect is seen clearly as not being different (*abhinnavāt*) from Paraśiva, who is the original cause.

Nor is it the fifth. The *Sruti* texts *Brahma vēda Brahmaiva bhavati* ⁴⁴⁸ | *Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati* | *iti*, etc., declare that the *jīva* who is distinct from Brahman will realize Brahman through meditation and worship until he becomes one with Brahman. Here also *bhēdābhēda* is shown to be not contrary to the authorities. Moreover, in the *Sūta Samhitā*, it is said *Bhēdābhēda stathābhēdō bhēda ētē matāstrayaḥ*. In *Mahimna* is seen *Dhruvam kaschit brūtē sakala māparastāvad dhruvam iti parō dhruvyā-dhruvyēti*, etc. (Some say that what is experienced at present is true; and all the future is untrue; the remote (i.e., the highest truth) is either existent or non-existent). In *Kūrma* it is said, *Kēchit dvaitam praśamsanti kēchidadvaita vādināḥ* | *Dvayōśśrutyēka dēśatvāt sarva śruti samanvayaḥ* | *Bhēdābhēda matasrautē parigrāhyo mumukshubhiḥ* | *iti* || (Some extol *dvaita*. Some argue in favour of *advaita*; both (these) are partial interpreters; *bhēdābhēda mata* is the one that should be accepted by *mumukshus* (i.e., those who desire salvation) as the doctrine that will harmonize the *Sruti* texts relating to both *dvaita* and *advaita*.) The *Gāthā*, ⁴⁴⁹ *Nādvaitamaparōksham chēnnachidrūpeṇa bhāsanāt* | *Aviśēshēṇa bhātamchēt dvaitam kim bhāsatē kila* | *Dingmā-trēṇa vibhātantu dvayōrapi samam khalu* | *Dvaita siddhivadadvaita siddhistvētāvātā na kim* | *Dvaitēna hīna madvai-*

⁴⁴⁶ *Mahōpa.*

⁴⁴⁷ *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

⁴⁴⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

⁴⁴⁹ Literally, verse, especially a religious verse, but not belonging to one of the *Vēdas*,

tam dvaita gnānē kathamtvīdam । *Dvirbhāvitva virōdhascha dvaita sādho samē ubhē* । *Tathā viśuddha chidrūpa Śiva sarvādhikāḥ smruthaḥ* । *Jagajjanmādi hētutvāt sarvagnatvādi lakṣhaṇāt* । *Asangatvāt nirmalatvāt satya kāmādi lakṣhaṇāt* । *Dvaitastad aprakriṣṭōpi tadupāsana rūpataḥ* । *Svīkāryam yōgibhissarvair vēdamārgaika vēdibhiḥ* । *Asau māyāmāyam dvaitam iti chēt tannayujyatē* । *Arthasiddhi kriyāsiddhyōr drishṭatvāt śrutidarśanāt* । *Bhēdābhēda matam chaiva vidhēyam panditair sadā* ॥ *iti* establishes that the doctrine of *dvaitādvaita* alone is the highest spiritual knowledge (*pāramārthika*). That is delightful (*tadīya ramaṇīyam*). The *Gāthā* quoted by *Srīpati* may be thus translated:—“If *advaita* will not lead to the knowledge that is necessary to realize the Brahman, if *chidrūpa* cannot throw any light, how can it be possible to find out by the rest a true knowledge which will enable the realization of Brahman? The light that is seen only shows the directions in the space but the space and light are one and the same. It is not possible to understand through controversial argument which is the correct one (*i.e.*, the correct knowledge to realize *Brahman*). *Advaita* appears inferior to *Dvaita*; but the dualistic view is not in conformity with nor is it in harmony with the *Srutis*. Therefore the only *chidrūpa* that should be accepted as Brahman is the Almighty Śiva, because He is the sole Creator, the all-knowing, the unassociated, the all-pure, and possessed of *Satyakāma* and other characteristics. And even though he appears to be of a *Dvaita* character as being realizable through meditation and worship, yet *Yōgis* acknowledge that *Srutis* prove *artha siddhi* and *kriyā siddhi* (realizing the cause by the effect). Therefore it is that the learned should accept the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine only as the highest spiritual truth.”

Nor is it the sixth. *Sruti* texts like *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyinantu Mahēśvaram* । *Tasyāvayava bhūtōltham vyāptam sarvam idam jagat* ।⁴⁵⁰ *Ētasmāt jāyatē*

⁴⁵⁰ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV, 10.

prāṇō manassarvēndriyāṇicha | ⁴⁵¹ *Vidyāvidyē īśatē yastu sōnyaḥ* | *Pradhāna kshētragnapatirguṇēśaḥ* ⁴⁵² | *Īśānassarvavidyānām* | ⁴⁵³ *iti* || ⁴⁵⁴ etc., and hundreds of other *Sruti* texts speak of *Paramātmān* and the *prapancha* in the form *niyāmya* and *niyāmaka* in a reconciliatory manner and as establishing the doctrine of *dvaitādvaita*. And also the text ⁴⁵⁵ *Īśānassarvavidyānam*, etc., and hundreds of other similar texts also declare the above view.

Nor can it be the seventh. The text *Sraddhā bhakti dhyāna yōgādavēhi* | ⁴⁵⁶ *Gnāna nirmathanābhyāsāt pāśam dahati panditaḥ* | *Vidyānchāvidyāncha yastad vēdōbhayam saha* | ⁴⁵⁷ *Tēna Brahmavit puṇyakrīchcha* | *Satyēna labdha stapasā hyēsha ātmā samyaggnānēna brahmacharyēna nityam* | ⁴⁵⁸ *iti*, etc., and hundreds of other similar texts declare that *Paramaśiva* can be realized in the *Advaita* form only after following *dhyāna* and *dhāraṇa* practices, according to the *dvaita karmānushtāna*, which is the only way for such realization, as the fruit of it. ⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵¹ *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1. 3.

⁴⁵² *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 16.

⁴⁵³ *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

⁴⁵⁴ Know that *Māya* is *Prakṛiti* and that *Mahēśvara* is *Māyin*. Out of his body has resulted this whole universe which pervades everywhere. From him has been created *prāṇa* and all the limbs of the body. Also out of him, *prāṇa*, *manas* and other sensory organs have taken their origin. *Vidyā* and *avidyā* are subordinate to *Īśa*, who is quite free and unconnected and is called *anyaḥ*. *Īśvara* is also the *Kshētragna* and the Lord who sees into the characteristics of all.

⁴⁵⁵ *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

⁴⁵⁷ *Īśa. Upa.*, 11.

⁴⁵⁶ *Kaivalya Upa.*

⁴⁵⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 5.

⁴⁵⁹ Know that *śraddhā* and *bhakti* can be obtained only through the practice of meditation in the form of *Yōga*. The wise can get their bondage burnt to ashes only through that correct knowledge got out of the process of churning known as the practice (of meditation). Both *vidyā* and *avidyā* must be understood along with it (*dhyāna yōga*), for then only they (the wise) will have understood Brahman by their virtue, because this *ātman* can be realized only by virtue and by a thorough knowledge through *Brahmacharya* practice followed continuously.

Moreover, if it is asked what is the good of all the trouble taken in discussing the topics of the *Śāstras* which are the end of the *Vēda* in order to cause the realization of *Advaita* Brahman, if such realization can be had only through the practice of *Dvaita karma*, then our answer is, it is not so. According to the *Sthūlārundhatī nyāya*, the realization of Brahman will be caused after the destruction of all evil through actions which are devoid of a desire for fruit. So declare the *Smritis*. In the Vēdic text beginning with *Yasyaitēṣtā chatvārimśat samskāraḥ* | *iti* and ending with *Sa Brahmanas sāyujyam sālōkyam gachchanti* | *iti*, the realization of Brahman is declared for all who are born through the rites of *garbhādhāna*, etc., and after the destruction of all sinful actions. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the worshipper of Paramēśvara being the worshipped Paramēśvara in the state of religious worship (*ārādhakarūpa karmaṇām arādhyarūpa paramēśvarasya cha prāpya prāpakatvam*). The text *Na cha sarva ētē puṇyalōkā bhavanti* | *iti* which means "these all cannot obtain the *Puṇyalōka*" cannot be taken to mean anything in contradiction to the *Srutis*, in regard to the obtaining of the respective fruits of the different *āśramas*. Because even though actions done with certain desires readily yield the fruits aimed at, actions done without any such desire will still lead to *Paramapurushārtha* after destroying the three-fold sins and the like associated with the three ages of man—youth, manhood and old age (*mānavādi malatrayādi nirmukta*, etc.).⁴⁶⁰ If not, in the absence of any such *karmānusṭhāna*, one cannot have a mental purification. In the absence of such purification, he will not give birth to true knowledge. In the absence of such true knowledge, no realization (*mōksha*) will result. Therefore, what has been said above must be said to be pleasant to the wise.

Nor is it the eighth. For in order to establish this same fact that that all-wise crest-jewel-like (personage), the

⁴⁶⁰ *Kaumāram yauvanam jarā.—Bhagavad-Gītā, II. 13,*

most revered Vyāsa, declares, in order to stop the fruitless controversies of vain logicians in their wranglings over *Vēda* and *Vēdānta*, in the fourth *Pāda* of the IV *Adhyāya* under the *Sūtras*, *Abhāvam Bādari rāhadyēvam* and *Bhāvam Jaiminir vikalpāmananāt* ⁴⁶¹ | *iti*, that the *dvaitādvaita* doctrine is the sole truth underlying both sets of *Srutis* which seem to be contradictory to each other, and establishes the truth at length under the *Sūtras* which come later on—*Dvādaśūhavad ubhayavidham Bādarāyaṇōtaḥ* and *Tasyabhāvē sandhyavadupapattēḥ* | ⁴⁶² *iti*—which also establish the fact that the essence of all *Sāstras* is contained in embracing the doctrine of *bhēdā-bhēda*.

Nor is it the ninth. According to the *dvaita* doctrine it is not possible to realize the unity with Brahman (*Brahmaikatva*) agreeably to the *Sruti* saying *samudravat*.⁴⁶³ According to the *advaita* doctrine, wherein *Saguṇa Brahmatva* and *Īśvaratva* are mere invented *siddhāntas* like the invented theory of *raju sarpa*, the *Vēdas*, *Sāstras*, *Āgamas* and the *Purāṇas* are reduced to mere matters of belief without faith and finally they are reduced to nothingness (*dattāñjaliprasaṅgaḥ*). Thus both these doctrines—*dvaita* and *advaita*—should not be adopted. Also *Anīśayā śōchati muhyamānaḥ* | *Brahmavēda Brahmaiva bhavati* |⁴⁶⁴ *iti*, and other texts decisively prove that the *jīva*, being tied up in the sorrowful envelopment of the bondage of *Māyā*, becomes ignorant of Paramaśiva, and yet after liberation (from such a bondage) becomes Paramaśiva himself. Thus, it is said in the *Kaivalya* in the text *Sraddhā bhakti dhyāna yogāt avēhi* ⁴⁶⁵ | and in the

⁴⁶¹ *Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 4. 10-11.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁴⁶³ *Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vikāya* | *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpāt vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣam upaiti divyam* || It is suggested by Śrīpati that the word *upaiti* here does not indicate *ēkatva* by transformation. *Upaiti* means “will obtain”, i.e., will obtain *divyam paramapurusham*.

⁴⁶⁴ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

⁴⁶⁵ *Kaivalya Upa.*

text beginning with *Umā sahāyam Paramēśvaram prabhūm* and ending with *Samasta sākshim tamasaḥ parastāt*⁴⁶⁶ | *iti*, that meditation done with devotion and faith (*śraddhā* and *bhakti*) regarding Paramēśvara and also being helped by his grace, with the aid of Pārvati, he gets out of the darkness and emanates into the light and through the means of meditation and worship of *Saguṇēśvara* will obtain *nirguṇa Brahma* (*Nirguṇa sākshi Brahma-prāptiḥ*). In this doctrine (of *bhēdābhēda*), above all doctrines, by the triple application of *bhakti*, *kriyā* and *gnāna*, a three-fold practice exists, which is capable of leading to *mukti* by enabling one to cross the ocean of *samsāra* and obtain unity with the Brahman, which is the essence of both the sets of *Sruti* texts. Therefore, it is only the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* which harmonizes the *Sruti* texts should be accepted. We, however, do not opine that the *advaita* doctrine is devoid of the teachings of *bhakti*, *kriyā*, *gnāna*, *śraddhā*, etc. Postulating *avidyā* as existing in *Īśvara* from the expression *asad* used in the *Sruti* text⁴⁶⁷ is like using a false *sāligrāma* as an object of worship. Who at all can be expected to acquire *bhakti*, *śraddhā* and *viśvāsa* for such an *Īśvara*? Nor can an invented *Īśvara*, who resembles a coiled serpent in a rope (*rajjvārōpita sarpavat*), though he be propitiated with all the duties involved in the service of worship, be the donor of all the boons required of him?

Nor can it be the tenth. In the text *Dvā suparna*,⁴⁶⁸ etc., both *vidyā* and *avidyā* are inseparably coupled up as *Śiva* and *jīva* and as constant associates. If the standpoint of the doctrine of *śuddhādvaita* can, without adversely affecting the conception of *advaita* Brahman, be reconciled to *dvaita prapancha*, then the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* opposes the position of neither (doctrine). Nor does the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine, in such a case, contradict the principles of either side (*dvaita* and *advaita*). The *Sruti* text *Ātmā vārē*

⁴⁶⁶ *Kaivalya Upa.*

⁴⁶⁷ *Asadvā idamagra āsīt—Taitt. Upa., II. 7. Cf. Asaditi chēna pratishēdhamātratvāt—Brahma-Sūtra, II. 1. 7.*

⁴⁶⁸ *Mund. Upa., III. 1. 1.*

drashtavyah, etc., is a clear authority for Vēdāntins that the object of realization is Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman will lead them to the realization (of Brahman). But in texts like *Samidhōyajati*,⁴⁶⁹ etc., the expressions (*Samidhōyajati*, etc.) denote that the way to realize the Brahman is through adopting the sacrificial rites known as the *panchapravāya vidhi*, by fulfilling which the realization will be attained. By adopting the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine, the double fruits that are the result of the sacrifices of Sautrāmaṇi and Brihaspatisavana, Agnichayana, Vājapēya, etc., carried out conjointly, will be obtained.⁴⁷⁰ Also it is stated in the opening *Sūtra*, *Athātō Brahmaṇyāsa*, as a firm conclusion that after the preliminary rites—according to the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa*—are finished, *Brahmaṇyāsa* should be begun in order to realize the double aspect of *bhēdābhēda* doctrine. Moreover, as in the *Sūtra* IV. 4. 12, *Dvādaśāhavat*, etc., Bādarāyaṇa declares his opinion by referring to the example of the *Dvādaśāha*⁴⁷¹ that both ought to be observed (*i.e.*, both *Karma* and *Gnāna*) and establishes in the *Sūtra* next following *Sandhyavat upapattēḥ*⁴⁷² that both the doctrines of *bhēda* and *abhēda* are established; it has therefore to be held that *bhēdābhēda* is the established *siddhānta* according to Bādarāyaṇa. It is also the chief *siddhānta* of Kāśakrītsna and this is without doubt the established *siddhānta*. In *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan*⁴⁷³ etc. Paramātmā is stated to be in a readily realizable condition

⁴⁶⁹ *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa*: *Panchapravāya Vidhi*—the law relating to the five principal sacrificial ceremonies.

⁴⁷⁰ Śrīpati's suggestion is that the adoption of the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* in the region of *Śārīraka Mīmāṃsa* is equal in result to the performance of Sautrāmaṇi and Brihaspatisavana, Agnichayana and Vājapēya, which have in each case to be conjointly done, if they are (according to the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa*) to bear fruit.

⁴⁷¹ A sacrifice lasting for or completed in twelve days.

⁴⁷² The twilight is suitable, *i.e.*, the meeting point of day and night is helpful. This *Sūtra* suggests, says Śrīpati, the truth of the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine which is the meeting point of *bhēda* and *abhēda* as *sandhyā* is of day and night.

⁴⁷³ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, V. 7. 9.

when the *jīva* attains the stage of *vignāna*. *Jīva* and Brahman are, therefore, declared to be distinctly separate. Āśmarathya decides on the support of the middle term (*madhya vākya pramāṇam ādāya*). He endeavours to prevent a contradiction arising from the *abhēda Sruti* texts such as *Tattvamasi*, etc., by means of comparison (*sādrūṣyēna vārayati*). As for Audulōmi, he argues on the strength of the proof afforded by *Sruti* texts like *Nēha nānāsti kinchana*, etc., and argues on the analogy of the *rajjusarpa* that in the *advaita Brahman* a vision of *dvaita prapancha* is seen without any contradiction arising therefrom. Kāśakritsna having studied, in an inquiring mood, the first, central and last stages of the whole of the *Vēdānta*, establishes a harmonious whole by the aid of the six-fold proofs (*ṣaḍvidha linga tātparyēna*) and concludes that *bhēdābhēda* is the correct and acceptable doctrine and adds that this should be accepted as the chief doctrine of the *Vedānta* system. In this way the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* is established without any contradiction being established between *jīva* and Brahman.

The Nature and Character of Mukti.

It is when we come to the discussion of the nature and character of *mukti* that we get a closer idea of the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* as propounded by Srīpati. Though Srīpati refers to *mukti* in different parts of his *Bhāṣya*, still it is best to go to IV. 4 to get his considered views on the matter. There, he lays down his conception of the nature and state of *mukti*. Commenting on IV. 4. 5, *Brāhmēṇa jaiminirupanyāsādibhyaḥ*, Srīpati states that the *Sruti* text, *Brāhmaṇōsya mukhamāśīt* | *Bāhūrādanyaḥ kritāḥ* | *Ūrūtadasya yadvaiśyaḥ* | *Padbhyām śūdrō ajāyata* || etc., declares that Parabrahma Śiva created Brāhmaṇas and others from the different parts of his body—face, shoulders etc. Therefore, it is not possible to say that the created world is devoid of bodily form or divisions. Jaimini infers from texts like *Aprāṇō hyamanāḥ śubhraḥ*, etc., that even in the *aprākṛita* state of *mukti*, the *Srutis* grant the existence

of higher *śarīra*, *indriya*, *mana* and *prāṇa*. If it is asked how, the reply is *upanyāsādibhyāḥ*, i.e., from allusions made to such things in discussions. Further, from the text *Ya ātmāpahatapāpmā*,⁴⁷⁴ etc., which is the utterance of Prajāpati, also, the existence of a bodily form for *muktas* is predicated, just as in the form of Parabrahman, in the various postures of *satya-sankalpatva*, *āsana*, etc. Also, *Sruti* texts like *Jakshan krīdan ramamāṇaḥ*,⁴⁷⁵ etc., are found declaring that *muktas* who have acquired the form of Brahman through realization are seen taking part in different pastimes. And, therefore, Jaiminiāchārya declares, on the strength of *Sruti* texts which hint at it, his doctrine that this is the exact state of those *muktas* who realize their form of Brahman. Thus having discussed the doctrine treating of the *muktas* in their realized state of Brahman in their *sāvayava*, *saguṇa*, *saviśēsha* form (*Sāvayavamatra brahmanvādimatam upannasya*), Śrīpati proceeds to state the realized form of Brahman in the *niravayava*, *nishkriya*, *nirviśēsha* form. Commenting on IV. 4. 6, *Chiti tanmātrēṇa tadātmakatvāditi Auḍulōmih*, he says that *Sruti* texts like *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt* | *Ēkamēva adviṭīyam Brahma* |⁴⁷⁶ *Ātmā vā idam agra āsīt* | *Brahma vā idam agra āsīt* | *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma*,⁴⁷⁷ etc., are considered by Audulōmiāchārya as enunciating that there is nothing beyond Brahman and that Brahman is always in the form of *chaitanya* (i.e., Supreme Spirit considered as the essence of being and source of all sensation) and that form of *chaitanya* cannot be taken to behave in the *jaḍa-praṇcha* form. And that, therefore, as *chaitanya* he is during all the three times—past, present and future—the unchangeable (*ēka ēva*) Brahman. Why? The answer is contained in the words *tadātmakatvāt*, because he has had the same form. He is also *adviṣyam*, *avyavahāryam*, *alak-*

⁴⁷⁴ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 7.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ait. Upa.*, I. 1.

⁴⁷⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

⁴⁷⁷ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

śhaṇam, *achintyam*, *avyapadēśyam*, and in fact he is the essence of all (*ēkātmā pratyaya sāram*) as enunciated in *Sruti* texts like *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam śivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē*; *Sa ātmā sa vignēyaḥ* ¹⁷⁸ etc.; *Yat tad adriśyam agrāhyam agōtram avarṇam achakshuśrōtram tadapāñipādam*, etc.; *Nityam vibhum sarvagatam susūkshmam*; ¹⁷⁹ etc., which declare that Śiva Parabrahman is *Chaitanya* (Supreme Essence of Spirit) only and is never in the form of body and its organs (*śarīra*, *indriya*, etc.), which statement Audulōmi contradicts.

In this way having stated at length, according to the one-sided views of the *Srutis* regarding *sāvayava* and *niravayava* doctrines respectively, Bādarāyaṇa conclusively states the essence of all the *Vēdānta* as his own opinion, in *Sūtra* IV. 4. 7, *Ēvamaḥpyupanyāsātpūrva bhāvādavirōdham Bādarāyaṇaḥ*. The expression *Ēvamaḥpyupanyāsāt* means, according to hundreds of *Sruti* texts, that both the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms of existence are seen in Śiva Parabrahman just as the world (*prapancha*), wind (*pavana*), etc., are seen. *Sruti* texts like *Dvāvēva Brahmanō rūpē mūrtanchā-mūrtamēva cha*; ¹⁸⁰ *Tadādi madhyānta vihināmēkam vibhum chidānandam arūpam adbhutam*; *Umāsahāyam Paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakanṭham praśāntam*, ¹⁸¹ etc., support the view of Bādarāyaṇa, the *sarvavēdānta siddhānta nīpūṇa* (who excels in all *Vēdānta* systems), that Śiva Parabrahman always consists of two forms (*mūrtā* and *amūrtā*) and therefore the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms of existence are not irreconcilable. Why? On account of previous existence. Such texts like *Parāśya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvikī gnāna bala kriyācha*; ¹⁸² *Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā* ¹⁸³ and others declare that Śiva Parabrahman consists of *sarvaśaktitva*, *apahatapāpmatva* and *satyakāmatva* and

¹⁷⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 6.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 3. 1.

¹⁸¹ *Kaivalya Upa.*

¹⁸² *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

¹⁸³ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 7.

these are always seen in him. On the strength of the maxim if you are *ubhayabalāt*, you will attain *ubhaya siddhi*, on account of both sets of *Sruti*s being strong enough (which speak of *mūrtā* and *amūrtā*), both the forms (*mūrtā* and *amūrtā*) of Brahman are to be accepted. But if we accept, on the other hand, the only proof afforded by the *Sruti* text, *Brāhmaṇo'syamukhamāsīt*, etc., then the proof of the following *Sruti* texts, *Ākāśavat sarvagatasya nityaḥ*; *Antaḥpūrṇo bahiḥpūrṇaḥ pūrṇa kumbhamivārṇavē*; *antaḥśūṇyō bahiḥśūṇyō śūṇyakumbha ivāmbare*; *Kham vāyuh jyōtirāpaḥ prithvī viśvasya dhāriṇī*; ⁴⁸⁴ *Yat param Brahma sarvātmā*, etc., will be contradicted. Moreover, if Brahman is understood to be *sāvayava* (combined with bodily form) just as a *ghaṭa* and limited as such, then, according to *Sruti* texts like *Tasmād vā ētasmādātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*, ⁴⁸⁵ etc., how can the all-pervading Brahman be said to be the cause of *ākāśa* (ether), etc.? Moreover, the quality of being existent in everything will also be contradicted. His *adhishṭhāna* in the world cannot be said to happen, for, if in accordance with *Sruti* texts like *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma*, ⁴⁸⁶ *Sa yathā saindhava ghaṇo'nantarō bāhyaḥ krityō rasaghana ēvam vā arē ayamātmānamantaro bāhyaḥ krithyaḥ pragnānaghana ēva*, ⁴⁸⁷ *Āprānōhyamanāḥ śubhraḥ*; *Aśarīram vā vasantam namē priyāpriyē*; etc., ⁴⁸⁸ we have to accept that Śiva Parabrahman is bodiless (*niravayava*) and attributeless (*nirviśeṣa*) and to conceive of him as consisting of *chit* alone (*chinmātratva*), then, several *Sruti* texts like *Sō'kāmayata bahusyām prajāyēya*, ⁴⁸⁹ *Tat srishṭvā tadēvānuprāviśat*, ⁴⁹⁰ *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē* | *Yēna jātāni jīvanti* | *Yat prayanti abhisamviśanti* | ⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸⁴ *Mahōpa.*

⁴⁸⁵ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁷ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 13.

⁴⁸⁸ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 1.

⁴⁸⁹ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6.

⁴⁹⁰ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 1.

⁴⁹¹ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

etc., are contradicted, because they would deny to Brahman his *lakṣhaṇa* as being the chief cause of creation. Again, according to *Sruti* texts like *Namō hiraṇya-bāhavē hiraṇyavarṇāya*,⁴⁹² etc., it is not possible to avoid the contradiction. Therefore, it is but right that we should accept for Parabrahman both the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms ; if not the *Sruti* texts relating to meditation in the *mūrtā* form (of Śiva Parabrahman) and also those relating to meditation in the *amūrtā* form, such as *jakṣhaṇa kṛdāṇa ramamāṇa*, etc., which provide for the fruits of realization for those who meditate in the *amūrtā* form, will be mutually contradicting each other. If we state that the *mūrtā* form of Brahman is of an *anitya* character, then the *Sruti* text *Sthirēbhiraṅgaiḥ pururūpa ugraḥ*,⁴⁹³ etc., will be contradicted as the *Sruti* text (quoted) enunciates that the *mūrtā* form of Brahman is of a permanent character possessing form and different limbs. In the *Sruti* text *Apāṇi pādōham achintya śaktiḥ paśyāmyachakṣuḥ saśruṇōtyakarnaḥ*,⁴⁹⁴ etc., the body and limbs are declared to be not necessary for Parabrahman and that even without them, he is capable of doing everything independently, and that everything can be effected by him. Having thus concluded in the *Avibhāgēna drisṭvādhikaraṇam* that Paraśiva Brahman will be realized after meditating upon the all-pervading *Amūrtā* (*vyāpaka Amūrtā*) form in order to attain unity, after being free from all disires, Sṛipati says that Bādarāyaṇa proceeds in the *Sankalpādhikaraṇa* (IV. 4. 8-12) to establish that those who meditate upon Paraśiva Brahman of the *Mūrtā* form will also be benefited by unsurpassed (*niratiśaya*) bliss (*ānanda*). For those who meditate on the *Mūrtā* form (of Brahman) will derive the benefit of enjoying by the mere thought of it garlands of flowers, sandal, damsels and such like happiness. How? So say *Sruti* texts like *Sankalpādēva asya pitarāḥ samuttiśṭhanti* ; *Sankalpādēva asya sarva dēvā gandharvā*

⁴⁹² *Mahōpa.*, X. 18.

⁴⁹³ *Rigvēda*, II. 7. 17.

⁴⁹⁴ *Śveta. Upa.*, III. 19.

vidyādhārāścha samuttishṭhanti, etc., which explain the idea of the *Sūtra* that for those who meditate on the form of *Mūrtā* Paraśiva Brahman even the *dēvas*, *pitris*, *gandharvas*, etc., come and wait upon them to attend to their wants. This is the gist of what is meant by the *Sūtra*. *Sruti* texts like *Sa tatra paryēti jakshan krīḍan ramamāṇa sthīr-bhirvā yānairvā gnātibhirvā*,⁴⁹⁵ etc., declare that those who meditate on the *Mūrtā* Brahman will, having reached the stage of *satyasankalpa*, realize whatever they think of. This is in keeping with the established practice as laid down in the *Srutis*. The doubt arises whether a *mukta jīva* possesses body and limbs or not; or whether he has any settled desire as mentioned above (*sankalpādīni santi na santi*) or not; and if he can achieve his desire, then, can he independently come by it (or satisfy it). Then the (further) doubt arises whether the desire of a *mukta jīva* goes over that of the will (*sankalpa*) of Paramēśvara. The answer is contained in the texts *Atmānam chēdvi jānīyā dayam asmīti pūrushaḥ* ; *Kimichchan kasya kāmāya śarīram anusancharēt* ; *Sahavai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayōr-apahati rasti* ; *Aśarīram vā vasantam na priyāpriyē prūsyatha* ; etc., which, after declaring that while in the carnal body misery cannot be got rid of, in the end—according to *Sruti* texts like *Asmāt śarīrāt samutthāya paranjōli upasampadya svēna rūpēṇa abhinishpadyata*,⁴⁹⁶ etc.,—when the soul is released there will be no bodily form for the *mukta*. So say the *Sruti* texts. And therefore the need for any effort (for *aśarīratva*) does not arise (*i.e.*, the released soul loses its bodily form as a matter of course). Moreover, in this world the need arises even for kings and the like to determine to achieve a result and therefore they call for all the necessary attempts and finally they gain their desires. Then, if it is asked, why should one labour so much for *mukti* when it is automatically obtained without any

⁴⁹⁵ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 1.

⁴⁹⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 3. 4.

exertion by merely desiring it, the answer is, "Yes, by mere determined will, he will attain *mukti*", for, *Sruti* texts like *Sayadi pitrilōka kāmō bhavati; sankalpādēva asya pitara samuttishṭhanti*,⁴⁹⁷ etc., declare that a *mukta* can have before him even his fathers and others, who are bound to come and stand before him at his mere desire. But the *Sruti* texts do not say that a *mukta* can attain his desires only after attempting and labouring for them. (That is, his mere desire for anything will be satisfied.) This establishes that the position of a *mukta* is one where mere resolves on his part are enough to have them realized. According to *Sruti* texts like *Sa ēkadhā bhavati tridhā bhavati panchadhā, sapṭadhā*, etc., the *Ātman*, though an undivided one, appears as if it were many and divided (*achchēdasya*); yet, all these (divided) forms denote that one undivided Brahman in his apparently divided form having a seeming body and limbs. The expression *śarīrābhāva* only denotes a reference to the meditation of Brahman in his *niravayava* form.

Moreover, the use of the expression *aśarīratva* denotes the non-existence of a carnal bodily form subject to *karma*. Therefore it is that to a *mukta*, though his bodily form was very much loved by him, while he was in the bondage of carnal existence, it at last becomes to him an object of hate (*apriyahetuḥ*). Thus it is settled that the form that a *mukta* assumes in order to obtain Kailāsa as a *bhakta* is one which is extraordinary and all-effulgent like that of Paramēśvara (*aprākṛita jyōtirmayatvēna paramēśvara śarīravat*), and free from all causes that go to make for unhappiness (*na dukkhaḥētuḥ*). Verily if it is questioned whether agreeably to the *Rājabhṛutya nyāya* (the maxim of the king and the subject), even though a *bhakta* reaches Mahā Kailāsa in the realized state, he has still a kind of respect for and fear of Paramēśvara as regards the duties of subordination (*pāratantrya*) and worship (*kainkarya*) which are, therefore, the source of fear (*bhayaḥētuḥ*), the answer is that it is not so; for, if that be so, there will be induced a contradiction with *Sruti* texts such as *Ānandam Brahmanō*

⁴⁹⁷ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 2. 1.

vidvānna bibhēti kutaschana,⁴⁹⁸ etc. This doubt is removed by the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 9) *Atayēva chānanyādhipatiḥ*, "Therefore *Ananyādhipatiḥ*," i.e., "Therefore the lordless state." For the very reason that a *mukta* is (called) a *satya-sankalpa*,⁴⁹⁹ he becomes also lordless (*ananyādhipatiḥ*). The state of *ananyādhipatitva* involves the status of *vidhinishēdhatvam*, i.e., freedom from the prohibitions resulting from ordinances.⁵⁰⁰ From the status of *vidhinishēdhatvam* results *apratihata satyasankalpatvam*, i.e., a *satyasankalpatvam* from which he is not beaten back. Therefore, according to the *Srutis*, he realizes *satyasankalpatva* and *ananyādhipatitva*. Therefore, according to the *Sruti* text *Sa Svarāt bhavati*, etc., he rightly becomes *svarāt* [i.e., identified with the self-refulgent (Brahman)]. This is the result of his meditation and worship of the all-powerful almighty Śiva, which has brought him to the stage of *satyasankalpatva* and *sarvakāmāvāptitva*. And hence to the state of *ananyādhipatitva*. This is according to the *Sruti* text *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvam anyat parityajya*, etc. *Ananyādhipati* is one who has no other to lord over him—*Śivētarāḥ na vidyatē anyaḥ adhipatiḥ yasya sō ananyādhipatiḥ*. He is not controlled by any other (than Śiva). Therefore he is as independent (*svatantra*) as Śiva (*Śivavat svatantra*) himself. Thus it is said in the *Skānda* (*Purāṇa*): *Sivaikānīṣṭhā prathita kshamānām Śivētaradhyāna nishēdhakānām । Triṇīkṛita Brahmapurandarāṇām kim dushkrītam Sankara kinkarāṇām ॥ iti*, etc.⁵⁰¹ By denoting *ananyādhipatitva* for a *mukta*, he is considered to have attained independence,

⁴⁹⁸ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 9. A wise man as soon as he realizes the *Ananda* state of Brahman has nothing to fear.

⁴⁹⁹ *Satya*=Truth ; and *Sankalpa*=reflection. The reflection of truth.

⁵⁰⁰ Brahman is described as *nishēdha śēshaḥ*, i.e., free from all kinds of prohibition.

⁵⁰¹ What sin should Brahma and Viṣṇu have committed for them to treat with such contempt those declared devotees who endued with the exalted quality of forbearance meditate only on Śiva and those (others) who prohibit meditation on any other (deity) but Śiva?

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by which is meant that he is no longer a subordinate bound to perform any duty of a binding character. He loses naturally also such duties which have a binding character as they disappear (on his attaining *ananyādhipatitva*). This means that there is no other than Paramēśvara (*na anyā Paramēśvara*) to control him, because he will have passed the stage where the flow of births and deaths as ordained by Śiva and the connected ordinances of a prohibitory nature (*vidhinishēdha śāstra patha atītātavāt*) prevails. Why? Because he has turned away from the bonds which enchained his soul (*paśu vyāvṛttēḥ*). It is but right that those who are distinguished by sins (*dōsha viśiṣṭānām*) and bound down by the scent of the three desires (*dharma, artha* and *kāma*) should be bound by the ordinances of Śiva for performing *karma*. But, on the contrary, for those Mahātmas, who have assumed the form of Śiva (*Śiva sārūpya dhārinām*), who are never decreasing in their happiness, who are always just like Śiva, who are always all-knowing (*Śivavat sarvagnatvādīnām*) like him, who are devoid of self-love (*abhimāna*) having exhausted it, who are beyond birth, death and fear of misery—for beings with such characteristics, it is no contradiction that they enjoy ever-increasing bliss (*ānanda*) and self-rejoicing according to their own desire (*svātmārāmatvēna svatantratvam avirōdham*). Verily according to *Sruti* texts such as *Yadā sarvē pramuchyantē kāmā yasya hridisthitāḥ | Atha martyō amritō bhavatyatra Brahma samaśnūtē*⁵⁰² || *Baddhōhi vāsanā baddhō mōkshasyāt vāsanā kshayaḥ | Vāsanātānaram Brahman mōkshaityabhidhīyatē | Na mōkshō nabhasaḥ prushṭhē na pātālē na bhūtālē | Sarvāśā sankshayē chētaḥ kshayō mōksha itīryatē* || etc.,⁵⁰³ a *mukta* is understood to be freed from all desires. The experience of a *mukta*, according to

⁵⁰² *Kātha. Upa.*, VI. 14.

⁵⁰³ When a mortal is absolutely free from mental desire of every kind, he becomes an immortal and thus enjoys happiness along with Brahman. Having been once bound by the bondage of smell (of past good and bad actions), as soon as he attains *mōksha*, he ceases from such bondage of smell (of past good and bad actions). And as

texts like *Kim karōmi kva gachchāmi kim grihṇāmi tyajāmi kim*; *Yan māyāpūritam viśvam mahat kalpāmbunā yathā*,⁵⁰⁴ etc., occurring in the *Muktānubhava Sruti*, is that as he soon leaves this (i.e., on release) he begins to contemplate: "Where shall I go?", "What shall I do?" "Which way shall I follow?", "Which (way) should I abandon?" "I have been all along in this world as a particle of water in the vast ocean (of life)." This shows that he has no other place to aim at in particular. Therefore a *mukta* will keep moving on according to the *Sruti* texts *Sa tatra paryēti jakshan krīḍan ramamāṇaḥ sthīrābhīrāvā yānairvā gnātibhīrāvā*, etc., by playing about in joy, sometimes with those damsels whom he meets as associates in travelling, in vehicles, sometimes along with some of his kinsmen he meets on the road. For such a *mukta*, can *vyavahāra* be ever applicable to him?

Sruti texts such as *Nānyat kinchana mishat*; *Vāchārambhaṇam vīkārō nāmadhēyam mrīttikētyēva satyam*;⁵⁰⁵ *Atō anyathā artham natu dvitīyamasti*, etc., do not indicate that there is any other thing than Brahman. So also, elsewhere, *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmani tishṭhan ya ātmanō antarōyamātmāna vēdayasyūtmā śarīram ya ātmānam antarō ayamiti* | *Sa ta ātmā antaryāmyamrutāḥ* |⁵⁰⁶ *Antaḥ pravishṭaḥ śāstā janānām*; *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*,⁵⁰⁷ *Dvā suparṇā*,⁵⁰⁸ etc., declare that the *jīva* and Brahman are different from each other, though *Sruti* texts like *Tattva-*

soon as he attains *mōksha*, all such bondage (of smell) becomes destroyed. Oh Brahman! it is the destruction of that smell of bondage that is called *mōksha*. There is no *mōksha* in the sky nor is it in the lower regions nor on this earth. But *mōksha* lies only in the absolute destruction of all desires.

⁵⁰⁴ A *Sruti* called *Muktikōpanishad* is found in the collection of 108 *Upanishads* called the *Ashtōttaraśatōpanishad* published by Nirṇaya Sāgara Press. It is quoted by Ānandatīrtha (under the identical name of *Muktikōpanishad*) when commenting on *Brahma-Sūtra* III. 4. 49. *Anāvīshkurvannanvayāt*. The texts quoted by Sripati do not, however, occur in the *Muktikōpanishad*.

⁵⁰⁵ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

⁵⁰⁶ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, V. 7. 3.

⁵⁰⁷ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

⁵⁰⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

masi, etc., point to *abhēda*. Thus *bhēda* and *abhēda* are referred to by *Sruti* texts, so that it is not possible for Vēdāntins to determine which is the correct way to follow. The *mukta* being thus in a puzzle, if the doubt arises whether *dharma-jignāsa* is the only fit thing, then there is evident the three-fold doctrine enunciated in the next *Sūtra*, *Abhāvam bādarirūhahyēvam* (IV. 4. 10). *Sruti* texts like *Sadēva sōmyēdamagra āsīt* ; *Ēkamēvādviṭīyam Brahma*;⁵⁰⁹ *Yatra nānyat paśyati nānyat śruṇōti nānyadvijānāti sabhūmā*;⁵¹⁰ *Nēhanānāsti kinchana*;⁵¹¹ etc., determinately prohibit for the past, present and future *bhēda*. Though *jagat* does not really exist and *jīva*, *Īśvara*, etc., do not exist, yet, for the time being, just as we mistake the rope for the serpent, all that we see is but a mere illusion (*mithyātvamēva*), much like as our imagining that a rabbit has two horns. Thus says Bādari. Therefore in order to bring it thoroughly home to the pupils that the *jagat* is an illusion, the existence of the *jagat* has been invented in keeping with the *Sruti* texts, reasoning (*yukti*) and experience (*anubhava*), and in conformity with the maxims *adhyārōpāpavādābhyām nishprapancham prapanchata*⁵¹² etc. This seems much like the description of a king born as a son to a barren woman and ruling over a kingdom. That the *jagat* is *mithyā* is the true doctrine of Bādari. Thus, in

⁵⁰⁹ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, VII. 2. 4.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, VI. 2. 1.

⁵¹² *Adhyārōpa* in *Vēdānta* means falsely attributing the properties of one thing to another—for example, considering Brahman, who is not really the material world, to be the material world ; and *apavāda* is a refutation as of a wrong imputation of belief. In order to teach what *adhyārōpa* and *apavāda* mean, the teacher exemplifies the case of *jagat*. The *jagat* is seen to be in existence, though it does not exist as a matter of fact. Even the *Srutis* contain fictitious texts in order to exemplify this fact. That is, the *Srutis* have these texts only for purposes of teaching (the non-existence of the world) and not for teaching its existence. The invention (*kalpana*) is for teaching the truth to thousands of disciples and not to testify to their literal correctness, See note 175 on page 320 *ante*.

this way, after pointing out the main points of contradiction in the *Srutis* and also pointing out where they partly stand to reason, Bādari discusses holding the pure *Advaita* (*kēvala advaita*) doctrine that the *jagat* is but an illusion (*mithyā*). In order to contradict such an opinion, the *Sūtrakāra* enunciates the following *Sūtra* in order to establish his own view (IV. 4. 11): *Bhāvam Jaiminirvikalpāmananāt*. *Sruti* texts like *Jyōtishṭōmēna svargakāmō yajēta*; *Bhūtikāmō vāyuva śvētamālabhēta*; *Karmachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē*; *Puṇyachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē*; *Pāpēnāndhō mūkō badhirō śvānō bhavati*; *Puṇyēna vidyāvān dhanavān bhōgavān bhavati*, etc., show without contradiction that according to the ordinances of God all actions which are devoid of *puṇya* such as *brahmahatya*, *surāpāna*, etc., will certainly lead to *Naraka* and other nether worlds. And similarly all virtuous deeds will surely lead to the enjoyment of experiences in *Svarga* and the like regions. *Sruti* texts like *Yagnēna dānēna tapasā nāśakēna*, etc., explain clearly that actions done without any particular desire but purely for propitiating Paramēśvara, such as sacrificial offerings done at the *Jyōtishṭōma* sacrifice and the like, will finally purge the *jīva* of all sins and lead to *Brahmagnāna* and salvation (*sādhakatva*). Jaimini considers that the *jīva*, *Īśvara* and the *prapañcha* beginning with the *Vēda* (*nigama*), the *Sāstras* (*āgama*) and their innate properties as absolutely eternal (not illusory). Why? *Vikalpāmananāt*; *vividhaḥ kalpō vikalpaḥ*. To invent in different ways is to mutilate the truth of the *Sāstras*. If *jagat* is granted to be *mithyā*, then we are reduced to the doctrine of the Bauddhas and others. Then the sacrificial rite of *Jyōtishṭōma* and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof, or the fruits accorded by the commission of wrong acts such as *brahmahatya* and the like, would not have existed in the least. Therefore, even what is laid down in the *Āgama* as an act to be done will go frustrated. If that be so, then, texts like *Sa ēkadhā bhavati tridhā bhavati panchadhā bhavati* | *iti*, etc., will prove clear contradictions of the *Srutis* themselves. Therefore, it is the firm doctrine of Jaimini that *jīva*, *Īśvara* and the rest, together with the

jagat, are eternal and that *jīva* and *Īśvara* are different from each other. This should be accepted as the *bhēdavāda* doctrine of Jaimini. In this way, to harmonise these two doctrines, each of which stands partially in agreement with the *Srutis*, and to remove all contradictions between them and to establish the truth, the *Sūtrakāra* gives in the next *Sūtra* his own opinion in the form of the *Dvaitādvaita* doctrine (*dvaitādvaitātmaka svamatam*), which harmonises with the whole of what is said in the *Vēda*, *Vēdānta* and the *Āgamas*. In the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 12) *Dvādaśāhavad ubhaya vidham Bādarāyaṇōtaḥ*, the attaining of *Parabrahmatva* is established. For what reason is the pure *Advaita* doctrine which is based on *gnāna* and supported only partially by the *Sruti* texts and for what reason, the *Dvaita* doctrine, which substantiates only *karma*, *bhakti* and *yōga*, become mutually contradictory, for the same reason, the whole *Vēdānta* declares as its chief purport that *dvaitādvaita* is what is to be rejoiced at (*abhiprēta*). *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrē'stam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya* | *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpād-vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣhamupaiti divyam* ||⁵¹³ *Brahma-vidāpnōti param*; ⁵¹⁴ *Brahma vēda Brahmaiva bhavati* ||⁵¹⁵ *Tattvamasi*; ⁵¹⁶ *Aham Brahmāsmi*; ⁵¹⁷ etc., declare decisively that *gnānakarma ubhayātmaka ubhayavidham dvaitādvaita matam* as Bādarāyaṇa's doctrine. What *ubhaya-vidham* means is that during the *samsāra* period, both Brahman and *jīva* exist separately in the relationship of *upāsya* (worshipped) and *upāsaka* (worshipper), and their existence as different entities is absolutely true (*pāramārthika satyatvam*). In the state of *mōksha*, they exist in the relationship of the river which winds its way to the sea (*nadī samudravat*) and agreeably to the *bhramara-kīta nyāya*, the *jīva* being naturally released of its *jīva* state, attains that

⁵¹³ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 8.

⁵¹⁴ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

⁵¹⁵ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

⁵¹⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.

⁵¹⁷ *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

all-pervading (*vyāpaka*), undivided (*akhaṇḍa*) and supreme *ākāśa* form (*paramākāśarūpa*) and bears the characteristics of *sat*, *chit* and *ānanda*, and becomes possessed of all that unrivalled, all-knowing quality (*sarvagnatvādi sādharmaṇa guṇākara*), acquires all the *guṇas* of Parabrahman, Paraśiva, Śivaśankara, Rudrēśvara, Mahādēva and others and claims all the terms by which Parabrahman is called. Bādarāyaṇa thus establishes that the *jīva* realizes *Parabrahmatva* by attaining it.

By the term *dvādaśāhavat* it is understood that in accordance with *Sruti* texts like *Yathā dvādaśāham ruddhikāmā upēyuh* and *Dvādaśāhēna prajākāmam yājayēt*, etc., the *jīva* acquires the results derived from both the sacrifices (i.e., *Ruddhikāma* and *Prajākāma*) and is enabled to reach the true state of Parabrahman. This is accepted by Bādarāyaṇa. Whereas in *Mantra Sruti* texts like *Dvā suparṇā*,⁵¹⁸ etc., *jīva* and *Brahman* are both described as possessed of different characteristics and whereas only in *Sruti* texts such as *Tattvamasi*,⁵¹⁹ etc., the unity of *jīva* and *Brahman* is also described, therefore, the supreme truth (*paramārtha*) of both of these sets of *Srutis* should be accepted in the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*. As it is declared that all *Srutis* speak nothing but the truth, and as very many *Sruti* texts, *Purāṇas* and *Purvāchāras* bear testimony to, *bhēdābhēda* is the only doctrine that can be accepted as true. If not, if the meaning of the *Srutis* is lessened (*sankōchē*), the proofs (*māna*) will be contradicted and other great Vēdic contradictions will result. It has been pointed out in one of the foregoing *Sūtras*, *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt*,⁵²⁰ etc., that the *Dvaita* doctrine that *jīva* and *Brahman* are admittedly different from each other, is established as true. At the same time the *Sūtra*, *Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*,⁵²¹ points to the truth of the *Advaita* doctrine. Similarly in the

⁵¹⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

⁵¹⁹ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.

⁵²⁰ *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 1. 22.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*, II. 1. 14.

Sūtra, *Lōkavattu līlākaivalyam*,⁵²² etc., the sporting character of Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvarasya līlā*) is pointed out. Such *Srutis* as refer to the occasions in which the *Dvaita* character of Paramēśvara is exhibited, have also been pointed out. It has also been explained that the term *kaivalya* indicates the absolute unity of *jīva* and *Brahman*. The truth of texts like *Nēha nānāsti kinchana*,⁵²³ etc., which declare *abhēda*, which means that there is no existence separate from Brahman, has also been clearly established. If it is asked what are we to do with those texts which declare the bodily form (*mūrtatva*) of Śiva Parabrahman, the answer is that they should only be taken merely as the sport (*līlaiva prayōjanam*) of Paramēśvara inasmuch as they serve the useful purpose of indicating to the *bhakta* the way of realization and how to realize *mukti*. Therefore Śiva himself, having assumed the form of a *līla mangala vighraha* (an auspicious sporting image), manifested through his lustre his own true condition (*tattva*) through a material world, and thereby brought into existence through Hiraṇyagarbha⁵²⁴ the pervasive nature of his qualities as declared in the *Vēdas*. Therefore a *mumukshu* following the path laid out in the *Vēdas* and meditating and worshipping the *mūrta* and the *amūrta* forms of Paraśiva Brahman finally realizes Parabrahman from a bodily form into a bodiless form, and attains *kaivalya mukti* (i.e., absolute unity—unity in its essence) with him, just as ghee which manifests itself in a liquid form when it is in the stage of melting assumes again its original solid hardened (*kāṭhinya*) form, when it is allowed to cool itself. If not, to whom else is it possible to attain to that state of absolute unity with Śiva? *Sruti* texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ*;⁵²⁵ *Hīraṇyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam sanō dēvaśśubhayā smṛityā samyunaktu*;⁵²⁶ *Yō brahmāṇam*

⁵²² *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 1. 33.

⁵²³ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

⁵²⁴ Name of Brahman as born from a golden-egg.

⁵²⁵ *Mahōpa.*, XI. 19.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, XII.

vidadhāti pūrvam | *Yōvai vēdāmscha prāhiṇōti tasmai* | *Tamhi dēvam ātmabuddhi prakāśam mumukshurvai śaraṇam aham prapadyē*,⁵²⁷ etc., sufficiently explain in several ways what has been above stated. And, hence, there could be no room for any manner of doubt. For the text *Sāṅkhya-yogau prithak bālāḥ pravādanti na paṇḍitāḥ* etc., applies. It is only those undeveloped young men who praise at length *Sāṅkhya yōga* (which speaks of *Dvaita*); but never so a man of advanced knowledge (*paṇḍita*). Thus *Krishṇa* (i.e., *Krishṇa Dvaipāyana*) himself has given out that the *Dvaitādvaita* doctrine is what, in his opinion, should be preferred. And therefore a one-sided view (either *dvaita* or *advaita* only) is incorrect (*asamanjasa*).

Srīpati commenting next on IV. 4. 13, *Tasya bhāvē sandhyavadupapattēḥ*, says that just as in the *Samanvayādhikaraṇa*, it was mentioned that all *Vēdānta* ends by declaring that *Brahmaprāpti* (realization of Brahman) is the final goal after attaining *Brahmagāna*, so, in the same manner, it has been pointed out by means of the illustration of the *Dvādaśāha yagna* that in conformity with the maxim that double realization (accomplishment) is obtained, by the strength of double means, and that all *Vēdānta* by the force of its virtuous merits proves the author's own doctrine *bhēdābhēda* as regards *jīva* and *Brahman*. By this means, it is clearly shown that the method of meditation and worship of the bodily (*sāvayava*) form of Brahman will necessarily lead to the realization of the bodiless (*niravayava*) form of Brahman. *Sruti* texts like *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam śivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē*; *Sa ātmā savignēyaḥ śivādvaitaḥ*; *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthuḥ*;⁵²⁸ *Ēka-mēva advitīyam Brahma*;⁵²⁹ *Sa īkshatā īmān lōkān srujāyē yēma satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpāḥ*;⁵³⁰ etc., declare that after

⁵²⁷ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 18.

⁵²⁸ *Atharvaśīras*.

⁵²⁹ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

⁵³⁰ Cf. *Āitarēya Upa.*, III. 1. *Sa īkshata imān lōkān lōka-pālāmscha annamēbhyaḥ*.

he realizes *niravayava* Brahman, he will realize the further characteristics of Brahman, such as his *advitīyatva*, *satyasankalpatva*, etc. As stated in *Sruti* texts like *Tasmāt vā ētasmāt ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*,⁵³¹ etc., he will gradually thereafter attain the three-fold qualities of becoming part of Supreme (*pradhāna*) Brahman by losing his divided power; by acquiring the Supreme Brahman's power of bringing into existence by his *līlā* this cobweb of a creation consisting of *bhūta* (beings) and *bhautika* (material elements); and during that Supreme Brahman's contracted state (*i.e.*, in his dormant condition), he acquires by his *satyasankalpa* character this cobweb of a world.⁵³² Therefore there is no contradiction in creating the (real) world in his state of Supreme Brahman consisting of undivided (*advitīya*) and (divided) *sadvitīya* characters.⁵³³ Why? Because of the proof demonstrated in the joint state of *sandhyā* (where the union of light and darkness, in the morning or evening) is exhibited, and also in the two conditions of *prabōdha* and *supti* (wakefulness and sound sleep), when the dreaming state is experienced; as in these joint conditions, in the creations of the world also the joint condition (co-existing with Brahman and separated from Brahman) is experienced.⁵³⁴

For example, in the dreaming state, according to the *Sruti* text beginning with *Atha rathān rathayōgān pruthak srujatē* and ending with *Atha vēśantān pushkarīṇyaḥ samprata srujatē sahikartēti*; and in other texts like *Yēshu suptēshu jāgarti kāmam kāmam purushō nirmimāṇaḥ*; *Tadēva śukram tadbrahma tadēvāmruta muchyatē* ! *tasminllōkāḥ sritāḥ sarvē tadunānyēti kaschana*,⁵³⁵ etc. ;

⁵³¹ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

⁵³² He acquires the three characteristics of the Supreme Brahman, during *srishṭi*, *sthiti* and *laya*.

⁵³³ In the state of *advitīya*, *i.e.*, unity, the world is in Brahman ; in the divided state, *i.e.*, it is in the *sadvitīya* state.

⁵³⁴ *Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 4. 13.

⁵³⁵ *Kath. Upa.*, VI. 1.

the *jīva*, though he had never seen anything before, in his state of wakefulness, yet during his dreaming state, experiences by the aid of his good luck, the existence of several creations (*śrīṣṭi*) made by Paramēśvara during that state. Therefore, during his dreaming state, even though he is sleeping, he has two kinds of experience—dreaming and sleeping—which are not contradicted. Similarly, the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* is not contradicted even in the realized state (*muktasyāpi*), because there still remains in him (the *mukta*), the smell of *prārabdha* (*prārabdhavāsanā*) which exists in *prakṛiti* (*prakṛitirasti*). By this, it is clearly concluded that when he is in Śivalōka, enjoying all the undiminished happiness, being absolutely freed from every vestige of smell of his former life, he will be in fact one with Śiva experiencing all that of Śiva himself (*kēvala Śivaikya kaivalyānubhava*). Now, a doubt arises, in the second part of the *mukti* state of Śiva Parabrahman, whether a *jaḍa* or lifeless thing (*i.e.*, *Pradhāna*) can also acquire the characteristic of *Sachchidānanda* by being one with him, though *Pradhāna* is a *prārabdhavāsanā*, which attaches itself to a *mukta*. The answer is that in the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*, there can be no such doubt. Because just as *chētana* and *achētana* and light and darkness, though absolutely opposite to each other in their character, co-exist, similarly *Pradhāna* co-exists with Śiva without any contradiction, because in the *sadvitīya* character of Śiva, it (*Pradhāna*) co-exists naturally. Similarly even in the case of a *mukta*, this is an acquired characteristic (in his realized condition).

In the state of dependence (*sāpēkṣatva*) (of a *mukta*), the *satyakāmatva*, which is established in the *Sruti* text, *Satyakāma satyasankalpa*, etc., would be contradicted. When according to the *Sruti* text, *Apāṇipādō javanō grihītā*,⁵²⁶ etc., a *mukta* has attained independence (*prāpta svātantrya*) and has no more need for penance or meditation (*sāadhanāntara nirapēkṣatayā*), he having acquired the

⁵²⁶ *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 19.

characteristic of *sarvakartrtva*, if he is to co-exist with *Pradhāna* (*Prakriti*) as if in a dependent condition, then he is still seen dependent and thus a mutual contradiction arises. The explanation for this is that no such mutual contradiction need be apprehended ; for the co-existence of *advitīya* and *sadvitīya* states (of Brahman with *Pradhāna*) is generally quite possible without such contradiction. Just as light and darkness co-exist, Śiva and *Pradhāna* do co-exist. In the *Sruti* text *Tasmātvā ētasmāt ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*, etc., in which the expression *tasmāt* stands for *Pradhānāt*, the expression *ētasmāt* for *Paramātmā* ; from these (*ākāśa*, etc.) the existing (*bhūta*) and the created (*bhautika*) came into being ; and the indeclinable *vā* denotes the state of co-existence together. For *Sruti* texts like *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyinantu mahēśvaram । Tasyāvayava bhūtōttham vyāptam sarvamidam jagat ॥*⁵³⁷ *Parāśya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvikī gnānabala kriyācha*,⁵³⁸ etc., explain that *Māyā* being dependent on Śiva in the creation of the world, naturally co-exists with him and therefore in the *Sūtra* it is stated *tasyabhāvē sandhyavat upapattēḥ*. Here the expression *tasyabhāvē* means *Śivādhīna pradhāna vikāsa sadbhāvē* (the manifesting power of *Pradhāna*, i.e., subordinate to the will of Śiva though co-existing with him) and the expression *sandhyavat* means *tanutrāya madhyāvagata liṅgaśarīram svapnāvasthācha vyavahriyatē*, i.e., establishes the co-existing condition of the germ of the carnal body and the dreaming conditions of—the scent of—previous existence. Just as the practice of meditation, as laid down in the whole of the *Vēdānta*, is the means (*hētu*) for an ignorant (*mūḍha*) *mumukshu* to reach the stage of a *mukta*, *mukta daśāsu mumukshu*, so does the seed of doubt in the *pūrvapaksha* lead to the *siddhānta*. In the same way, the germ of the carnal body (*liṅgaśarīra*) is the means for the development of the visible material (perishable) bodily form (*sthūla śarīra*) for its functions. So, *Sivagnāna* is the means for removing

⁵³⁷ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, VI. 8.

ignorance and realizing *mōksha*. Therefore, by way of 'illustration' Śiva Parabrahman is shown to co-exist with *Jagat srishti*.⁵³⁹

Moreover, when the *jīva* during the period of profound meditation (*samādhi kālē*) is almost on the verge of attaining the state of *mukti*, he will be experiencing that state of Brahman knowledge and that state of bliss (*ānanda*), being absolutely free from the touch of any desire connected with the outside forces (*bāhyēndriya*), which is usually experienced by Śivayōgins. This is explained in *Sruti* texts like *Ātmakrīḍā ātmaratir ātmānandasya svarāt bhavati*; ⁵⁴⁰ *Sōśmutē sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaschitā*, etc. By this is meant that the *jīva* assumes the means for attaining Kailāsa by assuming *sārūpya*. From this assumed state, he will realize that (condition of the absolute *mukta*). In the *Sruti* text *Ākāśaśarīram Brahma satyātma prāṇārāmam mana ānandam*, ⁵⁴¹ etc., it is said that Mahākailāsa which is the abode of Sadāśiva, is realized as the result of *parama ānanda* after all desires pertaining to outside forces have been absolutely given up. The expression *mana ānandam* in the text (quoted above) means *manasi ānandō yasya saḥ manānandah*, perfect joy in his mind. *Prāṇēshu āsaman-tāt ramata iti prāṇārāmaḥ*—this determines his (the *mukta*'s) state. It is also stated in *Sruti* texts like *Śānti samruddham amrutam*, ⁵⁴² etc., which mean the *mukta*'s form is that of being eternally virtuous (*tat śarīrasya satya-tvam*), eternally peaceful (*śānti karatvam*) and eternally

⁵³⁹ Śrīpati in quoting the *Sruti* text *Māyāntu prakritim*, etc. (*Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10) suggests that *māyā* and *prakriti* are synonymous with each other and *Mahēśvara* is termed *Māyin*. Out of the *avayava*, the world is manifested. With this compare the view of Ānandatīrtha, who quotes the *Sruti* text thus:—*Māyāntu prakritim vindyāt māyīnantu mahēśvaram* । *Mahāmāyētyavidyēti niyatir mōhinīticha* । *Prakritir vāsanētyēvā tavēchchā'nanta kathyatē* ॥ Ānandatīrtha suggests that *Māyā* is only the will of God existing not differently along with Brahman but in him (*vide* Ānandatīrtha, *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*).

⁵⁴⁰ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*, I. 6.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

lasting (*amrutatvam*). Even here the state of the meditator should also be considered, as of *Śivānanda* form. An alternative form, denoting the same idea, is enunciated in the next *Sūtra*—*Bhāvē jāgradvat* (IV. 4. 14). Just as the gross body (*sthūla śarīra*) in its state of repose assumes the subtle body (*sūkshma sarīra*) and experiences the results of its virtuous and sinful actions and subsequently attains the wakeful state of (*jāgradavastha*), in the same way at the time when *Prakṛiti*, the inert *śakti* in *Śiva*, is to come into play (*i.e.*, manifests itself), *Śiva Parabrahman* exhibits himself in the two forms of *sūkshma* and *sthūla* and thereby shows the five-fold means of his creation (*jagat sṛisṭi*, *sthiti*, *laya*, *tirōdhāna* and *anugraha*) and his methods of concealing and favouring (*tirōdhāna* and *anugraha*). By this, even though a *mukta* is free from all worldly bondage, yet by reason of his possessing the *Lingaśarīra*, he cannot help undergoing all the experiences in the different worlds—this and the next—so that, after experiencing all, he will realize *Śiva Parabrahman*. And, therefore, this *Sūtra* points out that a *mukta* should experience all (he desires). It is also described that even *Mahādēva*, the Lord of Gods, did several acts, such as the destruction of *Vyāghrāsura*, *Gajāsura* and *Tripurāsura*, and the drinking of poison, and protecting his faithful follower *Mārkaṇḍēya* (in order to show his *bhaktas* that all should be done by one if it has been ordained he should do them). For it is said in *Sṛuti* texts like *Bhidyatē hridayagranthiḥ chchidyantē sarva samśayāḥ* | *Kshīyantē chāsya karmāṇi tasmin drisṭē parāvarē* || ⁵⁴³ and *Yadā sarvē pramuchyantē kāmā yasya hridi sthitāḥ* | *Atha martyō amritō bhavatyatra Brahma samaśnutē*; etc., that one should get himself freed from all doubts, which will help him to shake off the ties of bondage when all his further *karma* will be at an end and *Brahman* realized by him. These and other similar texts declare that the truth of *Śiva's* true nature will only be then revealed to such of those who can strenuously attempt to understand it by their absolute absence of worldly desires and real knowledge.

⁵⁴³ *Mund. Upa.*, II. 2. 9.

Verily, according to *Sruti* texts like *Muktaḥ Śivasamō bhavēti* | *Sō'snutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā vipaschitā*,⁵⁴⁴ etc., a *mukta* in the beginning having obtained a status equal to that of Śiva as the result of his meditation and worship, will proceed from one heavenly place to another with a heavenly body and finally becomes absorbed in Śiva.

But if it is doubted how he can proceed from one heavenly place to another in different heavenly forms and at the same time continue to be on a level with Śiva (*Śiva-sāmyatvam*), the *Sūtrakāra* clears the doubt in the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 15), *Pradīpavadāvēśastathā hi darśayati*. Just as a light kept in a particular place throws its rays so as to light up the space surrounding it, similarly there is nothing strange in the *ātma*, being only in a particular part of the body, throwing its light throughout the body. Even so, though the *chaitanya* (*jīva*) stays only within the precincts of the heart, its consciousness extends all over the body. In the same manner, here also, the same understanding is to prevail. A *mukta* (who at first) possesses self-knowledge in a contracted (narrow) form is not capable of being present everywhere simultaneously. Because a *mukta* has not, in the state of his narrow knowledge, still grasped that particular knowledge whereby he can be simultaneously present, whenever he likes, according to his determination, the *Sūtra* uses the words *tathāhi darśayati*. (Similarly he, *Bādarāyaṇa*, proves.) For the *Sruti* text says *Vālāgra śatabhāgasya śatadhā kalpitasyacha* | *Bhāgō jīvaḥ savignēyaḥ sachānantyāya kalpatē* ||⁵⁴⁵ etc. Similarly, the *jīva* gradually acquires a controlling power over *karma* and the power of existence in a *sūkshma* form, just as *Paramēśvara*, which enables him, as he desires, to create any number of bodies simultaneously so as to assume such forms and travel wherever he wants. For, as it is said in *Sruti* texts like

⁵⁴⁴ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1. A *mukta* practically becomes one on a level with Śiva; he enjoys all his desires along with the wise Brahman.

⁵⁴⁵ Know that if the end of a hair follicle is divided into a hundred parts, one of the hundred parts represents the size of the *jīva*, which is capable of dividing itself *ad infinitum*.

Sa ēkadhā bhavati dvidhā bhavati tridhā bhavati sahasradhā bhavati,⁵⁴⁶ etc., that as the result of meditation and worship of Paramēśvara, he (*jīva*), out of His grace, obtains the power of assuming several forms simultaneously. It is to be understood as ascertained truth that the *Śāstra* which treats of the atomic character of the *jīva* is one which deals with the *jīva* in bondage (*baddha jīva*). Verily, if it is asked whether a *mukta* has, like a family man, his worldly body and sensory organs—*i.e.*, worldly existence—and if so what the difference between the two is, the answer is, he has not. A *mukta*, by virtue of his having realized the *Purushārtha*—one of the four principal objects of human life⁵⁴⁷—has no worldly desires to look to, though he is connected with the world. On the other hand, a *mukta* is bent upon meditating upon Brahman only in all his glory. And in that place—in the world of the Brahman (*Brahma prapancha*)—the *Sruti* text *Nānyat paśyati nānyat śruṇōti nānyat vijānāti sabhūmā*,⁵⁴⁸ etc., says that a *mukta* experiences nothing but Brahman. Moreover, it is said in *Sruti* texts like *Ētat tatō bhavati*; *Ākāśa śarīram Brahma*; *Satyātma prāṇārāmam manaānandam śāntisamruddham amrutam*⁵⁴⁹ etc., and also in the texts *Āpnōti svārājyam āpnōti manasampattiḥ*, etc., that a *mukta* will obtain the happiness of his natural place, *i.e.*, that of the state of Śiva Parabrahman (*Śivasya Parabrahmanah padam*). Further, after realizing that state, he becomes an absolute *yōgi* who has fully realized his entire wishes in Parabrahman. If it is asked what further remains to be realized by a *mukta*, the answer is, the *Sruti* text says:—*Vākpatishchakshushpatiḥ śrōtrapatir vijnānapatischa bhavati*; ⁵⁵⁰ *i.e.*, the state of lordship of speech and observation; also the lordship of hearing and knowledge, by which he can have command over his speech and

⁵⁴⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 26. 2.

⁵⁴⁷ *Dharma, artha, kāma and mōksha* are the four *Purushārthas*.

⁵⁴⁸ He sees nothing else but Brahman, he hears nothing else but Brahman and he knows nothing but Brahman. *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 1.

⁵⁴⁹ *Taitt. Upa.*, I. 6.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, I. 6. 2.

knowledge. In this way, a *mukta* will have realized the high state of Śivapada in Mahākailāsa and continue there for an endless period of time, in the purity of his affections, in the assembly of *muktas* (*viśvajālam bhavāti*). What follows next? The *Sruti* text goes *Ākāśa sarīram Brahmaiva*, etc. The *mukta* acquires the power of *Paraprakṛiti* (the natural form of Brahman) and *Paramasattā* (the Supreme Brahman existence, *i.e.*, reality) and forms himself into the all-pervasive *Parama-ākāśa* wherein *Parabrahma śarīra* is manifested. And this state is called *Prakāśakānanda samarasa Paramaśakti*. This state of the *mukta* is the actual realized condition of Paraśiva. Here there are several of them who are separate from each other from time immemorial. So the *Sruti* texts declare *Kōhyēvānyāt kaḥ prāṇyāt* | *Yadēsha-ākāśa ānandō na syāt* | *Rasōvai saḥ* | *Rasam hyēvāyam labdhvā* "nandībhavati" | *Ēsha hyēvānandayati* | ⁵⁵¹ etc., from which it follows that the *muktas* will experience every kind of *ānanda* region (*Brahma prapancha*). Later on, agreeably to the *Sruti* text beginning with *Sa ēkō mānushaḥ*, etc., and ending with *Sa ēkō Brahmana ānanda*, etc., the *mukta* enjoys *ānanda* (from that of a mere man) without any interruption (*upādhi*) to that of (the *ānanda* of) Brahman. Then as the *Sruti* text *Ānandāvīrbhāvastārātamyēna* declares, the *mukta* enjoys his *svarūpānanda* and without any interruption will enjoy, among the *muktas*, *ānanda* to the fullest extent and will be in the state of *paripūrṇa*. Then, as the *Sruti* text *Sa ēkō Brahmana ānandaḥ* ⁵⁵² declares, a *śrōtriya* who is devoid of desires finally realizes *Brahma buddhi* as a result of his virtuous acts, such as sacrifices, etc., and becomes fit for realizing Brahman (*paravidyāvān*). In such a condition even though he is in *jīva*, (*i.e.*, bodily) form, he becomes a *mukta* and equal with Brahman (*Brahmaṇaścha tulya ēva*) and enjoys all *ānanda*. The *mukta* had been experiencing in this world through his meditation and practice of *yōga* even before he realized the *ānanda* state, even before he left (this)

⁵⁵¹ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, II. 8.

world. Therefrom, after he reaches *Brahmalōka*, he continues to experience *ānanda* in his *mukta* form, beginning from that of the human state up to that equal to Brahman and ending with Brahman himself. And thus there can be no difference between the *ānanda* which a *mukta* experiences in his human form and that which he experiences after he assumes the *mukta* form. According to *Sruti* texts like *Atō ayamēva paramānandah parāprakritih; Parā chēt ānandō Brahmēti vyajānāt*, etc., *Brahmatva* and *jagatkāraṇatva* is established for the *mukta*. He will then be installed, according to the *Sruti* text *Saishā bhārgavī vāruṇī vidyā paramē vyōman pratishṭhitā*,⁵⁵³ etc., in the ethereal state of Brahman. And thereby a *mukta* here assumes that great ethereal form (*paramākāśarūpa śarīram*) of the Brahman in the region of Brahman and enters into the highest bliss (*paramānanda*) like Brahman himself, absolutely devoid of all connection with bondage or misery (*Brahmaṇa iva duḥkhānushangābhāvō darśitaḥ*). Verily, after thus realizing the *Paraśivabrahma sārūpya*, *Brahmagnāna lōpam darśayati*, i.e., the *mukta* loses the sense of difference between himself and Brahman (i.e., he feels he is one with Brahman. For he feels no knowledge of difference between himself and Brahman). The *Sruti* text goes *Prāgnēna ātmanā samparishvaktō na bāhyam kinchana vēda nāntaram*,⁵⁵⁴ etc. (Being enveloped in that supreme knowledge of *ātma*, he does not see anything else beyond himself.)

How can a *mukta*, then, be said to have acquired the *sarvagnatva*, the omniscient (or all-knowing) power? The reply is furnished by the *Sūtrakāra* in the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 16) *Svāpyayasampattyōr anyatarāpēksham āvishkritam hi*. This statement does not refer to a *mukta*; but refers to one who feels exultant in his own self by his own meditation in his *sushupti* condition. In the *Sruti* text beginning with *Sampattischa maraṇam vāṅgmanasi sampadyatē* and ending with *Tējah parasyām dēvatāyām*, etc., it is declared that in the two states of existence, viz.,

⁵⁵³ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 6.

⁵⁵⁴ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 3. 21.

the *sushupti* and the *marāṇa*, the reaching of *prāṇa* (i.e., Brahman) is imperceptibly the same.⁵⁵⁵ Therefore, in the *Sūtra*, the statement *anyatarāpēksham* denotes that the stages of *sushupti* and *marāṇa* are almost quite the same for a *mukta* when he has reached the *sarvagna* state. According to *Sruti* texts like *Nāham khalvayamēvam sampratyaत्मānam jānātyayamahamasmīti*; ⁵⁵⁶ *Nō ēvēmāni bhūtāni vināśamēvāpītō bhavati*; *Nāhamatra bhōgyam paśyāmi*,⁵⁵⁷ etc., the *mukta* knows himself during the time of *sushupti* and recognizes himself as a *mukta* without any perception of difference. The *Sruti* text *Sa vā ēsha divyēna chakshushā manasaitān kāmān paśyan ramatē ya ētē Brahmaḷōkam*,⁵⁵⁸ etc., says that the *mukta* will attain the *sarvagna* state. And similarly the *Sruti* text *Sarvam ha-paśyaḥ paśyati sarvamāpnōti sarvagna*, etc., states clearly that when he attains *sarvagnatva* the *mukta* perceives that there is no difference between *sushupti* and *marāṇa*. And the saying declared in the *Sruti* text *Ētēbhyō bhūtēbhyah samulththāya tānyēvānuvinaśyati*, etc., will have been experienced, so that the *mukta* does not experience anything beyond himself. Therefore, according to the *Sruti* text *Tasmāt prāgnēnātmanā*, etc., he will have obtained that state of self-knowing wherein he does not, as stated in the *Sūtra*, require the help of others.⁵⁵⁹

Verily, according to the *Sruti* text *Sarvēshu lōkēshu kāmachārō bhavati* । *Imān lōkān kāmān kāmārūpyanusancharan*,⁵⁶⁰ etc., the *mukta* can, through his meditation of Paraśiva Brahman without any break, can freely travel all over the worlds (*lōkas*) as he wishes. If it is doubted how he could travel over various worlds simultaneously, keeping a plural number of bodies, our

⁵⁵⁵ In the *Chch. Upa.*, it is stated that in the *sushupti* state the *jīva* is enveloped by *prāṇa*, i.e., Brahman.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, VIII. 11. 2.

⁵⁵⁷ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 9. 1.

⁵⁵⁸ *Mukta. Upa.*

⁵⁵⁹ The *Sruti* says: *Svāpyaya sampattyōr anyatarāpēksham āviśh-*

⁵⁶⁰ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10. 5, [kritam hi,

answer is, "There is no need for such doubting." For from *Sruti* texts like *Sa nō bandhur janitā sa vidhātā dhāmāni vēda bhuvanāni viśvā*; ⁵⁶¹ *Yatra dēvā amrutamānaśuḥ tritīye dhāmanyabhyairayanta*; *Paridyāvā prithivī yanti sadyaḥ*; *Parilōkān paridiśaḥ parisuvaḥ Rutasya tantum vitatam vivrutya tadapaśyat tadabhavat* ¹ *prajāsviti*, etc., it is clearly proved that the *mukta* being absolutely liberated from the bondage of *avidyā*, enters the region of the all-pervading Brahman. The meaning of the *Sruti* text, *Ēsha hi dēva iti*, is that the all-renowned Mahādēva, the Creator of the universe, is our father (*asmākam bandhur janitā*); he is the cause of all our happiness and joys (*sa vidhātā sakalaśrēyasām kartā*); he possesses majestic lustre of an extraordinary kind (*dhāmāni tējorūpāni aprākrutāni*); he is the Creator of all the universe (*bhuvanāni viśvānyapi janitā*); he is the maker of the eternal abode of happiness and meditation (*tatra bandhuvādi yōgasya dhāma viśvasya cha prayōjanam uchyatē*). And making it the abode for the eternal company of *bandhus* (spiritual brothers) and staying in such (happy) regions is the chief utility of *gnāna*. *Yatra yasmin iha dēvā amrutam kaivalya lakshmīm na śāsa aprāpya-nubhavantāḥ dēvāḥ tadbhāvāt vēdanasīlāḥ tritīyē dyusangnakē tatpadē māyātītē dhāmāni nijatējaḥ, pradhānāni svābhimatāni abhyairayanta svīkritavantāḥ*: he becomes subject to the grace of Mahādēva, the possessor of the *svarūpa* of Parabrahman, who is the sole eternal well-wisher just as a father and spiritual brother (*bandhu*), who finally cuts off all bondage whereby immortality is attained (*amrutabhāvam gatūḥ*). The *mukta* in the third stage passes to the region of *Paramavyōma* (the distant sky), where his own permanent station is actively realized by him as the result of his meditation and worship. And therefore (he) is then said to have *parama prāpti*, i.e., to have attained the realization of the Supreme. The *Sruti* text *Paridyāvā prithivī yanti*, ⁵⁶² etc., says that a *mukta*

⁵⁶¹ *Rig-Vēda*, X. 82. 3.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*

will, by the strength of his realized position, put forth his glorious lustre all throughout the aerial regions, which finally reach the *Hiraṇyagarbha lōkas*, which position he will then realize. Then he will cover up by his lustre far beyond *Svargalōka*. In this way, all the *muktas* will be in this condition. Verily, it is said *Tēna sarvagnataḥ satya-karmaṇaḥ vistṛṇam bhōgam tantum vivṛitya bhūtā puṇya-pāpavinirmuktāḥ santaḥ sarva-prāṇishu tadēva Mahādēvākhyā vastapaśyan sarvātmakatayā tadabhavat tatsvabhāvāchchā-bhavat tatrēti sambandhaḥ*. Having realized that state of *sarvagnatva*, having obtained a large part of the *mukta* world and being released from the touch of all *puṇya* and *pāpa*, he immediately sees nothing except Mahādēva. This will be the natural final result of the *mukta*, who sees no other form except Mahādēva in himself (*Mahādēvākhyā vastapaśyan sarvātmakatayā tadabhavat*). He will thus be existing ever afterwards in that state. Therefore, those who are called *jīvas* at first finally develop into the *mukta* state by virtue of the *saddharma* of Mahādēva and will be afterwards called after Mahādēva (*Mahādēva śabda vāchyāḥ*). They will then be called by the designation of *Dēvavrata*, those who will spread over to and live in the regions of the distant sky. In the text *Yē dēvā divishadaḥ*, etc., is fully described the state of these *Dēvavratas*. In the *Purāṇas* also it is said: *Tē hi sākshāt divishadatvantariksha-sadastadā* ¹ *Prithivīshada ityantē dēva dēvavratāstunḍ iti*. In this text, *prithivī* implies the whole form of Brahmānda and the word *prākṛita* (in this text)⁵⁶³ implies the firmament (*antariksha*); *dvitīyam* implies the abode of *Māyā* (*Māyāpadam*); *tritīyam*, property of *ākāśa* (*ākāśa paryāyam*) synonymous with that form of pure *śakti* of Śivapada. And thus the *muktas* are those who have realized the *vibhūtvā rūpa* (i.e., the Supreme form).

Moreover, the *Sruti* text *Prāgnēnātmanā samparishvatau na bāhyam kinchana vēda nāntaram*,⁵⁶⁴ etc., states that

⁵⁶³ Not quoted but indicated in the citation.

⁵⁶⁴ *Bṛhad. Upa.*, IV. 3. 21.

muktas will not have any other knowledge about the world in any kind or form except that of Śiva. What is said in this text refers only to those who are tied to the bondages of the world, such as sleep, dream, etc. In other words, a *mukta* will have no more even the touch of a thought of any thing other than Śiva Parabrahman.

Thus ending his commentary on the *Sandhyādhikaraṇa*, Śrīpati proceeds to the consideration of the next topic, *viz.*, whether *muktas* attain to the power of creation of the world, etc. Verily, if it is said, remarks Śrīpati, that those *muktas* who by virtue of their meditation on and worship of Paraśiva Brahman are capable of realizing *satyasankalpatva*, *vyāpakatva*, *sarvagnatva* and other characteristics, the doubt arises whether they will also be in a position to bring into existence (by means of creation) man, *jagat*, etc., *i.e.*, whether they will also possess the powers of creation, protection and dissolution of the world. Śrīpati answers the question thus raised by saying that the next *Adhikaraṇa* sets the distinguishing marks of *muktas*⁵⁶⁵ and *Paramēśvara*. The first *Sūtra* in this *Adhikaraṇa* called the *Jagadvyāpārādhikaraṇam*, is IV. 4. 17, *Jagadvyāpāravarjam prakaraṇādasannihitatvāchcha*.

It having been clearly shown above that those who meditate on and worship the *niravayava* form of Śiva Parabrahman will realize Śiva's characteristics of *pūrnatva* and *vyāpakatva*—like the all-pervading sky—and realize *Śivatva* themselves; and it having been also shown above that those who meditate upon and worship the *sāvayava* form of Śiva will realize *vyāpakatva*—like the light which sheds its brilliance on the space all round and illuminates it—*svatantratva*, *sarvalōkasanchāratva*, *sarvakāmāvāptitva*, etc., in the present *Adhikaraṇa*, the distinctive marks of *mukta-jīvas* and *Paramaśiva* are further explained.⁵⁶⁶ In this *Sūtra*, where *jagadvyāpāravarjam* is treated of, the state of those

⁵⁶⁵ Those who have become *muktas* through meditation on Paraśiva Brahman.

⁵⁶⁶ What follows is the *Pūrvapaksha* argument.

who meditate on and worship Paraśiva Brahman, absolutely free from the influence (*vyāpāra*) of all thought about *dēva*, *gandharva*, *manushya* and every other kind of thing connected with the worldly creation, except their own individual realization of Paraśiva and his powers, is treated of. These only will realize the very form of Śiva (*Śivasyaiva*). Such can be no other than Śiva only. How? *Prakaraṇāt* (says the *Sūtra*). *Sruti* texts like *Tasmād vā ētasmāt ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ | ākāśādvāyuh | vāyōragniḥ | agnēr āpaḥ | adbhyaḥ prithivī | prithivyā ōshadhayaḥ | ōshadhībhyō'nnam | annāt puruṣaḥ | yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē | yēna jātāni jīvanti | yat prayantyaabhisamviśanti | tadviḥjignāsasva | tad Brahmēti* ⁵⁶⁷ *dhyāyītēsānam pradhyaītavayam* ⁵⁶⁸ *| sarvaṁ idam Brahma Viṣṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē*; ⁵⁶⁹ etc., prove that such meditators on such a form of Brahman will acquire the power of creating the *chētanāchētana* world—i.e., the characteristic of the living and the non-living—and also the power of creating *dēvatas* as well. And the *Srutis*, *Smritis* and *Purāṇas* bear witness to the fact that such meditators will acquire powers to create *dēvas* and every other being except themselves (*svaśarīrātirikta*). Moreover, as regards the expression *asannihitatvāchcha*, we have to observe that *Sruti* texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ ; Yō Brahmāṇam vidadhāti pūrvam yō vai vēdāmscha prahiṇōti tasmai ; Tamhi dēvaṁ ātmabuddhi prakāśam mumukshur vai śaraṇam aham prapadyē*, ⁵⁷⁰ etc., state that the *mukta* by virtue of his having acquired the power of creating *dēvas*, *gandharvas*, etc., like Paraśiva Brahman in the form of Hiraṇyagarbha, gets into contact with Paraśiva (*sannihitatvāchcha*) and enters into his *antaranga* (*antarangatvāt*) (i.e., becomes closely connected with him or enters into his interior). He thereby becomes immediately separated from those other *muktas* who have not acquired the powers of creation, etc. These *mukta*

⁵⁶⁷ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

⁵⁶⁸ *Atharvaśiras*.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid*.

⁵⁷⁰ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 18.

*jīvas*⁵⁷¹ are kept distant (*asannihitatvāt*) from those who have acquired the power of creation and have entered the *antaranga* of Paraśiva. That these (*i.e.*, those who have not yet acquired the power of creation) have not got the power of creating the *jagat*, *jīvas* (beings), etc., is the essence of this *Sūtra*. The doubt arises then whether *Sruti* texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*,⁵⁷² etc., give the power of creating *jagat* to those who attain *mukti* through meditation and realize *Śivatva* and to Śiva or only to Śiva Himself. *Sruti* texts like *Yadā paśyaḥ paśyatē rukmavarṇam kartāramāśam puruṣam Brahma yōnim* | *Tadā vidvān puṇya-pāpē vidhūya niraṇjanaḥ paramam sāmyam upaiti*||⁵⁷³ declare that Śiva grants to *muktas* Supreme Equality (*paramam sāmyam*). Also, *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā*,⁵⁷⁴ etc., explain that *muktas* obtain *satyasankalpatva* and other powers just as Paramēśvara Himself possesses. Again, *Sruti* texts like *Sa yadi pitrulōkakāmō bhavati*,⁵⁷⁵ etc., declare that by virtue of mere determination (*sankalpa*), a *mukta* will be able to create *pitrulōkas*, etc. And further *Sruti* texts like *Imān lōkān kāmānnī kāmārūpyanusancharan*,⁵⁷⁶ etc., state that the *mukta* is capable of every kind of creation (*sarvatra vyāpāradyōtanāt*). And therefore the *mukta* is almost the same as Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvara sāmyē sankalpa-yōgūchcha*). And therefore a *mukta*, like Paramēśvara, will have assumed the power of creation. Thus argues the Pūrvaapakshin. The answer to this doubt is: *Jagadvyāpāravarjam*, *i.e.*, according to this *Sūtra*, he is excluded from *jagadvyāpara*, *i.e.*, creation of the world, etc. The meaning of *jagadvyāpara* is *nikhila chētanāchētanā svarūpa sthiti pravruttibhēda niyamanam*, *i.e.*, the powers of creation, controlling, etc., of the whole animate and

⁵⁷¹ Of a lower kind—those who have not got the power of creation.

⁵⁷² *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

⁵⁷³ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

⁵⁷⁴ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 7.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, VIII. 2.

⁵⁷⁶ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10. 5.

inanimate world and their different states of existence. *Tad varjam*, i.e., that is excluded. What is excluded? *Nirasta nikhila tirōdhānasya nirvyāja Brahmānubhavarūpam muktasya aiśvaryam*. In the bliss that the *mukta* has earned, he is excluded from obtaining all the further hidden powers of the genuine (*nirvyāja*) Brahman and the state of his further enjoyments. How? *Prakaraṇāt nikhila jaganniyamanam hi Paraśiva Brahma prakṛityāmāmnāyatē*. The original power of creation, powers of control, etc., are solely ordained and reserved by Paraśiva Brahman as declared by the *Srutis*. *Sruti* texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*,⁵⁷⁷ *Dyāvāprithivī janayan dēva ēkaḥ*,⁵⁷⁸ *Sōmaḥ pavatē janitā matīnām*, etc., declare that *muktas* cannot commonly earn the characteristic (*nasamgachchatē*) power of creation, etc., of the world possessed by Brahman. This is an extraordinary power (for the *Muktajīva*) to possess. (It is a power that cannot be claimed by him—for it is reserved to Brahman).⁵⁷⁹ Similarly *Sruti* texts like *Sadēvasaumyēdam agra āsīt*,⁵⁸⁰ *Ēkam ēvādvitīyam*; *Tadaikshata bahusyām prajāyēyēti*; *Tattējō'srujata*; *Yadā tamastam na divā na rātriḥ na san na chāsachchiva ēva kēvalaḥ*; *Tadaksharam tatsavilur varēṇyam pragnācha tasmāt praśrutā purāṇi*,⁵⁸¹ *Brahma vā idam ēkam ēva agra āsīt* | *Tadēkam sannavyabhāvāt*; *Tachchrēyōrūpam atyasrujata kshatram yānyētāni dēva nakshatrāṇi*; *Indrō varuṇaḥ sōmo rudraḥ parjanyaō yamō mruthyur īśānaḥ*; *Ātmāvā idam ēkam ēva agra āsīt*; *Nānyat kinchana mishat*; *Sa īkshata lōkān asrujata*; *Sa imān lōkān asrujata*; *Ēka ēva rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthe*; beginning with *Yaḥ prithivyām tishṭhan prithivyā antarē* and ending with *Yā ātmani tishṭhan*, etc., declare that Paraśiva Brahman is quite peculiar in his characteristics which are indescribable in respect of his powers of creation, etc., of the universe

⁵⁷⁷ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

⁵⁷⁸ *Rig-Vēdu*, X. 82. 3.

⁵⁷⁹ This seems to be the point involved in the use of the word *asādhāraṇalakṣhaṇa*.

⁵⁸⁰ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

⁵⁸¹ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

and such characteristics cannot be attributed to a *mukta*, who cannot partake of any part of such *vyāpāra* (creation of the world, etc.). Moreover, while *Sruti* texts like *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē bhūtasya jātaḥ patir ēka āsīt; Sūryāchandramasau dhātā yathā-pūrvam akalpayat; Ēka ēva Nārāyaṇa āsīt; Nārāyaṇāt Brahmā jāyatē; Nārāyaṇāt Rudrō jāyatē; Ēkō ha vai Nārāyaṇa āsīn na Brahmā nēsānaḥ*,⁵⁸² etc., declare openly that Hiraṇyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa and others are evidently empowered with the powers of creation, etc., of the world, how can it be said, that to Śiva Parabrahman alone is reserved *jagad janmādikāraṇa*, etc. Therefore why should not *jagatkāraṇatvam* be attributed (without contradiction), in a similar way, to *muktas* as well? The answer is propounded in the next *Sūtra* IV. 4. 18, *Pratyakshōpadēśānnēti chēnnādhikārika maṇḍalasthōktēḥ*.

The expression *Pratyakshōpadēśāt* in the *Sūtra* explains the meaning of *Sruti* texts like *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē*, etc., which explain in a self-evident manner that Hiraṇyagarbha, Upēndra, etc., have the power of the creation of the world. If it is asked that Śiva Parabrahman is not the only one who is capable of creating the world, *Sruti* texts *Dhyāyītēśānam pradhīyāyitavyam, Sarvam idam Brahma Viṣṇu Rudrēn-drāstē samprasūyantē*,⁵⁸³ etc., state that just like Śiva, Hiraṇyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa, etc., though they have the power of creation, yet they cannot claim equality with Śiva Parabrahman. Why? Because (the *Sūtra* states that) *adhikārika maṇḍalasthōktēḥ*, i.e., the charge of superintending creation was given to Hiraṇyagarbha, Indra, etc., out of the grace of Paramaśiva, so that they may, within their respective domains, Vaikunṭha, etc., create the world, according to his specification (*upadēśa*). Also, *Sruti* texts like *Tēna dēvā ajayanta sādhyā rushayascha yē*, etc., declare that Śiva Parabrahman alone

⁵⁸² *Mahōpa.*, X. 19.

⁵⁸³ *Atharvaśiras*.

can bring into existence the *dēvas* and every other kind of creation, while secondary (*avāntara*) creations could only be done by Hiraṇyagarbha, etc., he himself being in them and guiding them.

Moreover, if it is asked that, according to *Sruti* texts like *Sa svarāt bhavati; Tasya sarvēshu lōkēshu kāmachārō bhavati; Imān lōkān kāmānnī kāmārūpya nusancharan*,⁵⁸⁴ etc., a *mukta* can derive all powers relating to the world (*jagadvyāpāra*) just like Para-mēśvara, the reply is "It is not so". These *Sruti* texts mean that the *mukta* having undergone several changes has at last realized the *vibhūti* state of Paraśiva Brahman, so that he can freely take any kind of divine body (*divya śarīra*) and enjoy like Brahma, Indra and Upēndra, as he pleases. Apart from that, he will have no control over the world (*Tasmāt na jagadvyāpārah*). If it is doubted whether even though a *mukta* becomes free from the bondage of the world, he should still, even in his realized state (of *mukta*), experience only happiness, continuing at the same time in the circumscribed position (*baddhassēva*) of a subordinate being (*antavadēva*)⁵⁸⁵ and whether all that he has attained is only a limited (*alpa*) happiness (*bhōga*), the following *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 19) removes this doubt:—*Vikārāvartī cha tathāhi sthitimāha*. The meaning of this *Sūtra* is *vikāre, janmādikē na vartata iti=vikārāvartī; nirdhūta nikhila vikāram, nikhila hēya pratyānīka kalyāṇaikatānam niratīśayānandam Paraśiva Brahma savibhūtikam sakala kalyāṇa-guṇam anubhavati muktaḥ*. After *mukti*, the *mukta* is absolutely free from further changes (*vikāra*); he will have abandoned by then all that he should have left behind; and he is fit to enjoy all happiness and pleasure, without any abatement in it, along with Paraśiva Brahman, in the fullness of his realized condition (*savibhūtikam*). A *mukta* enjoys every blessing and eminence. A *mukta* by reason

⁵⁸⁴ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10. 5.

⁵⁸⁵ *Antavat + ēva*.

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of his having entered into (*antargata*)⁵⁸⁶ Paraśiva Brahman will cease to undergo further change and therefore he is called the enjoyer of "bhukta bhōga" (i.e., *bhuktabhōgyatva*). That is, existing in Parabrahman, without further change, and enjoying limitless happiness is the state of a *mukta* while he exists in Parabrahman.⁵⁸⁷ *Sruti* texts like *Yadā hyēvaiśha ētasminnadriśyē anātmē aniruktē anilayanē abhayam pratishṭhām vindatē; Atha sō'bhayam gatō bhavati; Rasō vai saḥ; Rasam hyēvāyam labdhvā'nandībhavati*,⁵⁸⁸ etc., declare that the *mukta* enjoys the state of full blessed happiness in that *mukta's* world in which he exists. Other *Sruti* texts like *Tasmin lōkāḥ śritāḥ sarvē tadū nātyēti kaschana*, say that the *mukta* lives in that blessed world along with all others, without any diminishing of happiness and therefore he will be near Parabrahman, in him enjoying his realized condition like others enjoying full happiness. *Sruti* texts like *Sarvēśhu lōkēśhu kāmachārō bhavati*, etc., declare to the same effect that the *mukta* can exist as he pleases throughout the *mukta* world. Moreover, as regards those *sūris* (sages) who are *nitya muktas* and who inhabit the Kailāsa of Paramaśiva, who always move about as they desire, as stated in the *Sruti* text *Kāmānūrī kāmārūpyanusancharan*,⁵⁸⁹ etc., who could transform themselves into any kind of form and who are quite free from all worldly ties, *Sruti* texts declare that they are absolutely possessed of *ichchūśakti*, *grānaśakti* and *kriyāśakti* by which they can immortalise themselves in absolute happiness and self-effulgence and enjoy *Śivasāmarasya* (equality with Śiva), and can exhibit the full *Sarva Śivātmakabhāva*.⁵⁹⁰ Again, *Sruti* texts like *Ahamannamahamannamahamannam; Aham*

⁵⁸⁶ *Antargata* or *Antargama* : in ; into ; between ; in the middle ; inside ; within ; interior.

⁵⁸⁷ This is a condition (*sthitimāha*.)

⁵⁸⁸ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, III. 10. 5.

⁵⁹⁰ The stress is on *bhāva*, i.e., the *mukta* gets that peculiar *sta* or condition of possessing the endearing form of Śiva ; he exhibits the condition of Śivahood.

annādō'hamannādō'hamannādah,⁵⁹¹ etc., declare similarly to the same effect. And so the experience of a *mukta* is thus clearly shown. Further, *Sruti* texts like *Trishu dhāmasu yadbhōjyam bhōktā bhōgascha yadbhavēt*⁵⁹² *Tēbhyō vilakshanaḥ sākshī chinmātrō'ham Sadāśivaḥ* || *Mayyēva sakalam jātam mayi sarvam pratishtṛhitam* | *Mayi sarvam layam yāti tad Brahmādvayam asmyaham* || *Aṇōraṇyān ahamēva tadvanmahānaham viśvamidam vichitram* | *Purātanō'ham purushō'hamīśō hiraṇmayōham Śivarūpamasmi* || etc., declare that a *jīvanmukta* obtains the *Śivatva* with the designated characteristics (*upalakṣhaṇa*) of *Śivatva*, possessing the all-pervasive character of the sky and knowledge of Śiva like Vāmadēva and the like.⁵⁹³ Those *jīvanmuktas* have the form of Śiva, enjoy the form of Śiva, and enjoy all the powers of *Ichchāśakti*, *Gnānaśakti* and *Kriyāśakti* except that of creating the world, etc. The term *Aham* (Self) is used in the *Sruti* text (*Ahamannam*,⁵⁹⁴ etc.), to convey the idea of superiority and emulation to which state the *mukta* is raised in order to show himself in comparison with *dēvas*, *men* and others, who are indistinguishable in creed and who possess such characteristics. Here the word "*Aham*" should be understood to mean that the state of a *mukta* is *Śiva* himself and with all his full qualities (*Sakala chidachit prapanchāvagāhitvēna paripūrṇatvāchcha*). In this wise the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 20) *Darśayataschaivam pratyakṣhānumānē*, should be interpreted. In the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, it was said that the *mukta* who is a *pratyagātmā* (reflected form of Brahman) but subject to *niyamana* and to the control of Paramapurusha Paramaśiva, cannot have the right to *jagadvyāpāra* (creation, etc., of the world) and control of the *jagat*. By the expression *vyāpāra* is meant *nikhila jaganniyamanarūpaḥ*, i.e., the chief controlling power of all the worlds and their creation.

⁵⁹¹ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10.

⁵⁹² *Mānd. Upa.*, I. 5.

⁵⁹³ Vāmadēva is the name of a sage, said to have been an incarnation of Śiva.

⁵⁹⁴ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10.

Sruti and *Smriti* texts such as *Bhīshāsmādvātaḥ pavatē*, *Bhīshōdēti sūryaḥ*; *Bhīshāsmādaghnischa indrascha mrutyurdhāvati panchamaḥ*;⁵⁹⁵ *Ētasya vā aksharasya praśāsane gārgī*; *Suryāchandramasau vidhrutau tishthataḥ*,⁵⁹⁶ etc.; texts like *Ēsha sarvēśvara ēsha bhūtādhipatiḥ ēsha bhūtapāla ēsha sēturvidhāraṇaḥ ēshām lōkānām asamhēdāya*,⁵⁹⁷ etc.; *Apa ēva sasarjādau tāsu vīryamapūsrujat*; the following text from *Manu Smriti*: *Sivēnōtpāditam Sivēna parivakshyatē punaḥ Sivē Mahādēvē līyatē sacharūcharam*; statements in the *Satātapa* and many other texts declare that Śiva alone is the cause of creation, etc. *Sruti* texts such as *Niranjanaḥ paramam sāmyamupaiti*; *Muktaḥ Śivasamō bhavati*,⁵⁹⁸ etc., declare that *muktas* attain only a state equal to that of Śiva and attain to sameness (*samō*, i.e., identity or equality) with him *without* acquiring his other powers, such as *jagatkāraṇatva*, etc., and therefore to such *muktas* as appear as Śiva (*Sivavattēshām*) it is but right that they cannot have the power of *jagadvyāpāra* as it is excluded from their purview.⁵⁹⁹ *Sruti* texts like *Ēkō vishṇur mahadbhūtam prithagbhūtānyanēkaśaḥ*, etc., and *Pādō'sya viśvābhūtāni tripādasya amrutam divi*,⁶⁰⁰ etc., declare that the expression *viśvābhūtāni* denotes the infinite, innumerable and unending *Brahmāṇḍas* which are existing and *Nārāyaṇa*, *Indra*, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, etc., stand for the animated creation among them and *Bhūpati* stands for *Paramaśiva*; and the *Sruti* text *Tripādasya amrutam divi*⁶⁰¹ stands for the *Satchidānanda Sivapada* which characterizes the remaining three-fourths of the world. And, therefore, *Paramaśiva* surpasses all the three (*Brahma*, *Vishṇu* and *Kālarudra*) in greatness.

And, therefore, though according to the text of the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*, *Sivam advaitam chaturtham*

⁵⁹⁵ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 8.

⁵⁹⁶ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, III. 8. 9.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, VI. 4. 22.

⁵⁹⁸ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

⁵⁹⁹ This defines limit of *Sāmarasya* set down by *Srīpati*.

⁶⁰⁰ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 12.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*

manyantē sa ātmā sa vignēyaḥ ; and the text of the *Taittirīya Upanishad*, *Yō vēdādaḥ svarāḥ prōktō vēdāntē cha pratishtḥitaḥ* । *Tasya prakriti līnasya yaḥ parāḥ sa mahēśvaraḥ*, etc., which mean that the *jīvanmukta* attains that form equal to or same as Mahēśvara (*paratvam mahēśvara sāmyatvam*) which denotes *akārōkāramakārātmaka Brahma Viṣṇu Kālarudra* and that though he attains to *paramasāmyatva*, yet the statement *jagadvyāpāravarjām* is not contradicted. Verily, though the *muktas* are excluded from the powers of Mahēśvara (such as *jagad janma*, etc.), yet both the *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* texts, such as *Niranjanaḥ paramam sāmyam upaiti*;⁶⁰² *Muktaśśivasamō bhavēt*, etc., declare without contradiction that a *mukta* is entitled to obtain *paramasāmyatva*. This contradiction between the *Sūtra* and the *Sruti*s is unavoidable (*durnivāraḥ*, i.e., difficult to ward off). To meet the doubt (*āśankya*) arising from this apparent contradiction, the *Sūtrakāra* propounds the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 21) *Bhōgamātra sāmyalingāchcha*. In this *Sūtra*, the expression *Bhōgamātra* establishes that the *mukta* is entitled to enjoy all that is granted by the *Sruti*s, viz., the state of Brahman within the limits prescribed for those who meditate on the Mūrta Paraśiva form of Parabrahman and nothing more. The expression *lingāchcha* denotes that with the exception of the power of *jagadvyāpāra*, reserved to Paramēśvara alone, he can enjoy every other form of happiness (i.e., every power except *jagadvyāpāra*). But if it is said that *muktas* generally have *jagadvyāpāra* without contradicting *Sruti* texts like *Sō'snut ē sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaschitā*,⁶⁰³ etc., and that a *mukta* is equal to Paramapurusha Śiva in all his enjoyments, then the reply is that the expression *Lingāt*⁶⁰⁴ in the *Sūtra* restricts his power for enjoyment with Paramaśiva. Hence the expression *jagadvyāpāravarjām* : excepting *jagadjanmādikāraṇatva*, etc. Even though the *mukta* meditated upon the formless form of Śiva Parabrahman,

⁶⁰² *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

⁶⁰³ *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 8.

⁶⁰⁴ *Linga* means distinguishing mark or characteristic.

yet that particular power of *jagatkāraṇatva* can never be obtained by the *mukta-jīvas*; even though they be *dēvas*, *manushyas*, etc., they can never aspire to get it, even if they obtained many other kinds of forms among *muktas*. *Sruti* texts like *Ēsha hyēvānandayati*,⁶⁰⁵ etc., declare that there is a graded (*tāratamya*) difference between the worshipper and the worshipped, in what is attained and what is aimed at (for attainment). Such a thing also is not in contradiction (to the *Sruti* texts), for we read in the *Skānda*, *Yadyapi bhēdāpagamē sāmbatavāham na māmakēnastvam*; *Sāmudrō hi tarangaḥ kvachana samudrō na tarangaḥ*, etc., and *Yadā sarvē pramuchyantē kāmā yasya hridi sthitāḥ*; *Atha marthyō'mrutō bhavati yatra Brahma samaśnutē*;⁶⁰⁶ *Na tatra prāṇānnōtkrāmantē tattraiva samavalīyantē*; etc. These texts declare that those who meditate upon the formless form of Śiva Parabrahman attain that knowledge which makes them realize all their desires for obtaining *Śivatattva* soon after the *lingaśarīra*⁶⁰⁷ is destroyed. *Sruti* texts such as *Gnātvā śivam śāntim atyantamēti*, *Na sa punarāvartatē na sa punarāvartatē*,⁶⁰⁸ etc., declare that the *mukta* enters into that state of *Śivatattva*, after which he has no *punarāvritti* (no turning back). As the meditation and worship of *vyāpaka* Brahman in a particular form is unreal just as the rope which is mistaken for a serpent, similarly *mukti* is not realizable through meditation and worship of such an unreal form of Brahman. So, the answer to the question whether *mukti* is realizable through meditation and worship of such a form of Brahman who is *nirguṇa* and *nirviśēsha*, thereby postulating *punarāvritti*, is that as declared in *Sruti* texts like *So'snutē sarvān kāmān saha (Brahmanā)*,⁶⁰⁹ etc., a *baddha jīva* also will attain through meditation such a state of Brahman as the

⁶⁰⁵ *Taitt. Br.*, III. 2. 12.

⁶⁰⁶ *Kaṭha Upa.*, VI. 14.

⁶⁰⁷ The subtle frame or body, the indestructible original of the gross or visible body. Cf. *Panchakōśa*.

⁶⁰⁸ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, III. 8.

result of his full realization. And if it is doubted whether such a thing is possible, the next *Adhikaraṇa* (*Anāvṛitti śabdādhikaraṇam*) ensures that position as the result of the firm truth definitely declared throughout all the *Vēdas* and *Siddhāntas*.

This *Adhikaraṇa* consists of one *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 22), *Anāvṛittiśabdāt anāvṛittiśabdāt*. In the previous *Sūtra*, it was declared that a *mukta* will, by virtue of meditation, power and *bhakti* realize *sālōkya*, *sarvakāmāvāpti* and *sāmya* with *satyasankalpa sarvachētanāchētana prapanchādhika bhakta-parādhīna paramakāruṇika Umāpati*, who is *Parabrahman* but does not attain to *jagatkāraṇatva*, which is an extraordinary (*ananyasādhāraṇa*) *dharma*. That is, *Umāpati* *Parabrahman* has got this power *solely* in him. In this *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 22), in accordance with *Sruti* texts like *Brahmavidāpnōti param Brahma vid Brahmaiva bhavati*;⁶¹⁰ *Tarati śōkam ātmavit* ; *Gnātvā Śivam śāntim atyantamēti*;⁶¹¹ and *Tattvamasi*, etc., it is declared that those who meditate upon and worship the form of *niravayava* *Brahman* will realize *Brahmātmakatva*. So, according to the *Lōharasādi nyāya*,⁶¹² a *mukta* by virtue of his meditation on that (formless) form of *Paramēśvara* alone will naturally realize *Śivatattva*.⁶¹³ He has no *punarāvṛitti* just like a *pāśabaddha jīva*.

But in the text *Umāsahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakaṇṭham praśāntam । Dhyātvā munir-gachchati bhūtayōnim samastasākshim tamasaḥ parastāt* ||⁶¹⁴ it is declared that those who worship the *mūrtā* form of *Paraśiva* will realize that extraordinary state of existence,

⁶¹⁰ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

⁶¹¹ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

⁶¹² By the use of the juice of a plant, a base metal is turned into gold.

⁶¹³ *Tattva* : The true state ; the real nature of the human soul or the material world as being identical with the Supreme Spirit pervading the universe. It should be noted that he attains *Śivatva* and not *Paraśivatva*, which is an *ananyasādhāraṇa dharma* referred to by *Srīpati*.

⁶¹⁴ *Kaivalya Upa.*

i.e., attaining *Sivatva*, after absolutely shaking off all their worldly qualities. Also, *Sruti* texts like *Vēdānta vignāna sunischitārthāḥ sanyāsayōgāt yatayaḥ śuddhasattvāḥ* | *Tē Brahmālōkētu parāntakālē parāmrutāt parimuchyanti sarvē*, etc.;⁶¹⁵ *Sa khalvēvam vartayan yāvadāyusham Brahmālōkam abhisampadyatē* ; *Na cha punarāvartatē na cha punarāvartatē*, etc., declare that those who meditate upon and worship the *mūrtā* form of Mahēśvara, after realizing all that they desire and after enjoying it in *Brahmalōka* along with Paraśiva Brahman, will finally cease to turn back (*na cha punarāvartatē*) ; and thereafter, it is in evidence in the *Srutis* that they will attain, in accordance with the *Bhramarakīṭa nyāya*, because of their fullness of knowledge (*vignāna paripūrṇa bhāvēna*), *Sivasāyujya siddhi*.

This *Sūtra* teaches in its essence that those *baddha-jīvas* who meditate on and worship the *mūrtā* form of Paraśiva Brahman will attain the never-returning state (*punarāvrittir na sambhavatīti sūtrasūchita sūksh-mārthāḥ*). *Sruti* texts like *Umāsahāyam Paramēśvaram prabhum*,⁶¹⁶ etc., declare also that those who meditate upon and worship the *mūrta Brahman* will also attain *Śivatattva*, and thus, agreeably to the *Sruti* text, *Tarati śōkam ātmavit, amūrta brahmōpāsakas* will be absolutely free from the touch of the sorrows flowing from family life. And if it is asked whether both *mūrtōpāsakas* and *amūrtōpāsakas* will alike realize *apunarāvritti*, then the answer is that, as stated in *Sruti* texts like *Sō'snutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā vipaschitēti*,⁶¹⁷ etc., *mūrta-brahmōpāsakas* will attain *sarvakāmavāpti*, i.e., all their desired states in *mukti*, we state that *Sruti* texts like *Yadā sarvē pramuchchyantē kāmā yasya hridi sthitāḥ* | *Atha martyō' mritō bhavati yatra Brahma samaśnutē* ;⁶¹⁸ *Atmānam chēdvi jānīyāt ayamasmīti pūrushaḥ* ; *Kimichchan kasya kāmāya śarīram anusancharēt*, etc., declare that all those

⁶¹⁵ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 15. 1.

⁶¹⁶ *Kaivalya Upa.*

⁶¹⁷ *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 8.

⁶¹⁸ *Kaṭha Upa.*, VI. 14.

who have realized the real knowledge of Brahman will obtain all their desires (*sarva kāma*) whether they be *mūrtabrahmōpāsakas* or others and to them there will be no *punarāvritti*.

Moreover, texts like *Kāmānnī kāmārūpyanusancharan*,⁶¹⁹ etc., declare that *muktas* who meditate upon *mūrta Brahman* will attain the power of assuming any kind of form they like and enjoy every kind of happiness (*bhōga*) they like. And this is self-granted by the *Sruti* text *Kartrutvam arthāt siddhyati*. Further, *Sruti* texts like *Puṇyachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē karmachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē ; Jyōtishṭōmēna svargakāmō yajēta ; Kshīṇē puṇyē martya-lōkam viśanti*;⁶²⁰ etc., declare that just as those who get their existence in the world as soon as they finish the enjoyment in *svarga*, similarly those *bhaktas* who realize Kailāsa, may also chance to come to the world, if they so desire. Texts like *Parīkshya lōkān karmachitān Brāhmaṇō nirvēdam āyāti ; Nāstyakritaḥ kritēna ;* etc., declare that those who have completed their *karma* and are entitled to *mōksha*, do not any more enter the world as they have finished with it. If it is doubted whether a *mukta*, by virtue of his meditation on *mūrta Brahman*, cannot on any account realize *eternal mukti*, we declare that *Sruti* texts like *Tē Brahmalōkē tu parāntakālē ; Nārāyaṇaḥ param Brahma tattvam Nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ*,⁶²¹ etc., state that the term *Brahma* (*Brahma śabda*) refers, according to customary usage, to *Chaturmukha* only and therefore one should realize only those regions (*i.e.*, the regions of *Chaturmukha*, *i.e.*, *Brahma*). And for those who worship the form of *Nārāyaṇa* as *Parabrahman*, they will also obtain those regions where *Nārāyaṇa* is *Parabrahman*, according to customary usage. And therefore the term "Brahma" is common to *Chaturmukha* and *Nārāyaṇa*. And these will gradually, after several generations, realize the

⁶¹⁹ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10. 5.

⁶²⁰ *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 14. 3.

⁶²¹ *Mahōpa.*, XI. 10.

forms of *Chaturmukha* and *Nārāyaṇa* without experiencing a turning back (*punarāvritti*). With regard to the rest, cannot eternal *mukti* be obtained by those who meditate upon and worship the *sāvayava* form of Brahman? The answer is *anāvrittiśabdāt anāvrittiśabdāt*. According to *Sruti* texts like *Dvē vāva Brahmanō rūpē mūrtanchāmūrtam ēva cha*;⁶²² *Tadādi madhyānta vihinamēkam vibhum chidānandam arūpam adbhutam*; *Umāsahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakaṇṭham praśāntam*;⁶²³ etc., Śiva Parabrahman has two forms, *niravayava* and *sāvayava*. Texts like *Virūpēbhyō viśvarūpēbhyāścha vō namō namaḥ*, etc., found in the *Śatarudrīya*, declare that devout followers (*bhaktānām*) can realize both the forms. Both those who meditate upon and worship the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms of Brahman will attain to *anāvritti*, because it is so declared in the *Vēda*. Also *Sruti* texts like *Dhyātvā munirgachchati bhūtayōnim*,⁶²⁴ etc., definitely predicate *anāvritti* particularly to those who meditate only upon the *mūrtā* form, while texts such as *Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya* | *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣam upaiti divyam*;⁶²⁵ *Ēsha samprasādō'smāt śarīrāt samutthāya param jyōli rūpa-sampadya svēna rūpēna abhinishpadyatē*,⁶²⁶ predicate *apunarāvritti*, i.e., no coming back again (i.e., into the world).

As regards those who are *āmūrtōpāsakas* (those who meditate upon the formless form of Brahman), they will enjoy well all their desires (*sarvān kāmān*) in the company of Brahman (*saha Brahmanā*). In the *Sruti* text (*Sō'snutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā*), the peculiar characteristics of the *baddhajīva* (the *jīva* in bondage) are seen and how it realizes Brahman in enjoying all its desires. *Sruti* texts like

⁶²² *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 3. 1.

⁶²³ *Kaivalya Upa.*

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁵ *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1.

⁶²⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 14.

Āptakāmaḥ pūrṇakāmō nishkāmō jīrṇakāmō bhavati, etc., clearly prove that *muktātmans* realize just like Brahman himself (i.e., in the same measure as Brahman) all the characteristics of Brahman and acquire the independence of Brahman for attaining all their desires. If bondage is admitted to exist by the learned (*vidushām*), then, according to texts like *Sō'kāmayaṭa bahusyām prajāyēyēti*, etc., it is absurd that even Brahman should have certain desires—which ends in *ativyāpti*. *Sruti* texts like *Yadā sarvē pramuchyantē kāmā yasya hridi sthitāḥ*,⁶²⁷ etc., predicate that those who meditate upon and worship Paraśiva Brahman without any desire (*nishkāma śruti*) will, at the end of their lives, realize Paraśiva (*Paraśiva prāpti*) having destroyed in course of time all kinds of bodily form. If this were not the case, then, those sages such as Vāmadēva, Śuka, Agastya, Dadhīchi, and others, who are *jīvanmuktas*, and others like Indra, Upēndra and Hiraṇyagarbha would not realize what they wanted. *Sruti* texts like *Kāmānnī kāmārūpyanusancharan*,⁶²⁸ etc., have admitted that *muktas* will realize *Śivasālōkya* (i.e., realize eternal undiminishing happiness with Śiva). Also, while *Sruti* texts like *Śraddhā bhakti dhyāna yōgādavēhi*; *Ātmānam arañim kritvā praṇavanṇa uttarāraṇim*; *Dhyāna nirmathanā-bhyāsāt pāśam dahati paṇḍitaḥ*⁶²⁹; *Ksharam pradhānam amritāksharam haraḥ ksharātmanā viśatē dēva ēkaḥ*;⁶³⁰ *Tasyābhidhyānāt yōjanāt tattvabhāvāt bhūyaschāntē viśva-māyā nivrittih*; *Amritasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam*; *Sarīrammē vicharṣaṇam*; *Triyambakam yajāmahē sugandhim puṣṭi vardhanam*; *Urvārukamiva bandhanāt mrutyōr mukshīyamāmrutāt*;⁶³¹ *Ātmāvā'rē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsītavyaḥ* ||⁶³² etc., definitely enunciate that

⁶²⁷ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 4. 7.

⁶²⁸ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10. 5.

⁶²⁹ *Kaivalya Upa.*

⁶³⁰ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 10.

⁶³¹ *Atharvasīras.*

⁶³² *Bṛihaa. Upa.*, II. 4. 5.

bhakti and *dhyāna* of Paraśiva Brahman through *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇa*, *pūjā*, *namaskāra*, *śravaṇa*, etc., will enable the *mukta* to attain the *bodily form* of Paraśiva Brahman (*sākshāt Paraśivaprapatti*). The procedure adopted in the method of meditation and worship through sacrificial offerings, such as *jyōtiṣṭōma*, etc., will make a *mukta* get back into creation again.⁶³³

Sruti texts like *Yāvadāyusham Brahmālōkam abhisampadyatē na cha punarāvartatē*,⁶³⁴ etc., declare that the expression *Brahmalōka* should be interpreted as applying to the world of *Chaturmukha*, as stated in the *Srutis*, *Purāṇas*, etc. Therefore, such of those as meditate upon the form of *Chaturmukha* Brahma will realize only his world. *Sruti* texts like *Tvam dēvānām Brāhmaṇānām adhipatiḥ*; *Vishṇuḥ kshatriyānām adhipatiḥ*,⁶³⁵ etc., and *Smṛiti* texts like *Brāhmaṇānām Sivō dēvaḥ kshatriyānām tu Mādhavaḥ*, etc., declare that Vishṇu is the deity of the Kshatriyas. And as Nārāyaṇa does not combine in himself the *kārya* and *kāraṇatva*, and lacks the overlordship over the Trinity (*mūrtitrāyātītatva*, etc.), *Parabrahmatva* cannot fitly go with Nārāyaṇa. *Mahōpanishad* texts such as *Nārāyaṇaḥ Parambrahma*, etc., settle that Śiva who is the overlord of Nārāyaṇa is Parabrahman. Later on, in the texts *Brahmādhipatiḥ Brahmaṇōdhipatiḥ* *Brahmā Sivō mē astu Sadāśivōm*; *Ritam satyam param brahma puruṣam krishṇapīṅgalam*; *Ūrdhvarētam virūpākṣham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ*,⁶³⁶ etc., the words *Śiva* and *Brahma* are clearly used synonymously, just as *ghaṭa*, *kumbha* and *kalaśa* are. In the *Māṇḍūkya* text *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam śivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē*; *Sa ātmā sa vighnēyaḥ*; and in the

⁶³³ *Sruti* texts predicate *Śivasākshātkāra* to those who offer *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇa*, etc., through *bhakti* and *dhyāna*, there being no *punarāvṛitti* for them; but to those who offer sacrifices, there is *punarāvṛitti* for them and so they will get back to creation.

⁶³⁴ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 15. 1.

⁶³⁵ *Kaivalya Upa.*

⁶³⁶ *Mahōpa.*, X. 11.

Kaivalya text beginning with *Umāśahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakaṇṭham praśāntam*⁶³⁷ and ending with *Sa Brahmā sa Śivaḥ sa Hariḥ sēndraḥ sō'ksharaḥ paramaḥ svarāt*,⁶³⁸ Śiva alone is spoken of as the overlord above the Trinity (*mūrtitrayātītatva*). And also the *Atharvaśiras* texts *Dhyāyītēśānam pradhīyāitavyam*; *Sarvamidam Brahma Vishnu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē*; and *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyat parityajya*, declare that every deity other than Śiva is prohibited for purposes of meditation. The expression *śivamkara* plainly indicates, agreeably to the *Bhramarakīṭa nyāya*, *śivam karōtīti śivamkara* which means that the meditation makes the *bhakta* get Śiva's own form (*svasvarūpa pradāyakatvam*). The word *Bhagavān* is generally seen used in the case of Indra, Upēndra, Dinēndra, Chandra, Yatīndra, etc., in worldly language⁶³⁹ (*i.e.*, in common parlance). The word *Bhagavān* is also used in connection with Śiva in the *Śvētāśvētara Sruti*, *Brahmakāṇḍa*, etc., for example in texts like *Sarvānana śirōgrīvaḥ sarvabhūta guhāśayaḥ* | *Sarvavyāpī cha Bhagavān tasmāt sarvagataḥ Śivaḥ* || etc. And also in the text of the *Atharvaśiras*: *Yō vai Rudraḥ sa Bhagavān yaścha Brahma* | *Yō vai Rudraḥ sa Bhagavān yaścha Vishnuḥ*; etc. The expression *Bhagavān* is frequently used for "Śiva" as an attribute. Also, in the *Satarudrīya*, in the text *namastē astu Bhagavan Viśvēśvarāya Mahādēvāya*, etc. Similarly such expressions like "*Bhagavān*" have been applied to deities other than Śiva in common worldly parlance. But we should hold that there is a difference between the word as used in the *Sruti* texts and as used in common worldly parlance. The former must be admitted as indicating a more appropriate and stronger (*balīyastvāt*) usage. And therefore the word "*Bhagavān*" is chiefly applicable to no other deity but Śiva.

Sripati's Final Summing up.

Thus at the commencement of the *jīgnāsa*, in discussing the first *Sūtra* (*Athātō Brahmajīgnāsa*), it was

⁶³⁷ *Kaivalya Upa.*

⁶³⁸ *Mahōpa.*, XI. 19.

⁶³⁹ The text has *laukika prayōga*.

concluded that a *mumukshu* should, after discussion, know Brahman. In this connection, the argument relating to the *nirviśēshatva* of Brahman was completely repudiated (*nirastah*) and Brahman was proved to be *saviśēsha*. In the second *Sūtra* (*Janmādyasya yataḥ*) it was, agreeably to the maxim *Lakṣaṇa-pramāṇādñā hi vastu siddhiḥ*,⁶⁴⁰ clearly proved that in order to realize Brahman, the characteristics (of Brahman) should be clearly understood. And the characteristics of Brahman (*viśēshatva*) are fully borne out in the second *Sūtra*. In order to further establish the characteristics of Brahman, *Sruti* texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*;⁶⁴¹ *Tasmādvā yētasmat ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*; *Yasya niśśvasitāni vēdāḥ*; *Rigvēdō yajurvēdassāmavēdō hyatharvaṇaḥ* and *Tantvaupanishadam puruṣam pruchchāmi*,⁶⁴² etc., have been adduced. These texts substantiate the truth of the third *Sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, *Sāstrayōnitvāt*, which establishes that Brahman is the chief cause and effect of creation of *prapancha* and by this means the *nirviśēsha vāda* and *jagad asatyatva vāda* have been repudiated. It has also been proved that there is nothing like any *asat padārtha* (unreal object), just as in the same way that there is no pair of horns to a rabbit (*śaśaśringādēḥ*). And such a thing cannot possibly come to pass (*i.e.*, into existence). And it has been clearly proved that all things are real (*sat padārthasyaiva utpattiḥ nirdiṣṭā*) and that nothing created could be unreal on the authority of the *Sūtras* enunciated by Bādarāyaṇa, *Asaditichēna pratiśhēdha mātratvāt* (II. 1. 7) and *Paṭavaścha* (II. 1. 19). So that even when the whole creation is reduced to *pralaya* or destruction yet, according to the *Bījānkura nyāya*, the germ of the thing exists in an infinitesimally minute form. Just as when an extended cloth is compressed, it exists in a very small form, the world also exists in a shrunken state in a *sūkshma* form and gets extended in the form of creation. Therefore the *prapancha*, which is real, cannot be said to be

⁶⁴⁰ A thing is recognized fully by its characteristics.

⁶⁴¹ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*, II. 1.

asat. And the *jīvas* who are in the *chētana* form are also eternal in their own forms (*svarūpatō nityatvam*), just as Paramātmā is eternal (*Paramātmavat upadiṣṭam*). On the strength of the *Sruti* text *Nityō nityānām chētanaśchētanānām*⁶⁴³ and also on the strength of the *Smṛiti* texts like *Pravāhavat prapanchasya satyatvam upadiśyatē* । *Svarūpatōhi satyatvam chētanānām vidhīyatē* । *Ativirōdhāna satyatvam svatassiddham Śivasya hi* ॥ etc., the learned delight in thinking about the *nirviśēsha chinmātra Brahmavāda*.⁶⁴⁴ If it is denied that the glorious body of Brahman is as unreal as the delusion in mistaking *rajju* for *sarpa* (*rajju sarpavat*), then how could the truth of the *Sruti* text *Bhīshāsmādvātaḥ pavatē, bhīshōdēti sūryaḥ, bhīshāsmā-dagnischēndrascha, mrityur dhāvati panchamaḥ*,⁶⁴⁵ etc., be clearly explained by the learned and how could the Sun as well as Vāyu (wind) be infused with fear against the extravagant discharge of their (respective) functions? In the *Sruti* text *Indrō māyābhiḥ pururūpa īśānaḥ*,⁶⁴⁶ etc., Paramaśiva, who is distinguished by Paramaiśvarya, is proved to manifest himself through his *māyāśakti* in various *bodily* forms characterized by several (countless) *lakshanas*, as is seen from the *Sruti* text *Sthirēbhirangaiḥ pururūpa ugraḥ*, etc., which figures he was pleased to partake of, assuming most brilliant and uncommonly auspicious appearances of pure knowledge and significance, which are all eternal and which will have to be given up (*dattānjali prasangaḥ*) as if by the (proverbial) pouring of water (when donating away something). Moreover, texts like *Yadā tamasṭam na divā na rātrir na san na chāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ*,⁶⁴⁷ etc., proclaim an unusual form assumed by Śiva at the time of *Mahāpralaya*. In the

⁶⁴³ *Kaṭha Uṇ.*, V. 13.

⁶⁴⁴ *Nirviśēsha* and *chinmātra* are contradictory; if you have one of these, you cannot have the other. *Chinmātra* means *pure intelligence* and *nirviśēsha* means *attributelessness*.

⁶⁴⁵ *Taitt. Uṇ.*, II. 8.

⁶⁴⁶ *Rig-Vēda*, II. 7. 17.

⁶⁴⁷ *Svēta. Uṇ.*, IV. 18.

Sruti text *Rudra yattē dakṣiṇam mukham tēna mām pāhi nityam*,⁶⁴⁸ etc., Paramēśvara is described as having had no birth. Again, texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharṣiḥ*;⁶⁴⁹ *Purāṣya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvikī gnāna-bala-kriyā cha*; *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyinantu Mahēśvaram*; *Tasyāvayavabhūtōttham vyāptam sarvamidam jagat*,⁶⁵⁰ etc., declare for Śiva *viśvādhikatvam*, *sarvaśaktitvam* and *sarvakāraṇatvādikam*. Moreover, texts like *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthuḥ na tasya kāryam kāraṇam cha vidyatē na tatsamaśchābhyadhikaścha dṛiṣyatē*, etc., declare *advitīyam* (for Śiva). Texts such as *Purushō vai Rudraṣan mahō namō namaḥ*; *Viśvam bhūtam bhuvanam chitram bahudhā jātam jāyamānam cha yat*; *Sarvōhyēsha Rudraḥ tasmai Rudrāya namō astu*; *Viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ*,⁶⁵¹ etc., declare that Śiva is *viśvātmaka* (all-pervasive in the universe). And *Sruti* texts like *Namō hiraṇyabāhavē sēnānyē disām cha patayē namaḥ*; *Hiraṇyāya namaḥ*; *Hiraṇyalingāya namaḥ*; *namō hiraṇya bāhavē hiraṇyarūpāya hiraṇyapatayē ambikāpatayē umāpatayē hiraṇyavarṇāya paśupatayē namō namaḥ*,⁶⁵² etc., declare for Śiva *jyōtirmayatva* (the all-supreme Light).⁶⁵³ If it is asked how does the term “*hiraṇya*” come to mean “*jyōtis*”, then the reply is that in the *Śāstras* the term “*hiraṇya*” is well known to mean “as consisting of a fiery element” (*vahnīyātmakatvam*). And the term “*jyōtis*”, in the light of the above meaning, means Śiva who prevails in the Sun, who is bright-bodied, who is as well in Fire, which has a golden colour and in the form of a flowing lustre (*dravatvaprasaktyā nityatvaprasaṅgō durnivāraḥ*). And generally speaking, the term cannot be understood as bearing any other meaning. In the *Atharvaśiras* text, God’s own expression (*Bhagavad vachanam*) is, *Pushkaramaḥam pavitramamaḥ agryancha*

⁶⁴⁸ *Kaivalya Upa.*

⁶⁴⁹ *Mahōpa.*, XI. 19.

⁶⁵⁰ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

⁶⁵¹ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10.

⁶⁵² *Mahōpa.*, XI. 18.

⁶⁵³ *Jyōtis*, light of Brahman; light regarded as the Supreme Spirit.

madhyancha bahiścha purastāt ; Jyōtirahamēkaḥ sarvē cha māmēva ; mām yō vēda sa sarvān vēdān vēdēti, etc. : “ I am Pushkara ; I am Pavitra ; I am the Foremost ; I am the Middle ; I am the Outside ; I am everything leading ahead ; and he that knows me that I am the all-glowing Light, he will have known everything.” Thus it is said in the *Śaiva Purāṇa* : *Dinakritkōṭisankāśam sthānam-adyamumāpatēḥ । Sarvakāma samāyuktam viśuddham nityam avyayam । Samprāpya tatpadam divyam atah klēśa vivarjitāḥ । Sarvagnāssarvadā suddhāḥ paripūrṇā bhavanti cha । Viśuddhākāryakaraṇāḥ paramaiśvaryaśamyutāḥ । Sadēhāścha vidēhāścha bhavantyātmēchchayā punaḥ । Yē samprāptāḥ param sthānam gnānayōgaratā narāḥ । Na tēśhām punarāvrittiḥ ghōrē samsāramaṇḍalē* । etc. These and other texts declare that he who is in the place of Paramaśiva in *Mahākailāsa* (*Paramaśivasthānasya mahākailāsasya*), possessing a light resembling (*sankāśa*) millions of suns (*dinakrit kōṭi*), will doubtless enjoy all *jyōtirmayatva* (Supreme Light). In the *Sruti* text *Sō'dhvanah paramāpnōti tadviśṇōḥparamam padam*,⁶⁵⁴ if the words *tadviśṇōḥ paramam padam* are construed as being the *Paramapada*, then it should be said, “It is not so”. Because, it is said in the *Sruti* text, *Parāt parataram Brahma tatparāt paratō Hariḥ । Yat parāt paratō 'dhāsastanmē manaḥ śivasankalpamastu*, etc. Also, in the *Bōdhāyana Sūtra* and in the *Śivasankalpōpanishad*, it is declared that the state of *Mahēśvarapada* is much higher than that of *Vishṇupada*. In the above *Sruti* text, it is stated that the state of *Nārāyaṇa* is not so high as *Śivasthāna* and therefore *Śivasthāna* is the highest of all states. And it is higher than *Vishṇupada* and therefore the *Mukta Śiva* will enjoy *Brahmalōkam*. *Tasmāt Brahmalōkam abhisampadyatē ; na cha punarāvartatē* is the meaning of the word *anāvritti* used in the *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 22).

And the term *Brahmalōka* should be taken to express *Sivapada*. For *Sruti* texts like *Virūpēbhyō viśvarūpēbhyascha vō namō namaḥ*, etc., declare that those who meditate upon

⁶⁵⁴ *Rig-Veda*, X. 90. 3.

the formless form of Śiva and realize the *niravayava* state will enjoy *Śivapada* in the *niravayava* form ; and those who meditate upon the *sāvayava* form, will enjoy in the *viśvarūpa* form. *Sruti* texts like *Nīlagrīvāśśitikanṭhāśśarvā adhā kshamācharāḥ*, etc., declare that *bhaktas* in realizing *Śivapada* will have the characteristic of *nīlakanṭhatva* of *Īśvara* and such other similarities (*tādriśāni*) as owned by Śiva. And the suggestion of some that the word *anāvritti*, which is repeated twice in the *Sūtra*, indicates the ending of a chapter, is not approved of by us. It should be taken to indicate that the other qualities of Śiva will also be realized by the *mukta* in enjoying *Śivapada*.⁶⁵⁵

In the previously enunciated *Sūtras* such as *Ubhaya-vyapadēśāt ahikuṇḍalavat ; Ubhayathā cha dōshāt ; Na sthānato'pi parasyōbhayaṃ lingam sarvatra hi ; Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt ; Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa śabdādi-bhyaḥ* ; etc., Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa suggests that *dvaitādvaita* is the system which he approves of as containing the essence of the whole of the *Vēdānta* (*sarva vēdānta sankōcha dvaitādvaitamatam*). He holds that opinion from the start without anywhere contradicting himself and confirms it in the *Sūtra* propounded by him *Dvādaśāhavadubhaya vidham Bādarāyaṇō'taḥ* (IV. 4. 12). Therefore, for those who desire to follow in the path of the *Vēda*, the system of

⁶⁵⁵ Rāmānuja commenting on this *Sūtra*, writing of the repetition of the words in it, remarks:—"The repetition of the words of the *Sūtra* indicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine." Ānandatīrtha commenting on a similar repetition of words occurring in I. 4. 29 (the last *Sūtra* of the last *Adhikaraṇa* in that *Adhyāya*) *Ētēna sarvē vyākhyātā vyākhyātāḥ*, writes:—"In the *Varāha Samhita* this is said, 'In a work propounding general doctrines (leading to final conclusions), at the end of each chapter, the wise sages repeat the words twice over, so that what has been said from the beginning of the chapter may receive emphasis.'" Sankara has the following comment on the repetition in IV. 4. 22:—"The repetition of the words 'Non-return according to Scripture,' indicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine." The remark of Sripati may, accordingly, be held to apply to Ānandatīrtha.

Dvaitādvaita, which approves of both *dvaita* and *advaita*, should prove acceptable. This postulates that the *jīva* and Brahman during the *samsāra*daśa are naturally quite different from each other (*svābhāvīkabhinna*tvam); if in the *mōksha*daśa, the *jīva* is *abhinna* like Brahman himself (*tadvadabhinna*tvam); and Brahman is possessed of both the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms. Therefore those *bhaktas* who meditate upon these forms will realize both these states of Brahman. Personal testimony is accordingly borne in this *Sūtra* (*Anāvṛittīśabdāt anāvṛitti śabdāt*) that both the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms should be meditated upon in order to realize the state of Śiva Parabrahman. And therefore it is the confirmed truth that the system (*mata*) of the *Sūtrakāra* consists in the *dvaitādvaita mata*.

The Dvaita View.

Jayatīrtha in commenting on *Brahma-Sūtras* IV. 4. 17 (*Jagadyāpāravarjam*) states that if the *viduṣa* (*mukta*) became the essence of Brahman (*tādātmya*), i.e., obtained unity with Brahman, then it would mean that he has acquired *sarvalōkādhīpatyam*. In that case, the *Sūtrakāra* should have said that this wise man (i.e., *mukta*) would become Paramātmā himself. This much would have been sufficient. Instead, the *Sruti* text *Na tu so'mu-naiva iti*, etc., declares that he is by himself unable to get at, i.e., the *jīva* has the power to become by himself one with Brahman (*Brahma tādātmya*). If he had the power of realizing *Brahma tādātmya* (becoming identical with Brahman), he would have acquired it unaided (*tādātmya prāptim taddharma-sya svatassiddhatvāt*). So the *Sruti* text could have also said (in the shortest manner) *Ayam asau bhavati*, he (the wise man) will become He Himself, i.e., one with Brahman Himself. Instead of these few words, the *Sruti* text uses many words, thus stranding the *Sruti* text in the *dōsha* of *akuśalatva*, (i.e., in the folly of inauspiciousness). For no wise man will put forth much exertion for obtaining a particular result which could be attained by him by the smallest effort. Moreover, is Paramēśvara to be understood as

saguna or *nirguna*? If he is the first, then the wise man (*vidusha*, i.e., *mukta*) cannot have *tādātmya*, because nothing (like *guna*) was granted (*ex hypothesi*); nor can it be the second, for if Brahman is *nirguna*, attributes such as *Āditya*, *Aiśvarya*, etc., would be inapplicable to him and prove contradictory. And such a one cannot acquire *sarvalōkādhīpatya*. That is, *nirguna* is incompatible with *sarvaprakāśakatva*, *sarvaiśvarya*, etc. Then the argument would end in *apavyākhyāna* (misinterpretation) of the truth. Therefore, the *Sūtra Jagadvyāpāravarjam* was enunciated by Bādarāyaṇa in order that it might be clearly understood that a *mukta* even though God's own (*svakīyāvara mukta*), yet he is only next to him (i.e., less than him)⁶⁵⁶ and therefore he is excluded from *jagadvyāpāra*. *Jagadvyāpāra* is a matter which is apart from the province of a *mukta* (*muktētara jagadvishayam*). Therefore this *Sūtra* uncontradictingly indicates that nothing that relates to *jagadvyāpāra* has anything to do with a *mukta*. If it were not so, it would not have been ordained in *Sruti* texts that Paramātmā is the person who nominates those who are lesser than himself as fit for *mukti*. That is the very reason why Paramātmā is styled "*Ananyādhipatiḥ*" i.e., one without a superior [*cf. Brahma-Sūtra, Ata ēva cha ananyādhipatiḥ* (IV. 4. 9)] and therefore what all a *mukta* can realize is only *ātmīyatva* [i.e., that which relates to *Brahmapada* (*ayam ātmā Brahma*)] and not at all *Pāramēśvarapada*. This means, the *mukta* attains everything by the grace of Paramēśvara, short of his own—i.e., *Pāramēśvarapada*. Because the *Sruti* uses the expression *tat prasādāt*—out of his grace everything next to Paramēśvara.⁶⁵⁷

Sripati's Philosophical Standpoint.

It will thus be seen that Sripati makes the Dvaitādvaita theory the central point in his interpretation of

⁶⁵⁶ *Svakīyā* but *avara*, i.e., his own but less than and dependent on him. *Avara* means an younger in years, follower, or an inferior, less, etc. Cf. *Māsēnāvarah*, *pūrvajēnāvarah*.

⁶⁵⁷ Jayatīrtha, *Nyāya Sudhā*, IV. 4. 17.

Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras*. Round it he builds up a system of philosophy, to which we may now turn our attention. We may conveniently study it under the following heads :—

- (a) The material world,
- (b) Brahman and the material world,
- (c) The purpose of material creation,
- (d) The nature of the *jīva*,
- (e) The origin of the *jīva*, and
- (f) The attainment of *mukti*.

His Conception of the Material World.

Srīpati's conception of the material world is elaborated by him in II. 1. 26 to 33. The world existed in the minutest form of matter (*paramāṇvādīnām jagatkāraṇatvam upapannam*) and this was developed into Brahmāṇḍa through the infinite power and uncontrolled independence of Śiva Parabrahman. He quotes the *Sruti* texts *Atastasya sarvaśaktitvāt sarvasvatantratvāt* (*And therefore he is of infinite power and uncontrolled independence*) and *Sa sarvam asrujata*⁶⁵⁸ (*He created all*) in support to show that there can be no limiting of the Parabrahman's power. He quotes further the texts *Nachāsti vēttā mama chit sadāham* (*There is no one who can know my will*); *Vedairanēkaiḥ ahamēva vēdyō* (*Throughout all the Vēdas I alone am extolled*); *Vēdāntakrit vēdavidō vachāham* (*I am the author of the Vēdas and can be understood through Vēdic expressions*). These show, he adds, that Paraśiva Brahman, without having a bodily form, consisting of the bodily organs, can exhibit his infinite powers. This is thus the wonderful power of Brahman in being the cause for the creation of the *jagat*. But how could the Brahman, destitute of bodily form, become the creator of a *jagat* which has a bodily form? This doubt is answered by him in II. 1. 28, *Ātmani chaivam vichitrāścha hi*. [*And in the Ātman only are such wonderful (powers).*] The power of *Ātman* (Paraśiva Brahman) is thus indescribably wonderful. Though bodiless, Paraśiva Brahman, in the form of *Ātman*, has always confined in

⁶⁵⁸ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 4.

him the infinite, variegated power of creating, through his *Māyā*, countless things which are possessed of bodily form (*Parichchinna śakti viśiṣṭe niravayavē jīvātmani svamanaś-śaktyā vichitra nānāvidha Brahmāṇḍa kalpana mupāpannam*).⁶⁵⁹ Such a Sentient Being is visible in such inanimate bodily forms as hair, nails and other lifeless objects; also in the forms of water and fire which are dissimilar to each other. This same thing is seen actually in an ocean in the form of heat and water co-existing without any opposition to each other, just as darkness and light are seen in the same manner.

Also, in the same way in the interior of the body of living beings, the digestive fire (*jaḥharāgni*) is observed (without burning the beings themselves). Therefore to Paraśiva Brahman, who is beyond all the worlds (*lōkāṭīta*) and who is possessed of all wonderful powers, there is nothing impossible. (That is, he can reconcile even irreconcilable opposites.) It is for this reason, that the venerable Bādarāyaṇa in answering the following query of his disciples, *viz.*, How did Lord Brahman, who is *nirguṇa* and *apramēya* and faultlessly *śuddha*,⁶⁶⁰ acquire the power of creation (*kartrtva*, etc.)? said: Lord Brahman's powers are so great and so many, beyond one's comprehension or knowledge. And for the same reason the capacity for such variegated creation, etc., is quite natural and possible to him, just as fire is naturally associated with (the resultant) heat. The *Srutis* also support his (Bādarāyaṇa's) statement:

*Q. Kimsvidvanam kam usa vriksha āsīd yatō dyāvā
prithivī nishtatakshuh |
Manīshinō manasā prichchatētu tadyadadhyatishṭhad
bhuvanāni dhārayan ||*

⁶⁵⁹ Sṛīpati's use of the word "creating" (*kalpanam*) here should be noted, for that is the key, as it would seem, for reconciling the *bhēda* and *abhēda* theories in his own theory of *bhēdābhēda*. The word "creation" here is meant to convey both the idea of "creation" and the capacity of making visible that which was invisible before.

⁶⁶⁰ Devoid of qualities, immeasurable and faultlessly pure.

*A. Brahmavanam Brahma sa vriksha āsīd yatō dyāvā
prithivī nishṭatakshuḥ |
Manīshiṇō manasā vibravīmi vō Brahmādhyaṭishṭhad
bhuvanāni dhārayan || iti.*⁶⁶¹

Q. What was that water and which was that tree that then existed whereon the Heaven and worlds depended? Thus inquired the great beings to know how so many worlds held together.

A. Brahma as water and Brahma with the tree existed whereon the Heaven and the worlds depended. Thus know, O holy Beings! in this manner Brahma existed sustaining all these different worlds.

Even according to the *Srutis* and *Smritis*, the bodiless form of Paraśiva Brahman possesses this power of creation. This is to be seen in them (*Srutis* and *Smritis*) and this is to be expected from them as natural. If it is then questioned whether Paraśiva Brahman is influenced by *Māyāśakti* just as ordinary *jīvas*, Bādarāyaṇa answers the query in the next *Sūtra* (II. 1. 29), *Svapakshadōshāchcha* (*And because of the defects of his view also*).

Agreeably to the maxim, that the needle is attracted to the magnet, if *Nirguṇa* Brahman is attracted by *sat* in order to render Prakriti the agent for creation, then the Advaita position is made faulty inasmuch as *niravayava* Prakriti is made to appear as possessing the power of creation. Or, in other words, even though the inanimate Pradhāna-Prakriti⁶⁶² is incapable of creating the world, the very fact of the nearness of *Nirguṇa* Brahman makes it appear to possess that power of creation just as the loadstone attracts the needle. This obviously breaks down the theory of *nirviśēshatva*. According to the maxim *Tachchaktēḥ tadadhīnatvāt*, (*To that power it is subservient, i.e., To its own power it is subject to*), the conclusion that Brahman is *Sa-guṇa*, becomes unavoidable. It is also agreed to by

⁶⁶¹ *Taitt. Brā. Upa.*, II. 8. 9.

⁶⁶² *Prakriti* considered as the first evolver, originator or source of the material world; according to the Sāṅkhya system, *Pradhāna* is the primary germ out of which all material appearances are evolved.

the Sāṅkhya School that *niravayava Pradhāna* in the form of Ākāśa, etc. (*mahadādi*) has wonderful powers of transformation in developing the form of the world (*viśvākāra pariṇāmatvam*). Similarly, the Kaṇādas agree that *niravayava niraṁśa nishpradēśa* Pradhāna-Prakṛiti, coming in contact with the inanimate minutest atom (*paramāṇu*) attains the power of developing into the form of the world (*jagadākāra*).⁶⁶³ Even though the inanimate Pradhāna is devoid of having any free action independently, yet, that it is, by the help of Brahman, by its very proximity, capable of developing wonderful transformations, is self-evident. Therefore, such a contradiction of one's own position (*svapaksha dōshaḥ*) in the case of Advaita, is inevitable (*durvāraḥ*). As the etymological derivation of the word *Māyā*, in the compound *yā mā sā māyā*, would have it, the existence of *Māyā* is seen to be (as real) as the horns of a rabbit (*yā mā sa māyēti vyutpattiyā māyāyāḥ śaśaśringatvāt*). In the same way, the nature of the inanimate and the animate, *Māyā* and Brahman, *satyatva* and *asatyatva*, become like the pot (*ghaṭa*) and the cloth (*paṭa*), destitute of their characteristic marks. If such a combination does not exist, the development of the world or its cause would not be possible. Else Brahman, who is never changeable (*nirvikārasya*), could not have associated with *Māyā*. If it is doubted whether Brahman is enveloped in *Māyā*, just as the rope (*rajju*) throws the illusion of the serpent (*sarpa*), the next *Sūtra*, *Sarvōpētā cha taddarśanāt*, meets the doubt. [And (the Supreme Deity is) endowed with all powers, because that is borne testimony to.]

⁶⁶³ The name of the founder of the Vaiśeṣhika system of philosophy is preserved in his nickname *Kaṇāda*—sometimes styled derisively *Kaṇabhuj* or *Kaṇabhakṣhaṇa*, *Kaṇabhakṣhaka*, etc., i.e., atom-eater. *Kaṇaḥ* means a grain, an atom or particle. Kaṇāda propounded the Vaiśeṣhika system of philosophy, which may be shortly described as the "doctrine of atoms". The Vaiśeṣhika is so called from the category of "particularity" (*viśeṣa*) on which considerable stress is laid in its theory of atoms.

Paraśiva Brahman is possessed of every power (*sarvaśakti*) including the world-creating powers, etc., (*jagad-jaṇmādi*) and thus is seen as *parāśakti*, for it is so experienced (*taddarśanāchcha*) and proved by *Sruti*. And this is plainly observed in Paraśiva Brahman and often expressly declared by *Sruti* texts such as *Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyatē*;⁶⁶⁴ *Svābhāvikē gnāna bala kriyā cha*;⁶⁶⁵ *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyinantu mahēśvaram*; *Indrō māyābhīḥ pururūpa īryatē*,⁶⁶⁶ etc., which declare that the bodiless (*niravayavyasya*) Paramēśvara naturally possesses all kinds of powers (*sarvaśakti*). Therefore he possesses also the complete *triguṇātmaka hētubhūta pradhāna śakti* (the operative part of the three-fold creative power). This *śakti* is called *bhinna śakti* and the *chit-śakti* in him is called the *abhinna śakti*. Thus, Īśvara possesses these two kinds of *śakti* in their entirety. Possessing these two varieties of *śakti*, which are opposite to each other, Śiva Parabrahman on all three occasions (*sṛisṭi*, *sthiti* and *laya*) remains in the same unaltered identical state (*kālatrayēpi ēkarūpatayā sthilaḥ*). Then, if Paraśiva Brahman is possessed of *nirviśeṣatva*, then there is no need for creation (*jagat-kāraṇatva na sambhavatī*) as it is clearly contradictory to *Sruti*, *Smṛiti* and *Purāṇa* which state expressly that Śiva Parabrahman is naturally possessed of the power of creation (*svābhāvika śaktimattva sarvakāraṇatvādi*). And it is not just to ignore these facts and argue the *adhyasta mithyāvāda* (i.e., that whatever we perceive is an illusion and is untrue). If, then, Brahman is conceived of as possessed of *sarva-śakti*, we have to accept that he is the creator of the world (*jagat-kāraṇatvāṅgīkārē*); concurrently we have also to accept that he undergoes change into earth and the like (*mrudādivat*). Thus a great contradiction results. In order to harmonise this (apparent contradiction), the next *Sūtra* is propounded : *Vikaraṇatvānnēti chēttaduktam*.

⁶⁶⁴ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁶ *Rig-Veda*, IV. 3. 1.

[Not on account of the absence of organs; this has been explained (before).]

The texts *Achakshuśśrōtram tadapāṇipādam*, etc., define the term *vikaraṇatvāt*. This means that it is the state of being destitute of body, sensory organs, etc., which are the means for accomplishing the desired object. The term *nēti chēt* indicates that Brahman cannot become the cause of the creation of the world, etc. (*jagat-kāraṇatvam*). If that be so, the reply is to be found in the texts *Śabda mūlatvāt* and *Vichitrāścha hi*. (*Śabda*—i.e., *Vēda*—is the fundamental cause and *śakti* is remarkably variegated in character.) Brahman, who is testified to by the *Vēdas* alone, is, even though destitute of body and sensory organs, capable of accomplishing every kind of act. Thus the *Sruti* declares :—*Apāṇipādō javanō grihītā paśyatyachakshuḥ sa śruṇōtya-karṇaḥ*. (Though destitute of hands and legs, Brahman can catch hold of and walk ; and can see without a pair of eyes ; and can also hear without ears.) This *Sruti* text thus testifies to the powers of the Brahman. There are other texts like *Parāsyā śaktir vividhaiva śrūyatē*,⁶⁶⁷ *Pādō'sya viśvā-bhūtāni tripādasya amrutam divi*,⁶⁶⁸ etc., which explain the variegated powers of Śiva Parabrahman and which also declare that a minute part of his *śakti* can dominate the whole world with all its wonderful characteristics. It is seen in the *Śiva Purāṇa* :—*Viśvōttarōttara vichitra manōrathasya yasyaikaśaktiśakalē sakalāḥ samāptaḥ* ¹ *Adhyāyam adhvapatim adhvavidō vadanti tasmai namaḥ sakalalōka vilakṣaṇāya*. (I bow down to Him whom those learned in the *Vēda*, those who possess the knowledge of the Brahman, and those who have realized Him declare that He is capable, by the minutest fraction of His will, of creating, protecting and destroying a succession of worlds ; and who is possessed of characteristics which are beyond the reach of comparison in all the three worlds.)

⁶⁶⁷ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

⁶⁶⁸ *Rig-Veda*, II. 7. 18.

Therefore, it should be understood that Sarvēśvara, who is possessed of *sarvaśakti*, should be made to be the refuge of all who might seek *mōksha* (*mumukshus*). Therefore Brahman, who is *nirviśēsha* and *nirvikāra*, has to undergo *vikāratva* if the creation of the world is to be brought about; and therefore, if in the circumstances, the doubt arises whether Brahman becomes *māyāśabalita* (spotted with *Māyā*), then such a view stands contradicted by the next *Sūtra*: *Na prayōjanavattvāt* (*None, there being no motive*). The *Sruti* bears witness thus: *Parā'sya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvikī gnānabalakriyā cha iti*. [His *Śakti* is of an indescribably variegated character. And *gnāna*, *bala* and *kriyā* (knowledge power and action) are absolutely natural to Him.] Brahman thus can never be of a *nirviśēsha* character (*i.e.*, a character which is without or destitute of distinction). The *Sruti* texts *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*; *Yēna jātāni jīvanti*; *Yat prayantyaabhisamviśanti*,⁶⁶⁹ etc., bear testimony to the fact that creation (*jagat-janmādi*) is all the aim of Brahman. This is the significance of the word *prayōjanavattvāt* in the *Sūtra*.

Moreover, the *Smriti* texts *Pradhāna kshētragna-patir guṇēśō samsāra mōksha sthiti bandha hētuḥ*, etc., declare that Brahman has an aim and end in creation, protection and destruction. Again, *Sruti* texts like *Amritasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam*; *Sarīram mē vicharshaṇam*; *Sarvalingam sthāpayati pāṇimantram pavitram*, etc., declare that in order to save the community of *bhaktas*, Brahman assumes the *sthūla* and *sūkshma* causative bodily forms in the symbols of *ishṭa*, *prāṇa*, and *bhāva* and releases them through *mōksha*; this therefore is the manner in which Brahman has made himself useful to them (*prayōjanavattvāt*). Here *prayōjanavattvāt* means *prakarshēṇa yōjanam prayōjanam*, *i.e.*, the extended application of *srisṭi*, *sthiti* and *laya* in all possible ways is called *prayōjanam*. Since he possesses this sort of power (*prayōjanam*), he is called

⁶⁶⁹ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

prayōjanavūn. The quality of having this power (*prayōjanavatō bhāvaḥ*) is *prayōjanavattvam*. For that reason he is called *prayōjanavattvāt*. By the extended use of his power, by reason of the spirit of utter love he bears, there is *yōjanam*, *prayōjanam*, *samyōjanam* (of his power) (*i.e.*, by the mere combination of love to *Prakṛiti* he can produce the world). The meaning is that Brahman reproduces⁶⁷⁰ himself in the self-chosen symbolical gross and other bodily forms. As the maxim *prayōjanam anuddiśya na mandō'pi pravartatē* goes (even an ignorant man does not undertake anything without profit), if those desirous of *mōksha* had no benefit to be derived from Parabrahman, they would not have meditated on him. *Bhaktas*, who are well acquainted with the *Vēdas* and *Vēdāntas*, who meditate on him for the realization of their long-cherished wish in this and the next world, will acquire them in their unqualified entirety (*phala prayōjanam nirviśēshē nōpā-padyatē*). Therefore the argument that Parabrahman in association with *Māyā* (*Māyāśabalita Brahma*) is the cause of creation, is as manifestly objectless and aimless as the mistaking of the rope for the snake (and basing an argument on such mistaken identity). Just as the likeness of an object seen in water and other like fluids is untrue, the creation that is as the result of the reflection of *Māyā* is also an incongruity. *Nishkalam nishkriyam śāntam niravadyam niranjanam*;⁶⁷¹ *Na tasya kāryam karanam cha vidyatē*;⁶⁷² *Ētasmāj jāyatē prāṇo manas sarvēndriyāṇi cha*;⁶⁷³ *Satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpah sō'nvēshṭavyah sa vijignāsitavyah*;⁶⁷⁴ and other *Sṛuti* texts declare that Parabrahman possesses the attributes of *nishkriyatvam* (redemption) and *kriyāśrayatvam* (being connected

⁶⁷⁰ *Sambhava* : gives himself birth to ; gives himself existence to ; etc.

⁶⁷¹ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 19.

⁶⁷² *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

⁶⁷³ *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1. 3.

⁶⁷⁴ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII, 7. 1.

with the execution of deeds). The doubt thus arises whether *Nirviśēsha* Brahman, by reason of being connected with *jagad-jaṇmādi*, etc., is the *Saviśēsha śābala* Brahman. If *Nirviśēsha* Brahman consisting of Pure Intelligence (Supreme Spirit) is never capable of being the cause of *jagad-jaṇmādi*, on account of his being *nirvikāra*, *nishkriya* and *niśśaktika*, then the assumption that *māyākalpita śābalēśvara* is the cause of the *jagat* (*jagat-kāraṇatvam*) is a false one (*āvōpa*). This being so, the established conclusion (*siddhānta*) is as propounded in the text *na prayōjanavattvāt*. We have the *Sruti* text *Parā'sya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē*. This text shows that *Nirviśēsha* springs up in connection with Brahman. How? *Prayōjanavattvāt*,—because of his being capable of being useful to everybody, without any benefit to himself. *Saviśēsha* Brahman alone is abundantly beneficial in granting *dēvas* and *mānushas* mentioned in the *Vēdāntas* all their desires in their entirety by the mere fact of his being *prayōjanavattvāt*. This doctrine is disregarded⁶⁷⁵ by *Māyāvādins* and *Adhyātmavādins* (those who believe Brahman as the Supreme Spirit manifested as the individual life). Verily can *Nirviśēshavastuvādins*⁶⁷⁶ postulate the existence in reality of a *vastu* existing without distinction—and yet having a difference (*Tathā hi nirviśēshavādibhiḥ nirviśēshē vastuni idam pramāṇam iti katham vaktum śakyatē*). (Because) every *vastu* is combined with its distinction. It is his own avowed doctrine that that *vastu* is real which is, from every known source of proof, within one's own personal experience. Even so is *ātmā* such a *vastu* (*sō'pyātmā*). But such a *vastu* has been contradicted, though actually seen and experienced to be *saviśēsha*, by mere (barren) argument.⁶⁷⁷ When it is said "This (*vastu*) I saw" it is within the experience of every one that the object seen bears

⁶⁷⁵ The word used is *anādarāṇīyam*, which would suggest that those who should naturally defend are found to be the opposers of the doctrine in question.

⁶⁷⁶ *Māyāvādins* who argue the *Nirviśēsha* Brahman.

⁶⁷⁷ *Sākshika saviśēshānubhava vādēna nirastaḥ*.

certain peculiar distinctive attributes (*kēnachidviśēsha-viśiṣṭa viśhayatvāt*). (Such being the position), how can we say, by the exercise of untrue ingenuity, that it (the *vastu*) is destitute of distinction (*nirviśēsha*)? In order to disassociate *Nirviśēsha* Brahman, we have to draw him out as the excess of actual Reality (*sattātirēka*) and as one unlike in character to things (*vastu*) which undergo constant changes as the result of their natural qualities. All these means of extracting *Nirviśēsha* Brahman from the Reality with which he is connected, the Reality itself, and the characteristics natural to it are in themselves the attributes of Brahman. Therefore by whomsoever would it be possible to deny the qualities of an object in order to establish it as being quite distinct from them? The answer is that it is never possible to postulate a *nirviśēsha vastu* as having been proved to exist.

When once knowledge is in disguise, ignorance is dispelled by self-illumination which is acquired through practice. That those who are in a state of a mental delusion, due to ignorance for the time being, get the same dispelled in course of time is in every one's experience. The reason for this could be explained at length. This is, indeed, in every one's daily experience. Such experience does not relate to the *vastu* alone ; it is possible to demonstrate this by arguments. In order to establish the existence of a *vastu* as absolutely true, beyond every argument brought forward against it, it is necessary to employ every argument in order to dispel doubts so that it might not be mistaken from those similar to it. Therefore, we have to bring in descriptive attributes (*viśēshairviśiṣṭasyaiva*) of the particular *vastu* along with proofs and establish its existence. Generally knowledge of a *vastu* is acquired by the use of the descriptive expression appropriate to knowing it. For what is *padatva*? It is the formation of a *pada* with its *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* (the root of the word with its prefix or suffix) connected with it. If *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* are to be considered as being without distinction, the meaning of the *pada* formed by such *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* cannot be

disregarded. Prefixes and suffixes are only intended to denote distinctions in the application of the *padas*. The difference as between *padas* necessarily connotes a difference in what they denote. A series of different *padas* combined together in the form of a sentence cannot possibly describe a *nirviśeṣha vastu*. And therefore if you try to establish a *nirviśeṣha vastu*, you are left without a *śabda* to prove it (*Na nirviśeṣha vastuni śabdaḥ pramāṇam*). A *vastu* which is before our very eyes, which is separated by differentiation and which is either conditioned (*nirvikalpaka*) or is accompanied with doubt (*savikalpaka*) cannot be proved to be without attribute (*nirviśeṣha*). *Savikalpaka* means belonging to a class possessed of a particular distinction; this distinction differentiates it from many other objects of its class taken together with all their different distinctions. Now, as to the *nirvikalpaka* class. It is the opposite of those objects which in our experience⁶⁷⁸ come under the head of those which are possessed of distinctions. Knowledge (of one of the four kinds) testifies to this fact. Then what is *nirvikalpaka*? How can such a thing which is improved be grasped by knowledge? Therefore an object which is so void of all distinctions can at no time be one capable of understanding. As such a thing devoid of attributes cannot be determined with exactness, it must be declared to be impossible of being spoken of thus with definiteness. As it is not possible to describe such an object with exactness, it becomes utterly unintelligible and untrustworthy. Therefore the conclusion previously arrived at should be held to be the reasonable one.

If it is doubted and asked wherefore does Mahādēva, who is ever of the *paramānanda* and *niravayava* nature, bring into existence the creation of the world, etc., without any benefit to Himself, the next *Sūtra*, *Lōkavattu līlākai-vālyam* (II. 1. 33), explains it. In commenting on this

⁶⁷⁸ *In our experience*: The word used is *svasvānubhūta*. *Anubhūti* means knowledge derived from four sources, *viz.*, direct perception, inference, comparison and verbal knowledge.

Sūtra, Śrīpati says that Śiva Parabrahman is seen at times in perfect isolation by way of pastime. Being thus in perfect isolation on an occasion is His peculiar native habit. His thus abiding in Himself is so determined for Him. This is parallel with what is experienced in this world. Just as we see in this world a great monarch, who is the lord of all the seven islands subject to his sceptre, with all his wealth, his prowess, his courage, his heroism, and powerfulness and capacity to bear the burden of sovereignty, determines once upon a time, by way of sport, to begin some work; and sometimes sits quiet in silent contentment.

Moreover, all beings are naturally animated by their vital breaths; in a like manner Paramaśiva who is glowing in his bliss, brings into existence creation, etc., out of his native sportive nature in consonance with his determination. Therefore it is seen that creation, etc., is a mere sport for Śiva, who has attained all his desires and is characterised by his native joy. After the destruction of creation and upto the time that creation is again undertaken, He is in His unblameable, habitual situation of sitting quiet in silent contentment. If it is doubted whether Paramaśiva, who is *nirguṇa* and *nirlipta* (without qualities and unsullied), being the cause of creation, etc., is responsible for health and sickness, wealth and poverty, righteousness and unrighteousness, among created beings, such as *dēvas*, animals and men and the rest, having created them into superior (*uttama*), middle (*madhyama*) and inferior (*adhama*) classes, the answer is that it is inevitable that there should result among them, souls in bondage, jealousy, cruelty and other sinful qualities.

Passing on to the *Sūtra* (II. 1. 34), *Vaishamya nair-ghrīṇyēna sāpēkshatvāt tathā hi darśayati*, Śrīpati asks, Are inequality and cruelty qualities attributable to Brahman? It is seen that they are the qualities of *jīvas* who get them bestowed on them by Brahman just as they desired them. In this world, *jīvas* are seen enjoying happiness or

undergoing misery which cannot reflect upon Parabrahman as attributable to him, because He has no share in the inequalities and cruelties seen in it. Why is this so? Because these are due to the desires of the *jīvas* themselves. Their desires are in consonance with the good and evil deeds wrought by themselves. This is seen (*from the Srutis*). This truth is brought to light in the *Srutis*. This is the gist of the *Sūtra*. Nevertheless, Paramapurusha Śiva, out of His natural power of *chitśakti*, even though He is bodiless in form, may be capable of being the cause of creating, etc., many different kinds of wonderful things (in this world) and thereby give room for the charge of partiality against Himself by the inequalities, etc., seen among the superior, middle and inferior classes of beings into which men, animals and the rest of the beings in bondage are found divided. This shows that these beings are bound to undergo the essential qualities appertaining to their doings by enjoyment in *Svarga* and suffering in *Naraka*, and by happiness and affliction (in this world). And if it is asked whether by His grace, they could escape the suffering from the cruelty, etc., inseparable from their own actions, the answer is, it is impossible.

The expression *sāpēkshatvāt* will rule the *Sūtra*, thereby meaning that "inequality" and "cruelty" (discernible) in creation, etc., will have to prevail because they are the peculiar results of the *jīva's* own *karma*. At the time the world was to be created, in the case of the *dēvas* and the rest, the creation had to become unequal because of the different desires expressed by the *jīvas* in accordance with their different *karmas*. The *Srutis* also point to the fact that the *dēvas* and the rest (in all their gradations—higher, middle and inferior) desire that which is in accordance with their respective *karmas*: *Sādhukārī sādhubhavadati* (the righteous person will be created righteous); *Pāpakārī pāpō bhavadati* (the sinful person will be created sinful); *Puṇyaḥ puṇyēna karmaṇā bhavadati* (the virtuous person by virtue of his virtuous deed will be born virtuous); *Pāpaḥ pāpēna karmaṇā*

bhavati (the sinful person by virtue of his sinful deeds will be born sinful), etc. Agreeably to these (texts) is the text of Vyāsa:—*Nimittamātram ēvāsau sriṣyānām svarga karmaṇā* । *Pradhāna kāraṇabhūtā yatō vai sriṣya-śaktayaḥ* । *Nimitta mātram muktvaiva nānyat kinchit apēkshatē* । *Nīyyatē tapatām śreṣṭhīa svaśaktyā vastu vastutām* ॥ This (Parabrahman) is only instrumental in bringing into existence *svarga*, while the *karmins* (beings) are really the chief causes (of their own beings); for that very reason they are capable of (helping) creation. Those beings, oh great among those who have done penance!, like *muktas* who ask for nothing more than what they desire, start in proportion to their strength, (for) *vastu vastutām* (*nīyyatē*), i.e., a thing is controlled by its own properties. In this way Parabrahman as *kshētragna*, who knows the different classes of persons from the *dēvas* and others who for different reasons are to come into the wonderful creation, allows them to go into it agreeably to their past *karma*. Therefore there is no contradiction.

In secondary creation, the desire for doing acts involving *puṇya* and *pāpa* on the part of one falls to the share of Śiva; in primary creation, it is otherwise, as there are no *jīvas* who are involved in acts involving *puṇya* and *pāpa*. In the agency of *Nirguṇa* Brahman, inequality, cruelty and such other defects are unavoidable. Consequently, *jagat* being unreal (*mithyābhūta*), we have the result that Brahman's variegated creation itself is unreal. To meet this doubt, the next *Sūtra* is propounded: *Na karmavibhāgāditi chēnnānāditvāpyupapadyatē chāpyupalabhyatē cha* (II. 1. 35). (If it be said 'Not so on account of non-differentiation of deeds,' we say, 'Not so, on account of beginninglessness.' This is reasonable, and it is also observed.)

Before creation there was no *karma* for *jīvas*. Why? Because they were all undivided from the rest. When the world consisting of *chētanas* and *achētanas* was dissolved at its destruction, *karma* was also destroyed. Such a line of argumentation will not hold. Because the *Sūtra* says

“*anāditvāt*” meaning “without beginning or end”. Agreeably to the *pravāhataranga nyāya*—the maxim of the current and the waves which are endless—creation and dissolution are endless and occur in constant rotation without break. And hence the existence of the world is also endless. And it follows that the result of *karma* done by the *jīva* previous to the dissolution will remain in a dormant state at the time of dissolution. And again re-appears at the time of re-creation as the previously accrued *karma* of the *jīva*, merit or demerit according as it might have been desired by it with the re-creation of the *jagat*. Moreover, at the time of next dissolution, it remains over and is dormant in a *sūkṣma* form according to the will of Paramēśvara. And therefore the reality of the world is inevitable. This (*prapancha-satyatvam*) accordingly must be accepted without question, for it is unavoidable (*anivāryam*). This is the inner meaning of the *Sūtra* as suggested by the words *upapadyatē* and *upalabhyatē* used in it.

Before creation, the *jīvas* were in the minutest undivided form in a dormant condition in Brahman. How? In what form? Visible only in an undivided form. Countless hundreds of *Sruti* texts like the following bear testimony to the fact that in the beginning nothing like *karma* nor the fruits thereof existed:—*Brahma vā idamagra āsīt*; ⁶⁷⁹ *Ātmā vā idamagra āsīt*; ⁶⁸⁰ *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt*; ⁶⁸¹ *Yadā tamastam na divā na rātrir na sanna chāsachchiva ēva kēvalaḥ*, ⁶⁸² etc. How then can *karma* and its fruits of the *jīvas* become their respective desires at the time of creation unless it be due to (a sense of) injustice (on the part of) Brahman? The answer is, it is not so. For the *Sūtra* text declares *Anāditvāt* (from without beginning). Agreeably to the *pravāha taranga nyāya*, the *jīvas* and their *karmanas* and the fruits thereof are flowing in a current without beginning or end in creation; therefore, whenever

⁶⁷⁹ *Āitarēya Upa.*, I. 1.

⁶⁸¹ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸² *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

opportunity permits, these *jīvas* come into existence during creation, according to the results of their previous *karmas*, just as during summer time seeds sown are seen *in situ* in the earth in tiny little forms of different kinds. In the same way, we have to accept that among *jīvas*, *karma* and its fruits are seen in an identical manner. If we do not accept such a conclusion, a great contradiction will result in the *Āgama* and its proofs. Hence the text of the *Sūtra* uses the word *upalabhyatēcha* (results in). Therefore souls with their *karma* and the fruits thereof have inevitably no beginning or end. Accordingly, *Sruti* texts like the following, *Srīṣṭēḥ pravāharūpēṇa satyatvamupadiśyatē*;⁶⁸³ *Gnā gnau dvāvajāvīśānīśau*,⁶⁸⁴ etc., declare that souls have no beginning or end and their *karmas* and their fruits have to be held as established from the context (of the *Sūtras*) to be even so.

Assuming, then, that *jīvas* have in them the results of their beginningless *karma*. Though this be so, yet Paraśiva has to provide them with their several encasements (bodies) and this forms his principal duty (during creation). To impart to the *achētana* bodily form that active principle which renders it useful by reason of its *karma*, is the great capacity of Īśvara. How is it that some *jīvas* which have abided (in the Para-brahman) in a dormant condition in the most happy manner at the time of creation have come into this world in a bodily receptacle meant for affliction (*klēśāyatana śarīra*)? This shows that He is ill-disposed towards some of the *jīvas*. *Jīvas* being unable (of their own accord) to enter their bodies, were quite free from all affliction; except for His (Brahman's) will they would not have come into existence at creation. This is no doubt so; but why then does not Brahman give those *jīvas*, who are simultaneously eligible for release and who are fit for eternal happiness, the same without bringing them

⁶⁸³ This is quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his *Mahābhārata Tātparyanirṇaya* thus:—*Jagat pravāhassatyōyam naiva mithyā kathanchana* ||

⁶⁸⁴ *Svēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

into creation which involves the bondage of *karma*? Because Śiva, even though He is All-Grace and capable of granting salvation simultaneously to all *jīvas* who deserve it, yet, just as the overlord of a kingdom, who feeling glad over the faithful manner in which his subordinate has discharged the duties of his office, in strict accordance with the laws of the realm, releases him from his obligations, so does the Lord Śiva dissolve the fetters that tie the *jīvas* to their *karma*, when they come to fruition. Just as a father, in this world, seeing his son behave in an unruly manner, does not receive him into his grace, without first duly punishing him, even so is it with Paramēśvara. Without administering (the fruits) of meritorious and evil deeds done by *jīvas*, Īśvara does not grant His grace (*svaprāptim na dāsyati*). Even the rays of the sun only open up the petals of the unblossomed lotus (and not others); even so Īśvara releases only such *jīvas* from the ties of bondage who meditate upon and worship him with *śama*, *dama* and *bhakti* combined. Moreover, it would follow from *Sruti* texts such as *Ēsha ēva sādhu karma kārāyati tam ūrdhvalōkam ninīshayati*; *Ēsha ēvāsādhu karma kārāyati tam adhōlōkam ninīshayati*,⁶⁸⁵ etc., that it is Paramēśvara alone that determines the fate of the *jīvas* and *jīvas* themselves individually hold no responsibility. But if it is said that the sins of *vaishamya* and *nairghrīnya* appertain not to the *jīvas* concerned but to Paramēśvara, the reply is: "It is not correct to say so." Even though *jīvas* are not all-capable and all-knowing like Paramēśvara, yet the *jīvas* because of their capacity, it so happens, possess a little of the responsibility and freewill (*kinchit kartrutvamcha svēchchayā sambhavati*) (appertaining to them); the result of the actions done out of their responsibility and freewill cannot be denied to the *jīvas*. Just as men and other beings in this world take to their avocations as the sun puts forth his rays of light at day-break, even so *jīvas* in keeping with the results of their respective *karman*s and by reason of

⁶⁸⁵ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 4. 22.

Paramēśvara's existence in them, accomplish their respective *karmas*. Therefore as the *Sruti* text *Dhyātvā munirga-chchati bhūtayōnim samasta sākshim tamasaḥ parastāt*, etc., declares, Paramēśvara like the Sun will be witnessing all that the *jīvas* do. And therefore no taint of sin, etc., attaches to Him. Therefore, also *jīva*, *jagat* and *karma* are proved to be not only eternal but also are demonstrated to be always subordinate to Paramēśvara. Numerous *Sruti* texts like the following, *Sūryā chandramasau dhātā yathāpūrvam-akalpayaḥ*;⁶⁸⁶ *Na jāyate na mriyate vā vipaśchit*;⁶⁸⁷ *Taddhēdam tarhyavyākṛitamāsīt*; *Tannāmarūpābhyām kriyate*; *Gnā gnau dvāvajavīśānīśau*;⁶⁸⁸ *Pradhāna kshētragnapatirguṇēśo samsāra mōksha sthiti bandhahētuh*,⁶⁸⁹ etc.; texts like *Satyagnānātmakō'nantō vibhurātmā mahēśvaraḥ*; *Tasyaivāmśō jīvalōkaḥ prāṇinām hridayē sthitaḥ*; *Visphulingā yathā vahnau jāyante kūshṭhayōgataḥ*; *Anādi karma sambandhāt tadvadamśā mahēśituh*; *Anādivāsanāyuktaḥ kshētragna iti kīrtitaḥ*; *Sivabhaktischa sarvēśhām sarvadā sarvatō mukhī*; *Tasyāntu vidyamānāyām yastu martyaḥ pramuchchyaṭē*; *Samsāra bandhanāt tasmāt anyāḥ kō vāsti mūḍhadhīḥ*; *Anādarēṇa śāthīyēna parihāsēna māyayā*; *Sivabhakti ratiriyasya sō'ntyajō'pi vimuchhyatē*; etc., appearing in the *Sivagītā*; *Prakṛitim purushamchaiva vidyāvādī ūbhāvapi*, a text which appears in the *Kṛishṇa-gītā*; and *Nishkalam nishkriyam śāntam*,⁶⁹⁰ etc., *Sruti* texts while they lay down *nishkriyatva* and other attributes of Brahman, also fix the standing responsibility which attaches to him in the sphere of creation. *Satyakāmaḥ*, *satyasankalpaḥ* and other *Sruti* texts have to be assumed in the light of the variegated Brahman who is reflected by *Māyā* (*māyāpratiphalita śabalabrahmaparatvam-ēvāṅgīkartavyam*). If we do not do so, great mutual contradictions in the whole of the *Vēdānta* will result and prove impossible of eradication. In order to remove this doubt, the next *Sūtra* is propounded: *Sarvadharmōpāpattīścha* (II. 1. 36). [And all the *dharma*s are proved (to be present in Brahman).] In accordance with the *Sūtra*,

⁶⁸⁶ *Mahōpa.*, I. 38.⁶⁸⁸ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.⁶⁸⁷ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 20.⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, VI. 16.⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, VI. 19.

Lōkavattu līlākāivalyam, it is now demonstrated that the sport of Brahman ends at times in such results (as aforesaid); and at other times, ends in his perfect isolation. *Sruti* texts like *Yassarvagnaḥ sarvavit*⁶⁹¹ | *Vāmadēvāya namō iyēśhthāya namaḥ śrēśhthāya namō rudrāya namaḥ kālāya namaḥ kalavikaraṇāya namō balavikaraṇāya namō balāya namō balapramathanāya namaḥ sarvabhūtadamanāya namō manōnmanāya namaḥ* |⁶⁹² *Natasya kāryam karaṇam cha vidyatē*,⁶⁹³ etc., declare that the *dharma* of Paramēśvara lies in the fact of his *sarvagnatva* in respect to *līlākālaparatva* and *nishkriyatva*, which are respectively exhibited through creation and its results and in his perfect isolation. And therefore all his *sagunatva* and *nirgunatva dharma* have their birth in Parabrahma Śiva himself. And *Sruti* texts like *Ēka ēva rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē* | *Ēkamēvādvitīyam Brahma*, etc., prove that Brahman is the sole author; through the agency of his supreme power, he appears in combination in the form of a reflected image of his variegated self fashioned after himself. All-pervasive yet bodiless, and not possessed of a reflected form, yet by reason of the mere agency reflected through the opening and the shutting of his eyes, all *dharma* (such as creation, etc.) proceed from him. These appear manifestly contradictory to what is declared both in the *Srutis* and *Smritis*, and are argued to be by Gautama, Dadhīchi, Vyāsa and Śiva and Kēśava, who are agreeable to imprecations, and others as false doctrines (*mōhaśāstrāṇi*) wherein *jīva* and *Īśvara* appear as inventions (*i.e.*, as separate entities) and the world as false. This view should be discarded and unheeded by Śivabhaktas who seek *mōksha*. This is the established truth.

“Some cat-like disputants,⁶⁹⁴ seeking support from the *Advaita* doctrine, state that they stand on an equality with

⁶⁹¹ *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 9.

⁶⁹² *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

⁶⁹³ *Namaka Chamaka*.

⁶⁹⁴ *Kēchidadvaitamāśritya biḍālapratimā narāḥ*. The latter words appear to be used in a deprecatory sense and probably indicate “spiteful” disputants.

Rudra"; "Those Brāhmans who were cursed by Dadhīchi and Gautama, having come into existence in the Kali age have become objects of censure"; "Dadhīchi, Vyāsa and Dūrvāsa and others having received curses have held the world as false (*jaganmithyātvam āśritya*), and expounded such a doctrine will attain the region of hell"; "having preached to the world about the world (*jagat*) and *Īśvara* in a false manner and being devoid of devotion, will necessarily enter the kingdom of Yama"; "One who declares 'I am Brahman' (*aham Brahma*) will by such an assertion enter the most fearful eternal Hell"—these and other declarations are seen clearly in the *Skānda*, *Laingya* and *Kūrma Purāṇas*, where the discussion of *jagat* being false is contradicted and discarded. And hence those who desire *mōkṣhā* should without any doubt whatever hold that Śiva Parabrahman is the sole cause of creation, etc., as the net result of Vēdāntic discussion and follow it as their main support.

Brahman and the Material World.

The relation of the material world to Brahman may now be considered. In commenting on *Sūtra* II. 3. 11, *Prithivyadhikārarūpa śabdāntarēbhyaḥ* [*Earth (from water); earth on account of the subject-matter, the colour and other texts*], Śrīpati sets out clearly the relation of Brahman to the material world. He starts by saying that when water manifested itself through the light, it reflected several beings. *Sruti* texts like *Tā annam asrujanta*, etc., declare that in order to sustain those beings, food was created. The doubt then arises, "Is it mere boiled food that was created or is it the world (that produced the materials of food)?" Certain sets of *Sruti* texts here and there declare *Prithivyā ōśadhayaḥ*; *Ōśadhībhyō'nnam*,⁶⁹⁵ etc., meaning that *prithivī* was created in which herbs and plants yielding corn were created. And these *Sruti* texts, even though appearing contradictory, yet confirm that all kinds of plants and herbs were created which yield food for sustenance to

⁶⁹⁵ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

created beings. And the word *prithvī* therefore has become synonymous with *annam* or food and not with seedlings. How? The expression *adhikāra-rūpa śabdāntarēbhyah* implies this meaning. The *Sruti* text *Tattējō asrujata*,⁶⁹⁶ etc., declares that those primary elements which possess the authority to give birth to that which is sown become *annam*, etc., and in their edible, ripened condition become named *annam* and in that state remind one of *prithvī*. And even water also bears its commonness with *prithvī*. The *Sruti* text *Tadyadapām śara āsīt tat samahanyata sā prithivyabhavat*, etc., declares that other terms also express the product of *prithvī* and shows that *prithvī* is the chief source from which food originates. Here and there during the time of creation, water assumed the solidified form and presented the shape of an arrow. And that form of the arrow in course of time (the solidified form) produced *Ātma*. And that form in course of time turned into the hardened form of *prithvi*. This is the meaning of the *Sruti* text.⁶⁹⁷ Similarly *anna*, which is cooked grain, cannot be said to have directly issued from water. It is the result of coming into contact with *prithvī*, by which it became grain and finally assumed the form of cooked food. And this is the established and uncontradicted truth.

So all the *Sruti* texts referred to above demonstrate without contradiction that the primary elements are the chief agencies involved in creation. The *Kaṇva* and *Mādhyandina* texts like *Yah prithivyām tishtān yah prithvī śarīram*, etc., also clearly explain that Śiva Parabrahman appears in the bodily form enclosed in *prithvī* consisting of all the primary elements. Though he cannot have a bodily form of his own, if he manifests himself in a bodily form which is liable to dissolution, he will reduce himself to equality with *jīvas*. If it be so—if he is not one different from the *jīvas*—there will result, from every point of view, an inconsistency in his being the chief cause.

⁶⁹⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

If it is said that a contradiction results by denying to Brahman the chief causality for *prithvī* and all things anterior and posterior to it, then the reply is, it is not so. For the *Sruti* text, “*Yō Rudrō agnau*” etc., proclaims his all-pervasiveness. And further other texts like *Yah prithivyām tishthan*,⁶⁹⁸ etc., are equal to the *Sruti* texts, *Annam Brahma*, etc. His bodily form is only to show his all-pervasiveness and not for creating the very bodily form like the *jīva*. Alternatively if it is argued whether *prithvī* and other primary elements behave even in *pralaya* in the way indicated in the *paṭasamkōcha nyāya*, keeping Brahman within themselves, the *asṭamūrtitva* of Brahman remaining undisputed, then, the following texts in the *Saiva Purāṇa*: *Mahēśvarān mahāśaktyā śchēśānā-khyō khagātmakeḥ*; *Sambhūtaḥ purushastasmāt pavanā-khyō mahābalaḥ*; *Tasmādaghōras sambhūtaḥ jvalanassarva-bhakshakah*; *Jalātmake vāmadēvastasmāt jataḥ kripānidhiḥ*; *Tasmāt bhūmyātmakeḥ sadyō jātamurtiś śubhapradaḥ*; *Tasmāt ōshadhayaḥ sarvē tatō’nnam jāyatē kramāt*; *Tasmāt pūjā bahirbhūtās chētanāchētanātmakāḥ*; *Sarvāntaryāmirūpēṇa sarvakartā sadāśivaḥ*; *Prathamam sūkshmarūpēṇa sadyōjātādi panchakam*; *janayāmāsa dēvēsaḥ tathā sthūla-prapanchakam*; etc., clearly prove that no one except (Parabrahman) is the chief cause. The *Sruti* text *Ākāśādāvāyuh*,⁶⁹⁹ etc., clearly deny to *prithvī* and other primary elements, which are mere lifeless objects, a hereditary character for causation. If it be doubted whether phenomenal agencies may possess such a character, the next *Adhikaraṇa* bears testimony to the fact that they do not possess such a character.

Tadabhidhyānādēva tu tallingāt saḥ (II. 3. 12). (*But he, from the inferential symbol supplied by their reflection.*) Now it is seen that Parabrahman joins the primary elements (*mahābhūta*), and becomes the associate with the associated and yet behaves as one separate from them. Then the question arises whether the primary

⁶⁹⁸ *Mādhyandina Upa.*

⁶⁹⁹ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

elements act on their divine initiative in bringing into existence the creative character of the beings or is it that they act under the controlling power of Paramēśvara presiding in them. If, in accordance with the text *Ākāśādvāyuh*,⁷⁰⁰ etc., it is inferred that the controlling power imparted to them in their respective ranges of action is used by the primary elements in their capacity to create, then a mutual contradiction in the *Srutis* arises. The reply is that Parabrahman within the range of the capacity of each primary element brings into play at a look, as it were, his controlling power and enables the element appear as if it did the work itself and on its own initiative. Hence the word in the *Sūtra Tallingāt*—that distinguishing mark. The Supreme Being (Parabrahman) bearing the distinguishing symbol of controlling power over everything, as declared in the *Sruti* text, *Yah prithivyām tishṭhan*,⁷⁰¹ etc., proves that he is the sole controlling Being. The term *prithvī* and its *abhimāni dēvatā* should be understood. The terms *ākāśa*, etc., are understood to signify only what they are held to indicate by their traditional usage and are expected to do as their apportioned duty under divine control. It does not mean that these primary elements are infinitely independent in the range of their actions and so we do not hear of the *Sruti* text *Ākāśādvāyuh*,⁷⁰² etc., giving them the all-independent power (of action). Nor should the *Sruti* text, *Tā āpa aikshanta*⁷⁰³ *iti*, should be taken to mean that the primary elements alone form the chief cause in their respective names, for they signify nothing more than their own limited range of action. As the constant look of Parabrahman keeps the controlling power over these primary elements, there is no proof for individual independence of these primary elements themselves. Thus it is clearly proved that the

⁷⁰⁰ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

⁷⁰¹ *Mādhyandina Upa.*

⁷⁰² *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

⁷⁰³ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

five great primary elements merge their agencies in the chief controlling power of Parabrahman in all their actions.

The Purpose of Material Creation.

On this head, *Sūtras* II. 3. 7 to 10 are of interest. Śrīpati remarks that when, in *Srutis*, we find mutual contradictions, we feel a doubt whether Brahman is the cause of *jagat* or not. To remove that doubt, the third *pāda* of *Adhyāya* II is devoted. Paramātmā has no desire in creation but creation and the *jīvas* are there. In allowing them their range of action in creation and giving them their desired realization lies the purpose of creation of Brahman. The *Sruti* texts say that the firmament is Brahman (*Kham Brahma*) and the all-extensive sky is his body (*Ākāśa Ātmā*). The formless form of Brahman, out of his will power, enters into the five primary elements (*pañchamahābhūtas*) and exhibits himself in their respective actions and finally terminates in the creation of *chētanās* of different forms. He then occupies the form of *ghaṭa* and in it places the *jīva* in the bodily form and stands in them in order to supervise their actions and also helps them to do their actions. The *jīvas* who appear like *jaḍa*, by his sole help in them, act freely as if they did their acts, in fact, on their own initiative. The *Sruti* texts express clearly that *jīvas* do their own actions and Parabrahman only witnesses their actions in them and helps them to achieve their desires. *Sruti* texts like *Tattējō asrujata*, etc., bear testimony to this. *Sruti* texts like *Ātmana ākāśassambhūtaḥ*⁷⁰⁴ declare that Brahman entered the bodily forms of the *jīvas* in the form of *ātman* and in the form of *tējas*, etc. And these, *ātman*, *tējas* and *āpaḥ* present in the *jīvas*, exhibit the Supreme Parabrahman in them by whose help the *jīvas* work freely. It is thus seen that throughout creation, Parabrahman plays the supreme part, both in the *chētanās* and *achētanās* (*jīva* and *jaḍa*) and behaves in them in their respective manner (*kāraṇabhūtē Brahmani yathāmukhyatvam*). If Parabrahman is said to possess no particular bodily form, then he cannot

⁷⁰⁴ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

bring into existence such forms. It should be said that he has the minutest form (*paramāṇvādīnāmapī nityatvam syāt*) which is eternal and which helps the *jīvas* in bringing them into creation and helping them to do their actions within their respective ranges. This peculiar power of Brahman cannot be contradicted.

According to the *Sūtra*, *Pratignāvirōdhāt*,⁷⁰⁵ wherever there is cause for Brahman, there also is his action ; else it would mean a contradiction. Therefore, in the creation of *jagat*, the purpose of his action lies merely in bringing into play those *chētanās* in the form of *jīvas* and allowing them their ranges of action, being himself in them in all their actions. This is his peculiar power. There is no contradiction here with the *Srutis*. And the *Taittirīya Sruti* text and the text *Tad brahma tējō'srujata* of the *Chchāndōgya* prove that there is no contradiction and that the cause and the power of action in Brahman are brought into play at creation in a manner quite in harmony with the *Srutis*.⁷⁰⁶

All the transformations that Brahman manifests in his creation are simply natural (II. 3. 6). The primary elements are his chief agencies, through whom these transformations are made to manifest in the *jīvas* when they come into being in creation. And this is the essence of the *Srutis*. Nothing is newly invented. Whatever is effected by one through an agency, will have to be reckoned as his own act.

The Nature of the Jiva.

We now pass on to the consideration of the next two topics, the nature of the *Jīva* and the origin of the *Jīva*.

⁷⁰⁵ Śrīkara reads the *Sūtra* II. 3. 5 *Pratignāhānir avyātirēkāt śabdēbhyah* thus: *Pratignāhānirvyātirēkāt śabdēbhyah*, omitting the negative letter *a* in the *Sūtra*. Sankara and Ānandatīrtha read it with the negative *a* but with the words *śabdēbhyah*, which form a separate *Sūtra* in Rāmānuja.

⁷⁰⁶ *Jīvas* exist ; creation cannot be denied to them ; *jīvas* prefer to go as they like into creation ; Brahman only agrees and brings them into creation, giving them bodily forms and power of free action but remains in them throughout in their individual division. There is no contradiction whatever in the *Srutis* in regard to this.

The nature of the *jīva* is discussed in the *Amśādhi-karaṇa* (II. 3. 40—II. 3. 50) more especially in II. 3. 40: *Amśō nānāvyapadēśādanyathā chāpi dāśakitavāditvam adhīyata ēkē*.

In the previous *Sūtras*, the atomic character (*anutva*) of the *jīva*, its capacity for understanding, its power for realizing Brahman, its power for independent action and the like having been demonstrated, now in this *Sūtra* are discussed at length the Oneness of the *jīva* (*jīvaikatva*), the *Brahmatva* of the *jīva* (*jīva brahmatva*), the *jīvas* falling off (from Brahman) (*jīvālīkatva*), the reflected character of the *jīva* (*jīvapratibimbādikam*) and other topics and how far they are impossible or inconsistent with the *Vēdas* (*Anupapannam avaidikatvāt*). Hundreds of *Sruti* texts like the following, *Yathā sudīptāt pāvakādvīspṃlingās sahasraśaḥ prabhavantē sarūpāḥ*; *Tathā kṣarādvīvidhās saumyabhāvāḥ prajāyantē tatra chaivāpiyanti*;⁷⁰⁷ *Māyāntu prakritim vīndyānmāyīnamtu mahēśvaram*; *Tasyā-vayava bhūtaistu vyāptam sarvamidam jagat*,⁷⁰⁸ etc., declare the *jīva* as the *amśa* of Brahman. It is therefore not right to discuss the question like *jīvaikatva*, etc. For the expression which occurs in the *Sūtra*, *Nānāvyapadēśāt*, clearly points out the meaning of *bhēda* in *Sruti* texts like *Dvāsuparnā*,⁷⁰⁹ etc., which declare that the *jīva* and Brahman are different. And the expression in the *Sūtra*, *Anyathā-chāpi*, denotes that *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi*,⁷¹⁰ etc., declare *abhēda*. Therefore it has to be accepted that there exists between the *jīva* and Brahman *bhēda* and *abhēda*. It is, however, proved by *Sruti* texts that *jīvas* are *amśas* (parts) of Brahman. Even though this is so, the expression in the *Sūtra*, *Dāśakitavāditvam adhīyata ēkē*, points out that the *Ātharvaṇikaśākhins*⁷¹¹ declare the *jīvas* as a servant class

⁷⁰⁷ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁹ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

⁷¹⁰ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 8.

⁷¹¹ Those who follow the *Ātharvaṇaśikhā Upanishad*.

(*Brahmaṇaḥ dāsakitavatvam*) of the Brahman, and therefore from the relation “of being a servant” and “of offering service” (*dāsya dāsakatvēna*), they declare that between the *jīva* and Brahman there is *bhēda*. *Sruti* texts like *Brahma-dāsū Brahmadāsū Brahmaivēmē kitavāḥ*,⁷¹² etc., incontestably prove that *jīvas* even in their *mukti* stage, having attained *Brahma sārūpya*, offer, by reason of their being servants, (holy) services and submit in their subordination to Brahman. The word *Ēkē* in the *Sūtra* particularizes *Ēkē sākhinaḥ*, i.e., those belonging to the Atharvaṇaśākha. That doctrine is proved to hold good and is held to be in conformity with the Vēdic doctrine. It is therefore to be accepted as proved that those *jīvas* who being released from the bondage of the world and of family ties and who become quite pure and are fit for *mukti*, they, in their *mukti* stage also, still hold to their status of subordination and by reason of fear (by fear of such subordination) (*bhayaḥētvēna*) offer their services (to Brahman) in the relationship of Paramēśvara *śēsha* and *śēshi* (Paramēśvara as the remainder and the *jīva* as the part taken away from the whole) (*Paramēśvara sēsha sēshitvādikam upapannam*). If it is urged, as against this, that *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyādi* etc., in which the identity of the *jīva* and Brahman (*jīva Brahmaṇōssvarūpaikyatva*) is declared, we suggest we always argue as those who act in conformity with the (teachings of the) *Sruti* texts. But as the saying goes *Na yuktim bahumanmahē*, intelligence in argument is not the only thing that deserves respect. As at length proved in the *Jignāsādhikaraṇam*, intelligence should always be used in conformity with the teachings of the *Srutis* combined with experience. Even in the *Advaita* and the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* doctrines, on account of the want of harmony created by them as between *Sruti* texts as interpreted by them, they cling for a support to the shadow of the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine. If, as they say, they depend (for the truth of their teaching) on the harmony as between all the *Sruti* texts (*sarva Sruti samanvaya*) then

⁷¹² *Atharvaśiras.*

they should be held to indirectly accept *bhēdābhēda*. As regards the highly argumentative followers of the Madhva school of teaching, who utterly hold to *bhēdāvāda*, they cannot be said to have harmonised all the *Srutis*—in so much as they practically reject all the *Advaita Srutis*,—just as Bauddhas who discard all the *Srutis*, both *bhēda* and *abhēda*. That such a doctrine should not be accepted is what is indicated as the gist of the *Sūtra*.

Now, who is this *jīva*? Is he absolutely different from Brahman (*Parasmādatyantabhinnaḥ*)? Or is he Parabrahman alone in this false form (*Paramēva Brahmābhrāntam*)?

Further, if we postulate that the *jīva* is only Brahman in disguise (*upādhi*) or only a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman, in either case it would be a contradiction of the *Srutis*. According to the *Sūtras*, *Tadananyatvam ārambhanaśabdādibhyaḥ* (II. 1. 14) and *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt* (II. 1. 22), etc., this conclusion is established: in truth, He is the same. Some *Srutis* declare plurality; others identity (with Brahman). If we examine these two sets of contradictory *Srutis*, then we will naturally arrive with the better conclusion that the *jīva* is a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman. So long as it is not clearly established that the *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of Brahman, till then it is to be understood that *jīva* is not different from Brahman. At any rate nothing beyond Brahman is established. Then, what is the result? Is it to be inferred that the *jīva* is absolutely different from Brahman. How? *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*,⁷¹³ etc., clearly point to difference (that Brahman and the *jīva* are different). It cannot be held out according to the *Sruti* text *Gnā gnau*,⁷¹⁴ etc., that the *jīva* and Brahman are one. The *Sruti* text *Agninā sinchati*, etc., declares metaphorically that the *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of Brahman. This cannot be proved. The word *aṁśa* means part and parcel of a certain thing. If *jīva* is then said to be an *aṁśa* of Brahman and forms a part of Brahman,

⁷¹³ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*

then it is to be understood that whatever faults exist in *jīva* also exist in Brahman. At any rate, the view that Brahman is a *khaṇḍa* or part of *jīva* is not supported by reason. As Brahman cannot deservedly be characterized as a part of *jīva*, we arrive again at the same contradiction as before. Therefore, for one who is out and out different from Brahman (*atyanta bhinnatvam*), to call him an *aṁśa* is really difficult of proof. If we postulate that the *jīva* is Brahman alone in a false form, on the support of the *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi*,⁷¹⁵ *Ayamātmā Brahma*,⁷¹⁶ etc., which explain the *jīva* as *Brahmātmabhāva* (as a form of Brahman in the form of *jīva*), then according to those who hold to the *nānātva* principle,⁷¹⁷ the result is that we arrive at a position which falsifies what is borne testimony to by *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*, which endeavour to prove the *Advaita* standpoint. According to *Advaita*, the *pratyakṣādi* (*anumāna*, *āgama*, etc.) argument tries to prove the *avidyā* which lies in Brahman. Therefore it holds that Brahman is inseparably connected with *upādhi* which ends in the manifestation of the *jīva*. And, therefore, it holds that *Brahmātmabhāva* is to be seen in the state of the *jīva*. But it is certain that it cannot as a fact be concluded that the *jīva* is a disguised form of Brahman or his false form. Because it is through Brahman that bondage, release, etc., is to be finally secured (by the *jīva*). So we again arrive at the conclusion that the *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of Brahman, for, according to the expression in the *Sūtra*, *Nānā-vyapadēśādanyathā chaikatvēna*, the *jīva* holds the double state of *jīva* and *Brahman* in its respective *aṁśas*. The *nānātva* of the *jīva* is exhibited in the power of creation, and controlling (*niyantrutva*), and commanding

⁷¹⁵ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 8.

⁷¹⁶ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 19.

⁷¹⁷ *Nānātva vādin*s as opposed to *ekatva vādin*s; pluralists as opposed to monists. *Nānātva vādin*s: Those who maintain the Sāṅkhya doctrine that each individual has a soul distinct from the Universal Spirit.

(*niyāmyatva*) and all-knowing (*sarvagnatva*) and also not knowing (*agnatva*), both *svādhīnatva* and *parādhīnatva* (independence and subordination), *śuddhatva* and *aśuddhatva* (purity and non-purity), *kalyāṇaguṇākaraṭva* and its *viparītatva* (good qualities and bad qualities), etc., are also seen in these dual states. In the *Sūtra*, the expression *Anyathācha* is used. It is seen that the *jīva* behaves to exist identically with Brahman according to the *Sruti* texts *Tattvamasi*,⁷¹⁸ *Ayamātmā Brahma*,⁷¹⁹ etc. In the *Sūtra*, moreover, the expression *Dāśakitavāditvamadhīyata ēkē* explains the *Ātharvaṇika Sruti* text *Brahmadāśā Brahmadāśā Brahmaivēmē kitavāh*, etc., which means that Brahman holds the forms of *dāśa* and *kitava* (servant form and the form of the rogue). Then all the *jīvas* generally hold this different form from that of Brahman. Thus, if we have to conclude by accepting the double state of the existence of the *jīva* and *Brahman* forms, then we must conclude that this *jīva* is only an *amśa* of Brahman. This is clearly accepting the opinions held by those who postulate that the *jīva* is different from Brahman. And it cannot well be otherwise. Then if Brahman is accepted to possess the powers of creation (*srujyatva*), control (*niyāmyatva*), remaindership (*tatśēshatva*), support (*tadādhāratva*), maintenance (*tatpālyatva*), destruction (*tat-samhāratva*), meditating upon him (*tadupāsakatva*) and to obtain through his grace the enjoyment of *dharmārtha kāma mōksha* and release therefrom, then, *jīva* and Brahman are absolutely different from each other. And therefore it is clearly proved through *pratyākshānumānāgama* that the *jīva* is other than Brahman and therefore so long as the powers of *jagat srisṭi*, etc., cannot be proved for him, so far it cannot be proved that the *jīva* is only a disguised form of Brahman. Nor can he be affirmed to be *akhaṇḍa*, i.e., an indivisible part of Brahman in a different state (*akhaṇḍaika rasa chinmātra svarūpēṇa*).

⁷¹⁸ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 8.

⁷¹⁹ *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 19.

If, against this, it is held that the *jīva* enters this world of bondage in the *pañchabhūta sṛisṭi* stage; after thus entering into existence under a certain nomenclature and undergoing in this world all the results of bondage by experiencing in a mixed form, sometimes happiness and sometimes misery and then meditating upon that form of Brahman who brought him into creation and striving for *mōksha* according to the principles of the *Śāstra* as explained to him by his *guru*; and all the while that he should be in the *jīva* form, himself Brahman in disguise,—all this would clearly show in truth the ravings of a mad man in the height of his madness (*tathāsati unmatta pralāpitatvāpātāt*). And therefore it can never be maintained, however much you might try, with the support of the *Srutis*, that the *jīva* is only Brahman in disguise (*upādhyavachchinnam Brahmā jīva ityapi nasādhīryaḥ*), because the powers of creation, and command clearly go against such a view (*pūrva nirdishṭa niyāmyatva niyantratvādi vyapadēśa bādhādēva*). It cannot be held to be a proved fact that Devadatta, being only some identical person, not only possessed the powers of creation, control, etc., of the world but also underwent all the miseries of a family man through his ignorance. Nor is it possible by any *Śāstraic* device to combine in one and the same person the attributes of the *jīva* and an *aṁśa* of Brahman (*jīvōyam Brahmanōmśaḥ*) unless we grant that the import of all the *Sruti* texts which proclaim the *dvaita* and *advaita* doctrines are in agreement on the fundamental points. And this is the conclusion. *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* texts such as *Śivaḥ satyam jagat satyam jīvaḥ satyam svabhāvataḥ*; *Tēshām abhēdassatyōvā krimibhramara-yōriva*, etc., declare that the existence of Śiva is true; that the existence of the world is true and that the existence of the *jīva* is true generally. Whether it is a fact that they are one and the same (*tēshām abhēdassatyōvā*), can only be understood in the manner in which we understand the relation of the *krimi* to the *bhramara* (*krimi bhramara-*

yōriva). Those who think thus with the *Smṛiti* text that Śiva is to the *jagat* and *jīva* as the *krimi* is to the *bhramara* and Brahman—think in a handsome manner. *Sṛuti* texts like *Ayamātmā Brahma*,⁷²⁰ etc., also declare of the *jīva* in terms of the Brahman (*jīvasyaiva Brahmatvōpadēśāt*). If that be so, then do *Bhēda Śṛuti* texts like *Brahmadāśā Brahmadāsā*, etc., which declare in the manner exemplified in the invented difference which mistakes the rope for the snake, lead us to a doubt as to how these two different sets of *Sṛuti* texts can be reconciled. The answer to this doubt is propounded in the next *Sūtra*, *Mantravarṇāt* (II. 3. 41).

Sṛuti texts like the following explain the gist of the *Mantravarṇa*, which declares that the *jīva* is an *amśa* of Śiva (*Sivāmsō jīvaḥ*):—*Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyīnantu mahēśvaram* ¹ *Tasyāvayavabhūtōttham vyāptam sarva-midam jagat* ⁷²¹; *Pādō'sya viśvā bhūtāni tripādasyāmṛitam divi*,⁷²² etc. These texts clearly show that *Māyā* possesses the character of *prakṛiti* and *Mahēśvara* is never separated from it and therefore the whole world is stated to be something that has been born out of a membrane of his body. Therefore *jīva* also is a part of *Māyā*, which is a small part of Paramapurusha Śiva.

Moreover, the term *amśa* is synonymous with the word *pāda*. Paramaśiva represents the *viśvabhūta* and *jīvas*, who are innumerable and thus spoken of in the plural number, represent only a part or an *amśa*. Both in the *Mantras* and in the *Sūtras*, the word *amśa* is used only in the singular, in order to show that as a class, *jīvas* form only a part of Paramaśiva, who represents *viśvabhūta*. In the *Sṛuti* text *Ātmā śrutēḥ*, the word *Sṛuti* is used in the singular number only, thereby conveying the idea of *jīvas* belonging to a "class". *Sṛuti* texts like *Nityō'nityānām chētanaśchētanānām ēkō bahūnām yō*

⁷²⁰ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 19.

⁷²¹ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

⁷²² *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 12.

vidadhāti kāmān,⁷²³ etc., all go to prove that Īśvara is seen in *jīvas* in his entirety and eternality though the *jīvas* are many. This sufficiently establishes the fact that in His *gnāna svarūpa*, He is one in all the *jīvas* (though they are) quite separate from each other and Himself absolutely separate from them. This is the chief reason for the separate existence of each in different forms. This is what those well versed in the knowledge of the real nature of *ātman* (*ātma yāthātmya*) hold as a settled fact.⁷²⁴

⁷²³ *Katha Upa.*, II. 18.

⁷²⁴ Cf. Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā*, I. 1. 1 (Nirṇaya Sāgara edition, page 18), dealing with *mukti*, after postulating that *mukti* is possible only through the grace of Hari, says that mere *gnāna* without a settled knowledge of Hari cannot help one to attain *mōksha*; that *mōksha* is the result of Hari's grace; and that Hari's grace is subject to *ātma yāthātmya gnāna*. He then observes:—*Ātma-yāthātmya gnānātanātmani śarīrādāvātmatvārōpē sati hi tadanukūla pratikūlayōh rāgadvēshau bhavataḥ tābhayā prayuktah puṇyapāpa lakṣhaṇām pravruttimāchinutē tataścha sura nara tiryagādi nanā-yōnīshu navīna śarīrēndriyādi samyōga lakṣhaṇam janmāsya bhavati*. [If there is no knowledge of the exact *ātma yāthātmya svarūpa*, then it results in *rāga* and *dvēsha*, and these two latter lead to commission of sin and subsequently end in birth and rebirth among the human and inferior (*tiryagyōni*) species.] Then Tīkāchārya writes:—*Tasmāchcha duḥkḥānubhava ityanādirayam kāryakāraṇa-pravāhaḥ samsāra ityuchyatē | Ātma tattva gnānāchcha agnāna viparyayau nivartētē | Tattvagnānasya samānāśraya viśhayāgnāna mithyāgnāna nivartana svābhāvāt | Śūktikā tattva gnānasya tadagnāna rajatārōpa nivartakatva darśanāt | Mithyāgnānanivritttau cha rāga dvēśānūdayaḥ kāraṇābhāvāt | Tayōrabhavē cha na pravrutteḥ utpattiḥ tata ēva prāk upachitāyāschōpabhōgēna prakṣhayaḥ | Pravruttyabhāvēcha janmāntarābhāvō hētvabhāvādēva vartamāna śarīrādēścha ārambhakakṣhayē sati nivruttiḥ | Janmābhāvē cha na nirbījasya duḥkḥasyōtpāda ityēvam ātyantiki duḥkḥānivruttir muktiḥ*. (And this ends in involving himself in the rotatory series of births and rebirths which is signified by the flow of *samsāra*. And therefore in order to free himself from such a flow of the bondage of life, *ātma tattvagnāna* is the only means—to remove him out of this illusion of ignorance. And this *ātmatattvagnāna* has the natural power of removing him out of the hold of *agnāna* and *mithyāgnāna*. Then, he will have been delivered from the ignorance which made him to imagine *rajata* in *śukti*. Thus ignorance being lost, he will

The *Sūtra*, *Asantatēschāvyatikarāḥ* (II. 3. 46), clearly states that the plurality of *ātman* (*ātma bahutva*) is brought to manifestation only subsequently. And therefore it is not a pleasure to discuss further the *dvaita* phase of the argument as *Ātmaikatva* is also supported.

Here *Srīpati* passes on to the *Advaita* point of view. In this view, further proofs (for this position) are pointed out in the next *Sūtra*, *Api cha smaryatē* (II. 3. 42). (Moreover it is so stated in *Smṛiti*.) There is in the *Sivagītā* the text, *Satyagnūnātmako'nantō vibhūrātmā mahēśvaraḥ | Tasyaivāmsō jīvalōkō hrudayē prāṇinam sthitah | Visphulingā yathā vahnau jāyantē kāshṭhayōgataḥ | Anādi-vāsanāyuktāḥ kshētragnā iti tē smritāḥ | iti*. And also in the *Krishṇa-Gītā*, there is the text: *Mamaivāmsō jīvalōkō jīvabhūtassanātanah | Īśvarassarvabhūtānām hruddēś' rjuna tishthati | Bhrāmāyan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni māyayā | Tamēva śaraṇam yāhi sarvabhāvēna bhārata || iti*. Both of these texts declare that *jīvas* in their plurality also possess *Īśvaratva*. Similarly in the *Taittirīya Sruti* text, *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē | Yēna jātāni jīvanti || iti* and others of the same import, there is clear proof of the plural existence (*jīva bahutvam*) of the *jīva*. And hence the pretended *jīvaikatva* and *jīva-Brahmatva* disputation

have no more cause for rotatory births, which, when it ceases, there will be no more seed left for sorrow to rise. And this state of being absolutely rid of any shadow of sorrow is called *mukti*, *Ātyantikī duḥkhanivruttir muktih*. The *Sruti* text, *Yasya prasādāt paramārti rūpat asmāt samsārān muchyate nāparēṇa*, declares that by nothing else but by *Paramātmā's* grace can the *jīva* be removed out of the bondage of *samsāra* and made to attain *mukti*, which is true *gnāna*.

Cf. Gnāni priyatamō'to mē tam vidvānēva chāmritah | Vruṇutēyam tēnalabhyah (*Smṛiti* text). *Yamaivēsha vruṇutē tēna labhyah tasyaisha ātmā vruṇutē tanūm svām* (*Sruti* text). Quoted by *Jayatīrtha* in *Nyāya Sudhā* (p. 17). (A *gnāni* should necessarily endear himself to me. Then only he is considered by me as one deserving of my grace and will thereby obtain it.) The *Sruti* declares: He whom he aspires for, through Him only could he attain *mukti*. And He will grant His grace in His personal Self in token of *mukti*.

is also possible. Verily, it is seen in the *Purusha Sūkta* text *Pādō'sya viśvābhūtāni*, etc., that Viṣṇu is the sole regulator of *srishṭi*, etc. And also in the *Krishṇa-Gītā* there is the text *Mamaivāṁsō jīvalōkaḥ*, etc., which denotes that Krishṇa himself in his *amśa* represents the *jīva*. And further from the invocation of Viṣṇu as *Hariḥ Om*, etc., which is prescribed as the starting point in the *Vēdas* and *Vēdāntas* generally and from the *Kapila Smṛiti*, it is seen from the text, *Vēdavyākyaṇi sarvāṇi Harinamāni vai smṛitāḥ*,⁷²⁵ that all the words used in the *Vēda* throughout are capable of being interpreted only in terms of Hari. If from this it is doubted whether the *jīvas* are the *amśas* of Viṣṇu only, our answer is "It is not so". Because this is a clear contradiction to several *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* texts previously quoted. The same thing is dealt with at great length in the *Purusha Sūkta* I. i. as well as in the *Krishṇa-Gītā*. It is a contradiction of all *Sruti* texts if Nārāyaṇa, who is one of the embodiments of the three deities, who make up the Trinity (*mūrtitraya antarbhūtasya*), alone forms the *amśa* of all *jīvas* and to appropriate for himself the use of that term (*Viṣṇu amśa*). In the *Sruti* text *Ēkō viṣṇur mahadbhūtam pruthak bhūtānyanēkaśaḥ* | it is said that Viṣṇu is one great being who pervades severally in several forms all the different beings of creation. Also in the *Sruti* text *Viṣṇvādyuttama dēhēshu pravishṭō daivatā bhavēt | Manuśyādyadhama dēhēshu pravishṭō mānavōbhavēt* | etc., it is declared that having entered into the highest class of beings like Viṣṇu and others, they become beings of high order; and having entered into the lowest class such as human beings, etc., they become beings of lower order such as human beings, etc. Thus Viṣṇu is stated to have assumed the *jīva* form. Viṣṇu is not explicitly proved throughout the *Srutis* that he is beyond the pale of the three forms of the Trinity, just as Śiva is. Śiva is present in all beings (*sarvātmaka*), and is the underlying

⁷²⁵ Cf. the following citation of this *Sruti* text taken from Ānandatīrtha's *Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, I. 1. 6 :—*Nāmāni sarvāṇi yamāviśanti tam vai Viṣṇum paramam udāharanti*.

spirit in all words (*sarvaśabda vāchya*). That Viṣṇu should, in a substituted sense, be represented, in the place of Śiva, as the highest deity, with the emblems of *śankha* and *chakra* and the marks of *ūrdhva puṇḍra* and as keeping the whole world under his delusive sway, is an impropriety. It is generally stated that Śiva is the *amśa* of the *jīva*. The phrase *Hariḥ Om* with which Vēdic texts begin, in token of offering praise to Viṣṇu and thereby suggesting that throughout all the *Vēdas* Viṣṇu is the supreme underlying deity, is an unfounded statement which is not pleasant to discuss (*avichārīta ramanīyam*). In hundreds of *Sruti* texts like *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ*; *Śivōmāmēva pitarah*; *Īśānassarvavidyānām*; etc., and also in hundreds of *Smṛiti* texts as well like *Vēdā śivaḥ śivō vēdaḥ*; *Vēdādhyāyī sadāśivaḥ*; *Nārudraḥ kramapāṭhaka iti*, etc., it is clearly proved that Śiva only is *sarvātmaka* (one pervading all); *sarvaśrutījanaka* (one who is the origin of all the *Sruti* texts); and *sarvavēdanīyāmaka* (one who controls all the Vēdic *dharma*). And thus all these powers cannot be claimed by any one else. Therefore in the expression *Hariḥ Om*, the word *Hari*, which is associated with the invocatory suffix *Om*, only implies Śiva in its utterance. For it is stated in the *Sruti* text, *Yō vēdādanu svarah prōktō vēdāntēcha pratishṭhitaḥ*,⁷²⁶ etc. (He who is invoked by the utterance of *ōmkāra* in the beginning of the *Vēdas* and also who establishes himself till the end of it). It is clearly shown that according to the *Srauta vidhi* (Vēdic practice), the expression *Om* only, unqualifiedly, is what should be uttered in the beginning as well as at the end of the *Vēda*.⁷²⁷

The *Māṇḍūkya Sruti* text beginning with *Om ityēta-daksharamidam sarvam iti* and ending with *Prapanchōpaśamaśśivōdvaita ēvamōmkāraḥ samviśatyātmanātmānam ya ēvam vēda iti*, declares that *Om* is the chief symbolic utterance expressive of the whole of the *Vēda* and denotes

⁷²⁶ *Mahōpa.*, X. 24.

⁷²⁷ That is, without the name *Hariḥ* being prefixed. See Note at the end of this Volume on p. 438 of the text on this topic.

Śiva as the Supreme deity of the *praṇava*. The word "Śiva" also expresses the primary meaning which the "praṇava" claims to express. And beyond "praṇava" there is no one. This is the chief idea underlying the *praṇava*. Also the *Taittirīya* text *Brahmādhipatir Brahmanōdhipatir Brahmā Sivōmē astu Sadāśivōm iti* and the *Sāma Sruti* text *Akārō Brahmā ukārō Vishnuḥ makārō kālakālōhyardha mātṛaḥ Paramaśivastasmādōmkāram linga-māhuriti*, declare clearly the gist of the *praṇava*. And the *Sruti* text *Parāt paratarō Brahmā tatparāt paratō Hariḥ | Yatparāt paratōdhīśastanmē maṇaśśivasankalpam astviti* || bears witness to the fact that the *praṇava Omkāra* can, without objection, be used as a prefix to the term *Hariḥ* but not as a suffix. Because the term "Śiva" should be expressed as being above that of "Vishṇu" as embodied in the *praṇava*. The *Sruti* text *Ardhōvā patnī ēshātmanō grihēshu iti* clearly shows and the *Smṛiti* text *Sivāya Vishṇurūpāya Sivarūpāya Vishṇavē* | and the *Kūrmēśvara Gītā* text *Mamaishā paramā mūrtir Nārāyaṇa samāhvayā* declare that in the body of Vishṇu the body of Śiva also is incontrovertibly contained. It is also stated in the *Sāma Sākhā* in the text *Sivasya śaktirviniyōgakālē chaturvidhābhūchchivā satprasādāt | Bhōgē bhavānī samarēcha durgā krōdhēcha kālī purushēcha Vishṇuḥ | iti* || that Vishṇu is represented as belonging to the *amśa* of Pārvatī (*Vishṇōḥ Pār-vatyamśōpadēśāt*). In the *Sivāshṭōttaraśatanāmavalī* there occurs the text *Sankaraśśūlapānīścha khaṭvāngī Vishṇuvallabhaḥ | iti*, etc. Also in the *Skānda*, we have the text *Vandē sūrya śaśānka vahninayanam vandē mukundapriyam iti*, etc. The ascriptions in these texts of *Vishṇuvallabhātva* and *priyatva* bear witness to the *ardhāṅgatva* to Vishṇu. In the same way, as moon and moonlight are related to each other, Śiva who is the embodiment of the *praṇava* and Vishṇu are so related (as *Chandrikā* cannot be separated from Chandra, Śiva cannot be separated from Vishṇu).⁷²⁸ In the *Vaiyāsika Skānda*, there is the text *Śivakēśava sambhūtam kalayē Kālabhairavam iti*, etc. It is generally stated in the

⁷²⁸ We seem to have a glimpse of the Hariharēśvara doctrine here.

Purāṇas that Śiva is incontrovertibly spoken of in terms of *Vishṇuvallabhatva*. If it is questioned that while the term *Gowrīpati* is accepted as the principal expression for Śiva, then at both the beginning and the end of the *Vēdas* and *Vēdānta* there ought to have been used the expression (implying *Gowrīpatitva*). According to the saying current in the world *Yōshā jāramiva priyam*, so in the *Vēda*, in order to exhibit the natural tendency for a man to incline more towards his paramour in order to indicate his intenser love for her, clandestinely than naturally, so in the *Vēdas* also, the expression *Hariḥ Om* is considered to be proper, because that term is, even though inextricably woven with the name of Vishṇu, a source of pleasure.⁷²⁹ Thus *jīvas*, being the *amśa* of Brahman in an infinitesimally small portion, whatever deficiency attaches to them should naturally apply to Brahman also in common. In order to remove this doubt the next *Sūtra* is propounded. *Prakāśādivattu naivam paraḥ* (II. 3. 43). (*But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest.*)

In this *Sūtra*, the indeclinable *tu* (*śabda*) indicates the exclusion of the discrepancy suggested at the end of the comments on the last *Sūtra* (*Prakāśādivat+tu+na+ēvam+paraḥ*). Like the brightness of a light, *jīva* is the *amśa* of Paramātma. Just as a fire, while it is burning with bright light, reflects brightness all about it, and thereby exhibits its *amśas* and just as cows and horses of different colours—white, black, etc.—possess certain common features between them as discriminating characteristics; and just as human beings and divine beings possess a carnal body, similarly *amśa* means a feature common to both.⁷³⁰ In certain things, there are a larger number of characteristics which could be compared with any one of them in common with others. Similarly discriminating people explain by comparing certain features common to the two things for purposes of

⁷²⁹ See Text note on page 438 on this topic.

⁷³⁰ *Ēkavastvēkadēśatvamhi āmśatvam* : i.e., Where in one particular point, there is Oneness, there is *āmśatva*. Being common in one part is *āmśatva*.

comparison. Thus the *amśa* and *amśi* become matters for comparison with their common features in them as their natural characteristics. In this manner, the *jīva* and the *Parabrahman* are thus compared with their common natural features as *amśa* and *amśi* in drawing up a comparison between the two. Thus, in the *Sūtra*, it is said *naivam paraḥ*, thereby meaning that the *jīva* only could be compared with *Parabrahman* and that *Parabrahman* could not be compared with anything else. What the *jīva* is as a being, the *Parabrahman* is not (as a being). In the same manner, the brightness also is of a different nature in these beings. And therefore the *ānanda* of *jīva* is something quite different from the incomparable *ānanda* of *Śiva Parabrahman*. In this way, the *jīva* and the *Parabrahman* stand, for comparison's sake, having these qualifying characteristics. And thus these natural differences in character stand as the fundamental basis for *bhēda* between *Īśa* and *jīva*. And these qualities naturally support the argument for *bhēda*. As for proving *abhēda*, there are not attributive expressions of a fitting kind that can help to establish it. And such expressions which can establish *abhēda* are not available in particular (*abhēda nirdēśāstu pruthak siddhyanarha viśēṣaṇānām viśēṣhyaparyantatvam āśritya mukhyatvenōpāpadyantē*). In the texts *Tattvamasi*,⁷³¹ *Ayamātmā Brahma*,⁷³² etc., and in the expression—*Ayamātmēti*, the words *Tat*, *Brahma* and *Ātmā* all clearly show that they are the controlling agency in the *jīva* and thus it is impossible to postulate *ekatva* as between *jīva* and *Brahman*. This has been already made known above. The *Smritis* also lay stress on the fact that the unhappy state of the *jīva* is not to be seen in *Śiva Parabrahman*. This is more clearly set forth in the next *Sūtra*, *Smaranti cha* (II. 3. 44). (And *Smriti* texts declare this.) The *Smritis* strongly support the above view.

The indeclinable *cha* denotes the *Smritis* taken as a whole—*chaśabdassamuchchayē*. Take such *Smriti* texts

⁷³¹ *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 8. 7.

⁷³² *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 19.

as the following: *Tatra yaḥ paramātmāsau sa satyō nirguṇassmṛitaḥ* | *Nalipyatē phalaiśchāpi padmapatrami-vāmbhasā* | *Karmātmātvaparōyōsau mōkshabandhaiḥ sayujyatē* | *Vigraham dēvadēvasya jagadētachcharācharam* | *Ēta-dartham na jānanti paśavaḥ pāpagauravāt iti* || etc. This Paramātmā is eternal and true and devoid of *guṇas*. He is never desirous of realizing any *phala* for himself, just as a lotus leaf on the surface of water. All *jīvas* endeavour by their actions to realize Parabrahman and thereby get themselves freed from bondage and obtain *Mōksha*. In trying to obtain *Mōksha*, the *jīvas* undergo a great struggle in this mundane world. Many a sinful creature does not know this real truth in what he is aiming at. Thus the *Smritis* clearly declare that the clear glow of light of Parabrahman attracts the *jīvas*; to obtain it they put forth all their efforts in their *amśa* form. And this relative feature of *jīva* and Brahman is sufficiently explained in the *Smritis* by Parāśara and other Rishis. The *Smṛiti* text *Ēkadēśasthitasyāgnēr jyōtsnū vistariṇī yathā* | *Parasya Brahmanāśśaktistathēdam akhilam jagat* | etc., declares that though fire burns in one particular place, it throws its light over a large area around it, similarly the glow of brightness of the *śakti* of Parabrahman is radiated throughout the world. Thus Īśvara partakes absolutely nothing of the miseries found in the *jīvas*. So proclaim the *Smritis*. The indeclinable *cha* lays stress on the absolute absence of *duḥkha* in Parabrahman. This is clearly declared in the *Sruti* text *Tayōranyaḥ pippalam svādvattyanāśnan anyō abhichākaśīti*,⁷³³ which declares that one of the two, *viz.*, the *anyō jīvākhya* bird enjoys its fruit of previous actions in its former births, while the Paramātmā bird (*anāśnan anyō*) enjoys its eternal undiminished joy. In this way, the *Srutis* and *Smritis* clearly explain the widely differing features which contrast the *jīva* from the Brahman. Thus it is seen throughout the *Vēdānta* that in certain respects the *jīva* and Parabrahman stand

⁷³³ *Śvēta. Upa., IV. 6.*

as objects for comparison—such as *amśa*, *gnāna*, *samāna*, etc.,—and these widely contrast with what is mentioned in other *Smritis*, their inequalities and improbabilities which cast the doubt as to how the *Śāstra* should be harmonised. In order to clear this doubt, the following *Sūtra* (II. 3. 45) is propounded: *Anugnā parihārau dēhasambandhājyōtirādivat*. (*Accepting and rejecting goes with the nature of the body with which it is connected, as we accept or reject fire, etc.*) Even though as a fact, all *jīvas* possess an *amśa* of Brahman and have knowledge about him, yet they being located differently among sects differing as those of Brahma, Kshatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra, with whom cleanliness and dirt (*Suchyāśuchirdēhasambandha*) are a matter of like and dislike and are tied up with their respective habits and practices. Just as fire which though it is the same everywhere it is found, is yet always preferred from the household of a Brahman well versed in sacred learning (*Srōtriyāgārāt agnirāhriyatē, smaśānādēstu parihriyatē*“) being discarded at the same time the fire, from the cremation ground and just as a person prefers to beg his food from the house of a learned Brahman and discards it even when offered at the house of a fighting enemy, even so it is in the matter of *jīvas* who possess bodily forms. Thus the acts done by Dēvadatta and those done by Yagnadatta widely differ in their characteristics and in their results.⁷³⁴ If it is asked why this is so, it is explained in the next *Sūtra*: *Asantatēschāvyatikarāḥ* (II. 3. 46). (*Being different in descent, they are not reciprocal.*) Though it is true that the *amśa* of Brahman is the same in all *jīvas*, yet it shows a difference in every individual body by reason of the difference that exists mutually between different bodies. The experience of these different bodies cannot

⁷³⁴ This is an elaboration by Śrīpati of Śrīkantha's short comment on this *Sūtra*. Both do not explain the term *ādi* in the *Sūtra*. Nor does Rāmānuja bring out the force of this word. (See *Śrī-Bhāṣya*, III. 3. 48). Śrīpati herein seeks to establish the dualistic position between *jīva* and *jīva* throughout creation.

be blended together. Judging from the (*Advaita*) theory which propounds the doctrine that *bhṛānti* makes us differentiate the *jīva* from the Brahman, from the *jīva* point of view, the differences that exist between *jīvas* seem as though they were inherent in the *jīvas* severally. In the experience of the *jīvas* severally, there is found to be difference; this seems a defect in them. And these defects cannot, as among the *jīvas* themselves, be harmonised. In order to establish that such a natural defect in the *jīvas* cannot be harmoniously blended, the word *avyatikaraḥ* has been fittingly used in the *Sūtra*. It cannot be said that the acts of Dēvadatta can make Yagnadatta responsible (for them), as both Yagnadatta and Dēvadatta are bodily absolutely different from generations and therefore the character of the one cannot be blended with that of the other. Those *jīvas* who are naturally wise and fit for realizing *mōksha*, until they have reached that stage they change their bodily form, behave differently from the other *jīvas* who are affected by *upādhi*; and these two cannot be harmoniously blended either. Just as a *jīva* in bondage (*baddha jīva*), which undergoes both happiness and misery as decreed to it by its fate, cannot be blended with one that is not so subject to bondage,⁷³⁵ by possessing a profound knowledge regarding Śiva Parabrahman, a *jīva* will be free from all family and other illusory bondages. To this effect, it is clearly said in the *Sivāgama*:—*Baddha śuddhādi bhēdēna jīvatrayam idam smritam । Gurudīkshā vihīnaścha Sivabhakti vivarjitah । Svakartrushvābhimānītu baddhassa paśuruchyatē । Gurudīkshām parām labdhvā kaimkaryatraya samyutah । Sāntyādi sadguṇōpētō mumukshū rāga varjitah । Sivādīna sudhī bhaktaś śuddha jīva iti smritah । Sivayōga Sivagnāna vibhavānanda samyutah । Prachandātapa madhyastha śuddha karpūra dīpavat । Sivākārē parākāśē kōṭisūrya prakāśakē ।*

⁷³⁵ Does Śrīpati believe in the theory of Ānandatīrtha : *Trividhā jīva sanghāstu dēva mānusha dānavāḥ* ? According to Ānandatīrtha, these cannot be blended together. See *Tātparyā Nirṇaya*, 1st *Adhyāya* (T. R. Krishnachar's Edition). See Note 740 on page 536.

Vilīna chittavrittistu mukta jīva iti smṛitaḥ । *Sa jīvan mukta ityuktō rāgadvēśha vivarjitaḥ* ॥ The *jīvas* are said to be of three kinds: *baddha*, *śuddha* and *others*. He who is void of faith in his *guru* and bereft of faith in Śiva Parabrahman belongs to one class. And he who esteems himself as his own lord and is self-conceited is considered to be one in bondage like a *paśu*. He who is always conscientiously serving his *guru*, who unites in himself the triple qualities of servitude, who possesses the qualities of humility and other good qualities fit for being a *mumukshu*, who is bereft of personal ties and who always realizes that he is dependent on Śiva, is said to be a *śuddha jīva*. He who is associated with Śiva, who is full of knowledge of Śiva, who enjoys in himself the company of Śiva in his undiminished joy and who is always standing in the burning sun fearlessly like a piece of burning camphor, and realizes Śiva Parabrahman in the open space in his resplendent brilliance of a thousand suns, keeping his mind dissolved, is called a *mukta jīva*. He is said to be a *jīvanmukta* who is absolutely free from either friendship or enmity (*rāga* and *dvēśha*) of any kind.

Moreover, if the doubt be raised whether such differences (as above) among *jīvas* and their enjoyment, etc., hold good in the case of the *Bhrānta-Brahma-jīva-vādins*, who postulate that such differences are due only to *avidya* caused by *upādhi* and that there could not naturally be such differences, it is cleared in the next *Sūtra* : *Ābhāsa ēva cha* (II. 3. 47). (*It is only fallacious appearance.*) Brahman, who is absolutely *akhaṇḍaikarasaprakāśa* (all fluid-like lustre) in his *svarūpa* but who on account of *upādhi* (disguise), which is a material which supports the cause of *bhēda* between *jīva* and himself, is only *hēturābhāsa* (an unsupportable cause or argument).⁷³⁶

⁷³⁶ Brahman is absolutely *akhaṇḍaikarasaprakāśa* in his *svarūpa*. But *upādhi*, the material which makes the reflection or deceitful appearance possible, on account of which he is made to appear as different from the *jīva*, is a false material and cannot support the *ābhāsa* for asserting that difference.

For it is said in the *Smritis*: *Prakāśaika svarūpasya prakāśaka tirōdhānam prakāśana ēva iti prāgēva upapāditam*. [Brahman is all *prakāśa* (resplendent lustre) only in *sva-rūpa* and *upādhi* is a material which obstructs the appearance. This was originally discussed and brought to light.] The *Sūtra* can also be read as *Ābhāsa ēva*; the indeclinable *cha* denotes only *hēturābhāsa*, i.e., the falsity of the material which causes the false appearance by its obstruction. But *Sruti* texts such as *Pruthagātmānam prēritāramcha matvā* | *Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśānīśau*⁷³⁷ | *Tayōranyaḥ pippalam svādvatti* | *iti*,⁷³⁸ etc., quite contradict the above argument and *avidya* becomes *kalpita upādhi*, i.e., an invented disguise, which brings into existence an idea of difference (*bhēda*) affecting the *sva-rūpaikya* (the union of appearance) contradicting the *bhēda*. The state of opposite experiences, as happiness and misery, which is constant between the two,—i.e., Brahman and *jīva*—is made to appear as only one. Moreover, if as is clearly proved in the *Sruti*, it is conceded that *bimba* and *pratibimba*, forming the Brahman and *jīva*, always live together each possessing a separate conscience of its own,—as declared in the *Sruti* text, *Guhām pratishtḥē paramē parārdhē*⁷³⁹—and *Sūtra* texts like *Guhām pratishtḥāvātmānau hi taddarśanāt* (I. 2. 11) etc., do contradict the position that *bimba* and *pratibimba* are one in their nature. This is a subject that it is pleasant not to discuss further. If this contention, however, regarding Brahman and the *jīva*, relating to the highest truth, as being enveloped by *upādhi*, raises the doubt whether such a difference is merely illusory and cannot be said to be real, as it is not clearly seen and declared to be so by the *Śāstras*, the next *Sūtra* meets it: *Adrishtānīyamāt* (II. 2. 48). (*And on account of the non-determination of the adrishtas.*) As the real nature of *upādhi* and its series of changes are not clearly understood when coming into contact with *Brahma-svarūpa*, therefore no definite conclusion has been arrived at

⁷³⁷ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*, IV. 6.

⁷³⁹ *Kaṭha Upa.*, III. 1.

nor declared and thus stands an unsettled fact. On account of this unknown *upādhi* coming into contact with *Brahmasvarūpa*, the position becomes one of an extirpator or an eradicator (of *Brahmasvarūpa* itself). Moreover, according to the *Advaita* system, the *jīvas* being alike in their *vibhutva* (lordliness), in spite of all of them being *pratibimbās*, it is also not determined in the *Śāstras* that these *pratibimbās* who appear different from each other are one in their original form. There is also no declaration about the nature of *puṇya* and *pāpa* with which these different *pratibimbās* are connected. The *Śāstras* do not clearly lay bare which class of *pratibimbās* are naturally of the poorer class and which of the richer class. And therefore we have to concede necessarily that *jīvas*, even in their minute form, are innumerable (*bahutvam*) and are by their very nature different from each other (*pratiśarīra svābhāvika bhinnatvam cha angī-kartavyam*).⁷⁴⁰ If it is doubted whether in such a case the *jīvas* as *pratibimbās* are of different kinds—saying “Verily I may obtain this fruit”; “I can get rid of this fruit”; “I will do this”; “I will not do this” and so on—thus exhibiting the *jīvas* as being in a confused state and making it impossible to determine their nature or the classes to which they really belong, etc., the next *Sūtra* clears the doubt.

Commenting on *Abhisandhyādishvapi chaivam* (II. 3. 49) (*And it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on*), Śrīpati remarks that it is also equally undetermined as to which class of *jīvas* could be stated to be possessed of *rāga* (love) and which of *dvēsha* (enmity). And therefore, under such indeterminable circumstances, it cannot be exactly stated in clear terms the distinction between the two classes of *jīvas*. Verily, it is said in the *Sruti* text, *Ēsha ēva sādhu karma kārayati*,⁷⁴¹ etc., that the *jīva* is absolutely devoid of independence and whatever is achieved by it as *puṇya* or *pāpa* becomes attributable in its birth to *Īśvara*. If

⁷⁴⁰ Śrīpati accepts that the *jīvas* are different from each other. Cf. Ānandatīrtha's *Jīvēśayōrbhidāchāivā jīva bhēda parasparam.—Tatva Vivēka*. (T. R. Krishnachar's Edition.)

⁷⁴¹ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 4. 22.

it is said that *karma* is subordinate to Īśvara's promptings, that Īśvara is its prompter, and that *karma* itself (which prompts action) is eternal (*anādi*) and that the result of actions done by both classes of *jīvas* goes to none other than Īśvara, then the answer is "It is not so". Because the *jīvas* unlike Īśvara, though devoid of all knowledge and all power, yet they are not as lifeless as *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* and are not *jaḍapadārthas* (motionless matter). But still as a servant behaves towards his king in his subordination, and acts agreeably to the king's commands, though his power of action within the pale of a servant cannot be denied to him; in the same manner, within the pale of their subordinate position, even though their liberty of action be very small, *jīvas* do enjoy the effects of their actions resulting in *puṇya* and *pāpa*. The *Sruti* texts *Jyōtiṣṭōmēna svargakāmō yajēta*; *Karmachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē*, *puṇyachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē*; *Parīkshya lōkān karmachitān Brāhmaṇō nirvēdamāyāt*; ⁷⁴² *Satyam vada dharmam chara*, ⁷⁴³ etc., and hundreds of others similar to them declare clearly that the *jīva* is one having some small right to action (*kinchit kartrutva*), some small knowledge (*kinchid gnanatva*), and possessing a body fettered in eternal subordination (*kinchit kartrutva, kinchid gnanatva baddhānāditva sarīrah*). *Sruti* texts like *Īkṣanādi pravēśāntam srisṭīrīṣēna kalpitā* | *Jāgrādādi prapanchasya srisṭir jīvēna kalpitā* | *iti*, etc., clearly state that beginning from the time the *jīva* desired to view the world, etc., until the *jīva* enters the final stage (*īkṣanādi pravēśāntam*), his creation rested in the responsibility of Īśa. Thereafter his (the *jīva*'s) wakefulness (*jāgrati*), etc., (*i.e.*, after he came into the world) was of his own responsibility. This shows clearly that *jīvas* have their part of *kartrutva*, though it is minute in its character. The Sun whose action results in the day dawning and the night following and also the actions of *paśu*, *pakshi* and *mṛiga* and the smaller creatures such as insects, etc., have within their own sphere their independence of action,

⁷⁴² *Mund. Upa.*, I. 2. 12.

⁷⁴³ *Taitt. Upa.*, I. 15.

which are not denied to them. In the same way, Īśvara has prescribed to the different classes of *jīvas* their limited nature of independence of action and there is, according to the *Srutis* and *Smritis*, no contradiction in this statement. If this were not so, the aforesaid *Srutis* and *Smritis* would become seriously opposed to each other. Therefore, the *Srutis* which grant the double *kartrutva*—the unlimited and the limited (*ubhaya kartrutva*)—are not contradictory to each other. It is therefore seen that *jīvas*, on account of their *Brahmāṁśa*, are in a divided form from Brahman (*Brahmāṁśatvēna parichchinnatvāt*), even though *amśa* and *amśi* are not different.⁷⁴⁴ Therefore if the doubt is raised whether *sukha* and *duḥkha* are not clearly determined, then the next *Sūtra* explains it:—*Praveśabhēdāditichēnnāntarbhāvāt* (II. 3. 50). [*Should it be said (that this is possible) owing to the difference of place ; we deny this, on account of (all upādhis) being within (all places).*] (The word *jīva* is understood here.)

If it is said that whatever it may be, Brahman is one and it is not possible for him to go into a divided condition by reason of his coming into contact with *upādhi* of various kinds in various different places, the answer is that Brahman himself does not come into contact with different kinds of *upādhi*. On the other hand, he closely accompanies the *jīva* in order to give the latter the experience of the different states. Therefore it is that the *jīva* is said to be subordinate. By Brahman following the *jīva* to make it undergo the different changes, Brahman remains in the *jīva* controlling it, himself absolutely unaffected by *upādhi*. This state of altered existence is always, in every state of existence, permanent to the Brahman and the *jīva* for all time. But since Brahman wanders in every place, together with the *jīva*, the experience gained by such connection also proceeds solely from the *jīva* and has nothing to do with the Brahman. Therefore, the statement that the *jīva* is the result of the *upādhi* of Brahman and that it is

⁷⁴⁴ *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* are both provided for here by Śrīpati.

subordinate to *upādhi* is not a matter relevant to the present subject to discuss.

Sruti texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*;⁷⁴⁵ *Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśānīśau iti*,⁷⁴⁶ etc., clearly contradict the position that Brahman is affected by *upādhi*. [They in fact declare that Brahman is absolutely free from *upādhi*.] In the *Sūtra*, *Utpattirasambhavāt*, the venerable Bādarāyaṇa has clearly said before that the *jīvas* are not brought into existence afresh. [Both Brahman and the *jīva* are *nitya*, eternal.] In the present *Adhikaraṇa* in the *Sūtra*, *Amsō nānā vyapadēśāt*, etc., it is clearly stated that some of the *jīvas*, who are eligible for realizing *Brahmapada*, do so at the *pralaya* by entering into Brahman (*Brahmānupravīṣṭānām*) in a naturally divided condition (*svabhāvabhinnānām*) and occupy their respective reserved places (*pada*). At the time of the next creation when they come into existence, *jīvas* who are naturally divided (*svabhāvabhinna*) appear again in their *amśa* form only, even though they belong to Brahman's creation and they cannot, on any account, be called as belonging to *Brahmāmśa* in their origin (*i.e.*, they are born in their own *amśas* and not Brahman's, though the *srīṣṭi* is Brahman's). In this world, by reason of the knowledge derived from the memory of several different previous births, men generally come into existence, just as a son is born out of the womb of a member of the female sex, and then are called, according to the *Sruti* text, *Ātmā vai putra nāmāsi iti* saying that "Thou art born to me as my son out of my *ātmā*", thereby proving that the son is of the *amśa* (*svāmśatvam*) of the father. Therefore, in our opinion, those several kinds of *jīva* who entered Brahman in the previous *pralaya* went in their own *amśa* form. And this has been accepted as a proof of *amśa* and *amśi* always going in conformity. The *Sūtras* and *Sruti* texts do not contradict each other when they declare that some *jīvas* are eligible for coming into creation while others are not. The *Sruti* text, *Tayōr anyah pippalam svāddvatti*

⁷⁴⁵ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

⁷⁴⁶ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

*anaśnan anyō abhichākaśīti*⁷⁴⁷ *iti*, etc., clearly proves that of the two (*jīvākhya pakshi* and *paramākhya pakshi*), the former (the *jīvākhya pakshi*) always seeks to enjoy the results of the actions of its previous births, whereas the latter (the *paramākhya pakshi*) which is always unaffected in its joys, exults in its transcendent splendour. This proves that there is no contradiction when it is said that the *jīva* always enjoys the results of its previous births. The theory, therefore, that for the mere reason that the *jīva* comes into Brahman's creation, he is of Brahman's *amśa* and because he is subject to sorrow and joy, such sorrow and joy belong to Paraśiva Brahman, stands rejected. *Sruti* texts like *Sō'ntarā-dantaram prāviśat*⁷⁴⁸ | *Antaḥ pravishṭaḥ śāstā janānām* | *Īśānassarvavidyānām Īśvarassarvabhūtānām*, etc., in their spirit clearly declare that Īśvara is all the while in the heart of the *jīvas* controlling them and directing them towards the results of their previous actions, which theory has been agreed to and accepted. And therefore it is established that whatever the *jīva* does, according to the results of its previous acts, be it sorrow or joy, the enjoyment of it cannot go to Īśvara.

Origin of Soul.

The principal *Sūtras* dealing with the *Ātman* are the following:—

- (1) I. 4. 26. *Ātmakritēḥ pariṇāmāt.*

(Rāmānuja and Srīkanṭha treat this as two *Sūtras*: I. 4. 26, *Ātmakritēḥ* and I. 4. 27, *Pariṇāmāt*. But Srīpati follows Sankara and Ānandatīrtha in reading the two *Sūtras* together as one.)

- (2) II. 1. 28. *Ātmani chaivam vichitrāścha hi.*

- (3) II. 2. 33. *Ēvanchātmākārchchanyam.*

- (4) II. 3. 16. *Nātmāśrutērnityatvāchcha tābhyah.*

⁷⁴⁷ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

⁷⁴⁸ *Atharvaśiras*. This text would seem to suggest that the *jīva* was already in a subordinate position (*antarāi*) and was enabled to enter into (*prāviśat*) a subordinate existence (*antaram*).

- (5) II. 3. 19. *Svātmanā chōttarayōh.*
 (6) II. 3. 28. *Yāvadātmabhāvitvāchcha na dōshastad-
darśanāt.*
 (7) III. 3. 15. *Ātmaśabdāchcha.*
 (8) III. 3. 16. *Ātmagrihītiritaravaduttarāt.*
 (9) III. 3. 51. *Ēkātmanaśśarīrē bhāvāt.*
 (10) IV. 1. 3. *Ātmēti tūpagachchanti grāhayanti cha.*
 (11) IV. 4. 3. *Ātmā prakaraṇāt.*

The *ātman* is accordingly dealt with in each *Adhyāya*. In the first *Adhyāya*, in *Sūtra* I. 4. 26, the term *ātman* is applied to the *jīva* when it has reduced itself to the infinitesimal part—*anutva*—agreeably to the *dadhikshīra nyāya*. That is, the *ātman* (*jīva*) has by giving up its own form (*svarūpa*) only obtained its another form (*rūpāntara eva*) and thus has transformed itself.

Srīpati, commenting on this *Sūtra*, says :—By becoming the instrumental and material cause, Brahman made, as connected with himself, the *rūpa* of *ātman* (*nimittōpādānatvē Brahmanāḥ ātmanassambandhinī kritirātmakritih*). In general, Brahman exhibited himself in his own form (*Ātmakritēh*) as the chief instrumental cause. According to the text *Tadātmānam svayamakurutē* (Then the Supreme Brahman makes himself of himself a *kārya*; i.e., he makes himself *kāraṇa* and *kārya*), Paramēśvara to whom is applied the appellation of *Ātman*, then transforms himself both as chief cause and as action itself, in order to bring about attainment of creation. If it is doubted how Śiva Parabrahman became himself *kriti* and *karma* (*katham kriti karmatvam*), the reply is summed up (in the word) *Pariṇāmāt* (in the *Sūtrā*), i.e., transformation. In the great, supreme, all-pervading Lord Paraśiva, who is all glory, far from any defilement, and who is above all, these two kinds of forms—*kriti karmatvam*—are not contradictory. These two forms of Parabrahman, viz., the *kriti* form and the *karma* form, culminated in evolving in the two states *chētana* and *achētana* or the *prapancha* form in the final transformation. Verily, according to the *dadhikshīra nyāya* (milk converted

into curds) so Parabrahman, out of his original form, converted himself into two kinds of forms leaving the original. *Pariṇāma* means exchanging the original form by conversion into these two states of existence, viz., *chētana* and *achētana*. If it is doubted whether it is possible for the eternal unpolluted one (i.e., Brahman) to assume a transformed inferior state, destroying his original state in all its glory, the reply is, "Even though Paramēśvara exhibits himself as the instrumental and material causes respectively, yet, there is no actual destruction of or harm to his original glory. Paramēśvara always has at his call the *Māyā Śakti*, with which he can transform himself into the *jagat-rūpa* (i.e., worldly form). That *Māyā Śakti* of *Paramēśvara* (*Tat Paramēśvarasya*) is the *nimittakāraṇa* (i.e., the instrumental cause) for the process of transformation. For, it is said in the *Sruti* text, *Mayāntu prakritim vindyāt*, etc.,⁷⁴⁹ by which *Māyā Śakti*, which is not different from himself, is the chief *śakti* of Paramēśvara whereby he stands as controller and also as the (controlled) (*Svabhinnamāyayā niyāmyatvam Paramēśvarasya niyāmakatvam cha śravaṇāt*). These (controller and controlled) can be predicated in this world of no other. This is proved. There are other reasons as well.

In the next *Sūtra*, *Yōniścha hi gīyatē*, the other reasons are developed. Śrīpati says, commenting on it, that in this word *Yōni* is used as the synonym for *Prakriti*. Because in the *Upanishad* it is stated, *Prithivī yōnirōśhadhi vanaspatīnām iti*, etc. (*Prithivī* is the womb for generating several kinds of plants, trees, etc.). *Yōni* is also a special organ of *śrīṣṭi*. Indra is also called *Yōni* because he is one of the sources of creation. Therefore *ātman* assumes the form of *Prakriti* in order to generate *śrīṣṭi* of various kinds through the instrumental cause acting upon the material cause. This view is supported by the *Sruti* text, *Yathōrṇanābhissrījatē grihyatē cha iti*,⁷⁵⁰ etc., which declares that the material

⁷⁴⁹ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

⁷⁵⁰ *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 7.

cause also is evidenced by Śiva. And there is thus no contradiction.⁷⁵¹

In the second *Adhyāya*, in *Sūtra* II. 1. 28, *Ātmani chaivam vichitrāścha hi*, the question is answered, as we have seen above, how Brahman, destitute of bodily form and qualities, becomes the creator of *jagat* which has a bodily form and has many qualities. In answering the question in the affirmative, the further question is raised whether Brahman is influenced by *Māyā Śakti* just as ordinary *jīvas* are.

In the third *Adhyāya*, we have *Sūtras* III. 3. 15 and III. 3. 16, *Ātmaśabdāchcha* and *Ātmagrikhīritiritaravaduttarāt*. Commenting on the former, Srīpati says that in this *Sūtra* the term *Ātma* denotes Parabrahman. Texts in the *Taittirīya Sruti* such as, *Tasmādvā ēlasmādātmana ākāśassambhūtaḥ iti*,⁷⁵² etc., declare that *Ātman*, that supreme form of Parabrahman, is the chief cause of creation. And through him *ākāśa*, etc. (*Vāyu*, *Agni*, etc.) were originated. It is also said in the *Māṇḍūkya Sruti* in texts such as *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam śivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē sa ātmā sa vignēyaḥ iti*, etc., which state that the term *ātma* is here used in order to denote that He is Śiva Parabrahman who is the cause of *prapancha*. It is also declared in the *Atharvaśikhā* text beginning with *Dhyāyī-tēśānam pradhyaītavayam sarvamidam Brahma Vishnu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē iti*, etc., and ending with *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya*, etc., that all those who wish to obtain *mōksha* in its final (*charama*) form should meditate upon Paraśiva Brahman only to the prohibition of other forms. Therefore, it is that it is decisively proved that Śiva Parabrahman, who is eternal and who is all-happy, who is all-auspicious and all-bliss,

⁷⁵¹ In this connection, Ānandatīrtha quotes the *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 6 :—*Yadbhūtayōnim paripaśyantidhīrāḥ* ; and follows it up with the following citation from the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* :—*Vyavadhānēna sūtiṣtu pumstvam vidvadbhiruchyatē* । *Sūtiravyavadhānēna prakṛititvam iti sthitiḥ* ॥ *Ubhayātmakasūtitvāt Vāsudēvaḥ paraḥ pumān* ॥

⁷⁵² *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

is the dual cause of this world under the nomenclature of *Ātman*. *Smṛiti* texts like *Ritam satyam param Brahma puruṣam kṛṣṇaṅgalaṁ* | *Ūrdhvarētam virūpākṣam viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ*,⁷⁵³ etc., declare that the *Kṛṣṇaṅgala* and *Virūpākṣa* form of Parabrahman must always be meditated upon. Thus say the *Smṛitis* : *Sivam bhajanti yē narāḥ Sivam vrajanti tē narāḥ* | *Sivētaram bhajanti tē Sivētaram vrajanti tē* || Those persons who meditate upon and worship Śiva finally go to realize Śiva, while those who meditate upon other forms of Parabrahman than that of Śiva, go to and realize only such other forms. So, therefore, those who are fond of and anxious to reach Śiva should meditate only upon the Śiva Parabrahma form in order to realize the fruit of *Ānandamaya* Śiva and should not think others. The *Sṛuti* text, *Anyō'ntara ātmānandamayaḥ*, etc., declares clearly that Śivamantra should be the chief term employed in meditating upon Śiva in order to derive *Ānandamayasiddhi* and this is clearly explained in them (the *Sṛuti* texts). Moreover, in other contexts also wherein, the text *Anyō'ntara ātmānandamayaḥ* appears, the word *ātma* denotes Parabrahman and in that context explains that Śiva forms the head of Parabrahman and that the other sides of Parabrahman, such as the two flanks and the back, are represented by other forms of deities. And therefore in order to derive complete happiness and enjoy it, head is the chief part of the body and this part being the form of Śiva Parabrahman above all others, must be meditated upon. The *Sṛuti* text, *Indriyēbhyaḥ parāhyarthā arthēbhyāścha param manāḥ* | *Manasastu parā buddhiḥ bud-dhērātmā mahān paraḥ* | *Mahataḥ param avyaktaṁ avyak-tāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ* | *Puruṣānnaṁ param kinchit sā kāśhṭhā sā parā gatih* || *iti*, etc., declares that subtler are the elements than the senses ; subtler is the mind than the elements ; subtler is the intellect than the mind ; subtler is the great *Ātman* than the intellect ; mightier than the great *Ātman* is the *Avyakta* ; mightier still than even the *Avyakta* is the

⁷⁵³ *Mahōpa.*, V. 8.

Purusha ; there is little beyond the *Purusha*. He is the final limit, and the final refuge (for the *jīva*).⁷⁵⁴ The *Sruti* texts, *Anyōntara ātmā prāṇamayah* | *Anyōntara ātmā manōmayah* | and also *Anyōntara ātmā vighnānamayah*⁷⁵⁵ point out that the term *Ātma* is used for the subordinate *anātma*, because this is the highest reward that he could reach in realizing *Ātman* on whom he meditates. And therefore the word *Ātma* is used in these two senses (for *Ātman* and *Anātman*).⁷⁵⁶ But how can we determine the *vighnānamaya anātma* to realize the *ānandamaya ātma* by meditation as declared in the *Sruti* text *Anyōntara ātmānandamayah*? The next *Sūtra* clears the doubt: *Ātmagrihītiritaravaduttarāt* (III. 3. 16). The term *Ātma* in the *Sruti* text, *Anyōntara ātmānandamaya iti*, points out only the Paramātma and should be understood only as such. The expression *itaravat* in the *Sūtra* means clearly “as compared with the word *Ātma* used elsewhere”—(i.e., the secondary sense signifying *anātma*, i.e., *jīva*). The *Sruti* text, *Ātmā vā idamēka ēvāgra āśīt* | *Sa īkshata lōkān srijā iti*,⁷⁵⁷ etc., in which the word *ātma* is used, refers only to Paramātman and should be understood in that sense. Then, why is this term used in this way? The expression *uttarāt* in the *Sūtra* explains the meaning of the *Sruti* as an answer. *Sō'kāmayata bahusyām prajāyēya*.⁷⁵⁸ It was his desire to create many such *prajas* (*ātmans*). And this is the answer of Parabrahman when questioned.

In *Ēka ātmanaśśarīrē bhāvāt* (III. 3. 51), *Srīpati* says: *Ātmanah*—In the body of the *jīva*, Parabrahma *Śiva*

⁷⁵⁴ *Kaṭha Uṇa.*, III. 10. *Avyaktam*: The undeveloped. Paul Deussen translates it as *natura naturans* and *Vyaktam* as *natura naturata* or the already developed. See the *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 240. *Purusha*: Spirit; the Knowing Subject. *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁵ *Anyōntarātmā* = *Anyah* + *antarah* + *Ātmā*, where *anyah* denotes Parabrahman. Cf. *Uttamah Purushastvanyah* (*Bhagavad-Gītā*, XV. 17); *antarah* + *ātmā* denotes the subordinate *anātma* (i.e., the *jīva*).

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⁷⁵⁷ *Aitarēya Upa.*, I. 1. 1.

⁷⁵⁸ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6.

prevails as its chief (or dominating) innate property. The texts, *Grihapratishtḥē paramē parārdhē* | *Īśānasarvavidyānām īśvarassarvabhūtānām* | *Pradhāna kshētragna-patirguṇēśaḥ samsāra mōksha sthitibandha hētuḥ* | *Brahma-vidāpnōti param* | *Tattvamasi* | *iti*, etc., clearly denote that Brahman as *Ātman* exists in the body absolutely over and above the *jīva* (*jīvātiriktatvēna*) as supreme and unsurpassed. And it is therefore not correct that the *jīva* should meditate upon himself for realization. This is the gist of what is intended to be conveyed by this *Sūtra*. In all this Brahma-vidya, during meditation, the *upāsaka* (i.e., the meditator) should clearly understand the *svarūpa* of Parabrahman in order to differentiate the *upāsaka* from the *upāsya*. In the *Sūtra*, *Trayāṇāmēva chaivam-upanyāsaḥ praśnaścha iti* and the *Taittirīya Sruti* text, *Bhrigur vai vāruṇiḥ* | *Varuṇam pitaramupasasāra* | *Adhīhi bhagavō Brahmēti* | *Tasmā ētat prōvācha* | *Annam prāṇam chakshuḥ śrōtram manō vācham iti* | *Tam hōvācha* | and the text beginning with *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*⁷⁵⁹ and ending with *Saishā bhārgavī vāruṇī vidyā paramē vyōman pratishṭhitā*,⁷⁶⁰ it is said in answer to the question raised whether in order to meditate on *ānandamaya* Brahman should the *upāsaka* (the meditator) think upon the *Paramātmā* or the *jīva*:—In the *Srutis* it is said *Ayamātmā Brahma*⁷⁶¹ (This *ātma* is Brahman) thereby meaning that the *jīva* alone is Brahman. The *Sruti* texts *Yō'nyāni dēvatām upāstē anyō' sāvanyō' hamasmi* | *Na sa vēda yathā paśuḥ* | *Mri-tyōssamrutyumāpnōti iti*,⁷⁶² etc., clearly state that there is no other beyond the meditator himself to realize as the Supreme. The *Sruti* texts, *Ahamasmi Brahmāhamasmi iti*,⁷⁶³ etc., also support the same view. Therefore if it is argued that it is the conclusion of all Vēdantic texts that the meditator should meditate on himself for realization, then the reply is

⁷⁵⁹ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, III. 1. 6.

⁷⁶¹ *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 5. 19.

⁷⁶² *Ibid.*, IV. 4. 19.

⁷⁶³ *Ibid.*, I. 4. 10.

that the explanation is propounded in this *Sūtra*: *Ēka ātmanāśśarīrē bhāvāt*. The expression “*Ēkaḥ*” means “*Paramātmān*; *Pradhāna kshētragnapatir mahēśvaraḥ*”; the expression “*Ātma*” means “*sthāvara jaṅgamātmaka jīva*” i.e., the being in the movable and immovable world; the word *Bhinnaḥ* is to be read here after the word “*Ātmanah*”. This word is suggested as completing the sense of the *Sūtra*, which *Srīpati* reads as to mean that “In the *jīva*’s body, *Paramātmān* dwells as the Chief Lord; on account of *jīva*, He is different from him (*jīva*)”. As read by him, the *Sūtra* would run: *Ēka ātmanō bhinnah śarīrē bhāvāt*.

Srīpati then proceeds. The *Sruti* texts *Ritam pibantau sukritasya lōkē guhām pravīṣṭau paramē parardhē* | *Chchāyātāpau Brahmadevō vadanti panchāgnayō yē cha triṇāchikētāḥ*⁷⁰⁴ | *Dvāsuparṇā sayujā sakhāyau* | *Ksharam pradhānam amritāksharam haraḥ ksharātmanā viśatē dēva ēkaḥ*, etc., declare that the two internal beings, *jīva* and *Īśvara*, are always living in the *Puṇḍarīka* (heart) of the body as two different beings. All *Vēdānta* agrees in declaring that the two are ever constant and this is amply proved in the dialogue between *Bhrigu* and *Vārūṇi*, in the manner of question and reply. *Bhrigu* has clearly explained the *Brahma dharma*, viz., that the *vignānamaya jīva* is absolutely different from the *Anandamaya Brahma*, as existing in the body of the *jīva*. This peculiar characteristic of the two is inevitable. In conclusion, the *Sruti* text beginning with *Sa yaśchāyam purushē* | *Yaśchāsavādityē* | *Sa ēkaḥ* | *Sa ya ēvam vit* | and ending with *Ahamannamahamannamadantamadmi* | *Aham viśvam bhuvanam abhyabhuvām* | *Suvarṇa jyōtiḥ* | *Ya ēvam vēda* | and also the *Sruti* texts *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ* | *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma* | *Ūrdhvarētam Virūpāksham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ*⁷⁰⁵ | *Hiraṇmayōham Śivarūpamasmi* | *Namō hiraṇyabāhavē* | *iti*, and numerous other texts declare that *Paraśiva* in his form of *Hiraṇmaya* and the All-pervading prevails everywhere. This cannot be claimed by another (*nētara paratvam*). *Sruti* texts

⁷⁰⁴ *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

like *Yō vignānē tishṭhan yasya vignānam śarīram* | *Ya ātmani tishṭhan yasyātmā śarīram*⁷⁶⁶ | *Hiraṇmayē parēkōśē virajam Brahma nishphalam* | *Tat śubhram jyōtishām jyōtistattadātmavidō viduḥ* | *Ātmāvā'rē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsitaḥ* | *Brahmavēda Brahmaiva bhavati* | *iti*, etc., declare that according to one's own and other *śākhās* of *Vēdānta* and every other branch of learning, Śiva Parabrahman is the one to be meditated upon and that the *jīva* is the meditator. And that by his meditation upon Brahman, the *jīva* can obtain and realize Brahman is also clearly explained. The meditation on Brahman as *Annam Brahma* by the *vignānātmaka jīva* during the period of meditation refers only to Paramēśvara Brahman who pervades him. And in order to reach him, the various stages of his meditation show the several steps that he advances in his progress of meditation in order to reach him. The conception of the *jīva* as Brahman himself absolutely is flatly contradicted by several *Sruti* texts :—*Anīśayā śōchati muhyamānaḥ* | *Tarati śōkamātmavit*⁷⁶⁷ | *Īśam gnātvā amritatvamēti* | *Tamēvam veditvā atimrityumēti* | *Nānyaḥ panthā vidyatē ayanāya*;⁷⁶⁸ *Śraddhā bhakti dhyāna yōgādavēhi* | *Ātmānam arañim kṛtvā praṇavam chōttarāraṇim* | *Dhyāna nirmathanābhyāsāt pāsam dahati paṇḍitaḥ* | etc., and many others. This forms the subject of discussion of the *Bhṛiguvalī* dialogue from the beginning to the end. *Sruti* texts like *Aham Brahmāsmi*, *Tattvamasi*, *iti*,⁷⁶⁹ etc., though they lead to the inference that the meditator and the meditated are one in the result (*phala*), yet they have not sufficiently proved and declared that the *jīva*, who enters into *anādi malasamsāra* (an infinite series of sins) and binds himself for entering into several generations in his bodily form, now going into it and now coming out of it, and who thus keeps struggling on in this fire of

⁷⁶⁶ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, III. 7. 22.

⁷⁶⁷ *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 1. 3.

⁷⁶⁸ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 8.

⁷⁶⁹ *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 8. 7.

tāpatraya and feels burning pain (*dandahyamāna*), could ever come out of it and ever could possibly attain *Brahmatva*—this is kept as a great doubt. That this is never possible is conclusive (*Tāpatrayānala dandahyamāna svabhāvasya naśvatō Brahmatvam sambhavadīti siddham*).

Ēvanchātmākārtsnyam (II. 2. 33). (*And in the case of space also, on account of there being no difference.*) Thus, it follows that the *ātman* (as *jīva*) became a totality with the Supreme. In other words, the *jīva* is, as compared with the body, in small size and occupies but a small portion of it. There, in that small space, it lives in a very diminutive form; in the same way it lives in small insects occupying but a small space in them, and making the totality of its form with the Supreme *Ātman*. Moreover, if it is conceded that the *jīva* occupies the body in as small form, then, there is room to think that it goes even to *Paralōka* in that small form. And therefore we have to accept that the *jīva* assumes the *sūkshma* form and lives in the body.

If we have to oppose such a view, the next *Sūtra*—*Sarīrāṇām chānavasthitaparimānatvāt* (II. 2. 34) (*And on account of recognition*)—explains that it cannot be so contradicted.

We have seen insects such as flies, etc., in minute forms, born as the result of their previous *karma*; such insects are born again in their future lives as elephants as the result of their previous *karma*.⁷⁷⁰ But the suggestion, because the *jīva* is small and minute, it can ascend to the other world in that form (*i.e.*, with its body), because its body is small and that the elephant cannot because of its heavy body, is fallacious and cannot be accepted. Such a reasoning ends in contradicting the *siddhānta* (the theory) that no *jīva* goes to the other world with its body but leaving the body behind.

Nātmāśrutēr nityatvāchcha tābhyah (II. 3. 16).

The word *Ātma* cannot obtain the meaning of *śarīra*. Why? Because it is not so supported by the *Srutis*. We do not

⁷⁷⁰ A fly in one generation may become an elephant in another birth. See *Mahābhārata*, *Anuśāsanika Parva*, *Kiṭōpākhyāna*.

hear from the *Sruti* texts describing creation that the *jīvas* were created anew. (They already existed.) *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*, etc., bear testimony to the eternal existence of the *jīvas*. This is the gist of the meaning of this *Sūtra* (*Na+ātma+aśrutēḥ +nityatvāt+cha+tābhyah*). That this entire world was originated through the influence of *Ākāśa*, etc.⁷⁷¹ and that Brahman became manifest through Parabrahman is stated in the *Sruti* texts. Then, if it is asked whether the *jīva* also came into existence along with Brahman and the entire world, the question arises which is the right answer. The answer should be in the affirmative (*astīti*). How? The ready reply is provided by the *Sruti* text *Ēkavignānēna sarvavignānam*⁷⁷²—by understanding one we have to understand the rest in the same way, in order that we may be consistent with our previous *pratigna* (*Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*, etc., texts). We have agreed that originally there was only one *srishṭi* (creation) during which just as *ākāśa* and the rest became manifested, *jīvas* also became manifest and this is supported by the *Sruti* texts as already set forth in our arguments (texts like *Yataḥ prasūtā jagataḥ prasūtī-tōyēna jīvān visasarja bhūmyām*).⁷⁷³ From whom the world came into existence, through him (the Parabrahman) i.e., the same source, came also the *jīvas*. *Prajāpatiḥ prajā asrujata; Sanmūlāssomyēmāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ*

⁷⁷¹ *Ākāśadvāyuh vāyōragniḥ agnērāpaḥ*, etc., *Rig-Vēda*, *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1. 1.

⁷⁷² *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

⁷⁷³ This is a text from the *Mahānārāyaṇōpanishad*, I. 16. It is quoted by Ānandatīrtha, I. 1. 1. The full text is as follows:—

Yam antassamudrē kavayō vadanti yadakṣharē paramē prajāḥ |

Yataḥ prasūtā jagataḥ prasūtī tōyēna jīvān visasarja bhūmyām ||

Ānandatīrtha quotes it for establishing his thesis that the world is eternal and only became manifest through Parabrahman at the time of creation along with the *jīvas*, thereby suggesting that *jīvas* were no new entities brought into being at the time of creation but only previously existing ones brought into manifestation at creation by him.

satpratishthāḥ;⁷⁷⁴ *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*;⁷⁷⁵ *iti* and other texts clearly prove that the creation of the world was along with all the *jīvas* in a *sachētana* form. These texts clearly demonstrate that the coming into being of the *jīvas* was along with the world and that it is to be understood to be as such. No separate statement (of this) is necessary, for Brahman is also said to be eternal. This view is amply proved by *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi*⁷⁷⁶ etc., inasmuch as the *jīvas* to whom *Brahmatva* is attributed, are also eternal. *Sruti* texts like *Aitadātmyamidam sarvam*;⁷⁷⁷ *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*;⁷⁷⁸ etc., also prove that Brahman became manifested through *Ākāśa* etc., though eternal. And therefore the view that even the *jīvas* did come through the influence of *Ākāśa*, etc., has to be accepted. If this is the conclusion we have to come to, then according to the *Sūtra Nātmāśrutēr nityatvāchcha tābhyah iti*, etc., the word *ātma* cannot be construed to mean the *śarīra*, because it is not so established by the *Sruti* texts. The *Gītā Smriti* says: *Na jāyatē mriyatē vā vipaśchit*⁷⁷⁹ (Neither is he born nor does he die). And *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*, etc., conclusively oppose the holding of a contradictory view. The eternity of the *Ātman* (*Ātmanō nityatvam*) (i.e., *jīva* and the Parabrahman) is amply proved by the *Sruti* and *Smriti* texts themselves. *Sruti* texts such as *Nityō'nityānām chētanaśchētanānām ēkō bahūnām yō vidadhāti kāmān*;⁷⁸⁰ *Ajō nityaśśāśvatōyam purāṇō na hanyatē hanyamānē śarīrē*;⁷⁸¹ *iti*, etc., declare the same view, viz., that *jīvas* are eternal among the eternal things (*nityō'nityānām*); are sentient

⁷⁷⁴ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 6. 4.

⁷⁷⁵ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

⁷⁷⁶ *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 8. 7.

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, IV. 8. 7.

⁷⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, III. 4.

⁷⁷⁹ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II; *Kaṭha Upa.*, II. 18.

⁷⁸⁰ *Kaṭha Upa.*, V. 13.

⁷⁸¹ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II.

beings among sentient beings (*chētanaśchētanānām*); and one among several eternal things (*ekō bahūnām*), who realize their desires; this *jīva* is called *aja* (because he is not born); *nitya* (eternal); and *śāśvata* (ever existing as a being); he is always old (*purāṇaḥ*); he is neither killed nor does he die although he loses his bodily form. And therefore *ātma* cannot mean the *śarīra*. Then how is it possible to know everything by knowing well one thing (as stated in the *Sruti* text *Ēka vignānēna sarva vignānam*)?⁷⁸² The reply may be thus formulated. The *jīvas* also possess the right to act and are in the fields of *kāraṇa* and *kārya* independent of others.

This being so, then, we have to admit that the world and *jīvas* came into existence by the influence of *Ākāśa*, etc. But it is said that it is not so (*nētyuchyatē*). Because of *dravya* (substance)⁷⁸³ being the same, all others are the transformed travail (*avasthāntarāpattiḥ*) of that one. And the same remark applies to the *jīva* also. But in the *jīva*, there is something more, *viz.*, while *Ākāśa*, etc., are *achētana*, *jīva* is not so, because it is a *chētana* (sentient being). This is the peculiarity (*viśēsha*). Another peculiarity is that the *jīva* has in it invested *gnāna* (knowledge) to a small extent while *Ākāśa*, etc., do not possess it. But *Ākāśa*, etc., have for their part a peculiar transforming characteristic, thereby showing a constant tendency to change from one appearance to another (*svarūpānyathābhāva*). This last peculiarity of liability to constant change is not found in the *jīva*, which is prohibited (*pratishiddhyatē*) to it. So, in conclusion, it follows that having proved the eternity of the *jīva* and explained the difference between Parabrahman and the *jīva*, and the *jīva* being always dependent on the Parabrahman for obtaining all that it is to enjoy through his favour and under his control, the *jīva* can in no circumstances aspire to be on a level with

⁷⁸² *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 1. 6.

⁷⁸³ *Dravyam*: a thing, substance, matter; the ingredient or material of anything. An elementary substance, the substratum of properties, one of the seven categories of the *Vaiśēshikas*.

the Parabrahman in the many characteristics which mark him—*nityatva* (eternality), *niravadyatva* (faultlessness), *sarvagñatva* (all-knowing), *satyasankalpatva* (truthful determination), *kāryakāraṇādhipatva* (lordship of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*), and *viśvapātitva* (lordship of the universe). And therefore Parabrahman is the ordainer of all the states in the *chidachit* world in the entire creation and is responsible for its control. And therefore in the light of all the qualities proved in Parabrahman, the *jīva* can never acquire any such *dharma* unto himself. Even though in his *sūkshma daśā*, Parabrahman lies in him (*jīva*) also in a *sūkshma daśā*; *dvaita* (dualism) is eternal (*dvaitasya nityatvam*). In the *mōksha daśā* (realized state), by virtue of the *Bhramarakīṭanyāya*, the *jīva*, being freed from all kinds of bondage, attains *Sivatva* (*Sivatva prāptih*). *Sruti* texts like *Brahmavēda Brahmaiva bhavati iti*,⁷⁸⁴ etc., clearly declare this truth. Therefore we have to admit that in the state of bondage (*baddha daśāyām*), *jīva* and Brahman are entirely different from each other (*baddha daśāyām jīva Brahmanōr bhēdatvam*) and in the realized state (*mukta daśāyām*) they are one (*muktadaśāyām abhēdatvam*). This is the manner in which *Sruti samanvayam* is brought about. When one's power in himself expands, *Sivatva* is naturally reached in its fully developed state (*Sivasvābhāvika svaśakti vikāsatayā*). Just as *Sruti* texts like *Yathōrṇa nābhissrujatē grihyatēcha iti*, etc., demonstrate that both the act of creation of the universe and the act of withdrawing of it is in one and the same *ūrṇanābhi* (Paramount Lord), the *dvaitādvaita* doctrine follows in the same way. If we are to discuss the principles involved, then it comes to *bhēdatva*, i.e., Parabrahman being the cause (*srishti*) and the material world the *upādāna kāraṇa*. Judging from the material world and its creation (*upādānatva*), *abhēdatva* is established. Both *kāryāvastha* and *kāraṇāvastha* have come to prevail upon *jagat* and *Īśvara* and this establishes the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēdatvam*. Judging from *kāryāvastha*, Parabrahman's own *śakti* is throughout

⁷⁸⁴ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

seen to be in continuity without any break (*svaśaktipari-
ṇāmatvēna abhēdatva*) and hence *abhēdatva* is established ;
but judging from *niyāmakatva* (the controlling power be-
hind the creation), *bhinnatva* is proved (*svaniyāmakatvēna
svabhinnatvam*). Even judging from the standpoint of
kāraṇāvastha, every part of the creation is withdrawn into
himself—which proves *abhēdatva* (*svāntarlīnatvēna abhēda-
tvam*). Just as in the hot season (*grīshma kālē*), the earth
is seen quite free from green grass, etc., being parched up
these existing but in very minute (*sūkshma*) form, everything
having been absorbed in Parabrahman, *svabhinnatvam* is
established by the whole of the *Vēdānta* (that is, it follows
that the material world is separated from the Parabrahman).
Thus *abhinnatva* is, in Srīpati's opinion, the minutest form
of *bhinnatva*. This passes generally as *abhinnatva*. *Sruti*
texts like *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt*,⁷⁸⁵ etc. (*He was the
only one that existed at first in the form of Sat*) declare that
at the time of *Pralaya* in this world, Parabrahman existed in
the form of *chidachidātmaka Parabrahman* (i.e., keeping
everything in himself, He alone existed). Then when crea-
tion came into being, Parabrahman began to manifest every-
thing as quite different from himself and brought into
existence the world and the rest. *Sruti* texts like *Asadvā
idamagra āsīt; Tatō vai sadajāyata iti*,⁷⁸⁶ etc., declare that
the term *asat* in the *Sruti* texts denotes the *chidachidātmaka*
form of Parabrahman and that he existed in a very minute
(*sūkshma*) form and thereafter everything became minutest in
a visible form. Thus the things which were in the manifest
form at first, became, through the cause of Parabrahman,
all visible in their gross (*sthūla*) form. In other words, these
transformations from their minutest forms to big, bulky
forms were due to that Supreme Parabrahman, who caused
these changes from one state to another, i.e., from cause to
effect through his *śabda* and other influences, which did not
exist before (that is, what was in *sūkshma bhinnatva*, i.e.,
aikatva, became in Parabrahman's hands *sthūla bhinnatva*).

⁷⁸⁵ *Chch. Upa.* VI. 2.

⁷⁸⁶ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

Parabrahman in whom *chidamśa* was latent, minutest during *srishṭi* its actual, real state, by way of *vikāra* (transformation), in order to prove the fruit of its own action (*karma phala bhōktravāya*) i.e., the real nature of *chidamśa* (latent in Parabrahman). (What was latent in him looked like *aikya* but not really *aikya*; so in *srishṭi* it comes out in its real form.) This double manner of manifesting himself which is latent in Parabrahman and which is brought into play during *srishṭi* shows his controlling nature. This manifests his two-fold nature, in which *chidachit* are, in *Pralaya*, latent in him. In creation, these are separated and are shown, by reason of *kārya* and *kāraṇa* as separate, each with its different characteristics. These are different in creation (*srishṭi*) owing to their inherent characteristics and are so manifest. These two kinds of manifestations look, in their manner of operation, quite different from each other, so as to seem that they are the result of magic (*Prakāradvayē prakārinicha samānaḥ*).⁷⁸⁷ Therefore an undesirable conclusion is reached (*āpattiḥ*). The *Sruti* text beginning with "*Yēnāśrutam śrutam*"⁷⁸⁸ and ending with *Ēkavignānēna sarva vignānam*, etc. (what has not been heard has now been heard; by understanding one thing thoroughly well, everything will be understood) is illustrated in the example contained in the *Sruti* text *Yathā saumyēkēna mritpiṇḍēna*,⁷⁸⁹ etc. (Oh sweet disciple! look at this rounded ball of earth, etc.) This example seems knowledge in a nutshell, which, when expanded, explains clearly the whole relationship which is made up of coming together and parting (i.e., creation and dissolution). In the same way, you have to understand, by way of application, how the *jīva* is brought into manifestation and how it undergoes dissolution (*jīvasyōtpatti maraṇavādinyah*). Several *Sruti* texts like *Prajāpatiḥ prajā asrujata*, etc., declare clearly how

⁷⁸⁷ *Sūkshmadvaita* is *advaita* reduced to the minutest form. This, briefly put, seems to be Sripati's view.

⁷⁸⁸ *Chch. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, VI. 1. 4.

the *achidamśa svarūpa jīva* comes into existence and goes into dissolution. This forms the subject of discussion between the two sets of argumentators known as *jīva-nityatva-vādin* and *jīva-pratishēdha-vādin*, those who argue that *jīva* is eternal and those who contradict that view. *Smṛiti* texts like *Na jāyatē mriyatē*, etc., and *Sruti* texts such as *Nityō'nityānām chētanaśchētanānām*,⁷⁹⁰ *iti*, etc. declare the two states of the *jīva* in their *svārūpa* in the *sankōcha* and *vikāsa* form in the illustrating example (of *mṛitpinḍa*) shown to the disciple. Also, texts like *Savā ēsha mahānaja ātmā ajarō amarō amritō Brahmā*,⁷⁹¹ *Nityō'nityānām*,⁷⁹² etc., prove distinctly the *Parabrahma vishaya* (i.e., characteristics of Parabrahman). Thus, at all times, it is clearly explained what there is contained in Paraśiva-brahman in his latent form of *chidachid vastuḥ*; while he himself is *Pūrṇaḥ* and while before creation he shows himself, as one all contained in himself, undifferentiated in name, form and division (*prākṣrishtērēkatvā-vadhāraṇam nāmarūpa vibhāgābhāvādūpāpadyatē*). This is how it operates. *Sruti* texts like *Tarhya vyākṛitamāsīt tannāmarūpābhyām vyākriyatē, iti*,⁷⁹³ declare how during *srishti* those latent things in *avyakta* Parabrahman became manifest, and how they have been described in the *Sāstras* by their individual names and forms in their several states of existence at their origin and at their dissolution. There are interpreters who argue that Brahman himself appears in several *jīva* forms owing to the *upādhi* of *avidyā* (*avidyōpādhi*) in him (*Yētvavidyōpādhikam jīvatvam vadanti*); there are those who argue that at all times the *jīva* lies in Brahman absolutely separate from him, but only comes into *srishti* in order to work out his own destiny (*pāramārthikōpādhikṛitam*); and there are those who argue that Brahman, who by himself forms the *bhōktru* (the enjoyer), *bhōgya* (the object of enjoyment) and the controller (*niyantru*). All these

⁷⁹⁰ *Kaṭha Upa.*, V. 13.

⁷⁹¹ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 25.

⁷⁹² *Kaṭha Upa.*, V. 13.

⁷⁹³ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 3.

three sets of disputants maintain *avidyāśakti*, *rūpādiśakti* and *bhōktru-bhōgya-niyantru śakti*, and agree to the conclusion that at the time of *Praḷaya*, Parabrahman alone exists as Self. And all these say that Parabrahman alone exults in bliss without another name, form or division as explained in *Sūtras* like *Vaishamya nairghrīṇyēna sāpēkshatvāt* (II. 1. 34), *Nakarmavibhāgāditi chēnnānāditvāt hyupadyatēchāpyupalabhyatēcha* (II. 1. 35), *iti* etc. These texts declare clearly that the flow of *jīvas* in their different states of existence (*jīvabhēdasya*) in their different series of *karma* (*tat karma pravāhasya*) is of eternal nature (*anāditvāt*) and is seen in the form of a stream continually flowing. They also say that in both the states—*pāramārthika* and *anādyupādhi*—Parabrahman himself undergoes bondage. As *upādhi* is nothing apart from Parabrahman nor anything new from him, Parabrahman alone undergoes all these transformations (*Upādhi Brahma vyatirikta vastvantarābhāvāt aparasya Brahmaiva vichitrākārēṇa parīṇamatē*). He alone enjoys all results, both good and bad. But in that capacity as controller (*niyantru*), he does not enjoy any portion of the results ; yet the unseparateness from Parabrahman as both *enjoyer* and *enjoyed*, he manifests himself as All-alone. As for our part, we hold that Parabrahman, out of his supreme power of expanding and contracting in the forms *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, is always absolutely free from any speck of fault and far from any smell of it. His *satyasankalpatva* (truthful resolution) is exhibited variously and without end and is always seen in the midst of the ocean of his good qualities. He holds in himself *chit* and *achit* things ; but He has no other kinds of forms which are wanting in His goodness. And therefore the demonstrated conclusion is everything is reasonable and virtuous in Him.

Svātmanā chōttarayōḥ (II. 3. 19) (*Sva+ātmanā+cha+uttarayōḥ*). Is *sva* (Parabrahman) or *ātma* the greater ? The answer is in the conclusion reached. In order to reject any *vibhutva* for the *jīva*, this *Sūtra* is propounded. The particle *cha* in this *Sūtra* is intended to restrict the meaning of *ātma*. However, death follows from the

separation of the *jīva* from the *śarīra*. This is called *utkrānti*. Even if the *jīva* as the associate of *sva* stayed in the *śarīra*, he finds no secure home in it. (This *Sūtra* says that the *jīva* cannot reckon on the *śarīra* as its permanent home ; because *jīva* has no *vibhutva* over the *śarīra*.) Therefore *anūtva* (atomicity or minuteness) becomes established (as the chief characteristic) of the *jīva*. [The *Sūtra* means : The meaning of the word *ātma* (*jīva*) used with the term *sva* (Parabrahman) is restricted by the conclusion arrived at later on.] The word *sva* must be understood from its own meaning according to the term used in the *Sūtra*. Because the term *sva* used in *Sūtra* 21 restricts the meaning to *jīva* who occupies in a minute form the *śarīra* merely for enjoyment of the results of his previous *karma* (II. 3. 20). The term *anu* cannot apply to *jīva*, but to Parabrahman, the chief *adhikāri*, who is other than the *jīva* and controls the *jīva* in the *śarīra* (*Na+anuh+atah+śrutēh+iti+chēt+na+itarādhikārāt*) (II. 3. 20). In the next *Sūtra*, *Svaśabdōnmānābhyāmcha* (II. 3. 21), it is stated that the *jīva* also is called *anu* when in the *śarīra*. Thus the *Sruti* text says, *Yēshō anurātmā chētasā vēditavyō yasmin prāṇaḥ panchadhā samvivēśa*,⁷⁹⁴ *iti*, etc. (This *anu* who is also called *ātma* and who is determined by the method of his actions also entered the *śarīra* in the form of the five elements). This *anu* form of the *jīva* was placed in the *śarīra* along with the controlling *adhikāri* (*sva*),⁷⁹⁵ in order to give the *jīva* opportunities of enjoying the fruit of his actions. The text says, *bhāgō jīvassavignēyaḥ* (The lesser one who actually enjoys should be understood to be the *jīva*). The *jīva* is usually known to be of such a minute form as to be known in the world's parlance as the size of a hair at the end of the tail of a horse (*vālāgra mātṛō vyavahārōpi*). Therefore he (*jīva*) is also called *anu* as well as the Supreme *Ātma*, with whom he stays in association in the *śarīra*. Thus under the control of the Supreme *Ātma*, this *anu*

⁷⁹⁴ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 9.

⁷⁹⁵ *Sva*. Literally, one's own, belonging to oneself. Brahman, the Supreme Soul, claiming the *jīvas* as his own.

jīva pervades the whole of the *śarīra* and undergoes experiences such as misery, etc.⁷⁹⁶

In the *Sūtra*, *Svaśabdōnmānābhyāmcha* (II. 3. 21) (*And on account of the very word—Sva—and of the measure of pervasion*), the significance of the term *sva* is explained at some length. The term *sva* is employed to show that Parabrahman is also in the *aṇu* form. The *Sruti* text, *Eshō anurātmā chētasā vēditavyō yasmin prāṇaḥ panchadhā samvivēśa*⁷⁹⁷ declares that this *jīva* in the form of *aṇu* is to be understood by his actions; he entered the *śarīra* as *prāṇa* composed of the five elements. The expression *unmānam* in the *Sūtra* means *Udhrutyamānābhyām*, i.e., the measure of elevation *as between the two*; (*Sva*) resembles *aṇu* in his form; what results from the resemblance and the measure of elevation (afforded) to the *jīva* (by *Sva*) makes it get such elevation applied to itself (the *jīva*).⁷⁹⁸ The *Sruti* text declares *Vālāgra śatabhāgasya śatadhā kalpitasya cha | Bhāgō jīvas savignēya iti*. (The *jīva* is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of hair follicle of a horse's tail divided a hundred times.)⁷⁹⁹ And in *vyavahāra*, the *jīva* occupies such a small minute form in the *śarīra*; yet he throws his refulgence throughout the whole body during life. And therefore it is the *ātma* in the *aṇu* form that exists in the *śarīra* and it is he who calls himself the *jīva*. In this *aṇu* form, whatever experiences he, (the *jīva*), gathers of sorrow, pain, etc., is for himself only and not for the *Sva*. If it is asked whether it is possible for two sets of beings—*jīva* and *sva*—one undergoing pain, sorrow and

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⁷⁹⁸ The *sva* is in the *śarīra* in *aṇu* form and gives his *prabhāva* to the *jīva* and makes him appear as if he was everything. The *bimba-pratibimba* theory is implicit in this comment.

⁷⁹⁹ *Svēta. Upa.*, V. I.

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⁷⁹⁹ *Svēta. Upa.*, V. I.

the like and the other free and exultant in joy, to co-exist, the following *Sūtra* explains it: *Avirōdhaśchandanaavat* (II. 3. 22) (*There is no contradiction as in the case of sandal unguent*).

There is no contradiction; because it is like the sandal plant in the midst of a number of other kinds of trees. Just as the sandal paste smeared over the body in a particular spot spreads its scent throughout the body and produces coolness, etc., similarly the *jīva* and *kshētragna* staying in one place in the body throws its radiance all over the body and experiences sorrow and joy in every part of the *śarīra* generally. Hence, there is no contradiction here. If it is asked in which part of the *śarīra* the *jīva* lies in its *amśa* form (*Kasminnamśēva sthānam*), the next *Sūtra* determines its special place (in the *śarīra*). *Avasthiti vaiśēshyāditi chēnnābhyupagamāddhrudhi* (II. 3. 23) (*If it be said that this is not so on account of specialization of abode, we say no, because of the acknowledgment of a place of the Sva, i.e., in the heart*).

Sruti texts like *Hridayadēśē hyātmanah sthitiḥ*; *Hridihyayam ātmā tattraikaśatam nāḍīnām iti*,⁸⁰⁰ etc.; *Katama ātmā iti*,⁸⁰¹ etc.; *Yō yam vignānamaya prāṇēshu hridyantarjyōtiḥ*,⁸⁰² etc., declare that the *ātma* cannot live in any other place than what is allotted to it especially as its own, viz., the interior of the heart. The example of sandalwood is given only to proclaim the special region allotted to it in the *śarīra*, by which it proclaims itself through its radiant rays—just as the scent does the existence in the midst of other trees of the sandalwood. The example of the sandal is not to show merely its position among the trees; but to indicate how it proclaims

⁸⁰⁰ *Praśna Upa.*, III. 6.

⁸⁰¹ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 3. 7.

⁸⁰² These may be thus translated:—*Ātma* is in the *Hridayapradēśa*—the area of the heart; in the area of the heart, along with a hundred nerves, this *ātma* dwells; the *ātma* is none at all when compared with the Supreme *Sva*; he who is proclaimed as *vignānamaya* dwells in the living body in the interior of the heart in a glowing form.

its existence in the place where it is by its scent. Even though its existence is confined to one particular spot, its rays carry its fame through the *śarīra* and makes itself all-pervasive (all which is due to the influence of *Sva* in the body by the side of the *jīva*). The following *Sūtra* gives a further description of the *jīva*'s existence in the *śarīra*: *Guṇādvā lōkavat* (II. 3. 24)⁸⁰³ (*Or on account of its all-round lustre*).

The expression *vā* in the *Sūtra* excludes all other doctrines than what is declared herein. *Ātma* by its own property (*guṇa*) and knowledge (*gnāna*) stays in its allotted spot with its rays radiating throughout the *śarīra*. And therefore *ālōkavat*. Just as a jewel seen in the rays of the sun puts out the rays of the jewel exhibiting its property, similarly the *jīva*, remaining in the region of the heart, receiving the rays of the Supreme *Sva* (Parabrahman), radiates in his own property as his characteristic, just as a mirror, wherever he moves. In the same way, the wisdom of the *jīva*, through the supreme influence, pervades throughout the *śarīra*. Therefore it is, in conclusion, determined that in that special region, which gives him the opportunity of catching the rays of light by virtue of being under the influence of *Sva* (*svāśrayāt*), the *jīva* is so much capable of as to throw out rays in his own capacity. Verily, if it is doubted whether so long as the *jīva* is dependent for his *gnāna* and *prabha* because of the influence of one who is different from himself (*svarūpa vyatirikta*), then he should be considered as different in his properties also from the Supreme. The next *Sūtra* removes this doubt: *Vyatirēkō gandhavattathācha darśayati* (II. 3. 25)

⁸⁰³ Śrīpati reads this *Sūtra* thus: *Guṇādvā ālōkavat. Ālōkavat*: *Ā* as a prefix to verbs and nouns expresses the senses of near, near to, towards, from all sides or all around. *Ālōka*, as read by Śrīpati, would thus suggest light, or lustre, spreading all around, which is peculiarly appropriate when used with reference to the *jīva* who, under the influence of the *Sva*, is held to pervade the whole *śarīra*.

(There is a distinction as in the case of smell ; and thus Scripture also declares).

Just as we experience from different smells their different qualities and determine the differences between them, in the same way the *jīva* recognizes himself by his *gnāna* that he is pervading throughout the *śarīra* and every part of it from the particle of a hair to the end of the nail and can say that he can feel and experience all over the *śarīra*. The *Sruti* text *Ālōmabhyaḥ ānakhāgrēbhyaḥ Jānātyēvāyam puruṣaḥ iti*, etc., (This man can feel all over and experience his existence) declares that even though he dwells in an atomic (*anu*) form within the region of the heart, yet by virtue of power, he proclaims that he lives in every part of the *śarīra*. *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi*,⁸⁰⁴ *Aham Brahmāsmi*,⁸⁰⁵ *Ayamātmā Brahma*,⁸⁰⁶ *iti*, etc., proclaim as if the *jīva* and Brahman live in the *śarīra* as if they were one (*jīva Brahmanōrēkatvōpadēśāt*).⁸⁰⁷ If it is asked whether they are actually one in their lordliness (*vibhutva*), the next *Sūtra* answers the question: *Pruthag-upadēśāt* (II. 3. 26) (*Their distinctness is taught*).

Sruti texts like *Īśānassarva vidyānām ; Īśvarassarva bhūtānām*,⁸⁰⁸ *Yō dēvānām prathamam purastāt ; Viśvādhikō rudrō maharṣiḥ*,⁸⁰⁹ *Pradhāna kṣhētragnapatirguṇēśaḥ sam-sāra mōksha sthiti bandha hētuh*,⁸¹⁰ *Dvā suparṇau*,⁸¹¹ *iti*, etc., clearly declare that *jīva* and Parabrahman in their respective capacities of the controlled and the controller, and in their peculiar characteristics of *jīvatva* and *Īśatva*, and in their subordinate and independent existences and in the state of experiencing bondage and in the shape of being free from

⁸⁰⁴ *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 8. 7.

⁸⁰⁵ *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

⁸⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, II. 5. 19.

⁸⁰⁷ Some of these texts are quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* when commenting on this identical *Sūtra*, which is according to his text II. 3. 27.

⁸⁰⁸ *Mahōpa.*, XIX.

⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, X. 19.

⁸¹⁰ *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 16.

⁸¹¹ *Ibid.*, IV. 6.

such bondage—in all these the two (*jīva* and Parabrahman) are entirely distinct from each other. While they are thus distinct from each other, *vibhūta* is only due to the independent Parabrahman, who is the controller. This is the conclusion proclaimed by the *Sruti*s. There are, however, seen *Sruti* texts like *Yō vīgnānē tishṭhan*;⁸¹² *Vīgnānam yagnam tanuta, iti*, etc. If it is doubted whether the *jīva* cannot be called *vīgnānātmā*, the next *Sūtra* explains the doubt: *Tadguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadēśaḥ prāṇavat* (II. 3. 27) (*A particle of the essence of Parabrahman's qualities being reflected in the jīva, he is termed as if he were a prāṇa*).

In this *Sūtra*, the *śabda* 'tu' screens the blame of dependency attaching to the *jīva*, because of the good quality reflected by the ray of his (Parabrahman's) grace; because also *vīgnāna* is all his (Parabrahman's) grace bestowed on the *jīva* through his goodness. And therefore the *jīva* is extolled as *vīgnānātmā*, thereby suggesting that the *ātma* derives that name (*vīgnānātmā*) purely through his being associated with Parabrahman. According to *Smṛiti* texts like *Yathā prāṇasyānanda sārabhūtō guṇa iti*, the word *prāṇa* as applied to the *jīva* is simply intended to pass him falsely as *ānanda*, because of the grace of Parabrahman. Accordingly *Sruti* texts like *Yadēśa ākāśa ānandō na syāt*; *Ānandō Brahmēti vyajānāt*⁸¹³ *iti*; *Prāṇasya hyānanda sārabhūtō guṇaḥ*; *Sa ēkō Brahmanā ānandaḥ*; *Ānandam Brahmanō vidvān nabibhēti kutaśchana*⁸¹⁴ *iti*, declare that just as Parabrahman is all *satya*, all *gnāna*, all *ānanda*, so, this *jīva*, who becomes a *gnāni* by his (Parabrahman's) grace, also passes as such but falsely by the application of the terms *prāṇa* and *gnāni* to him as stated in *Sruti* texts like *Saha Brahmanā vipaśchitā*;⁸¹⁵ *Yassarvagnaḥ iti*, etc. In conclusion, the *jīva*,

⁸¹² *Bṛihad. Upa.*, V. 7.

⁸¹³ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 6.

⁸¹⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 4.

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*, II. 1.

who becomes a *prāgna* and a *gnāni* through his *samskāra*, calls himself through his qualities *vignāni*.

The following *Sūtra* assigns further reasons why he is so called: *Yāvadātmabhāvitvāchcha na dōshastaddarśanāt* (II. 3. 28) (*And since the quality of vignāna exists wherever the Self is, there is no contradiction here; thus the Scripture declares*). The *Sruti* text *Yōyam vignānamayaḥ prāṇēshu hridayantarjyōtiḥ purushassamānassannubhau lōkāvanusancharati, iti*, declares that the *jīva* when he attains the stage of *vignānamaya*, gets the opportunity to catch sight of that luminous Supreme Brahman (*prāṇēshu hridayantarjyōtiḥ*) who, living within the *śarīra* as an associate with the *jīva*, enlightens as to both the internal and the external world. In saying this there is no contradiction, because it is only when the *jīva* becomes possessed of *ātmabhāvitva* (the form of Parabrahman in his mind), that he will be in a position to realize the Supreme Brahman (*taddarśanāt*), i.e., only by actual sight. Hundreds of *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyassyandamānāssamudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya* | *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpādivimuktah parātparam purushamupaiti divyam* |⁸¹⁶ *Gatāḥ kalāḥ panchadaśāḥ pratishṭhā dēvāścha sarvē pratidēvatāsu* | *Karmāṇi vignānamayaścha ātmā parē'vyayē sarva ēkībhavanti* |⁸¹⁷ *Ēsha samprasādōsmāt śarīrāt samutthāya paramjyōtirupasampadya svēna rūpēṇābhinishpadyatē* |⁸¹⁸ *iti* | etc., declare that the *jīva*, naturally meditating through the *nivritti mārga*, will subsequently enter the region of *Śiva* (*Sivatattva*); being rid of his carnal body will enter the kingdom of *Śiva* through *Śiva-yōga*, *Śiva-dhyāna* and *Śiva-gnāna* and become a *jīvanmukta* (a *jīva* free from bondage) and enter *Śiva-dhyāna samādhi* in the midst of burning brightness radiating like the lighted camphor, even in his *anu* form and present himself before the Supreme Brahman. And therefore there is no contradiction in the declaration of the *Sruti* texts. This clearly shows that the

⁸¹⁶ *Mund. Upa.*, II. 2. 8.

⁸¹⁷ *Ibid.*, III. 2. 7.

⁸¹⁸ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 14.

jīva through his continuous ardent labour of holy meditation and austerity, has finally, like the one in sleep (*supta puruṣha*) who awoke at once into the illumination of the bright day, through enlightenment obtained by knowledge. In the comparison of the *jīva* in his *aṇu* form along with Parabrahman in his *vibhūtvā*, of course, there is a contradiction as between the *jīva* and Brahman, just as there is as between the river and the ocean. The former in running through his meditation concentrates on the Brahman in the form of a vast ocean ; this contradiction between the two cannot be prevented (*durnivāra*). Moreover, if it is said that Īśvara cannot live in the heart as a separate entity giving light to the *jīva*, and that the *aṇu* form of the *jīva* cannot be accepted, being merely an illusion through *upādhi*, then the argument becomes inconsistent (*asaṅgata*). *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*⁸¹⁹ *iti*, etc., clearly declare that *jīvas* were brought into being through *bhūta sṛisṭi* and remained so until they reached Parabrahman again all throughout in the *aṇu* form. And therefore the *aṇutva* of the *jīva* as its natural form is clearly proved as a fact. It has also been proved as an undoubted fact that the *jīvas* were in the state of *sushupti*, etc., without *gnāna*. And that *gnāna* is not their natural adjunct in their *svārūpa* or their *dharma* in their original state is proved by the *Sūtra*: *Pumstvādivattvasya satōbhivayakti yōgāt* (II. 3. 29) (*Since, as in the case of virile power, etc., there may be manifestation of that which exists*).

The term *tu* in this *Sūtra* is intended to clear the doubt expressed above, *i.e.*, whether the *jīva* is associated with *gnāna* in its original form (*svārūpa*) ; or in its natural state. Even in the *sushupti* state, the *jīva* is not completely free from *agnāna*, because it is only after he becomes awake that he is able to refer back to what took place in *sushupti* as something that occurred while he was asleep. Therefore, *gnāna* is only what he could acquire as a *dharma* subsequently (to his holy practices). *Gnāna* is a *dharma* to be acquired and not one attaching to the *jīva* naturally (*svārūpa dharma*),

⁸¹⁹ *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

just as manliness and other extraordinary powers become manifest only when the child grows into manhood, because they are extraordinary qualities (*asādhārana dharma*), which though they exist in children, yet they are not manifest in them until they become men, when only such qualities become manifest in them and never earlier, nor at all times. The body (*śarīra*) is made up of the *sapta dhātu* (i.e., chyle, blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow and semen), which keep continually developing themselves and are attached to the *svarūpa* in unbroken sequence (*svarūpānubandhi*). "Body" (*śarīra*) means the thing which is made up of the *sapta dhātu*, the three-fold impurities (*trimala*), the two births (*dviyōni*) and the four-fold feeders (*chaturvidha āhāramaya*).⁸²⁰ (*Tatsapta dhatu trimalam dviyōni chaturvidhāhāramayau śarīram.*) This identical meaning was conveyed previously when discussing the *sushupti* state. The experience and the varied knowledge he had acquired, in that *sushupti* state, the *jīva* was able to recall in the wakened (*jāgrata*) state. These qualities, therefore, are the natural *dharma* of the *jīva*, which he can avail himself of always. This point has been already discussed. Therefore, even before he develops the state of *prāgnatva*, the *svarūpa* of the *jīva* was in him. Therefore, this *ātma svarūpa* is not always small in measure (*anuparimāṇa*). And this the *jīva*, even after death, carries with him in a symbolic form, and nothing is new in him even in the *mukta* state. And therefore he cannot be said to have not possessed it at any time. Moreover, according to the *Sruti* text *Ētēbhyōbbhūtēbhyassamuthhāya tānyēvānu vinaśyati iti*, whatever of a destructible kind is possessed by the *jīva*, during the time he is tied to family life, such as birth, death, etc., is not seen by him at the time he becomes a *mukta*. The same is explained in the *Sruti* text *Yathā nadyādi*⁸²¹ etc., which declares that a particle of water goes and joins a mass of water. Water attains to water at the time of *mukti* (*jalē jalavanmuktadaśāyām*).

⁸²⁰ *Annamaya, prāṇamaya, manōmaya, vīgnānamaya.*

⁸²¹ *Mund. Upa., III. 2. 8.*

Similarly, the *jīva* as soon as it becomes morally pure (*śuddha jīvasya*) finds its home (*tat prāptitva darśanāt*) in itself at the time of its realization. *Smṛiti* texts such as *Na paśyō mruthyūṃ paśyati narōgam nōtaduḥkhatām* | *Sarvam raha paśyaḥ paśyati sarvamāpnōti sarvaśaḥ* | *Nōpajanam smarannidam śarīram manasētān kāmān paśyan ramatē* | *iti*, etc. (the *jīva* does not see death, *i.e.*, he has no death; nor suffer illness, nor unhappiness; but he sees everything secretly and finally when he comes out, he sees everything clearly all round; and finally he always recollects and keeps in memory what all he saw and experienced and enjoys all he wants for ever) state that the *anu* form of the *jīva* and the *jīva* in his well-developed and all-knowing state (*svarūpa*) are not different from each other and they are never a contradiction to each other. (That is, there is no contradiction between the *anu* and *prāgna* states of the *jīva*.) If it is hereafter doubted how the *jīva* acquires knowledge of *Brahman*, casting off all his ignorance, etc., the next *Sūtra* clears the doubt: *Nityōpalabdhyānupalabdhiprasaṅgō'nyatara niyamō vānyathā* (II. 3. 30) (*Otherwise there would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or else restrictive limitation to either*).

If it is admitted that the *jīva* is capable of obtaining all-pervading influence, then the question arises whether it refers to his all-knowing character or being present in all places at the same time (*i.e.*, omnipresence). If the first alternative be assumed, then the *jīva* should be conceded to have possessed such knowledge at all times, which is not true. Also the *jīva* in his *anu* state should be conceded to have possessed all the characteristics of Parabrahman. But according to the above conclusion it is not so. Therefore, the *jīva* should at all times attain to knowledge in due course. It means this:—In this world, in order that the *jīva* may realize *Brahmatva*, he has to obtain *gnāna* by meditation and then only he becomes a cause for realizing Parabrahman. If not, realization is not possible. If the *jīva* does not continually work through meditation in order to realize Brahman, then, *mōksha* is not realizable. *Jīva* fails

to realize his intended purpose. For our part, it has been sufficiently proved and declared that within our *śarīra*, in the central region of the heart, the *ātma* remains and prompts the *jīva* to realize (Brahman) by his own exertions. We have already declared, after offering sufficient proofs, that in all cases wherever there is the cause easily workable, in all such circumstances, the *jīva* constantly meditates upon through penance and realizes the *ātma* who remains in him. Else, it is not possible, on account of the various kinds of sins to which he is attached. Therefore, what has been previously proved, holds true. According to the *Sruti* texts *Ayamātmā Brahmā iti*,⁸²² etc., *Brahmatva* is possible of realization only if the *kshētragna* is well understood and that he alone is the chief *kartru* within. Else, it is otherwise. This can be realized only when all the illusory bondage to which he (*jīva*) is attached has been absolutely broken. In order to throw overboard (eschew) the *Advaita* argument developed in the *Jīva-Brahmavāda*, the *Ātmā Adhikaraṇa* i.e., (*Kartradhikaraṇam*) is begun.

Ātmēti tūpagachchanti grāhayanti cha (IV. 1. 3)
(But as the *Ātma*; thus he realizes and apprehends).

In this *Sūtra* the term *ātma* means *jīva*. This *jīva* being a *mumukshu*, constantly meditates upon, by prayer, etc., in order to realize Paraśiva Brahman and thus realizes him. *Mumukshu* means a *bhakta* (i.e., a devotee) of Para-brahman. After knowing the *Vēdānta*, etc., well through the *Dahara*, *Sāṇḍilya* and other *vidyas* (i.e., means of meditation) he finally apprehends⁸²³ the Paramātmā, and thus realizes him and gets near him.⁸²⁴ This is the gist of the *Sūtra* as suggested by itself. The term *tu* in the *Sūtra* denotes certainty. *Sruti* texts like *Yadā paśyaḥ paśyatē rukmavarṇam kartāramīśam puruṣam Brahma-yōnim* | *Tadā vidvān puṇyapāpē vidhūya niranjanam paramam sāmyamupaiti*⁸²⁵ | *Yathā nadyassyandamānāssamudrē*

⁸²² *Bṛihad. Upa.*, II. 5. 19.

⁸²³ *Grāhayanti*=*jānanti*.

⁸²⁴ *Upagachchanti*=*prāpnuvanti*.

⁸²⁵ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya । *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpādvimuktaḥ parātparām puruṣhamupaiti divyam* ॥⁸²⁶ *iti*, declare that those who thus meditate on Brahman as laid down in the *Muṇḍakōpanishad*, apprehend Brahman and finally realize him. In the *Kaivalya Sruti* text beginning with *Hritpuṇḍarīkam virajam viśuddham* and ending with *Umā-sahāyām paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakantham praśāntam* । *Dhyātvā munir gachchati bhūtayōnim samasta sākshim tamasaḥ parastāt*, *iti*, it is said that *Daharōpāsakas* who meditate upon Śiva Parabrahman in order to attain *Śivatattva*, finally realize him in this way (*i.e.*, as laid down in the *Kaivalyōpanishad*). *Upāsana* is of three kinds:—(1) *Ahamgrahōpāsanāni* ; (2) *pratīkōpāsanāni* ; and (3) *angāvabaddhōpāsanāni*. Of these, the first is carried out according to the method prescribed in the *Dahara*, *Śāṇḍilya*, *Vaiśvānara* and *Upakōsala vidyas*. Of these, some hold to the *Sruti* text *Vācham Brahmētyupāsīta* (There is Brahman in the utterance). This denotes that the *chētana* who is the *jīvātma* meditates upon Paramātman in order to realize him. Some others (*i.e.*, some other *vidyas* named above) hold to the doctrine enunciated in *Sūtra* texts like *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt* and *Sruti* texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ*, *iti*,⁸²⁷ etc. Agreeably to these *Śāstras*, the *jīva* is enjoined to meditate upon the Brahman *svābhinnatayā* (*i.e.*, I am not different from Him). This is called *Ahamgrahōpāsanam*. *Sruti* texts like *Kam Brahma*, *Kham Brahma*,⁸²⁸ *iti*, etc., declare that just as we see idols made of copper, earth and stone in the forms of Śiva, Kēśava, etc., so, the *Sruti* texts like *Nāma Brahmētyupāsīta*,⁸²⁹ *iti*, etc., urge that *upāsana* should be in the name of Parabrahman as if he were present in these material objects (*jaḍapadārthas*). This kind of meditation of Parabrahman, keeping in view the form of an idol, is called *Pratīkōpāsanam*. The third kind

⁸²⁶ *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 8.

⁸²⁷ *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

⁸²⁸ *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 15.

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*, III. 18. 1.

of *Brahmōpāsana* is explained in the chanting of the *Udgītha* (*Sāmaveda*) where the sacrificial functions are executed by meditating on Parabrahman, through the performance of ceremonial functions by the meditator as *upāsana*. If it is asked whether the *jīva*, who is the *upāsaka*, is meditating in his *chētana* form thinking that he is himself the *Ātma* and meditates upon Śiva or whether he thinks that he is separate from Śiva and meditates upon Śiva as different from him, the reply is that *Sruti* texts like *Ayamātmā Brahma*,⁸³⁰ *Aham Brahmāsmi*,⁸³¹ *Pragnānam Brahma*,⁸³² *iti*, etc., declare clearly that the *jīva* should settle in the belief that he himself is Brahman and as such meditate upon Brahman through the knowledge of *Dahara* and other *vidyas* thinking that he is himself Śiva (*kēvala Śiva*) as enjoined in the *Srutis* that he should do so. And, therefore, it is inevitable that he (the *jīva*) is meditating on himself as *svātma*, being Brahman himself, the object meditated upon (*Svasya svātmatvēna Brāhmōpāsanamanivāryam*). Though *Sruti* texts such as *Vācham Brahmētyupāsīta*, *Nāma Brāhmētyupāsīta*, *Manō Brahmētyupāsīta*, *Prāṇō Brahmētyupāsīta*, *iti*,⁸³³ etc., declare generally that meditation upon Brahman should be made by uttering the above *Sruti* texts, even though the utterance in the form and speech is inanimate (*achētana*), yet the *Srutis* support the *Brahmōpāsana* of *Ātma* in this manner. But if it is asked whether it is right for *mumukshus* to meditate in this manner without discriminating between the *chētana* and *achētana* character of their methods of meditation according to the *Dahara* and other *vidyas* and whether *Sadāśivōpāsana* should not thus be done, then the answer is that a reference to the *Sruti* text beginning with *Daharam vipāṇam paramēśmabhūtam* and ending with *Tasmin yadanta-stadupāsītavyam*,⁸³⁴ supports the meditation upon Paramātman with *Dahara vidya*. And if it is asked what is that

⁸³⁰ *Bṛihad Upa.*, II. 5. 19.⁸³¹ *Ibid.*, I. 4. 10.⁸³² *Aitarēya Upa.*, V. 3.⁸³³ *Chch. Upa.*, III. 18. 1.⁸³⁴ *Kaivalya Upa.*

knowledge, the answer is furnished to us in the *Sruti* text *Yō vēdādaṁ svarāḥ prōktō vēdāntē cha pratisht̥hitāḥ* । *Tasya prakriti līnasya yaḥ parāḥ sa mahēśvaraḥ*,⁸³⁵ which supports *Śivatattvōpāsana* in this way and enjoins that all *mumukshus* should follow this method without waiting to discriminate between *chētana* and *achētana*, often discussed (herein) in several places. It is also stated in *Kaivalya Sruti* texts like those beginning with *Hrit-puṇḍarīkam virajam viśuddham* and ending in *Umāsahāyām paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakanṭham praśantam*, etc., which describe that the *līlāmangala vighraha Śiva Parabrahman*, who is the embodiment of *chit-prakriti*, should be meditated upon in the interior of their hearts by the *mumukshus*. *Sruti* texts like *Ākāśa śarīram Brahma, Satyātma prāṇārāmam mana ānandam, Śānti samruddhamamrutam*,⁸³⁶ *iti* and *Prāchīna yōgyōpāsya, iti*, etc., all prove that meditation should be done in the same way as above. And therefore it is concluded as a matter of certainty that meditation should be undertaken by *mumukshus* on Paraśiva Brahman without exerting to discriminate between *chētana* and *achētana* character. *Sruti* texts like *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma, Sarvō vai Rudraḥ*,⁸³⁷ *Ritam satyam param Brahma puruṣam kṛṣṇa pīngalam, Ūrdhvarētam virūpākṣam viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ, iti*,⁸³⁸ etc., declare that Śiva Parabrahman is *Sarvātmaka* (omnipresent). *Sruti* texts like *Yā ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmanō antarō'yam ātmānavēda yasya ātmā śarīram ya ātmānamantarō yamayati sa ta ātmā antaryāmyamruta iti*,⁸³⁹ etc., and *Yō Rudrō agnau yō apsu ya ōṣadhīshu yō Rudrō viśvā bhuvanāvivēśa tasmai Rudrāya namō astu iti*, etc., declare omnipresence for *sarvāntaryāmi chētanāchētana Parabrahman* without contradiction.

Moreover, *Sūtra* texts like *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt, Bhēdavyapadēśāchchānyah*, and *Sruti* texts such as *Yēśhāmīśō paśupatiḥ paśūnām viśvādhikō Rudrō*

⁸³⁵ *Mahōpa.*, X. 24.⁸³⁷ *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10.⁸³⁹ *Bṛihad Upa.*, V. 7.⁸³⁶ *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.⁸³⁸ *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

maharshih,⁸⁴⁰ *Īśānassarva vidyānām īśvarassarva bhūtānām*,⁸⁴¹ *Ksharam pradhānam amrutāksharam haraḥ ksharātmanā viśatē dēva ēkaḥ*,⁸⁴² *Tasyābhidyānāt yōjanāt tatvabhāvādbhūyaśchāntē viśvamāyā nivruttiḥ*⁸⁴³ *iti*, etc., declare that Parabrahman is visible to the naked eye of the *mumukshu*. They also declare that Śiva famous as Parabrahman (*Śivākhyā Parabrahma*) is greater than the *jīva* (*Śivākhyam Parabrahma jīvādadhikamēva*). Notwithstanding this, if we examine *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi*,⁸⁴⁴ etc., which postulate the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine and discriminate between the meditator and the meditated object as *upāsaka* and *upāsya*, we find that they declare in the final (*charamāvasthā*) state *abhēda*. According to the *Mahāvākya Sruti* texts like *Aham Brahmāsmi*,⁸⁴⁵ etc., it is declared in incontrovertible fashion that meditation on Śiva should be done by uttering *Śivōham*. Further, *Sruti* texts like *Atmānamaraṇim kṛitvā praṇavanchōttarāraṇim, Dhyāna nirmathanābhyaśāt pāśam dahati paṇḍitaḥ iti*,⁸⁴⁶ etc., declare that *mōksha* is realized by constant meditation on the *vilakshana Śivatattva* form, freed from all touches of worldly feelings and attaining unsurpassed *Paramānanda* (*Niratiśaya paramānanda chidachitprapancha vilakshana śivatattva prāptirēva mōkshaḥ*).

In the extant teachings of the *Vēdānta* doctrine, it is declared that release from the animality of the *jīva* from bondage can never be obtained without this form of meditation. Without this (*i.e.*, meditation), it is impossible to realize *Śivatattva yōga*. Therefore meditation without any kind of break should be constantly employed during *Śivōpāsana*. As declared in *Sruti* texts like the one

⁸⁴⁰ *Mahōpa.*, X. 19.

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴² *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 10.

⁸⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁴ *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.

⁸⁴⁵ *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

⁸⁴⁶ *Kaivalya Upa.*

beginning with *Dhyāyītēśānam pradhyāyitavyam*,⁸⁴⁷ and ending with *Sambhurākāśa madhyē Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivam-karaḥ sarvamanayat parityajya* |⁸⁴⁸ *iti*, etc., a *mumukshu* is forbidden to meditate upon any other form but that of Śiva. Either in the animate form of *śarīra* or in the inanimate form of *prapancha*, the chief source of earning *mōksha* and realizing *Sivatattva* (the state or condition of Śiva) is the constant meditation on Śiva and none else. *Sūtras* like *Tadananyatvam ārambhāṇa śabdādibhyaḥ*, *iti*, etc., declare that the form of the world (*prapancha*) belongs to Śiva as a sort of *Sivatattva* (state or condition of Śiva) and as such the world is said to be the body of Śiva (*Sivātmakatvam nirdiṣṭam*). Here some hold, agreeably to the *Sruti* text *Prapanchōpaśanam śāntam Sivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē*, *Sa ātmā sa vignēyaḥ*,⁸⁴⁹ *iti*, etc., and hundreds of other texts, that the term *ātma* is used to denote Parabrahma - Śiva. And therefore the term *Ātma* denotes Śiva only and he is the only one who should be meditated upon by *mumukshus* through the *Dahara*, *Sāṇḍilya*, etc., *Brahma vidyas* and worshipped. This is how those famous Rishis like Upamanyu, Dadhīchi, Gautama, etc., meditated upon and worshipped Śiva Paramātmā in the forms of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *kīrtana*, *smaraṇa*, etc., and how they understood Śiva Parabrahman. The word *grāhayanti* was taken by them to mean *jānāti*, *sākshātkurvanti*. That is how they understood and how they got perception of Śiva. And the term *upagachchanti* was admitted by them to mean *prāpnuvanti*, i.e., finally reached Śiva. Thus they say.

The indeclinable *cha* indicates *samuchchayārtha*, while the term *tu* denotes the prohibition of other kinds of meditation than that of Śiva. And even this is rightly said by them. Thus ends the *Ātmādhikaraṇam*.

Ātmā prakaraṇāt (IV. 4. 3) (*The Ātma on account of the subject matter*). This *Sūtra* concludes the first

⁸⁴⁷ *Atharvasīras.*

⁸⁴⁸ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

⁸⁴⁹ *Atharvasīras.*

Adhikaraṇa—*Sampadyāvīrbhūtādhikaraṇa*⁸⁵⁰—of the fourth *pāda* of the fourth *Adhyāya*.

The effect of *dahara*, etc., *upāsana* is to attain a *śarīra* which is actually that of the form of *Sadāśiva* (*Śarīra sāksāt Sadāśivarūpō bhavati*). How? *Śabdāt*, i.e., by the utterance, *Aham Brahmāsmi* (IV. 1. 1). He realizes thus his real *svarūpa*; as water joins with water and fire unites with fire, in the same way, the *jīva* joins with *Sivasvarūpa* (*Sivasvarūpēṇa svarūpaikya kathanāt*, IV. 1. 2). Thus the *jīva* attains to *Sivalōka* through the *Prabhākaramaṇḍala* and joins the *Sivatattva* region. If it is doubted whether the *jīva* entering the *Sivalōka* (*Sivalōka prāptirēva*) was one with the body of *Paraśiva* Brahman himself, the next *Sūtra* answers the doubt—*Ātmā prakaraṇāt*. In this *Sūtra*, the term *ātma* means *Paramātma* and is used in the sense of *jyōti* (light regarded as the Supreme Spirit). It does not mean the region of the Sun (*āditya maṇḍala*). Why? Because it is a topic by itself (*prakaraṇāt*). *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā vijarō vimrutyurviśōkō vijighatsō pīpāsassatyakūmassatyasankalpah*,⁸⁵¹ *iti*, etc., declare that *ātmā* treats of the topic of *Prajāpati* Brahman and this is purely one which speaks of *Paramātman*, as explained in the *Sūtra*, *Uttarāśchēdāvīrbhūta svarūpastu iti*. If the *jīva* which has neither beginning nor end (*anādi*) is not at this stage freed from all worldly bondage, then how else could it attain such a condition? *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*,⁸⁵² etc., declare that the *jīva* and *Īśvara* are eternally little-knowing and all-knowing respectively, characteristics which are opposite in character and always co-existing. But as the effect of concentrated meditation (*Brahmavidyā mahimnā*), the *jīva* becomes quite free from the *mala-traya* bondage and in that liberated condition becomes a pure *jīva* and joins that *Paranjyōti* form in his next state, just as a river joins the ocean and is transferred

⁸⁵⁰ The *Adhikaraṇa* which deals with that which is brought about, accomplished, effectuated or manifested.

⁸⁵¹ *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 1.

⁸⁵² *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

into the ocean, as declared in hundreds of *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyassyandamānāssamudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya, Tathā vidvān nāmarūpādvimuktaḥ parāṭparam puruṣhamupaiti divyam*,⁸⁵³ *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati, Tattvamasi*,⁸⁵⁴ *Aham Brahmāsmi*,⁸⁵⁵ *Brahmavidāp-nōti param, Gnātvā Śivam śāntamatyantamēti*,⁸⁵⁶ *iti*, etc., which enunciate the truth that the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are clearly explained to be of a *bhēda* and *abhēda* character. Thus ends the *Sampadyāvīrbhūtādhikaraṇam*.

The Attainment of Mukti.

What is 'mukti'? How is it attained? Is there any continuance of 'bhēda' after attaining mukti? These are questions which are again and again referred to by Śrīpati. Commenting on IV. 3. 9, *Sāmīpyāttu tadvyapadēśaḥ* (*Parabrahma sāmīpya is mukti*), he gives an outline of his views. After remarking that the *śabda* 'tu' here clears the doubt, he states that *Sruti* texts like *Yō dēvānām prabhavaśchōdbhavaścha viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ*,⁸⁵⁷ *Hiranyagarbham janayāmāsa pūrvam sanōbudhyā śubhayā samyunaktu*, etc., declare that the *jīva* came into origin through Parabrahma Śiva by the agency of *Hiranyagarbha* and that in meditating on him alone lies his union with him. Then again the *Sruti* texts, *Tamīsānam varadam dēvamīdyaṁ*⁸⁵⁸ *nichāyyainām śāntimatyantamēti, Yō dēvānām prathamaśchōdbhavaścha viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ, Hiranyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam sanō budhyā śubhayā samyunaktu*, etc., declare that the *jīva* through constant meditation gets within sight of *Hiranyagarbha*⁸⁵⁹ through whom he is brought to the presence of Parabrahman and within sight of him. He,

⁸⁵³ *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1.

⁸⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, III. 1. 3.

⁸⁵⁵ *Brihad. Upa.*, 1. 4. 10.

⁸⁵⁶ *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

⁸⁵⁷ *Mahōpa.*, X. 19.

⁸⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁹ Cf. Ānandatīrtha. *Hiranyagarbhaḥ, khaṇḍaprōktaḥ īśaḥ Sankara ēvacha srishtyādinā vartayati* || *Skānda*. In the beginning, Parabrahman assumes the *vyakta* (*sat*) form in *Hiranyagarbha* and begins the work of creation, etc.